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ART THEFT, ART VANDALISM, AND GUARDIANSHIP IN U.S. ART 
INSTITUTIONS 
Katharine L. Salomon 
August 7, 2018 
 Art crime scholars and art world professionals constantly grapple with 
determining the most effective methods by which to reduce and prevent victimization by 
art thieves and art vandals. Despite the numerous accounts of this form of criminality, 
there is a dearth of empirical studies focused on the security and care of art collections. 
Using Routine Activities Theory to guide the research, the present study explores the 
relationship between social and physical guardianship practices and the prevalence of art 
theft and art vandalism using questionnaire data collected from 111 American art 
museums and art galleries. The results indicate an overwhelming lack of statistically 
significant association between the majority of the guardianship measures and art theft 
and art vandalism victimization, a pattern consistent with the possibility that social and 
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Statement of the Problem 
On November 20, 2015, three armed, masked men entered Italy’s Castelvechcio 
Museum in Verona, shortly after it had closed. The bandits tied up and gagged both a 
cashier and the museum’s remaining security guard. The thieves quickly helped 
themselves to seventeen rare paintings worth approximately 15 million euros and escaped 
in the security guard’s vehicle using the keys stolen from him. The Italian authorities 
speculated that the theft had been ordered by an unsavory private collector. On March 16, 
2016, thirteen suspects were arrested in connection with the heist. Interestingly, 
investigators discovered the entire caper was a possible inside job because one of the 
museum’s security guards’ sisters was in a relationship with one of the suspects. The 
guard was also arrested in conjunction with the crime. 
(http://www.artfixdaily.com/news_feed/2016/03/16/4996-arrests-made-in-16-million-art-
heist-from-verona-museum, electronically retrieved April 21, 2016). Luckily on May 6, 
2016, Ukrainian border guards discovered the seventeen valuable Old Master paintings 
wrapped in black plastic bags which were buried under a pile of leaves on a small island 






ster_paintings_stolen_from_verona, electronically retrieved May 12, 2016). Art thefts are 
only one form of crime that wreak havoc to cultural institutions’ collections, staff, and 
their visitors’ ability to appreciate irreplaceable relics of humanity.  
Art vandalism, also known as iconoclasm, is a more general term for the 
intentional destruction of art (Cordes & Turcan, 1993; Williams, 2009). Destructive acts 
targeted at works of art can be just as debilitating to a museum or gallery as the theft of 
art. On October 5, 2007, four masked men armed with axes and crowbars loudly entered 
Andres Serrano’s exhibit of sexually explicit photographs, “The History of Sex”, which 
was on display at an art gallery in Lund, Sweden. The men ran through the gallery 
smashing and hacking the works to the sound of death-metal music while verbally 
expressing their disgust with the imagery of the photographs. Seven 50 by 60 inch works 
worth a total of $200,000 were damaged. The vandals proudly advertised their video of 
the attack on YouTube and the vandals threatened, via the internet, to return in order to 
attack the show again. Needless to say, security at the gallery was intensified to deflect 
another criminal perpetration 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/09/arts/design/09serr.html, electronically retrieved 
October 30, 2009).  
For hundreds of years, museums and art galleries have been society’s guardians of 
humanity’s greatest treasures for present and future generations. In addition to storing, 
researching, and displaying objects, these institutions have the responsibility to safeguard 
these valuable, works of art; a role otherwise known as guardianship. Guardianship is a 
major responsibility, though institutions do not always succeed in its implementation and 





“refers to the ability of persons or objects to successfully prevent crime” (p. 517). 
Protection of collections and persons in museums and galleries has evolved from a simple 
extra duty to a regulated, standard industry practice.  The Code of Ethics put forward by 
the American Alliance of Museums (AAM), for instance, states that any museum is 
obligated to ensure the collections “in its custody are lawfully held, protected, secure, 
unencumbered, cared for and preserved” (http://www.aam-us.org/resources/ethics-
standards-and-best-practices/code-of-ethics). Likewise, the International Council of 
Museums’ (ICOM) Code of Ethics also requires that museums “should ensure 
appropriate security to protect collections against theft or damage in displays, exhibitions, 
working or storage areas and while in transit.” 
(http://www.icomoesterreich.at/shop/data/container/ICOM%20Code 
%20of%20Ethics.pdf). Yet, despite the fact so many resources and so much expertise 
have been devoted to collections guardianship, theft and vandalism remains a seemingly 
unstoppable problem. The strict guidelines and the increasingly sophisticated security 
systems and practices most museums and galleries have implemented still do not protect 
art museums and galleries in the United States from victimization by art thieves and art 
vandals, which is the focus of this dissertation. Specifically, this dissertation seeks to 
explore the relationship between cultural institutional guardianship practices and the 
prevalence of instances of art theft and art vandalism in American art museums and art 
galleries, as well as analyze which guardianship measures can reduce the odds of art theft 
and art vandalism victimization. 
As a category of criminality, art crime can assume various forms. According to 





works of art and includes a spectrum of phenomena as diverse as art thefts and 
confiscations, faked and forged art, vandalism and illicit excavation and export of 
antiquities and other archaeological materials” (p. 115). Though often under-publicized, 
art crimes annually result in significant losses of both financial assets as well as 
irreplaceable cultural patrimony worldwide.
1
 According to Newsweek and other popular 
news publications, the international art crime industry generates six to eight billion 
dollars in total material losses each year, and exponentially more in intangible losses to 
communities, nations, and cultures (http://www.newsweek.com/outgunned-search-stolen-
art-258531, electronically retrieved June 14, 2014). Despite the fact the global economic 
consequences of art crimes are significant, quantitative investigations of the topic are 
surprisingly limited both in the U.S. and abroad.  
Numerous case studies and historical accounts comprise the body of literature on 
art theft (Bazley, 2010; Burnham, 1975; Chappell & Hufnagel, 2014; Charney, 2009; 
Charney, Denton, & Kleeberg, 2012; Charney, 2016; Clarke & Szydlo, 2017; Conklin, 
1994; Conley, 1995; Dolnick, 2005; Durney, 2010, 2013; Grove & Thomas, 2014; 
Jackson, 2016a; Kila & Balcells, 2015; MacKenzie, 2005; Nairne, 2011; Nicita & 
Rizzolli, 2009; Pasas & Proulx, 2011; Purkey, 2010; Slattery, 2012; Tompkins, 2016; 
Webb, 2008; Wittman & Shiffman, 2010), art vandalism (Bazley, 2010; Boldrick, 
Brubaker, & Clay, 2013; Brisman, 2011; Conklin, 1994; Dornberg, 1982; Fine & Shatin, 
1985; Freedberg, 1985, 1989; Fuller, 1987; Gamboni, 2007; Grove & Thomas, 2014; 
Held, 1963; Jackson, 2016a; Kila & Balcells, 2015; Koldrud & Prusac; 2014; Phillips, 
1925; Phillips, 1973; Scott 2010b; Teunissen & Hinz, 1974; Tompkins, 2016; Williams, 
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2009), and art museum/art gallery security (Bazley, 2010; Benny, 2013; Burke & Liston, 
1993; Charney, 2009; Clarke & Szydlo, 2017; Conklin, 1994; Grove & Thomas, 2014; 
Keck, 1966; Layne, 2014; Mason, 1978; Noblecourt, 1964; Tompkins, 2016). However, 
scant qualitative research has been devoted to art theft (Aarons, 2001; Adams, 1974; 
Agama, 2016; Barelli, 1986; Benson, 2013; Ho, 1992; Kerr; 2015; Wylly, 2014), art 
vandalism (McNamara, 2013; Scott, 2009), and security practices within cultural 
institutions (Benson, 2013; Kerr, 2015, McNamara, 2013, Scott, 2009) exists. An even 
greater deficit of studies encompasses the repository of quantitative scholarly 
contributions of art theft (Benson, 2013; Burnham, 1978; Burmon, 2017; Durney, 2011; 
Ho; 1992), art vandalism (Bessette, 2016; Scott, 2009, 2010a), and art museum/art 
gallery security (Benson, 2013; Burmon, 2017; Cordes & Turcan; 1993; Dobovšek, 
Charney, & Škrbec, 2010; Normaker, Norlander, & Archer, 2000; Scott, 2009, 2010a; 
Wilemse and Etman, 1995). Furthermore, Burmon (2017) is the only scholar thus far to 
utilize theoretically informed quantitative methodology within her study of patterns of art 
theft in the U.S. and the recovery of stolen art. Burmon (2017) notes that a considerable 
number of her measures, “involve substantial reliance on the theoretical framework of 
situational crime prevention and routine activities theory” (p. 79).  For example, Burmon 
(2017) applies two of RAT’s theoretical constructs to her variables measuring target 
suitability and guardianship.  
However, Burmon’s (2017) study only incorporates univariate analysis and 
bivariate correlations among her variables within her scholarly investigation. Thus far, no 
scholar has tested Routine Activities Theory or any other theory as within a multivariate 





In terms of combing the study of either art theft or art vandalism with security 
practices related to each particular form of victimization, only six academicians are 
recognized within the art crime literature. Kerr (2015) examined the securitization and 
policing of art theft in London, England, Scott (2009, 2010a) investigated art vandalism 
and museum security in the United Kingdom, Ho (1992) incorporated security measures 
within her exploratory study on art theft in New York City, Benson (2013) examined 
security measures within her study on cultural heritage crime  in Gauteng, South Africa, 
McNamara (2013) researched museum security protocols and practices as they relate to 
vandalism as a portion of her thesis on art vandalism, and as mentioned above, Bowman 
(2017) utilized variables measuring security in her study. To date, Wilemse and Etman’s 
(1995) Dutch study is the only work which analyzes both art theft and art vandalism in 
conjunction with museum security.  This research is limited in the sense it did not 
quantitatively investigate any theoretical construct explaining art crime. Therefore, this 
dissertation seeks to not only examine the relationship between art theft, art vandalism, 
and cultural institutional security procedures, but also to explore theoretically derived 
quantitative models relating to guardianship practices, art theft, and art vandalism.  
 
Art Theft and Art Vandalism 
The American public heartily embraced the entertaining topic of art theft when 
Pierce Brosnan burst onto the silver screen in the 1999 remake of The Thomas Crown 
Affair (the original featuring Steve McQueen and Faye Dunaway, released in 1968). The 
suave, debonair gentleman embodied by the lead character of Thomas Crown is hardly a 





typical of the world of art crime. According to former Art Loss Register’s in-house 
counsel, Chris Marinello, most art thieves are actually “common thugs who have no real 
knowledge of art other than they knew something was valuable” (quoted in Aminedoleh, 
2011, p.3).  
 For instance, The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested three thieves in 
New York City with Italian Mafia ties who knew so little about the five stolen artworks, 
that when the federal agents eventually caught them fencing the piece(s), they were 
revealed to have actually been clever forgeries (http://nypost.com/2000/09/30/fake-art-is-
an-offer-you-cant-refuse/, electronically retrieved April 5, 2015), (Thomas, 2002). 
Former FBI Special Agent Robert K. Whitman describes in his memoir, Priceless: How I 
Went Undercover to Rescue the World’s Stolen Treasures, that the art thieves he 
encountered did not share any particular characteristics other than they were all motivated 
to steal art by their greed for money. Conklin (1994) posits eight additional motives 
behind art theft: “for personal possession, on commission for collectors, for sale to 
dishonest dealers, for consignment to auction houses, on speculation, for investment, for 
ransom for personal gain, and for political purposes” (p. 130). Each of these motives will 
be discussed in greater detail in chapter two.  
Art vandals, on the other hand, are not driven to perpetration for material rewards 
but by different impetuses.  The media, museum officials, and the public tend to 
promulgate the notion that art vandals are mentally unstable or insane due to the crime’s 
seemingly senseless, irrational acts (Bazley, 2010; Bessette, 2016; Conklin, 1994; Fine 
and Shatin, 1985; Scott, 2009, 2010b). For example, in 1987, ex-soldier Robert 





shotgun and shot Leonardo DaVinci’s drawing, The Virgin and Child with St. Anne and 
St. John the Baptist (1499-1500). Cambridge’s bullet shattered the protective glass and 
made a six-inch hole in the work. Eventually the $35 million work was restored and 
placed back on exhibit. Cambridge “told the police his intent had been to show his 
disgust with ''political, social and economic conditions in Britain.''” 
(http://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/08/arts/restoring-a-leonardo-drawing-that-was-hit-by-
a-shotgun-blast.html, electronically retrieved April 24, 2016). However, despite 
Cambridge’s explicit, concrete explanation for his destructive acts, the authorities did not 
accept his motive as rational and he was committed to a psychiatric hospital (Conklin, 
1994).   
Further explanations for acts of destruction of art include envy (Cordes &Turcan, 
1993; Fuller, 1987), protest against sexual imagery (Bazley, 2010), and destruction for 
destruction’s sake (Scott, 2009). Scott (2010b) holds mental disturbance and destruction 
for destruction’s sake are unacceptable explanations for an art vandals’ behavior. Rather, 
there are four underlying motivations for art vandalism: “political agitation, ego-centric 
publicity-seeking, religious convictions, and the belief that an exhibit does not constitute 
“art”” (Scott, 2010b, p. 22).  Scott (2010b) also astutely surmises, “By affording the 
question of motive greater consideration, a better understanding of the phenomenon and 
its context would be achieved, and this would truly empower the museum sector” (p. 36). 
In sum, if museums would consider the underlying reasons that art thieves and art 
vandals perpetuate their crimes, then security practices and procedures could be designed 







In order for art theft and vandalism to be prevented, there must be adequate 
security measures in place in museums and galleries. The American Alliance of 
Museums (AAM) provides on its website a detailed “Suggested Practices for Museum 
Collections Space Security” document for museums accredited by the AAM to utilize. 
These suggested practices “are necessary to protect from loss or damage of the museums’ 
collections and loaned collections that are in the museums’ collections”.  
(https://www.aam-us.org/docs/professional-resources/suggested-practices-for-museum-
collections-space-security.pdf?Status=Master&sfvrsn=2). The Smithsonian Institute 
boasts one of the best security departments in the in the world. It possesses an innovative 
security service and its security guards are “well trained, armed and have law 
enforcement authority” (Benny, 2013, p. 7). The Metropolitan museum of Art (The Met) 
also has an impressive security department. John Barelli, the chief of security at the Met, 
relates his department’s strengths in Museum, Behind the Scenes at the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art. He proudly reports 600 employees in his security department who are led 
with strict discipline. The Met utilizes a sophisticated communications center, a 
plainclothes detail, and armed officers at the front door. Barelli proclaims “when people 
come into this Museum, they see my security staff, and they know we mean business; 
they know if they do anything here, we are going to react, and they’re going to be taken 
care of”. (Danzinger, 2009, p.7).  
However, at times, our cultural institutions cannot or will not provide appropriate 
levels of security and their alleged negligence has resulted in unnecessary scrutiny by a 





Kunsthal Rotterdam museum for making it too easy for him and his band of thieves to 
steal seven famous paintings worth over $24 million on October 16, 2012 in three 
minutes. Dogaru contended the museum’s sloppy security was the real crime in the heist, 
given there were no alarms on the paintings and the emergency back door was unlocked. 
According to the New York Times Magazine (2013), the valuable works were displayed 
close to an exit on the first floor of the museum and the wires holding the objects to the 
wall were weak. The museum did not employ night guards and the CCTV was not 
programmed to cover the area of the museum where the thieves broke in. An alarm 
eventually activated, but not until after the men had entered the institution. A curator, not 
affiliated with the museum, humorously noted, “It struck me as shoplifting, rather than 
robbing a museum””(Caesar, 2013, 29). Paradoxically, after the theft, Kunsthal 
museum’s chairman of the board claimed that “adequate security measures had been 
taken” (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/17/world/europe/Picasso-and-Monets-Are-
Stolen-From-Dutch-Museum.html, electronically retrieved August 14, 2014). However, it 
appears Dogaru never followed through with his litigious allegations and in February of 
2014 he was sentenced to serve six years and eight months in jail 
(http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2513970/Romanian-29-Picasso-Monet-Gaugin-
art-theft-Dutch-museum.html, electronically retrieved May 23, 2016).  
Additionally, in 1996, the St. Louis Museum of Art sued the Whitney Museum of 
American Art (the Whitney) and its security service over a painting that was damaged 
while on loan to the Whitney On August 7, 1993, one of the Whitney’s temporary 
security guards, Reginald Walker, drew a heart inscribed with “Reggie + Crystal 1/26/91” 





valued at $1.5 to $2 million. 
(http://search.proqust.com/docview/430632180?accountid=14665, electronically 
retrieved July 14, 2015).  
Lastly, on March 12, 2007, a Russian judge reprimanded the State Hermitage 
Museum in Moscow, Russia for its security lapses and ordered the museum to increase 
security after one of its curators was able to slowly remove approximately 221 objects 
worth a total of $5 million from the museum over a six-year period. Apparently, the 
curator’s husband sold the stolen works to pawn shops in order to pay for his wife’s 
diabetes insulin. He was sentenced to serve five years in prison 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/16/arts/16herm.html?_r=0, electronically retrieved on 
July 24, 2014) 
These cases pose the question: Are some art museums and art galleries more 
prone to art crime than other art museums and art galleries? Moreover, how accurately do 
museum and gallery personnel access their overall security measures? What levels of 
guardianship are reasonable to expect from our esteemed cultural repositories? Stevan 
Layne astutely points out in Art and Crime that museums spend millions of dollars 
building their collections and similar amounts building their structures to house these 
collections. Yet, they only devote a small portion of their budget to protecting their works 
and their security departments (Layne, 2009). In conclusion, the budgetary constraints of 
security departments affect decisions as to which guardianship practices and policies will 
most effectively decrease a museum and gallery’s chances of art theft and art vandalism 
victimization.  It would be helpful to anchor the need for security within a theoretical 






Theoretical Framework – Guardianship 
Just over twenty years ago, Conklin (1994) proposed Cohen & Felson’s (1979) 
Routine Activities Theory as a theoretical framework for the study of art crime including 
art theft and vandalism. Cohen & Felson’s (1979) underlying assumption is that in order 
for crime to occur, three perpetually recurring factors must converge in time and space 
(a) motivated offenders, (b) a suitable target, and (c) the absence of a capable guardian or 
guardians. Conklin (1994) similarly asserts in order for an art crime to be committed, 
there must be a motivated offender (an art thief), a suitable target (the art work), and an 
absence of a capable guardian (lack of adequate security). 
 
Factors Which Motivate Offenders 
Cohen and Felson’s (1979) defined a motivated offender as a person who has both 
the criminal propensity and ability to commit a predatory act. Conklin (1994) applied the 
scholar’s definition of a motivated offender when referencing art criminals as motivated 
offenders. 
Accordingly, in addition to the motivations listed in the previous section, the 
nature of the dynamics of the art world present potential thieves with the ease of 
successful crime commission due to the fact art thieves and art vandals elude arrest, a 
lack of reporting from victims, and low prosecution rates if apprehended.  (Bazley, 2010; 
Conklin, 1994; Scott 2009, 2010a, 2010b). Art thieves often elude arrest or discovery. 
According to Charley Hill, former detective inspector with Scotland Yard’s Art and 





toward recovering stolen art as more serious crimes, such as terrorism, murder, and rape 
take precedence over finding a painting (Webb, 2008, p. 26). In fact, it has been 
estimated only ten percent of all art-theft cases worldwide result in the successful 
recovery of works of art (Charney, 2009; Conklin, 1994), and Bonnie Magness-Gardiner, 
the program manager for the FBI’s art crime team and the administrator of the FBI’s 
National Stolen Art File program, claims the more accurate figure narrows to just 6% (B. 
Magness-Gardiner, personal communication, August 22, 2014).  
Conversely, many art vandals want to generate publicity for their criminal actions. 
Cordes and Turcan (1993) report art vandals who commit major acts of vandalism such 
as slashing, stabbing, or attacking a work of art with violence yearn to be exposed. For 
example, on February 28, 1974, prior to spray painting “KILL LIES ALL” on Pablo 
Picasso’s famous painting, Guernica (1937), Tony Shafrazi called the press prior to 
entering the Museum of Modern Art where the painting was currently on exhibit. After 
Shafrazi finished his act of destruction, a security guard grabbed Shafrazi and Shafrazi 
shouted, "Call the curator. I am an artist” 
(http://www.artnet.com/magazineus/features/zeitz/tony-shafrazi9-10-09.asp, 
electronically retrieved April 25, 2016; 
http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20087449,00.html, electronically 
retrieved April 26, 2016).  Shafrazi was only sentenced to five years’ probation and later 
became a successful art dealer (Gamboni, 2007). According to research, however, minor 
acts of vandalism such as scratching, scribbling, or even placing chewing gum on a work 
of art are more common and these offenders want to avoid detection (Cordes & Turcan; 





Since law enforcement agencies typically do not investigate art crime cases with 
as much rigor as they do murder, rape, or terrorism cases there is an industry wide 
reluctance of owners and institutions victimized by art theft and art vandalism to report 
the predatory violations. Many victims do not want their reputations tarnished to the 
extent donors think twice about contributing financial support to an institution perceived 
to be a poor guardian or incapable of adequate guardianship (Burnham, 1978; Conklin, 
1994; Durney, 2013; Ho, 1992; Scott, 2009, 2010a; Webb, 2008). Lastly, the low 
prosecution rates contribute to the attractiveness of the commission of art theft and art 
vandalism. Other than on the federal level, there are no art crime specific statutes. 
Therefore, art criminals are prosecuted under state statutes for burglary, larceny, and 
criminal mischief which may carry lower penalties than art crime or these types of cases 
are handled in civil courts which may require victims to engage in lengthy and expensive 
litigation (Bazley, 2010; Conklin, 1994).  
 
Suitable Targets At Risk For Victimization 
A suitable/attractive target, has been defined by Felson and Cohen (1980) as an 
object or a person which contains one or all of these four features: value (material or 
symbolic allure), inertia (dimensional size, weight and any features that prevent it from 
being removed), physical visibility (prominence or prestige) and accessibility (location, 
easy to access, and easy to escape). In terms of art theft victimization, expensive, smaller, 
less prominent, and easily accessible objects due to their location are usually higher risk 
and pose the potential for greater losses. Valuable small paintings, glass works, 





floor of a building might be relatively effortless to slip under a coat or dropped into a bag 
or briefcase unnoticed. In addition, thieves often cut a work from its frame, roll it up, or 
place it in some type of discreet container, with which they can walk away undetected.  
For example, on December 4, 2004, two men entered Adam Williams Fine Art Ltd., an 
art gallery on the Upper East Side of Manhattan in New York City. The solo employee 
allowed the men entrance after thinking they were either expected telephone company 
repair persons or prospective customers. The men turned out to be neither. One of the 
men distracted the employee while the other man went to the back of the two-room 
gallery and was able to purloin a 18” by 14” untitled 19th century French painting by 
Theodore Chasseriau by hiding it under his coat. The value of the painting was not 
disclosed. However, police said, “it’s an expensive piece of art, but it’s not Picasso’s 
bowl of flowers” (http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/04/arts/design/a-doorbell-rings-and-
a-painting-is-gone.html?_r=0, electronically retrieved April 26, 2016).  
A suitable target for art vandals contains properties desirable to each vandal’s 
particular motivation. For instance, devout Catholic Dennis Heiner smeared white paint 
over the entire surface of Chris Ofili’s, The Holy Virgin Mary (1996) on October 2, 1999 
at the Brooklyn Museum of Art in order to restore the religious dignity of the Virgin. The 
Holy Virgin Mary was a large painting of a black Madonna which is resting on balls of 
elephant dung. The cut-out collages on the painting are images of vulvas taken from 
pornographic magazines. The artist’s intent may have been to unite Nigerian ideas of the 
woman as the source of fertility with traditional Catholic iconography of the Virgin 






to-be-sold.html?_r=0, electronically retrieved April 25, 2016). Additionally, a target’s 
prominence may attract an art vandal, especially those who wish to make a political 
statement through acts of vandalism (Scott 2010b). On March 10, 1914, Mary Richardson 
slashed Diego Velazquez’s painting, The Rokeby Venus (1647), seven times with a meat 
cleaver to protest the imprisonment of the British suffrage’s leader, Emmeline Pankhurst. 
The paining had been recently acquired by The National Gallery in London, England and 
was considered a national treasure (Adams, 1993). Lastly, a suitable target for an art 
vandal may be a proxy figure for a person with whom the vandal is angry with, wants to 
punish, or exert revenge (Cordes & Turcan, 1993; Scott 2010b). For instance, on April 9, 
2003, in the main square of Baghdad, hundreds of Iraqis attacked the statue of Saddam 
Hussein with sledge hammers and attempted to pull the statue to the ground with rope to 
demonstrate their hatred for the ousted Iraqi leader 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/9/newsid_3502000/3502633.stm, 
electronically retrieved April 25, 2016).  
 
Lack Of Capable Guardianship In Art Museums And Art Galleries 
The final component of Routine Activities Theory is lack of capable guardianship. 
According to Cohen and Felson (1980), guardianship “refers to the supervision of 
persons or objects that can prevent crime from occurring” (p. 392). Conklin (1994) 
defines guardianship as, “the degree to which owners protect their work” (p.123). 
Understanding the context and relevance of “the degrees” of the guardianship necessary 
to protect works of art forms a fundamental role. Absent, flawed, or substandard 





galleries, and vaults that store works of art usually feature variable levels of security (i.e. 
guardianship for different kinds of objects). It would be logical to assume thieves and 
vandals are more attracted to institutions with weak or poor guardianship practices and 
each form of criminal perpetration utilizes different modus operandi in which museums 
and galleries may not be equipped to defend against. Within the criminological literature, 
guardianship has been divided into two classifications: physical guardianship and social 
guardianship. Physical guardianship includes those security elements that would 
commonly be referred to as “target hardening”, such as alarms, locks, special outside 
lighting (Madero-Hernandez & Fisher, 2013; Miethe, Hughes, & McDowall, 1991; Meier 
& Miethe, 1993; Miethe & McDowall, 1993; Rountree, Land & Miethe, 1994), and 
CCTV (Addington, 2008; Burrow & Apel, 2008; Breetzke & Cohn, 2013; Johnson, 
1999).  Social guardianship refers to the human element of crime prevention such as 
having a neighbor watch your house while you are away (Fisher, Sloan & Lu, 1998; 
Fisher & Wilkes, 2003; Tseloni, Wittebrood, Farrell, & Pease, 2004), household 
composition (Fisher, Cullen, Turner, 2002; Outlaw, Ruback & Britt, 2002; Miethe, 
Hughes, McDowall, 1991, Miethe & McDowall, 1993; Rountree, Land, & Miethe, 1994), 
and home occupancy (Garofalo & Clark, 1992; Wilcox, Madensen & Tillyer, 2007). As 
the research on guardianship evolved, the concept of the place manager became an 
integral aspect of the social guardianship construct. Place managers are actors who 
discourage crime and reduce the potential for criminal activity by their mere presence and 
daily activities at specific places. These managers are not guarding a potential target; 
rather, these actors are controlling activities at specified locations (Eck, 1994, 1995; 





gallery context, a place manager might include museum/gallery security personnel, as 
well as non-security staff such as employees, volunteers, and even visitors.  Indeed, 
everyday citizens are often credited with successfully protecting museums’ and galleries’ 
at-risk treasures. As Vicki Oliveri astutely proclaims, in the context of the gallery, the 
goodwill of the common citizenry is “just as vital to the life of a cultural institution as a 
good security system” (Oliveri, 2014, p. 97). 
 
The Present Study 
The motivation for the current study stemmed from the 1995 Dutch article by 
Willemse and Etman, in which they investigated the mitigating impact of museum 
security on thefts and vandalism in museums in The Netherlands. Numerous art thefts 
had plagued Europe during the 1990’s, resulting in the Dutch Government sponsoring 
Willemse and Etman’s research. The researchers mailed questionnaires to gather 
information on museum security and incidences on art theft and art vandalism to more 
than 200 museums throughout Europe and compiled the results in the aforementioned 
article. Surprisingly, the researchers’ final recommendations included utilizing replicas 
from the more valuable works in the collection.  
Taking a somewhat similar tack, this dissertation seeks to expand upon Willemse 
and Etman’s research by examining current museum security practices and explore the 
relationship between these practices and the contemporary frequencies of theft and 
vandalism within American art museums and art galleries.  The research contained 
addresses, among other aspects, the extent to which opportunity and guardianship within 





vandalism. This study has two goals. First, this research analyzes the frequency with 
which these two acts of art crime within American art museums and art galleries occur 
and how their parameters correlate to the various forms of guardianship surveyed.  
Secondly, this study tests the applicability of the guardianship component of Routine 
Activities Theory within the context of art theft and art vandalism.  Specifically, separate 
social and physical guardianship models will be created in order to quantitatively 
investigate which theoretical measures most effectively predict the probability of art theft 
and art vandalism perpetration. However, as the first research of this type in the United 
States and the first study to attempt to apply a quantitative theoretical model to the above 
forms of art crime, the current project remains largely exploratory in nature. Furthermore, 
this academic investigation lays the foundation for future study and the ultimate goal is to 
contribute to a field of research that can increase the protection provided to artwork 














ART WORLD BUSINESS STRUCTURES 
 
This chapter outlines the corporate structures operating in today’s art world and how 
these structures impact the impact and reporting of art crime. 
 
Structures of Art Museums and Galleries as Non-Profit Institutions 
Art museums and art galleries are popular leisure destinations for many 
Americans. According to the National Endowment for the Arts’ 2012 Survey of Public 
Participation in the Arts, 47 million Americans visited an art museum or gallery in 2012 
(http://arts.gov/news/2013/national-endowment-arts-presents-highlights-2012-survey-
public-participation-arts, electronically retrieved August 17, 2014). Moreover, according 
to the AAM, there are approximately 850 million visits each year to American museums, 
which is “more than the attendance for all major league sporting events and theme parks 
combined and museums preserve and protect more than a billion objects” 
(http://www.aam-us.org/about-museums/museum-facts, electronically retrieved August 
17, 2014) and the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City alone hosted 6.2 
million visitors during the fiscal year that ended June 30, 2014 
(http://www.artfixdaily.com/artwire/release/2651-metropolitan-museum-announces-62-





The International Council of Museums (ICOM) defines a museum as “a non-
profit, permanent institution in the service of society and its development, open to the 
public, which acquires, conserves, researches, communicates and exhibits the tangible 
and intangible heritage of humanity and its environment for the purposes of education, 
study and enjoyment” (http://archives.icom.museum/statutes.html#2, electronically 
retrieved August 13, 2014). There are many categories of museums including: military, 
art, science, children’s and history museums. This dissertation’s focus will be on art 
museums and art galleries, respectively.  
When museums first emerged in Western societies, they existed as exclusive 
collections presented only to an elite audience, mainly artists, aristocrats, and wealthy 
gentry. Museums were often palaces that had held private collections of treasures and art 
objects for centuries for private contemplation and pleasure. They were often referred to 
as simply “cabinets of curiosities” (McClellan, 2008). Since the late eighteenth century, 
museums have evolved into esteemed public institutions and keepers of vast collections 
of artifacts representative of numerous cultures worldwide. They remain one of the most 
highly regarded sources of public knowledge and trust, attested to by the willingness of 
the public to place its confidence in museums’ responsibility to educate our communities 
in cultural and art history, contemporary expression and design (Cuno, 2004). Museums 
are upheld as trustworthy sources of objective information (http://www.aam-
us.org/about-museums/museum-facts, electronically retrieved August 19, 2014). 
Museums are also places of escape where members of the public can go to find peace and 
a meditative experience. When the Metropolitan Museum of Art (The Met) in New York 





soothed after the horror that had ripped Manhattan apart. Dr. James Cuno, President and 
CEO of the J. Paul Getty Trust expresses it best: “art museums offer ‘places of refuge and 
spiritual and cultural nourishment’ where people may be ‘led from beauty to justice by a 
lateral distribution of caring.’” (McClellan, 2008, p. 3) 
Closely aligned, the difference in the title “gallery” or “museum” is largely 
semantic. According to Ho (1992), there are two classifications of art galleries that exist 
in American culture: private galleries operated by art dealers for profit, and non-profit 
organizations that operate community gallery spaces. John Begley, former University of 
Louisville Hite Art Institute gallery director and professor of curatorial studies, also 
specifies that non-profit galleries serve the public through carrying out an educational or 
community service mission and are certified by the United States Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) as eligible to receive tax- exempt donations.  Begley further notes that 
these galleries are often very similar to museums in almost every aspect, except that they 
tend to not maintain permanent collections, though, even this difference is not a hard and 
fast rule.  There are also museums, galleries, and other forms of public art centers that are 
government owned, publicly-funded and operated, both publicly and privately funded at 
all levels of government from -national, to state, to county, and to municipalities. Both 
the Los Angeles County Museum of Art (LACMA) and the St. Louis Art Museum are 
examples of hybrid institutions with both public and private funding, which is now the 
most common model). In contrast, institutions like the Sterling and Francine Clark 
Institute of Art in Williamstown, Massachusetts, or the Crystal Bridges Museum of 
American Art in Bentonville, Arkansas, are private non-profit museums. Additionally, 





they are operated by public universities (J. Begley, personal communication, August 28, 
2014). Case in point, the Hammer Museum is a publicly-funded division of the 
University of California, Los Angeles, while the Yale University Art Gallery is a public 
art museum funded by the private endowment of Yale University.  
Non-profit art galleries include art-center galleries, university galleries, artist co-
ops, and exhibition spaces at libraries, hospitals, or government buildings (Ho, 1992, p. 
23). Non-profit galleries are usually governed by an elected board of trustees and enjoy a 
tax exempt status as a 501C-3 organization. Such non-profit art galleries can support 
small paid staffs but are often dependent on volunteers who also fulfil staff functions. 
Trustees of non-profit galleries are unpaid. Non-profit co-op galleries depend on the 
membership of artists who comprise their ownership and operation, and who must take 
turns running the gallery on a day to day basis. Non-profit galleries are typically 
restricted by limited budgets, and due to these restrictions sometimes do not acquire the 
insurance adequate to cover works of art appraised of any value, and often they cannot 
afford to maintain the security precautions needed to protect the objects they exhibit (J. 
Begley, personal communication, August 28, 2014). According to Peter Morrin, the 
former director of the Speed Art Museum, boards of non-profit galleries also may not 
have expertise in issues of security, and, as such, may fail to provide adequate support as 
well as oversight to paid staff. These issues discussed above then leave non-profit 
galleries especially susceptible to security infringement (P. Morrin, personal 
communication, December 18, 2014).  
It should be noted that while non-profit institutions produced earned revenue 





sales, they generally do not engage in sales of artwork. But there are exceptions even to 
this practice, as some non-profit galleries are intentionally organized to support artists 
and see providing artists with income through such sales as support and part of their 
mission. Museums may also de-accession works of art to fund new purchases.  
 
For Profit Institutions 
Commercial art galleries are for-profit businesses with inventories that represent 
both individual artists and private collectors. They buy, sell and trade in art works with a 
vested interest in generating revenue and return on investments for either their owner(s) 
or the corporate entity that oversees the gallery’s operations. Private gallery owners, or 
art dealers, typically charge commissions of 25% to 75% of the price of an artist’s work 
in any given sales transaction. Additionally, an item they have purchased and owned will 
be marked it up to any price the market will bear. Select galleries that represent 
prominent contemporary artists might also provide an annual stipend to artists for the 
exclusive right to show and sell their work to the high net worth buyers they retain as 
clients. The directors/owners of these galleries not only exhibit and sell the work of the 
artists they represent, they can possess exceptional connoisseurly knowledge of a given 
artist’s studio practice and repertoire, and aim to “educate clients, curators, and the public 
about an artist’s practice” (Bunting, Allison, & Richie-Handler, 2014, p. 81).  However, 
while this educational function is perhaps similar to non-profit mission statements that 
guide museum operations, profits on revenue from art sales are distributed among the 






Hybridity of Art World Institutions 
As the art world has evolved, museums’ and galleries’ operating models and 
purpose have become intertwined. According to Conklin (1994), some galleries consider 
themselves similar to museums because they don’t charge a fee to the public and many of 
their patrons are simply looking at the works as they would do in a museum. Conversely, 
others argue that art galleries cannot resemble museums because they are retail spaces. 
Their primary purpose is profit driven. Additionally, they argue that galleries do not 
educate the public nor do they elevate the public’s cultural consciousness. (p. 268). In the 
New York Times (NYT) article, “The Art World Blurred,” the authors report that private 
galleries are changing and starting to provide more museum-style exhibitions 
emphasizing didactic texts and descriptive labels 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/28/arts/artsspecial/boundaries-blur-at-art-
showcases.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, electronically retrieved August 17, 2014).  This 
change has been prompted by a decrease in museum funding for large exhibitions, which 
has created opportunities for high end galleries to pursue the missed opportunity.  For 
example, the private dealer, Acquavella Galleries in New York, mounted the exhibition, 
Wayne Thiebaud: A Retrospective, a historically-based monographic exhibition more 
common in the public museum context.  Not only are private galleries holding their own 
exhibitions, they are borrowing works from and loaning works to museums. According to 
John Wilmerding, Professor Emeritus of American Art at Princeton University, 
“organizing an exhibition in a gallery has its advantages. The galleries have the resources 
and are willing to put up the money. You can do a handsome catalog in two months, not a 






showcases.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, electronically retrieved August 17, 2014).  The 
overlapping of the for- and not-for-profit models can also be witnessed in the healthy 
retail shop trade within museums, and at after-hours events where visitors are offered 
food and wine. Prominent gallerists have also transitioned into top roles at major 
museums, such as Jeffrey Deitch, who gave up his position as a New York gallery owner 
to become to director of the Museum of Contemporary Art, Los Angeles, for three years. 
Conversely, museum curators are being integrated into commercial galleries, as when 
former Museum of Modern Art curator, John Elderfield, became an employee of the 
Gagosian Gallery. Some particularly well-known, established blue-chip galleries, such as 
Blum & Poe or Los Angeles’ Louver Gallery, recently hired a team of professional 
archivists, a profession typically only seen in institutions of higher learning, historical 
societies, or large municipal art museums like The Met, or the Museum of Fine Arts, 
Boston. Most professional galleries also employ a number of professionals who one 
could previously only find in museums, such as a registrar, exhibition coordinator, 
security guards, and frequently student interns seeking experience in the art industry 
(McCullen, 2008; Bunting, L., Allison, V, & Richie-Handler, B.L., 2014). Increasingly, 
under pressure of falling philanthropic support, most museums, such as the Kentucky 
Museum of Art and Craft in Louisville, Kentucky, also draw revenue from other sources 
like ticket sales, artwork sales, and gift shops. (J. Begley, personal communication, 
August 28, 2014).  
All of these “blurred roles” between museums and galleries creates an 





museums to commercial galleries creates new challenges such as custodial issues. If a 
work is on loan from a museum to a gallery (or vice versa), how can the museum be sure 
that the gallery will have adequate security measures in place to protect the work? How 
can the gallery be certain the security presented in a site visit will remain in place 
throughout the exhibition? How much responsibility does the “borrower” carry in making 
certain the borrowed work is not a fake or forgery? How can the “lender” be certain 
someone will not vandalize or steal one of the works that is on loan?  
 
Art World Ethical Issues and Crime 
American art museums and art galleries constantly encounter ethical quandaries   
that arise from the current the art industry. While these issues often do not rise to the 
definition of legal crime within this broad context, ethical transgressions are pertinent. 
Many public American museums are institutional members of the AAM, as well as the 
international Association of Art Museum Directors (AAMD), both professional 
regulatory bodies with by-laws and standards of practice to which all institutional 
members are compelled to adhere by virtue of membership. The AAM’s Code of Ethics 
holds, for example, that a museum’s duty to the public is not only to act legally, but also 
ethically, responding, and representing the public interest” (Amineddolch, 2013, p. 247). 
However, AAM standards and best practices for museums are voluntary and are not 
legally enforceable rules. Yet, despite the rigorous standards these two professional 
organizations have established even public art museums occasionally have been known to 





One of the central tenets of the AAM’s Code of Ethics is that while a public art 
museum may deaccession and sell any unrestricted objects in its permanent collections in 
order to support new acquisitions, they are forbidden to do so in support of operating 
costs. Whenever it is revealed that a member institution has done the latter, it will be 
“sanctioned” by the AAM and presumably shunned by the museum community. An 
AAM sanction directly affects any existing loan agreements between the offending 
institution and any other institutions from which it has borrowed works of art, or where it 
has lent objects from its permanent collection. In 2014, the board of trustees of the 
Delaware Art Museum, in Wilmington, Delaware, voted in favor of deaccessioning one 
of their most treasured objects, the Pre-Raphaelite William Holman Hunt's Isabella and 
the Pot of Basil (1868), and putting it up for auction at Christie’s, where it sold for $4.25 
million (half of what the Museum expected to earn from the sale). The Delaware Art 
Museum then committed the profits it received from the transaction to support operating 
costs necessary to keep the museum from insolvency. In a statement released by the 
AAMD dated June 18, 2014, the AAMD advised that there were other options such as 
reaching out to their donors for additional funding (https://aamd.org/for-the-media/press-
release/association-of-art-museum-directors-sanctions-delaware-art-museum, 
electronically retrieved August, 19, 2104).  In the end, the museum was sanctioned by the 
AAMD and, although not a member of the AAMD, was consequently denied the 
opportunity to borrow from other member museums. However, the AAMD’s sanctions 
do not constitute a true legal obligation between the organization and its members, so that 
should a member museum wish to conduct loans or exchanges with an AAMD-





Taylor advises “AAMD sanctions are guidelines, so member museum directors have the 
flexibility to make their own decisions” 
(http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/06/19/delaware-art-musem-
accreditation/10888703/, electronically retrieved August 20, 2014). 
In the U.S., the most prominent business association of commercial galleries in 
membership and prestige is the Art Dealers Association of America (ADAA). The annual 
ADAA exhibition at the Park Avenue Armory is thus a premier showcase for high-end 
galleries and their inventories, such as the aforementioned Acquavella Galleries, as well 
as others worldwide who conduct business in the U.S. The ADAA states that, “each 
member is expected to conduct business professionally, fairly, with integrity and with the 
courtesy and respect due to artists, clients, colleagues, and other Members, and the 
general public” (http://www.artdealers.org/about/code-of-ethics-and-professional-
practices, electronically retrieved December 30, 2014).  The language of some of these 
ethical requirements details the circumstance and consequences of a situation in which an 
ADAA member may encounter stolen art or artifacts, even if the liable organization is 
initially unaware that any works involved in its transactions have been obtained by illicit 
means. The ADAA expects its members to report irregularities to law enforcement 
agencies and to cooperate fully and candidly should any investigation ensue. The ADAA 
maintains that all members are mandated to provide potential clients with an accurate 
condition report and description of the work(s) offered for sale, all known provenance, 
and must provide to interested buyers a detailed invoice of any works intended to be 
purchased prior to the sales transaction. Violation of any of these prescribed ethical 





suspended, being expelled from the ADAA, or “such other penalty as the ADAA, acting 
through its Board of Directors, may deem to be appropriate.” 
(http://www.artdealers.org/about/code-of-ethics-and-professional-practices, electronically 
retrieved December 30, 2014).  
Intriguingly, however, as with the non-profit-focused AAM and AAMD, the 
ADAA’s warning still falls short of fully defining what constitutes these kinds of 
transactional scenarios or any overly specific language clearly detailing the penalties 
associated with expulsion from the ADAA other than the presumed loss of credibility in 
the arts community (http:www.artdealers.org, electronically retrieved December 30, 
2014).  Such ethical advice, therefore, presents member organizations with no genuine, 
enforced industry regulation or measurably effective deterrence for unethical behaviors. 
Houpt (2006) stated that “…trade associations are relatively weak, rely entirely on their 
members for subscriptions, and have little capacity to enforce rules. Many dealers flatly 
deny that there is a problem. Some resent the cost.” (p. 8). It is for this reason that the 
transactions that take place between art institutions, collectors, and dealers often seem 
opaque, secretive, and virtually unregulated to those outside business. Unfortunately, the 
clandestine climate of the art trade sets the stage for an industry replete with opportunities 
for successful art crime endeavors.  
Private dealers often value highly the confidences and discretion maintained 
between buying and selling parties, especially given the significantly high value of the 
commodities in which they conduct business. As a result of this commonly acceptable 
discretion, buyers do not have to be provided with a clear provenance. For example, in 





any deeper into an inquiry surrounding the questionable previous ownership of a painting 
she and her husband had recently purchased from Frederick Mont, Inc., on Upper East 
Side of New York City: Mrs. Mont relayed, “As we told you we bought the painting 
through an agent, and you will understand that this man does not wish to give away his 
sources-this, you will admit- is his good right, because he hopes to get other items from 
them. “(B. Mont, personal communication, May 8, 1967).  There is no further 
information on this particular matter. However, according to Thomas Hoving (1997), 
former director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, Frederick Mont had been involved 
with another sale of a work of art with disputable provenance. In 1974, Mont sold a 
painting of 16th century St. Catherine by Matthias Grunewald to the Cleveland Museum 
of Art for one million dollars. This panel was later discovered through forensic analysis 
to be a fake and Mont reluctantly returned the money to the museum.  
More recently, In 2013, Glafira Rosales, a Long Island art dealer plead guilty to 
fraud for selling forged artworks to the Knoedler Gallery, one of the oldest commercial 
art galleries in New York City. Rosales and her boyfriend, Jose Carlos Bergantiños Diaz, 
his brother, Jesus Angel Bergantiños Diaz, and Pei-Shen Qian, the artist who forged the 
work all conspired to defraud the gallery. Ann Freedman, the former president of 
Knoedler, and Julian Weissman have since repeatedly stated that, despite the lack of 
documentation, they were both convinced the work was genuine, based on their 
connoisseurship. Weismann further remarks that the art industry’s mask of secrecy was a 
large contributor to the situation, explaining that “secrecy is something that occurs left 
and right in this business.”  (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/03/arts/design/selling-a-







 In sum, the highly competitive nature of the art market is an environment in 
which ethical practices are perceived as potential obstacles to conducting a legally run 
profitable business. Such is the quandary evidenced in the deliberate ambiguity in any 
rules and regulations that pertain to the appearance of conscientious practices in both 
non-profit galleries that acquire works of art for public exhibition and education and the 
commercial entities that facilitate a marketplace for these objects.  
Ancient works of art are particularly likely to draw attention to potentially 
unethical business practices. In the years before ethical archaeological practices, ancient 
artifacts have been routinely looted or stolen from historic sites, especially those located 
in politically unstable states or former colonies of Western super powers. Included in this 
category are items looted from archaeological dig sites, ancient structures, or graves.   
Historically, it took archeologists’ advocacy, well-publicized scandals, and 
government-initiated advisory panels composed of government and art world 
professionals that issued policy recommendations to implement basic regulatory 
measures, to pressure both the US and the UK to comply with international agreements 
regarding the acquisitions of looted antiquities (Efrat, 2016). However, this issue persists 
within the art world. Some prominent public art museums have attracted scrutiny by 
overlooking, intentionally or not, the various warnings that emerge in the acquisition and 
accessioning process for ancient antiquities.  
For example, objects later discovered to be looted or obtained initially by 
unscrupulous methods can be the finest pieces in a given museum’s current permanent 
collection. In these situations, museums can be resistant, even under governmental or 





order to maintain the status and prestige of their collections vis-à-vis other comparable 
museum collections. Jonathan Webb (2008) remarks that “museums are the institutional 
equivalent of the compulsive private collector; their hunger for acquisition is unbending 
and insatiable” (p. 127). In 2008, the Metropolitan Museum of Art somewhat 
begrudgingly returned an object known as the Euphronios krater, discovered to be a 
looted object, to Italy after a 30-year legal battle with the Italian government. (Brodie & 
Proulx, 2013; Bazley; 2010; Conklin, 1994).  Similarly, in 2005 Marion True, a former 
curator of Greek and Roman Art at the J. Paul Getty Museum (The Getty) in Los 
Angeles, California, was indicted along with American antiquities dealer, Robert E. 
Hecht, by the Italian government on charges of receiving stolen antiquities, trafficking, 
and conspiracy to traffic. The charges were eventually dismissed due to the expiration of 
the statute of limitation. The Getty found it had no choice but to return the objects in 
question to Italy, as a show of good faith (Bazley, 2010; Brodie & Proulx, 2013).  
Art crimes such as those at the Knoedler Gallery and the Met fuel a multi-billion 
dollar black market, which, according to the FBI and other sources, contributes to $6 -$8 
billion annually in commercial profit (http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/investigate/vc_majorthefts/arttheft, and http://www.newsweek.com/outgunned-search-
stolen-art-258531, electronically retrieved June 14, 2014). 
In conclusion, as stated in the introduction, art crime, in general, has been defined 
as “criminally punishable acts that involve works of art and includes a spectrum of 
phenomena as diverse as art thefts and confiscations, faked and forged art, vandalism and 
illicit excavation and export of antiquities and other archaeological materials” (Durney 





reflect the complexity and multiplicity of possibilities for  criminal acts to be perpetrated. 
This in turn requires a thorough examination of several elements of this multifaceted 
issue in order to formulate strategies to combat the problem.  
This dissertation cannot engage all these possibilities for criminal activity within 
the art world; however, it should be noted that the overall configuration of the 
contemporary art market contributes to an atmosphere that encourages illegal activity and 
allows factors such as the non-reporting of crimes, secrecy, and the lack of 
documentation to render difficult how gaining an understanding and sound formulas for 
combating the two forms of art crime which are the focus of this dissertation:  art theft 
















ART THEFT AND ART VANDALISM 
 
 
 “Edgar Degas once said of painting a picture, that “It calls for as much cunning as 
the commission of a crime”” (Tompkins, 2016, p. 210) 
In this chapter, we review current and previous literature on the two forms of art 
crime which are the focus of this dissertation-art theft and art vandalism. The literature 
argues for the special status of art theft and art vandalism due to its impact upon art 
history and cultural well-being of society. Additionally, we focus on the motivations of 
the aforementioned types of criminality and combative mechanisms in place to curb the 
incidences of art theft and art vandalism, as well as the environmental factors that 
influence art crime today. 
   
PART ONE – ART THEFT 
A Review of Art Theft  
“On December 4, 2014, thieves broke into a shuttered tavern adjacent to a 
prominent art gallery (Puerta de Alcalá) in Madrid, punched a hole through the wall that 
led to the gallery, managed to deactivate the gallery's alarm system, and then proceeded 





stolen-from-madrid-gallery-195850, last accessed December 30, 2014). The stolen works 
have not been recovered. However, stolen art has a very low recovery rate, and experts 
estimate only two to ten percent of stolen art is ever found.” (Conklin, 1994; Charney et 
al., 2011; B. Magness-Gardiner, personal communication, 2014). 
According to Encyclopedia Britanica art theft is “criminal activity involving 
the theft of art or cultural property, including paintings, sculptures, ceramics, and other 
objets d’art” (https://www.britannica.com/topic/art-theft, electronically retrieved May 30, 
2018). Further, theft is defined as “ the physical removal of an object that is capable of 
being stolen without the consent of the owner and with the intention of depriving the 
owner of it permanently” (https://www.britannica.com/topic/theft, electronically retrieved 
May 30, 2018). Art theft and its normative counterpart differ in several respects.  
While art theft and general theft are classified as property crimes, theft of 
artworks do not fit the normative characteristics of ordinary theft cases. Given that the 
aforementioned form of criminal perpetration also target art objects, which are venerated 
works held in the public trust, any victimization to these works elevates the seriousness 
and symbolic power of the crime (Freedberg, 1985; Gamboni, 2007). Additionally, the 
social norms to protect and preserve these artifacts of culture are violated and the 
consequences exceed the financial losses to society. According to Robert Wittman, a 
former FBI special agent with the art crime unit, “art crime is different from a car theft or 
a bank robbery, it wasn't perpetrated by your average thief, and it wasn't sold to your run-
of-the-mill fence or pawnbroker. It has got a different group of people involved in it. You 





might end up." (http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=98281679, 
electronically retrieved May 29, 2016). 
Furthermore, due to the need for some knowledge of art, law enforcement may 
not investigate a theft of art as rigorously as they investigate a car theft or a home 
invasion due to the stolen object not being perceived as worthy of intense examination 
(Benson, 2013; Kerr, 2013; Clarke & Szydlo, 2017). Secondly, the victims of art theft 
primarily only want their artwork recovered rather than apprehend the thief, which is in 
conflict with law enforcement’s goal of closing a case by arrest.  
Lastly, in many instances, art theft is an interstate and international crime. Art that is 
stolen from one state or country can be quickly and surreptitiously moved to another one. 
 
 
Art Theft Legislation and Criminal Statutes 
In the rare instance that an art thief is identified, and apprehended, criminal 
offenses will apply and the defendant can face prison terms. On neither the state nor the 
local levels are there any specific statutes, however, related to prosecutions of art theft. 
This legal conundrum is a frustration echoed by many scholars and art world 
professionals practitioners alike (Benson, 2013; Charney, 2014; Clarke & Szydlo; 
Conklin,1994; Dobavasek & Slak; Kerr, 2013; Pastore, 2009; Williams, 2008), as well as 
the minimal criminal penalties associated with art theft prosecutions (Benson, 2013; 
Clarke & Szydlo; Conklin,1994; Kerr, 2013; Pastore, 2009; Williams, 2008). One 
resulting problem has been noted by Charney, “Statistics are hard to come by because 





Rembrandt is classified with a CD” (http://ec2-79-125-124-178.eu-west-
1.compute.amazonaws.com/articles/Recovery-rate-for-stolen-art-as-low-as-/31145, 
electronically retrieved May 31, 2018).  
This is due to the crime generally falling under the Uniform Crime Reports 
(UCR) offenses of Robbery, Burglary, and Larceny-Theft Statutes. (Conklin, 1994; 
Bazley, 2010).  
The UCR defines Robbery specifically as “the taking or attempting to take 
anything of value from the care, custody, or control of a person or persons by force or 
threat of force or violence and/or by putting the victim in fear” 
(http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-
2010/violent-crime/robberymain, electronically retrieved  4/12/2015).  Indeed, there have 
been some incidences of art theft that have included the threat and use of force, and 
weapons. In one notable example, five armed and masked robbers stormed into the 
crowded galleries at the Museum of Fine Arts in Nice, France, on the first Sunday of 
August in 2007, when admission is free. They ordered the six security guards to lie down 
and proceeded to steal four masterpieces off of the walls within ten minutes 
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/ 
08/06/AR2007080600596.html, electronically retrieved September 12, 2014). The UCR 
defines Burglary (breaking and entering), the next level of theft downgraded from 
Robbery as “the unlawful entry of a structure to commit a felony or a theft. Attempted 
forcible entry is included.” (http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/property-crime/burglarymain, electronically retrieved 





typical example took place in December 2005, when two thieves broke into a California 
gallery after 11:00 pm through the back door with a crowbar. They absconded with a 
Picasso linocut (Femme regardant par la Fenêtre) and a Marc Chagall lithograph (The 
Tribe of Dan) (Houpt, 2006, p. 148).  
Larceny-Theft (except motor vehicle theft) is defined by the UCR as the 
“unlawful taking, carrying, leading, or riding away of property from the possession or 
constructive possession of another” (http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/property-crime/larcenytheftmain, electronically retrieved 
April 12, 2015). This even more common variety of theft includes bicycle theft, car parts 
and accessories, shoplifting, pick-pocketing, or the stealing of any property or article 
without force, violence, or deception.” The most frequent mode of art theft that fits into 
this category is through the sleight-of-hand maneuvers of a thief disguised as a typical 
museum visitor who quickly purloins an object and escapes undetected, usually by 
simply walking out the front door.  In June of 2012, a small painting by Salvador Dali 
entitled, Cartel de Don Juan Temiro, was stolen from Venus Over Manhattan, an upper 
east side gallery in New York, by a brazen thief who merely lifted the painting off of the 
wall during business hours while a security guard was on duty. Curiously, the thief 
mailed the $150,000 painting via FedEx back to the gallery one week after he stole it 
(http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/offenses.cfm, electronically retrieved September 8, 2014).  
At the level of federal offense, several statutes apply to art theft. These are listed 








The Statistical Picture 
Despite ardent efforts by law enforcement, legal advisors, and legislators, art theft 
remains an unresolved worldwide problem. Very few empirical studies exist which 
quantitatively capture an entire picture of this issue. Due the high incidence of unsolved 
crimes, law enforcement agencies lack the statistics that could yield enough data to 
conduct these studies.  INTERPOL, the European Union’s international police bureau, 
formally states that it does not: 
possess any figures which would enable [them] to claim that 
trafficking in cultural property is the third or fourth most common 
form of trafficking, although this is frequently mentioned at 
international conferences and in the media. In fact, it is very 
difficult to gain an exact idea of how many items of cultural 
property are stolen throughout the world and it is unlikely that 
there will ever be any accurate statistics. National statistics are 
often based on the circumstances of the theft (petty theft, theft by 
breaking and entering or armed robbery), rather than the type of 
object stolen. An enhanced information exchange could assist 
INTERPOL in determining the importance as well as the trends 
and patterns of this type of crime. 
 
(http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Works-of-art/Frequently-asked-
questions, electronically retrieved September 14, 2014). 
 
However, the agency does concede that despite the lack of reliable, internationally 
harmonized statistics on cultural property thefts, their website does provide a minimal 
amount of related data.  
There is a small amount of data available on some of the sub-categories of art 
theft, such as location. The majority of thefts investigated by INTERPOL were carried 
out in private residences. Museums and places of worship are also among the common 





thefts by location worldwide in 2008 breaks down as private residences (52%), art 
museums (12%), commercial galleries (9%), unknown locations (8%), churches (5%), 
corporate sites (4%), other locations (4%), public spaces (3%), in transit (2%), 
warehouses (1%), and cemeteries (0.1%) 
(http://www.artmarketmonitor.com/2009/04/23/art-loss-register-data-dump/, 
electronically retrieved September 14, 2014).  
 In 1986, John Barelli, chief security officer at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, 
published the results of an analysis of art and antiquities thefts that had been investigated 
by New Scotland Yard’s Arts and Antiquities Squad. According to these statistics, in 
1984 the majority of thefts were likewise in private residences (92%), followed by 
churches (1.6%) and museums (1.4%). Barelli acknowledges that criminals found it 
easier to steal from private residences because they are not as well protected as museums 
and the objects in museums are harder to sell and are well documented (p. 211). Ho 
(1992) empirically examined 229 art theft reports filed with the New York City Police 
Department’s Art and Antique Investigation Unit, between January 1985 and December 
1988. The location data from this study differs from the one Barelli portrayed, and shows 
the highest percentages of reported thefts took place in commercial galleries (45%), 
followed by private residences (20%), business offices (12.2%), cars parked on the street 
(8.3%), storage/warehouse (4.4%), churches and schools (3.5%) and hotel/clubs (3.1%) 
(p.56). Ho also surveyed 45 art dealers in New York City and found that most art thefts 
took place in gallery showrooms (68%), storerooms (25.5%), warehouses (3.9%), or 
while one work or group of works were on loan to another institution (2.0%) (p. 107). 





34% of reported theft also took place in exhibition spaces, while just 4% took place from 
a storage space (p. 55). Aarons (2001) collected data related to the prevalence, frequency 
and characteristics of art theft in Australia. According to her findings, of the 57 reported 
incidences of art theft in that country, 27 were works stolen from commercial galleries, 
17 from private residences, 5 from public museums, and 3 from storage spaces or works 
in transit to storage facilities (p. 23). 
Burmon’s (2017) sample of 114 police reports made to the FBI revealed that 
25.4% of art theft perpetration occurred in a gallery, 34.2% occurred from a private 
owner (specific location not noted), 9.6% occurred in a business, 8.8% occurred in both a 
religious institution and a university/school, 7.0% occurred in an “other” location, and 
interestingly on 6.0% occurred in a museum. When these figures are compared with other 
statistics regarding location of art thefts, the museums generally are not victimized as the 
smallest percentage of a study’s sample. In Figure 1, the distribution of location of art 
theft perpetration according to the FBI’s National Stolen Art database is presented. While 
the exact sample size was not revealed, the top three locations of victimization in 2014 
were residences (n=370 objects), galleries (n=218 objects), and museums (n=180 objects) 







Figure [3.1]. Source: National Stolen Art File, Federal Bureau of Investigation (B. Magness-
Gardiner, personal communication, August 22, 2014).  
 
A second area of interest to those researching international art crimes is the 
type of objects most commonly stolen, which INTERPOL indicates vary by country, but 
typically cover “paintings, sculptures and statues, and religious items.” But really no type 
of object is spared by enterprising art thieves, and this category ought also to include 
antiquities, antiquarian books, antique furniture, numismatics, and arms and armor 
(http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Works-of-art/Frequently-asked-questions, 
electronically retrieved September 28, 2014). 
According to data provided online by the Art Loss Register, the highest 
numbers of stolen objects are paintings, drawings, and works on paper (89,019), followed 























by sculpture (25,016), and silver (21,865). Other categories include timepieces (12,390), 
ceramics (10,668), jewelry (10,641), objets d’art (8,197), furniture (7,997), textiles 
(4,653), arms & armor (3,101), vehicles (2,334), books & manuscripts (1,919), coins 
(1,801), enamels (1,482), glass (1,279), instruments (984), lighting appliances (868), 
medals (383), memorabilia, toys & medals (257), miscellaneous (189), and stamps & 
seals (95). When Burnham (1978) conducted a survey of museums and art dealers, she 
found that museums reported decorative art as most frequently stolen, followed by 
paintings, and small sculptures. Some thefts of small objects occurred during a museum’s 
open hours, in broad daylight. Likewise, Burnham found that small objects were also the 
most commonly purloined item in commercial galleries as well. 
In his analysis of Scotland Yard’s Arts and Antiquities Squad records from 
1978-1982, Barelli (1986) found that small paintings, porcelains, silver objects, oriental 
rugs, clocks, small sculpture and furniture were the most common items stolen in the 
United Kingdom, because they are relatively easy to sell (p. 211). Ho’s study of theft 
from commercial galleries in New York City (1994) identified paintings (25.3%) as the 
most common target, followed by sculpture (35.2%), prints (9.9%), folk art (8.8%), then 
drawings (6.6%), followed by antiquities (3.3%), and finally silkscreens (1.1%) (p. 132). 
The respondents also reported that small objects (under 18 inches) were most often taken 
because they are easy to conceal and carry. (p. 131). Ho found that the frequency of 
objects stolen from New York commercial galleries by organized burglary trended 
toward these smaller objects, but that burglars usually absconded with more substantial 
quantities of inventory, such as larger objects, which might be valued also by their 





here: prints (29.1%), sculpture (23.6%), craft (14.6%), print and antiquity (12.7% each), 
and drawings and other (7.3% each). Aarons (2001) found that in 57 instances of reported 
art theft during the 1990s in Australia, paintings were stolen 47 times, sculpture 5 
instances, drawings and prints 2 instances, and just one photograph was reported stolen. 
Australian respondents maintained that paintings were most desirable because “the 
physical nature of many paintings renders them easy to steal and easy to remove from 
display” (p. 24). 
Burmon’s (2017) findings on types of objects stolen provide further data on 
what objects are desirable to art thieves. Specifically, 38.6% of the sample suffered the 
theft of a painting, 28.1% sample sustained the theft of a sculpture, 10.5% sample 
sustained the theft of a historical artifact, 8.8% sample suffered the theft of multiple 
objects, 7.9% sample sustained the theft of “other” objects, and 6.1% sample suffered the 
theft of a drawing. According to the FBI, multiple types of objects have been recorded 
stolen. Specifically, the data garnered from the NSAF database in 2014 revealed that  
2,920 paintings, 1,262 sculptures, 829 prints, 322 drawings, 320 books/manuscripts, 160 
photos, 145 pieces of jewelry, 89 plant potters, 49 cloacks, 48 musical instruments, 39 
maps, and 18 textiles were reported stolen (B. Magness-Gardiner, personal 






Figure [3.2]: Source: National Stolen Art File, Federal Bureau of Investigation (B. Magness-
Gardiner, personal communication, August 22, 2014).  
 
The frequency that works by specific artists are stolen over others presents a third area of 
interest. According to data provided online by the Art Loss Register the artists whose 
works are most frequently stolen, include Pablo Picasso (699), Salvador Dali (396), Joan 
Miro (390), Marc Chagall (361), Albrecht Durer (212), Pierre-Auguste Renoir (192), 
Andy Warhol (183), Rembrandt van Rijn (181), Peter Paul Rubens (147), and Henri 
Matisse (138) (http://www.artmarketmonitor.com/2009/04/23/art-loss-register-data-
dump/, electronically retrieved September 14, 2014). 
Other types of criminal offenses committed during art thefts comprise a fourth set 
of data. In Europe, breaking and entering is the most common method used by thieves. 
Ho’s (1992) analysis of 229 art theft reports to the New York City Police Department’s 
Art and Antique Investigation Unit from January 1985 to December 1988 shows that 
types of offenses that accompanied museum theft could be grouped into four main 
categories: larceny (58.1%), burglary (38.9%), robbery (1.7%), and fraud (1.3%) (p. 54). 













CATEGORIES OF STOLEN ARTWORK 





The range of offenses committed in the burglary of commercial galleries are shoplifting 
(4%), burglary (20%), employee theft (2.9%), and “mysterious disappearance” (2.9%) (p. 
59). According to the FBI’s National Stolen Art file, in 2009, the majority of the criminal 
activity within the NSAF was burglary, followed by larceny. The three remaining types 
of criminal activity are armed robbery, robbery and a small percentage of the criminal 
activity is consignment fraud (B. Magness-Gardiner, personal communication, August 
22, 2014). In terms of gender distribution, according to Dr. Magness-Gardiner in her 
presentation at the 2009 annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, only 
10% of art thieves are female and approximately 90% of art theft was committed by 
males. 
As mentioned earlier, recovery rates for stolen art are comparatively quite low 
compared with other forms of stolen property, typically around 10% according to Naylor 
(2008), and these interceptions usually happen as one attempts a sale of a stolen work of 
art (Spadanuta, 2011, p. 51). To bring the statistics into the more recent past, according to 
Mark Durney (2010) only 1.9% of stolen works of art were successfully retrieved by 
authorities between 2000 and 2009. A significant outcome of this study was the 
“correlation between the amount of information provided to stolen art databases and the 
likelihood that a registered object will be recovered” (p. 7). Durney statistically isolated 
the variables of the premise-type recorded versus the omission of premise-type records. 
What he found was that recovery rates spanned 2.75% and 1.24% of the number of 
investigated art thefts, and recovery likelihood improved if the stolen objects in question 
appeared in databases devoted to catching art thieves. The premise-types in this study 





company, gallery, in transit, museum, other, private, public, unknown, and warehouse” 
(p. 6). When Durney added the variable of geographic-location versus its lack of 
geographic-location information in other investigations ranged from 3.16% to 1.18%. 
Durney concluded that the more information that institutions can supply to stolen art 
databases, the likelihood of object return improves (p. 8). 
 
 A History of Art Theft 
The FBI’s National Stolen Art File website defines a work of art as a thing or 
things that can be identified as fine arts, decorative arts, antiquities, Asian art, Islamic art, 
Native American art, ethnographic objects, archaeological material, textiles, books and 
manuscripts, clocks and watches, coins, stamps, musical instruments, or scientific 
instruments, and which are “uniquely identifiable and have historical or artistic 
significance” (http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/vc_majorthefts/arttheft/national-
stolen-art-file, electronically retrieved August 16, 2014).  The theft of works of art is 
likely as old as human history itself. In the last century, the first widely publicized crime 
was the 1911 theft of Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa from the Musée du Louvre in Paris 
by a museum employee, an Italian national, Vincenzo Peruggia, who simply remained in 
the museum after closing in a broom closet, pulled the picture off its wall display, and 
walked out with the painting under his coat. Authorities eventually apprehended Peruggia 
when he attempted to sell the painting to the directors of the Uffizi Gallery in Florence, 
Italy. (Ho, 1992; Conklin, 1994).  
Simon Houpt (2006) attributes the volatility of the art market and the increased 





bidders in leading auction house sales. England’s Metropolitan Police’s website notes 
that criminal activity surrounding the art community is a highly lucrative criminal 
enterprise, estimated to be worth in excess of £3 billion each year 
(http://content.met.police.uk/Site/artandantiques, electronically retrieved September 3, 
2014). How can art crime be so profitable and difficult to control? Some answers lie in 
the nature of the art market itself. 
 
The Art Industry 
Many aspects of the modern art industry contribute to desirability of art as a target 
for cunning or not so cunning thieves. As Robert Volpe, a former New York City Police 
Department art detective, puts it:  
the least guilty of all parties are the thieves. These mules couldn’t 
do it without the cooperation of gallery owners, flea-market 
purveyors, auction houses, museums, security companies, 
collectors and finally law enforcement agencies. Everyone else 
either knowingly or through neglect gives the thief a leg up (Del 
Piano 1993, p. 18). 
 
A shroud of secrecy permeates the art world, and as long as the art market continues to 
conduct business so secretively, thieves will use its opacity to their advantage. Despite 
the guidelines set forth by the ADAA, dealers are not required by law to hold any sort of 
license to conduct business, nor are they obligated by law to report transactions or 
disclose details of their clients. Million dollar deals regularly take place in a relatively 
clandestine manner versus other forms of commerce, and despite the large sums 
transacted, other than the customary attention to provenance (essential to the valuation of 





The two main forms of sales transaction for works of art are private party sales 
and public auction. The former scenario tends to be closed, discreet, and, as three authors 
have described the culture in which these transactions take place, “negotiated 
arrangements” brokered between parties can be “as ephemeral as a conversation over 
cocktails.” (Bichler, Bush & Malm, 2014, p. 363). Public auction sales disclose more 
information to the public and the major auction houses are publicly traded companies 
with shareholders to keep informed. Yet secrecy still punctuates sales in the auction 
world. Interested parties bid on art as an anonymous buyer, an identified buyer, or on 
behalf of a buyer, and sales guarantees, and bidders can remain anonymous (Bichler, 
Bush & Malm, 2014; James, 2000). Loopholes define the business, as Charney et al. 
(2012) maintain with the frank question of “what other multimillion dollar market so 
rarely leaves a paper trail of transactions, regularly hides commodities to avoid luxury 
tax, and relies so heavily on the unscientific assurance of connoisseurs to determine 
authenticity and value, with fortunes in the balance?” (http://www.fbi.gov/stats-
services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/march-2012/protecting-cultural-heritage-
from-art-theft, electronically retrieved July 19, 2014; 2012; Webb, 2008).  
In addition, as stated earlier, crimes of art theft are more likely to go unreported 
by museums and art galleries. Burnham (1978) revealed in her study of American 
museums and commercial art dealers/art galleries that inventories of works were 
conducted with surprising infrequency. Given the large number of objects in most large 
public museum collections, thefts from storage facilities, especially those located off-site 
from the main museum campuses, can go undiscovered for long periods of time.  Limited 





insurance values of stolen objects also contribute to the tendency to only report 
significant crimes. Even when these objects are discovered missing, their loss through 
theft may be difficult to pinpoint. Fear of future victimization was a reason cited by 34 of 
the museums Burnham surveyed, and 7 museums explained their losses were not covered 
by insurance and thus were unreported. In these instances, the museum simply absorbed 
the cost of the loss. Burnham’s interviews with commercial art dealers confirmed that the 
practice of “absorbing” minor theft losses remains firmly entrenched in the art market for 
the purpose of avoiding appearing publicly as unprotected victims remains firmly 
entrenched in the art market. Commercial dealers necessarily worry about the alienation 
of their patrons in the wake of such disclosure and their insurance premiums can increase 
dramatically. Additionally, if a collector consigns a work to a private gallery for sale, a 
theft would raise the fear of the loss of the collector’s property and thus impact future 
business opportunities.  
Ho (1992) surveyed 45 art dealers in New York City, and the respondents 
from this study admitted they did not officially report victimization in more than 30% of 
the events in which thefts occurred (p. 63). 60% of the respondent victims claimed not to 
recall why thefts went unreported, and 28.6% remained assured that any items stolen held 
valuation below insurance deductibles. Respondents supplied a number of other reasons 
given for not reporting art crimes. The most common of these was the assumption that 
any investigation would likely be very low-priority to the New York City Police 
Department, which would not expediently solve cases, if at all. Another concern 
commonly presented were worries that any official report of a theft of objects valued less 





premiums, or even cancel existing coverage. An insurance problem may place undue 
financial pressure on small outfits already maintaining a delicate balance of costs 
associated with maintaining prestigious inventory versus sustaining steady cash flow 
from sales to regular clients. Comparably, the threat of bad publicity makes commercial 
galleries makes fearful of losing consignments they rely upon to stay in business. Staffing 
issues were a third issue for galleries that did not report thefts, several of whom stated 
anxieties over the psychological trauma of confronting an employee believed guilty of the 
crime, not to mention the costs that could emerge in any litigation related to the human 
resource liabilities that would stem from art crimes committed by internal employees (p. 
63-66). Both public art museums and commercial art galleries prefer to limit information 
regarding the overall monetary value of their collections, especially if higher-valued 
unaffected objects remain in affected collections. Larger institutions like museums are 
sensitive about exposing any vulnerability in their security practices, which might also 
have a negative impact on grant-based funding, large gifts, or the institution’s perceived 
authority in the arts community as leaders in conservation, preservation, and art-historical 
knowledge production. Lending institutions might thus think twice about facilitating 
loans of works of any value from the lending museum’s permanent collection. Curatorial 
departments focused in ancient antiquities in particular do not wish to attract any 
unnecessary scrutiny from the foreign nations where objects in the permanent collection 
may have been originally obtained. Culpable dealers who have knowingly traded in 
contraband artifacts understandably would not want such scrutiny focused at their 





In their 1995 study of museum security in the Netherlands, Wilemse and 
Etman observed that less than 20% of respondents reported instances of victimization. 
Although the researchers who conducted these studies found that despite vocalized 
promises to notify and engage authorities of such a crime, Ho found that, “in practice this 
is certainly not the case” (p. 56). The researchers further learned that when the theft was 
from the institution’s storage spaces, only 3% of the incidences were reported to the 
police. The researchers surmised that this could be attributed to the face that employees 
were involved and the institutions preferred to handle the incidents internally. Another 
factor that contributed to the tendency not to report art crimes is the concern that 
“philistine” law enforcement officers would inherently lack the knowledge necessary to 
fully appreciate, understand, and recognize the importance of any specific stolen 
object(s), and, hence be highly unlikely to successfully solve the case.  
Despite the fact that stolen works of art have aspects important to the nations 
and societies of their origin beyond just their monetary value, historically-speaking, law 
enforcement has not always regarded the recovery of art as a top priority. According to 
Johnathan Webb (2008), “police officers in general have little patience with the secrecy 
and what some see as the pretentiousness of the art world” (p. 26). Former Scotland Yard 
Art and Antiquities unit detective chief investigator, Charley Hill, adds that “many police 
officers find it hard to take art theft seriously. Why one piece of paint-daubed canvas is 
worth millions while another is more or less worthless strikes many of them (and many 
laypeople for that matter) as a mystery hardly worth thinking about. Police departments 
in large cities in particular usually prioritize allocation of resources toward solving crimes 





everyday occurrences such as armed robbery, sexual assault, and homicide. In this 
context, the disappearance of a painting, sculpture or old desk can seem trifling” (Webb, 
2008, p. 26). This blasé attitude of police officers, whether real or imagined, has 
contributed to the art theft phenomenon. Victims of theft can be reluctant to report crimes 
because they are wary that police will not take them seriously. Art thieves themselves 
know that their crimes will not attract the same investigative scrutiny as the other violent 
crimes listed other crimes.  
 
Art as a Desirable and Accessible Target for Thieves 
Artwork itself possesses qualitative properties that make it a perfect target for 
thieves, which also contributes to the difficulty of solving art theft cases. One is the 
nature of art itself.  Most art objects can be easily concealed, stored, and can be quite 
portable. Stolen paintings can be cut from their frames and rolled up into a suitcase with a 
false bottom and small sculptures or vases can be broken into pieces and then re-
assembled at a later date. Stolen works of art rarely remain in the geographical area in 
which they were taken. More often than not, they are transported out of the country 
within a few days of the theft. Moving works of art, even if stolen, can be quite easily 
transferred across sovereign borders. It is easy to move art across state and international 
borders because it can be disguised as something else such as covering an antiquity with 
another material, so it will resemble a modern reproduction. Usually, customs officials 
are not educated about cultural heritage objects and/or trained in recognizing stolen 
artworks (Fidler, 2003; Bernick, 1998). Because many police agencies will not work with 





goods and the laws vary between cities, states and countries. Secondly, stolen art may not 
reappear on the market for many years; art thieves may be waiting for the statute of 
limitations to run out. Third, stolen art rarely remains with its original thief, passed as 
soon as possible to either another thief or an art dealer, who then sells it to either to a 
legitimate or to an illegitimate customer. Because art is one of a kind there is no way to 
track a chain of title by a serial number or license plate. Consequently, if the art is 
discovered, more than likely it will not be in the hands of the original perpetrator of the 
crime (Webb, 2008).  
Lastly, the public value of a work of art remains the chief incentive to thieves. 
First, the art dealers and artists can set the price of work and then this price can be 
changed at any point. The prices of art are reflective of how much buyers are willing to 
pay and are not based on any other factors. The prices fluctuate without any other 
seemingly logical explanation. Moreover, thieves are attracted to art because its value 
generally appreciates over time so it is difficult to estimate how much a stolen item is 
actually worth. Due to the high prices that artwork commands, thieves foolishly assume 
they will be able to easily sell it. (Webb, 2008; 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2009/05/29/crime-and-picasso-the-shadowy-
underworld-of-art, electronically retrieved 7/19/14; James, 2000, p. 4). 
Ulrich Boser (2010), former director of security at the Isabella Stewart 
Gardner Museum reports that stolen art is very difficult to unload, and typically sells for 
approximately 10% of its true value. He also adds that once art is stolen the thieves can 
be left with the responsibility of having to care for delicate works that need special care, 





such as excessive heat or humidity. Occasionally, in the interest of distancing themselves 
from contraband art objects, some thieves can unload their loot to an unsuspecting 
customer. That mentioned, art thieves may just as likely not recognize well-known 
objects easily recognized on the black and legitimate art markets.  
In December of 2007, art thieves broke into the Museum of Art in São Paulo, 
Brazil, forcing open the museum’s doors with a crowbar and a car jack, and stealing 
Picasso’s Portrait of Suzanne Boch, and a painting by the Brazilian artist Candido 
Portinari. Authorities found the pieces later leaning against a house on the outskirts of the 
city, which suggests that the thieves did not know what to do with the art once they 
acquired it (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/14/arts/14arts-ANOTHERARTTH 
_BRF.html?_r=0, electronically retrieved September 20, 2014; Naylor, 2008; Ramsey, 
2004). Some art looks “expensive” and thus can attract thieves eager for large financial 
rewards. Some cast bronze sculptures attract thieves interested in moving a stolen work 
of art quickly. The price of copper, for instance, has increased in the past six years, 
causing sculptures derived from that mineral to become a relatively hot commodity. The 
city of Brea, California, for instance lost its fourth large bronze sculpture, the 250-pound, 
The Spirit of Life (artist unknown), to theft in May of 2008 after already losing the 
previous three through similar crimes. The Wall Street Journal claims that artists 
worldwide have gradually abandoned the use of bronze in cast sculpture, because of the 
copper found in bronze, which elevates the risk of theft for cast bronze objects 
(http://online.wsj.com/rticles/SB120959221333557457, electronically retrieved July 19, 
2014). Other examples of sculptures stolen and melted for scrap metal are Barbara 





England in 2011and Henry Moore’s Reclining Figure (1929), stolen from the estate of 
the Henry Moore Foundation in Much Hadham, Hertfordshire, in December 2005 
(http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB12095922133355745, electronically retrieved July 19, 
2014).  
Unlike banks, many smaller commercial art galleries and public art museums lack 
the security infrastructure needed to adequately deter theft, a weakness thieves often 
exploit. Such was the unfortunate circumstance of the E.G. Bürhrle Collection in Zurich 
Switzerland, when four masterpieces, Cezanne’s Boy in the Red Waistcoat (1888), 
Monet’s Poppies near Vétheuil (1879), Van Gogh’s Blossoming Chestnut Branches 
(1890) and Degas’ Count Lepic and his Daughters (1871) valued at $163 million, were 
stolen during museum hours by a group of armed, masked men on February 10, 2008. 
(Harnischfeger & Kulish, 2008.; Conklin, 1994) (a more thorough discussion of security 
will be continued later in this chapter).  
If stakes are often high for smaller, underfunded public institutions, or smaller 
commercial galleries, art crimes themselves often carry comparably lower risks for 
perpetrators. If art thieves do find themselves overtaken and apprehended by authorities, 
if prosecuted and convicted, penalties are nominal and prison sentences short, due 
especially to the lack of specified parameters for the punishment of art crime in the penal 
codes. According to Robert Whitman, a former undercover agent in the FBI’s art crime 
division, “even when the most important perps do go to jail . . . it’s only to be for a few 
years” (http://www.newsweek.com/2013/05/15/some-crime-does-pay-art-heist-
237342.html, electronically retrieved July 19, 2014). Conklin (1994) agrees and reports 





objects serve comparatively lighter sentences versus crimes involving other types of 
objects. Furthermore, in the U.S., some art crime cases are tried in civil rather than 
criminal courts. Conklin posits that if more severe penalties were threatened and carried 
out, it would reduce the frequency and occurrence of art crimes in the U.S. (p. 275). For 
example, when a bold thief was found guilty and convicted of stealing a historic bayonet, 
cap, and a patch from a veterans’ museum in Parkersburg, West Virginia, August of 
2014, the museum placed a sarcastic sign outside its building announcing, “Steal From 
Us, No Jail Time!” 
(http://www.newsandsentinel.com/page/content.detail/id/595214/Detroit-s-CFO-calls-
financial-controls--very-poor-.html?nav=5073, electronically retrieved May 23, 2016). 
Hence, portability, high exchange or material value of stolen objects, the lack 
of transparency and industry regulation for commercial art transactions and the art 
market, justifiable reluctance by institutions to report art crimes, and the mutual distrust 
between law enforcement, the judicial system, and the art world that results from what is 
often excessively lenient prosecution, art objects remain attractive targets for theft 
worldwide. 
 
The Perpetrators of Art Crime 
Art thieves represent a diverse community of criminals. They are neither more or 
less likely than other criminals to be affluent, poor, or individuals operators of criminal 
organizations. They come from and operate in virtually every nation throughout the 
globe. Because of the wide variety of personalities and incentives that drive art thieves in 





personality profiles for art thieves, the way these agencies do for terrorists, serial killers, 
sex offenders, and other kinds of high risk criminals. As a result, these criminals are even 
harder to track and apprehend. The shrewdly unethical oligarch with an ever-growing 
collection of contraband works of art who patronizes various skilled art thieves is largely 
a myth, and most crimes are not committed to bolster the ego of some criminal 
mastermind. According to Detective Hrycyk of the Los Angeles Police Department’s 
(LAPD) Art Theft Detail:  
Very little art theft is commissioned . . . there is no ‘Dr. No’ community of 
art collectors. Why would you put your future in the hands of a thief 
who’ll turn you over in a second? The Cooperstown of art thieves is 
peopled by students, Hungarian auto mechanics, ophthalmologists, 
university administrators, and septuagenarians who will goldbrick anyone 
in nearly any way for nearly any reason: jealousy, collateral, artistic 
aspiration, wagers, and charity. The one uniting trait? They are 
consummate opportunists.” (Ramsey, 2004, p. unknown). 
Former Special Agent Wittman adds that the one element that art thieves share is “brute 
greed” (Wittman and Shiffman, 2010, p. 15). 
 
Typologies of Art Thieves 
Several different typologies or profiles for art thieves have been proposed for 
various criminal databases. Bonnie Burnham (1978) devised such a theoretical approach 
after analyzing the data derived from her study of U.S. museums and art dealers and 
proposed that the ideal target location is most often a large metropolitan area, and the 
criminal profile is a petty thief stealing for quick sale, or because of some impulsive 
desire for an object. A small piece currently on display, possibly a sculpture, is the likely 





Barelli (1984) conducted face to face interviews with two art thieves in London, UK, as 
part of his doctoral dissertation on art and antique theft in England. He concludes that 
there are two types of art thieves: the professional and the amateur. The professional art 
thief is: 
intelligent, possibly well educated, [and] has learned to use the art and antiques market 
for the purpose of making money illegitimately . . . [he] fits in with legitimate society, 
and the legitimate art and antique markets. He is articulate, well spoken, and is confident 
in his approach and presentation. He will research specific objects to meet his needs of 
disposing the object (s) into the art and antique markets to make money, and avoid 
detection (p. 212). 
 
 
The amateur thief is the other typology proposed by Barelli. Art theft is not the 
exclusive focus of the amateur, and, lacking any extensive criminal network, the amateur 
thief likely lacks the connections, resources, and expertise necessary to dispose of stolen 
loot discreetly, making this sort of thief easier for authorities to catch. Barelli suggests the 
amateur art thief is more impulsive, tending not to conduct extensive research on specific 
objects or the facilities in which they are kept by museums or commercial galleries. Like 
employees who steal from their places of work, juvenile criminals, or misdemeanor 
shoplifters, amateur art thieves take greater risks and act more impulsively (Barelli, 1984, 
p. 212). 
In Ho’s (1992) personal interviews with New York art dealers (1994), she learned 
that 38.2% of the respondents believed specialized professional art thieves steal work the 
most often, as opposed to the jack-of-all-trades professional (the most frequent offender 
according to 10.9% of respondents), the common thief (25.5% of respondents), or art-
obsessed individuals (24.4% of respondents) (p. 75). The majority of Ho’s (1992) 





by art enthusiasts with easy access (11.3%), low risk of arrest (7.5%), and minimal 
penalties if caught (1.9%) (p. 76). The data on the prevalence, frequency, and 
characteristics of art theft in Australia, collected by Aarons (2001), found that most 
curators and dealers believed that the art thieves stole what they could not afford from 
galleries, or to acquire specific prestigious pieces. Aarons’ respondents expressed the 
belief that opportunism rather than art obsession motivated art theft, however.  
MacKenzie (2005) also proposes two different leading types for art thieves 
aligned along similar but different guidelines: the art-motivated instead of the amateur, 
and the profit-driven instead of the professional. The art-motivated thief is compelled by 
an obsessive need to personally possess and control a work of art. The art-motivated thief 
wants to keep a stolen work for him- or herself and hides his or her loot in a private 
setting, where the thief can enjoy the pieces or pieces whenever he or she pleases. The 
art-motivated thief, according to MacKenzie, likely lacks a criminal history and is not 
systematic (p. 353). This is not to say the art-motivated thief will not engage in an 
excessive crime spree, such as that of Dr. Frank Waxman, a Philadelphia osteopath, who 
stole 170 works of art from “dealers desks, gallery stockrooms, and delivery trucks after 
signing into the galleries with fictitious and often pretentious names,” all over in the 
United States for eight years. When the police finally caught up to Waxman in 1982, they 
found him and all 170 artworks, valued at more than $1 million, in his Philadelphia 
apartment (Conklin, 1994, p. 132). Similarly, Stefan Breitwiser, a 31-year-old French 
waiter, managed to steal 239 pieces from various European museums, galleries and 
antique fairs from 1995 until 2001. When he reflected on the first painting he ever stole, a 





1744), Breitwiser explained how he was captivated by “the beauty, the qualities of the 
woman, by her eyes,” which he said reminded him of his grandmother 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/17/magazine/17art.t.html?pagewanted=print, 
electronically retrieved July 19, 2014).  Breitwiser was uninterested in financial gain 
from the pieces he stole and kept them in his bedroom in the home where he lived with 
his mother, to enjoy as he pleased. Once apprehended, Breitwiser’s mother burned many 
of the works to destroy evidence during the investigation.  
According to MacKenzie (2005), profit-motivated thieves are professionals and 
more likely to conduct their criminal endeavors as a group. Profit-motivated art thieves 
tend to be less inclined to ensure a stolen artwork remains undamaged and heists are 
more likely to involve violent confrontations. These thieves do what is necessary to 
capture their loot and complete the transfer of holding in order to earn the highest price, 
usually as quickly as possible. Nicita & Rizzolli (2009) concluded in their case study of 
Edvard Munch’s The Scream (1893), which has been stolen multiple times by different 
thieves, that an art thief’s best strategy for successfully turning over stolen loot quickly 
and profitably is to focus on capturing less famous, second-tier masterpieces since 
famous masterpieces draw too much scrutiny and risk of discovery (p. 297). This type of 
thief, a version of Barelli’s professional, or Mackenzie’s profit-driven art thief has also 
been described as a “smart thief” by Lynn Pearson, a former director at the Art Theft 
Archive, a division of the International Foundation for Art Research. Pearson describes 
this common profile of an art thief as someone who pursues more accessible, lesser-
known works in smaller collections or gallery inventories, which he or she can quickly 





The dealer can then sell it to an ethically flexible collector for just under market value, or 
sell it to another dealer so that, after circulating through the market a number of times, the 
integrity of its provenance is restored enough to appear legitimate. The individuals who 
run these types of thief-fence scenarios are astute and intelligent professionals who know 
how to conduct their illicit business in such a way that it attracts minimal scrutiny from 
investigating authorities and are rarely caught (Pearson, 1986, p. 3).  
The criminal profiles discussed above share many similarities, but a lack of a 
definitive psychological profile for the typical art thief personality inhibits efficient 
apprehension and prosecution of art crimes. A valuable future research direction in the 
study of art crimes would be to qualitatively examine the personalities and behaviors of 
art thieves, to arrive at a more comprehensive profile that could be applied to 
investigations across the world.  
 
Art Theft Strategies 
Art thieves implement different strategies for works stolen from public art 
museums and private galleries.  
 
Employee theft strategy 
Inside jobs are the most common and account for 80% of all museum thefts, 
according to Special Agent Goldman 
(http://search.proquest.com.echo.louisville.edu/pqrl/printviewfile?accountid =14665, 
electronically retrieved January 22, 2013). An employee, a volunteer, a visiting scholar, 





institution’s security protocols for protecting its collection. Eligible for a cut of the profits 
from the theft of an object or objects from the public collection to which he or she has 
unprecedented access, the insider either helps professional thieves steal artworks, or 
absconds with the works themselves (Spadanuta, 2011). Collateral damage to the 
institution that is victim to inside jobs ranges from public and internal embarrassment 
along with feelings of being violated and betrayed from a trusted steward of their 
collection. Lynne Richardson, former manager of the FBI’s Art Theft Program, cites that 
insider-connected thieves usually steal smaller, less noticeable objects (Falkenstein, 2005, 
p. 136). Such was the case of an art handler, Nick Pace, who worked for the Art Institute 
of Chicago, who stole three Cézanne paintings valued at a total of $75 million in 1978. 
The thief gained access to a closet in one of the museum’s storage vaults, and then held 
them for ransom. The perpetrator claimed to be an intermediary in a Mafia-financed art 
theft operation. He was arrested and served 10 years in prison (Falkenstein, 2005, p. 136).  
Approximately 20 years later, Earnest Medford, a longtime custodian at the Historical 
Society of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia, described by co-workers as "congenial and well-
liked," was arrested, tried, and convicted of theft of more than 200 "culturally significant 
historic artifacts," and sentenced to four years in federal prison 
(http://articles.philly.com/1999-05-25/living/25515262_1_museum-thefts-earnest-
medford-museum-director, electronically retrieved July 31, 2014). 
Individual artists can also find themselves victims of art theft by cataloguers and other 
employees who work with their estate collections. In 2014, James Meyer, Jasper Johns’ 
former assistant, pled guilty to the interstate transportation of stolen unfinished works by 





million profit for himself) between 2006 and 2012. Meyer pled guilty to the charges and 
he was recently sentenced to 18 months in prison on April 23, 2015 
(http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/04/23/during-sentencing-jasper-johnss-assistant-
says-he-regrets-betrayal/?_r=0, electronically retrieved May 1, 2015).   
 
Art Print Theft as a Strategy 
Certain types of institutions and collections are particularly vulnerable to theft. 
Works on paper, and prints especially, are often stolen, and losses can go unnoticed for 
long periods of time given the multiple series and states in which art prints are published. 
Ho (1994) found that 3 New York print dealers reported employee thefts having been an 
issue because the sheer volume and turnover of print inventories make it difficult to keep 
track of objects (p. 133).  
 
Art Theft Motivations 
The personalities and strategies of art thieves explored, there are likewise myriad 
reasons that motivate art theft beyond simply financial reward or obsessive fascination. 
The reasons behind art heists throughout history present as many unexpected and even 
irrational motivations behind these crimes. Ranging from the band of thieves hoping to 
pilfer a trophy to a disgruntled security guard seeking revenge, to over-zealous curators 
convinced they can care for priceless works of art better than their seemingly 
disinterested institutions, art thieves are driven by as many emotional justifications as 
predictable financial gain.  Conklin (1994) identifies eight common psychological 





collectors, (3) for sale for dishonest dealers, (4) for consignment to auction houses, (5) on 
speculation, (6) for investment, (7) for ransom, and, (8) for political purposes” (p. 130). 
 
The Personal-Possession Art Theft Motivation 
Motivation for personal possession essentially fits the same profile as 
MacKenzie’s art-motivated thief, described above. Someone driven by such an obsession 
was the French alarm technician, Partrick Vialaneix, whose fascination with Rembrandt 
van Rijn’s, undated Child with a Soap Bubble started when he was 13 and first saw it at 
La Musée Municipal d'Art et Histoire in Draguignan, France. In 1999, Vialeneix, then 28, 
stole the painting by mastering the museum’s security system, hiding in the museum after 
hours on Bastille Day, and carefully removing the painting from its plastic case. 
Vialeneix hid the painting in his bedroom closet for 15 years, until his overwhelming 
guilt compelled him to turn himself in and return the lost painting to the museum 
(http://www.artnews.com/2014/05/28/french-rembrandt-thief-lives-real-life-version-of-
goldfinch-story/, electronically retrieved May 29, 2014). 
 
The Contractual-Obligation Art Theft Motivation 
When a thief steals an artwork on commission for a collector, the expectation is 
that a successful robber will sell his prize to a prearranged collector for a high sum 
(Conklin, 1994). Such art-crime scenarios are sometime referred to as “made-to-order 
thefts.” An example of such a professionally-driven, “made-to-order” theft was on 
December 31, 1999, when a thief broke through a skylight at Oxford University’s 





space to obscure the view of the crime being committed by active security cameras, and 
stole Paul Cézanne’s Auvers-sur-Oise, valued at $5 million. The picture was just one in a 
room full of extremely valuable canvases by the Post-Impressionist, so investigating 
authorities posited that job was intended to obtain a specific object for a specific buyer. 
(Lyall, 2000), 
(http://www.oxfordmail.co.uk/news/10927154.C__zanne_back_in_the_frame 
at_Ashmolean/, electronically retrieved September 20, 2014). Frequently, such crimes 
prove to be tied to relationships between certain professional thieves and dishonest 
dealers. Such an unscrupulous dealer knowingly buys stolen art, and may, in some cases, 
also be the mastermind behind such thefts as of Ashmolean’s Cézanne. Boston art dealer 
Michael Fildes was one such dealer. Convicted in 1984 of conspiracy, and transporting 
and receiving stolen property across state lines, Fildes worked with a specific art thief to 
acquire works that met a set of pre-agreed requirements. When the thief eventually 
testified against Fildes in criminal court, it emerged that Fildes had given the thief clear 
specifications as to what type of work he wanted in terms of imagery, size and artists. As 
punishment, the judge sentenced Fildes to serve five years on probation, pay a fine of 
$300,000, and complete 1,000 hours of public service by giving lectures on art to 
disadvantaged urban youth in the Boston region (Conklin, 1994, p. 137).  
When thieves steal artworks for consignment to auction houses, the approach and 
outcome are similar, but the successful thief consigns the work(s) stolen to a third party, 
in this case an auction house, to sell it for them. The thief discreetly steals a work or 
works of art, and consigns it to an art auction house, such as Swann Gallery or Skinner, 





catalogues such businesses produce ahead of highly anticipated sales. If the object sells 
the thief will receive a commission, as was the case of a thief who took antique dolls 
from houses she rented, and consigned them to the major art auctioneer, Christie’s. 
Guiltily, the thief eventually confessed to the crime and returned some of the proceeds 
from the auction sale to the dolls’ owners (Conklin, 1994, p. 141).  
 
The Speculative and Investment Art Theft Motivation 
Thieves that work on speculation steal artworks without having pre-arranged with 
a buyer to off-load the object was obtained. In some instances, thieves will steal an 
unplanned object along with the others planned, even if they have no idea what they have 
stolen, how to sell it, or how to pass it off to a fence. For example, drug addicts shoplifted 
solid bronze sculptures from New York galleries and sold them for the scrap value of the 
bronze. In one instance of a speculation-motivated theft, a group of thieves travelled from 
city to city, dressed in workmen’s clothes, and stole pieces from public art museums’ 
vitrine cases during daylight hours, and then shipped each object to a central location via 
Federal Express. Because the group had no fence arranged in advance, they identified 
potential buyers by looking in the windows of art galleries and antique shops until they 
spotted objects similar to those they had to sell. Incredibly, although they made it 
consistently clear to each dealer that they were selling stolen objects, they still managed 
to find buyers. Their streak of luck came to an end once one of the team asked the price 
of $1 million for a vase valued at only $35,000 to a dealer who turned out to be more 
honorable, and called the police, who eventually found and arrested those involved in this 





is to steal random objects, only to then hide them for a number of years until either the 
theft is forgotten, and/or the value of the object increases dramatically. In the theft on 
investment thieves deliberately hold stolen works of art for the long-term until the statute 
of limitations for prosecution of the theft runs out. Another investment-motivated art theft 
scenario involves a thief using the stolen work as collateral for a loan. Again, once the 
statute of limitations expires, the lender can sell the work with the hope of both 
reimbursing the loan and making profit on top (Conklin, 1994, p. 143-44).  
 
The Ransom Art Theft Motivation 
Ransom theft for personal gain, also known referred to as “art-napping,” involves 
holding high-value objects to extort money from insurance companies or public art 
museums. Ransom theft is especially risky for the thief, and more often than not the 
victimized party cannot afford the ransom, or simply refuses to pay it. The considerable 
financial leverage many large insurers have at their disposal can also empower brokers to 
counter ransoms with offers of financial reward for the artwork’s return. Sometimes, 
handling a ransom theft through these means is preferable to paying what can be the more 
expensive option of paying out the victimized institution’s claim. Technically for a 
financial institution, this former approach, ethically dubious though it might be, is usually 
better for business and offsetting risk. Insurance companies that offer such rewards for 
the return of stolen objects are often criticized by the arts community for short-
sightedness, because this approach in the long run can be seen to generate a considerable 
conflict of interest for insurers whose reward strategies might stimulate the incidence of 





insurance premiums for the victimized institutions. Insurance providers can mitigate this 
ethical gray area by allowing a lengthy period of time between the theft and the collection 
of the reward, so that thieves unable to sell loot thus flagged by authorities have no 
choice but to return the work for compensation for the crime committed. Professional 
thieves tied to organized-crime networks have greater success in art-napping strategies 
because they must arrange for collection of the ransom without exposing themselves to 
arrest. This endeavor is usually only possible through leverage gained also from 
corruption and bribery in the agencies and authorities pursuing the arrest of the art-
nappers.  
An interesting example of art-napping occurred in 1975, when Milan’s Galleria 
d'Arte Moderna paid the ransom for the return of 28 paintings stolen from their galleries. 
Three months later, thieves stole another 38 pictures from the same gallery, half of them 
the same pictures taken in the first theft (Conklin, 1994; Aarons, 2001; Naylor, 2008; 
Ramsey, 2004).  
 
 The Political Purpose Art Theft Motivation 
Art-napping thefts can also be politically motivated, especially in countries 
rendered unstable from economic difficulties or war. Terrorists, revolutionaries, and 
others who steal for political reasons will demand ransoms to finance their political 
activities the same as they would from kidnapped individuals. Other demands might 
include the release of prisoners who are members of their political group in exchange for 
the return of the stolen art work. Some thieves can also steal art to raise money for 





Fine Arts Museum of Brussels in 1971, and then demanded a $4.8 million ransom be paid 
to support Bengali refugees.
 
 In another episode of politically-motivated or activist 
ransom theft, a group of art thieves that styled themselves as the Australian Cultural 
Terrorists stole Pablo Picasso’s The Weeping Woman (1937), valued at $1.2 million, from 
Australia’s National Gallery of Victoria in Melbourne in the late summer of 1986. The 
group threatened to destroy the picture unless the Australian government increased arts 
funding by 10% and established a $15,000 annual prize for young artists. Ultimately, the 
Australian Cultural Terrorists’ demands were rejected, the perpetrators apprehended, and 
the painting recovered. In a far more sinister scenario, Cambodian political factions 
successfully raised funds to support their military coup through ransom theft of treasured 
artifacts from the country’s ancient Angkor Wat complex, and from various warehouse 
repositories. These works of art were smuggled into neighboring Thailand and sold 
secretly. Similar situations are common throughout destabilized regions of Central Asia, 
where, for example, the Afghanistan Northern Alliance sold three million pounds of 
looted Bactrian art to a Pakistani group in order to fund their war effort against 
marauding Taliban (Conklin, 1994; Aarons, 2001; Fidler, 2003). In a curious instance of 
an unsuccessful though well-intentioned ransom theft described by Ulrich (2009), a thief 
stole Marc Chagall’s 1914 drawing, A Study for Over Vitebsk, on loan from a private 
Russian collection to the Jewish Museum in New York. Investigating authorities found a 
ransom note in the gallery that announced the stolen work would only be returned when 
Israel and Palestine made and maintained peace with one another. These demands not 






underworld-of-art, electronically retrieved 7/19/14). 
Another political motive for art theft in Europe specifically has been to create 
leverage to negotiate early release from prison terms, or the proverbial “get-out-of-jail-
free card.” In these instances, criminal organizations stockpile stolen works and tap into 
the loot for ransoms aimed at bribing officials for more lenient sentences or even early 
releases from incarceration for other members of the organization who have been arrested 
and imprisoned for various crimes. Wittman suggests during his interview that the thieves 
who steal artworks for bribery leverage are usually also stealing cars, trafficking drugs, 
engaged in arms dealing, and myriad other criminal enterprises, making them easier to 
prosecute if arrested (https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/No-Artistry-in-These-Crimes.aspx , 
electronically retrieved 7/18/14).  According to Boser (2010), Myles Connor, a notorious 
art thief, stole Rembrandt’s Portrait of a Man In A Gold-Trimmed Cloak (1632) in 1974 
from the Museum of Fine Art, Boston, and later offered it in exchange for a lower 
sentence for a conviction on a different art crime  
(online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704026204575266293870407552, 
electronically retrieved 7/18/14). More recently in 2013, FBI agents offered to drop 
suspected Gardner art theft perpetrator, Robert Gentile’s charges of weapons possession 
and illegal sale of prescription drugs in exchange for information about the location of the 
stolen paintings (http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/18/arts/design/arrest-by-fbi-is-tied-to-







Art Theft and Money Laundering 
Stolen art can be linked to money laundering. Industries such as banking and real 
estate have tightened regulations. As a high-value, though not necessarily liquid asset, 
stolen artworks can be used as short- to long-term investment vehicles to sequester illicit 
profits from criminal activity. As discussed previously, the overall secrecy of the art 
market, with its lack of enforced accounting regulations, and the arbitrary nature of 
provenance as the definitive index for the authentication and valuation of works of art, 
creates incentives within the art market for unethical transactions. According to Purkey 
(2010) money launderers increasingly turn to the art market to replace off-shore safe 
haven and subsidiary strategies now under tighter regulations by government agencies 
worldwide (Purkey, 2010; Fidler, 2003; James, 2000). For example, a drug cartel member 
may need to quickly hide his cash profits and will buy stolen artwork(s), or, even better, 
works of art whose value has recently fallen in order to deflect suspicion from the 
authorities. The cartel member will then sell the art for the same original purchase price 
to a legitimate art dealer who will create documents that show a significant profit from 
the sale of the art which will account for the extra cash in the drug dealer’s bank account. 
The piece of stolen art will now become legitimate as a commodity in the art market 
(Bernick, 1998, p. 105). Organized crime syndicates have, according to Conklin (1994), 
“consistently been identified as one of the black market’s best customers” (p. 496). In 
some cases, stolen works of art can be used in lieu of large cash positions to transact sales 
of arms, drugs, human trafficking, and other lucrative illegal activities.  (Durney & 
Proulx, 2011; Naylor, 2008; Conklin, 1994; Bernick, 1998; Dobovšek & Slak, 2013). In 





boss in the Neapolitan Camorra, the equivalent to the Sicilian Mafia, they discovered a 
large cache of stolen art objects decorating its interior. Italian newspapers called it "the 
Camorra's Louvre”.  A year earlier, Italian investigators tracked down 27 additional 
artworks stolen from a museum in Bettona, in a secret facility in Kingston, Jamaica, 
where it served as exchange value for large drug shipments 
(http://www.nytimes.com/1992/08/02/arts/art-art-thieves-bleed-italy-s-heritage.html, 
electronically retrieved September 21, 2014).  Stolen art also adds the allure, ostentation, 
and prestige desired by higher-ranking leaders in organized crime syndicates. Put bluntly 
to a Washington Post reporter, a federal agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) described the air of sophistication stolen works bring to the lairs of the criminals 
his agency investigates and tracks: “They go out to a business meeting, shoot somebody, 
come home and there’s a Picasso on the wall-it tends to legitimize them” 
(http://search.proquest.com.echo.louisville.edu/docview/307397150/fulltext/ 
32A6B422C7A648B0PQ/1?accountid=14665; Webb, 2008; http://www.usnews.com/ 
news/articles/2009/05/29/crime-and-picasso-the-shadowy-underworld-of-art). Some 
organized criminal organizations are particularly active in the black market for stolen 
works of art, including, according to Purkey (2010), East Asian gangsters, the IRA, and 
Latin-American drug cartels (p. 121). Ordinary individuals might use this market for 
similar reasons as well, in order hide income and avoid taxes, much like off-shore 








Some Global Approaches to Fighting Art Crime 
Given the variety of motivations, forms of art crimes, huge monetary losses at 
stake, and costs to global society’s cultural heritage and artifacts, many countries have 
recognized the dire importance to develop solutions to fight art crime. One response has 
been the formation of specialized art crime units.  
 
Art Crime Law Enforcement Units 
Not all law enforcement agencies fail to take art crime seriously, and there are 
numerous specialized units whose primary objective is the recovery of stolen cultural 
property. Internationally, the largest such agency is Italy’s Carabinieri Headquarters for 
the Protection of Cultural Heritage (Comando Carabinieri Tutela Patrimonio Culturale - 
TPC), established in 1969. Over three hundred officers help protect Italy’s cultural 
property by preventing art crime internationally. In the United Kingdom, the 
Metropolitan Police’s Scotland Yard Art and Antiquities Unit (SYAA Unit), formed the 
same year, disbanded, but then re-established in 1989. Their official mission is to disrupt 
“criminal networks engaged in theft and laundering of cultural property within London” 
(http://content.met.police.uk/Site/artandantiques, electronically retrieved September 3, 
2014). When faced with significant budget cuts in 2007, the SYAA Unit created ArtBeat, 
a program that utilizes ten special constables, known as ArtBeat officers, which partners 
with the Metropolitan Police, and the arts industry, from which ArtBeat also recruits its 
constables. Arts organizations throughout the UK provide allowances for interested 






patrol/1260267473067/1257246745756, electronically retrieved September 4, 2014).  
Other specialized worldwide art crime teams include Spain’s Heritage Team of 
the Central Operational Unit of the ‘Guardia Civil’, Poland’s National Unit for 
Combating Crime against National Heritage-the Criminal Investigation Bureau, Peru’s 
Police Division for Historical Heritage (División de Patrimonio Historico Policial), the 
Netherland’s Art and Antiques Crime Unit, Lithuania’s Section of Investigation of 
Cultural and Art Theft, Ireland’s Arts and Antiques Unit, Hungary’s Art and Treasure 
Unit, and Greece’s Department Against Smuggling of Antiquities 
(http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/illicit-trafficking-of-cultural-
property/partnerships/specialized-police-forces/, electronically retrieved September 4, 
2014).  
In the United States there are two main art crime units: the Los Angeles Police 
Department’s Art Theft Detail (est. 1984), and the FBI’s Art Crime Team. The LAPD 
unit is the only municipal law enforcement detail in the country devoted solely to the 
investigation of all thefts and burglaries involving art, and their cases also include fakes, 
frauds, and forgeries. Two detectives are assigned to this specialized unit and these 
investigators “target suspects who prey upon” artists, galleries, art dealers, auction 
houses, and museums, and provide information on unrecovered stolen art to these 
organizations, in addition to art associations, publications, and other law enforcement 
agencies – both nationally and internationally. Since 1993, the LAPD’s Art Theft Detail 





(http://www.lapdonline.org/about_the_art_theft_detail, electronically retrieved March 15, 
2018). 
The FBI’s Art Crime Team was created in 2004 in response to the extensive 
looting and vandalism of the Iraqi National Museum Baghdad in 2003 during the U.S. 
invasion, and the subsequent political pressure and public outrage (Webb, 2008; Parmar, 
2005). Today, the department consists of 16 special agents, each assigned in a separate 
geographic region of the United States. The Art Crime Team is coordinated through the 
FBI’s Art Theft Program, managed by Bonnie Magness-Gardiner, PhD. According to 
Magness-Gardiner, Art Crime Team agents receive yearly specialized training in art and 
cultural property investigations and assist foreign law enforcement officials and FBI legal 
attaché offices in art related investigations worldwide. Agents are educated in technical 
art fields, such as conservation, art handling, as well through lectures and collection visits 
with auctioneers, art dealers and other experts. Magness-Gardiner emphasizes that “this 
kind of material requires special expertise. It has special qualities. For example, there are 
no serial numbers on pieces of art, so they have to be categorized in other ways.” Agents 
need to understand which qualities distinguish one work of art from another, and they 
need to know who they can call on for advice. (Webb, 2008, p. 29). Three specialized 
prosecutors are also assigned to the Art Crime Team, in the event of an arrest 
(http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/vc_majorthefts/arttheft/art-crime-team, 
electronically retrieved August 31, 2014).  
Recovery rates are comparatively impressive for the FBI’s Art Crime Team, and 
as of 2018, the unit has recovered over 14, 850 items worth $16 million. The team not 





File (NSAF), which is “a computerized index of stolen art and cultural property as 
reported to the FBI by law enforcement agencies throughout the United States and the 
world.” The NSAF consists of images and physical descriptions of stolen and recovered 
objects, in addition to investigative case information. The primary goal of the NSAF is to 
serve as a tool to assist investigators in art and cultural artifact theft cases, as well as 
function as an analytical database providing law enforcement officials with information 
concerning art theft. The public can search an online version of the National Stolen Art 
File, minus the investigative information” (http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/investigate/vc_majorthefts/arttheft/national-stolen-art-file, electronically retrieved 
April 1, 2018).  
Criteria for inclusion in the database are that the stolen object needs to be 
uniquely identifiable, have historical or artistic significance, and be valued at $2,000 or 
over. All the investigation requests must come through a law enforcement agency 
accompanied by a physical description of the object, a photograph of the object if 
available, and a copy of any police reports or other information relevant to the 
investigation” (http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/vc_majorthefts/arttheft/national-
stolen-art-file, electronically retrieved on September 13, 2014).  Started in 1979, the 
database sources information from local and state law enforcement agencies, insurance 
companies, public art museums, commercial galleries, and private collectors. The FBI, 
for the most part, does not investigate reports of theft from this database. However, they 
do investigate the reports that have been entered that meet the criteria for FBI jurisdiction 
by violating the Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property Act and the Theft of Major 





agency that initiated the investigation (B. Magness-Gardiner, personal communication, 
August 22, 2014).  
Figure [3.3]: Source: National Stolen Art File, Federal Bureau of Investigation (B. Magness-
Gardiner, personal communication, August 22, 2014).  
As of 2014, the NSAF had 1,483 theft reports with 7,005 stolen objects, and 183 
recovery reports with 591 objects secured. Dr. Magness-Gardiner reports that the 
recovery rate is approximately 6 percent, and the NSAF becomes aware of recovered 
objects only if the affected person or institution who filed the report notifies the agency, 
or if the NSAF locates objects through its own investigations. It should be noted that the 
art crime team and the NSAF recoveries are not always related since the FBI does not 
investigate all of the stolen objects on the NSAF (B. Magness-Gardiner, personal 
communication, August 22, 2014).  
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In addition to the NSAF, several other law-enforcement databases track stolen 
cultural property. Interpol, the largest international police organization, does not 
investigate art thefts, but the agency will act as a clearinghouse for information on stolen 
art. Interpol art theft posters are published twice a year, and show a sampling of 
Interpol’s reported missing works of art wanted for recovery.  Interpol also coordinates 
information between international agencies and organizations including law enforcement, 
customs and the art industry, with whom they organize “joint training sessions, 
conferences and workshops to share knowledge and best practices.” Interpol coordinates 
and integrates the stolen-art data . . . compiled by [its] partner agencies, particularly 
UNESCO, directly into [its] stolen art database, and disseminate other partner 
information to member countries, for example lists of cultural experts or of “at risk” 
objects” (http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Works-of-art/Works-of-art, electronically 
retrieved September 1, 2014). 
Interpol’s first published notices of stolen art appeared in 1947, following World 
War II. Today their tracking system is an online database accessible not only to law 
enforcement agencies but also to specific members of the public who have been provided 
with special access rights.  However, certain information can be garnered by the general 
public: “the most recent stolen works of art reported to Interpol, recovered works of art, 
works of art that have been recovered but remain unclaimed by their owners, stolen 
Afghan items, and stolen Iraqi items.” By the end of 2011, the database contained around 
40,000 records submitted by 125 countries, with more than 36,500 searches carried out 
that year. Approximately 2,000 stolen items have been recovered since the database was 





retrieved September 1, 2014; Webb (2008); Bazley (2010). The LAPD Art Theft Detail 
also has their stolen art included in their own online database, as does the Metropolitan 
Police’s London Stolen Art Database (LSAD), which currently contains 57,000 stolen 
objects.  The Italian Carbinieri also maintain a stolen art database, Leonardo, which 
contains 2.6 million objects of missing art. (Amineddoleh, 2014).  
There are also useful private databases organizing information on art crimes 
without ties to law enforcement. The Art Loss Register (ALR) is a London based 
organization that provides object registration, search and recovery services to collectors, 
the art trade, insurers and worldwide law enforcement agencies. The ALR is perhaps 
largest private database of stolen art, antiquities and collectibles. According to The New 
York Times, leads generated by the ALR assisted in the recovery of more than $250 
million worth of art by 2011(http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/21/arts/design/tracking-
stolen-art-for-profit-and-blurring-a-few-lines.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, electronically 
retrieved September 1, 2014). The ALR not only registers stolen art objects but also 
objects destroyed by fire or other means. Therefore, if a forged replica of the object 
appears on the market it will be detected as a fake (Webb, 2008). The Association of Art 
Museum Directors likewise maintains the Object Registry database, which features 
search engines focused on “New Acquisitions of Archeological Material and Works of 
Ancient Art,” and “Resolutions of Claims for Nazi-Era Cultural Assets” 
(https://aamd.org/object-registry/new-acquisitions-of-archaeological-material-and-works-
of-ancient-art/browse, electronically retrieved September 1, 2014).  
In conclusion, obviously more solutions to combat art crime must be developed. 





precedence from the viewpoint of department administrators.  Thankfully, protecting the 
world’s cultural treasures continues to be an ongoing mission for representatives within 
disciplines as diverse as museology, criminology, and political science.  
 
 
PART TWO – ART VANDALISM 
Art Vandalism in Art Museums and Art Galleries 
On August 20, 2014, a Canadian performance artist named Istvan Kantor walked 
into the Whitney Museum of Art with a black bag, wearing dark sunglasses. As he 
wandered through a highly anticipated Jeff Koons retrospective exhibition, he stopped in 
the third-floor gallery where Koons’ stainless-steel sculpture, Rabbit (1986), was on 
display. The vandal splattered red paint on a blank gallery wall in the shape of a large X 
and signed “Monty Carlton was here Aug. 20/2014” in black ink. A nearby visitor taking 
a selfie of her reflection in the iconic bunny alerted guards to the vandal’s presence and 
behavior, and Kantor was apprehended, removed from the museum, and taken to a 
hospital for a psychiatric evaluation. Meanwhile the museum evacuated the third floor for 
a few hours until the wall was repainted, and Kantor was released from the hospital a 
short time later.  
The events that took place at the Whitney in August 2014 were not Kantor’s first 
defacement of artwork. In 2005, he attempted to vandalize another Koons sculpture on 
display in Berlin, Germany, and in 2004 he tried to squeeze a capsule of blood onto 
Koons’ Michael Jackson and Bubbles sculpture in the Hamburger Bahnhof Museum, also 
in Berlin. Although other visitors in the gallery stopped him, and he only managed to 





campaign” was an ongoing art project: “I have always been breaking the rules of art . . . 
my art was always anti-establishment and anti-institutional . . . I consider my criminal 
activities the most creative part of my work” (http://nypost.com/2014/08/21/critic-
spatters-paint-on-wall-at-whitney-museums-jeff-koons-exhibit/, electronically retrieved 
August 23, 2014).  
Unlike crimes of art theft, less is known about acts of art vandalism, the 
incidences of which are usually collected under the broad category of vandalism, criminal 
mischief, or library offenses (Bazley 2010; Williams, 2008). The UCR definition of 
vandalism is “To willfully or maliciously destroy, injure, disfigure, or deface any public 
or private property, real or personal, without the consent of the owner or person having 
custody or control by cutting, tearing, breaking, marking, painting, drawing, covering 
with filth, or any other such means as may be specified by local law. Attempts are 
included” (https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/offense-
definitions, electronically retrieved on May 30, 2018).  
There are also no specialized police units devoted to investigating incidents of art 
vandalism. However, the impact of art vandalism may be graver than the effects of art 
theft both financially and the impact upon the damage of priceless artifacts of cultural 
heritage. Additionally, without specific “art vandalism” statutes the true severity of the 
crime will not be acknowledged and “the tangible and intangible value lost when an 
artwork is damaged or destroyed” will not be sufficiently punished (Williams, 2008, p. 
610). This lack of legal accountability could potentially encourage the commission of art 





  The definition of what constitutes art vandalism has changed over time. Up until 
the 19
th
 century, the term ‘vandalism’ specifically referred to the destruction of art 
objects with religious or political meaning, until its use began to refer to general property 
destruction (Cohen, 1973; Conklin, 1994). In his 1994 book, Art Crime, John Conklin 
defines art vandalism as “the intentional or negligent destruction of a work of art” (p. 
227). Excluded from this definition is destruction by the artist who created or still owns a 
work of art (p. 23), broadening Fine & Shatin’s (1985) definition of art vandalism as an 
intentionally destructive illegal act towards works of art.  
Although the victims of art vandalism are typically whomever owns the work 
defaced, gallery vandals do not normally single out and target institutions, rather a work’s 
creator(s), or “the public value [of a piece], what the museum and artwork represent, 
embody, and create” (Williams, 2008, p. 604). The destruction of art can result in 
significant financial losses to owners or to the insurance companies that cover damages to 
the object in question. Depending on the nature of the particular act of vandalism, 
bystanders’ safety might also be threatened (Williams, 2008).  
Similar to art theft, art vandalism differs from its normative counterpart; namely, 
with respect to the target of a vandal’s aggression-artworks. Works of art represent the 
unique cultural patrimony of a civilized society, are fragile, and irreplaceable (Williams. 
2008). When art work is damaged from a museum or gallery, not only is the work 
victimized, but so is the “institution, the values it symbolizes, and its mission to care for 
and display works of art for the public’s benefit” (Williams, 2008, p. 596). Williams 
(2009) further notes “works of art are not neutral objects but instead aim to elicit 





594) and “an attack on an artwork assaults the social order by targeting objects that 
embody shared cultural meaning” as opposed to objects that are attacked by non-art 
vandals (p. 595-596). Lastly, Williams (2008) also adds that legally, “socially valued 
works of art are “property plus public interest” and art vandalism thus threatens both 
interests” (p. 604). 
A few scholarly studies offer limited data on art vandalism as a category of art 
crime. One important study is Cordes & Turcan (1993), who conducted a survey of 
public museums and commercial art galleries in the UK to determine the frequency and 
degree of vandalistic acts within these institutions. Their study revealed that, out of the 60 
institutions that responded to the survey, 18 respondents experienced no incidents of 
vandalism within the past ten years, 37 of the respondents reported at least one incidence 
of vandalism in their galleries within the same time frame. Five respondents did not 
respond to the questionnaire. Typically, such damages resulted from scratches, scrapes, 
and mild penning of the works carried out by children under 15 who were trying to 
impress their friends. These forms of art vandalism were classified as minor acts and 
these vandals wish to remain anonymous and are rarely caught. The more serious damage 
such as slashing, stabbing, tearing, arson, or smashing is committed by experienced adult 
vandals who often wish to be noticed for their destructive acts and are more frequently 
arrested than the vandals who commit less severe acts of vandalism. Additionally, the 
vandals who intentionally cause more extensive damage to works of art may in the 
process risk public harm such as the group of men who violently attacked the Andres 





Scott (2009) also studied the extent and nature of art vandalism in the UK. Her 
research examined 250 British museums and galleries. Her findings indictate that the 
majority of her sample experienced no incidences of vandalism (51.9%). The next two 
highest frequencis reported were one to two incidences (23.7%) and three to five 
incidences (11.1%). Scott (2009) also examined the types of art vandalism. The most 
frequent methods of attacking works was pen/pencil marking (30 respondents), 
scratching/scoring with a sharp instrument (23 respondents), using food/drink (15 
respondents), and using physical violence (14 respondents). Motives for destruction of art 
was another variable which was a subject for inquiry. Accordingly, the top reasons for 
acts of vandalism stated by the respondents according to the forced answer choices 
analysis were: destruction for destruction’s sake (82 respondents), mental disturbance (52 
respondents), accident (46 respondents), publicity seeking (43 respondents), moral 
outrage (35 respondents), religious conviction (29 respondents), and political 
consternation (28 respondents).   
Occasionally art vandals are apprehended and prosecuted. Fine (1985) analyzed 
four cases of art vandalism involving Michelangelo’s Pietá (1498-99) in Saint Peter’s 
Basilica in Rome, Rembrandt van Rijn’s The Night Watch (1642) at the Rijksmuseum in 
Amsterdam, Rokeby Venus (1647-51) by Diego Velázquez in London’s National Gallery, 
and the Palace of Versailles site, in terms of what motivated the vandals, public response, 
and the legal consequences for the arrested vandals. In 1972, Lazlo Toth jumped over the 
barricade at St. Peter’s Basilica in Rome and struck Michelangelo’s Pietá with a hammer 
four or five times causing serious damage before he was apprehended. Claiming to be 





the mother of God did not exist and therefore had to be destroyed (Fine & Shantin, 1985). 
Instead of serving any prison time, Toth was declared mentally insane and was placed in 
a mental hospital for two years.  
In 1975, Wilhemus De Rijk, an unemployed language teacher, defaced 
Rembrandt’s large painting, The Night Watch, after he was refused admittance to 
Rijkmuseum in Amsterdam because he arrived after the museum had closed. When he 
returned the next day and gained admittance, De Rijk slashed the painting several times 
with a small knife until he was stopped by guards. When questioned, de Rijk explained 
that he had “had been sent by the Lord . . . [and] forced to do this by forces out of this 
earth” (p.143). De Rijk was committed to a mental institution and he committed suicide 
after one year of hospitalization.  
Mary Richardson’s 1914 defacement of Diego Velazquez’s Rokeby Venus in the 
National Gallery in London was politically motivated. A member of the British 
suffragettes in 1914, Richardson claimed the destructive act was meant as a public protest 
of the imprisonment of suffragette leader, Emmeline Pankhurst. According to witnesses, 
Richardson stood a few moments in front of the painting, then took out a meat cleaver 
and smashed the glass container that held the painting, and then hacked at the painting 
itself, slashing the surface seven times. (Adams, 1993). Mary was sentenced to 6 months 
in jail for her crime.  
In an act of vandalism that would likely have drawn considerable media attention 
and public rancor were it to occur in the present moment, three groups that called 
themselves the International Organization of the Jobless, the Revolutionary Workers, and 





de Versailles on June 25, 1978, causing extensive damage to the building and its art 
collections. The cost of repair was estimated at millions of francs. Three rooms and 
several major works of art commissioned by Napoleon were damaged, and two Breton 
separatists, Lionel Chéneviére and Patrick Montauzier, were identified, arrested, and 
convicted of “crimes tending to harm the state”. They were sentenced to 15 years 
imprisonment (p. 140). 
Fine and Shatin (1985) concluded and categorized the vandalism perpetrated on 
the Pietà and The Night Watch were by motivated extra-normal (in the religious or 
cosmic realm) forces, the media labeled the vandals as insane. The perpetrators of 
vandalism on the Rokeby Venus and Versailles Palace were deemed to be motivated by 
political protest and were labeled insane in a moral sense by the media.   
Given the various motives of art vandalism mentioned above it is important to 
elaborate upon this aspect of art vandalism. Dornberg (1987) asserts, attacks on art are 
not random occurrences, but typically motivated by divisive political convictions. Like 
Richardson’s National Gallery attack, or the bomb at Versailles, another British 
suffragette named Mary Wood slashed John Singer Sargent’s Portrait of Henry James 
(1913) in 1914 to demonstrate to the voting public that their nation’s art treasures would 
not be secure from willful destruction until women were granted as many political 
freedoms as men in the United Kingdom (Conklin, 1992, p. 246). In 1987, the Leonardo 
Cartoon (1499-1500), a rare drawing by the Renaissance master named in its title, was 
shot several times with a sawed-off shotgun by Robert Cambridge in 1987, while the 
object was being exhibited at The National Gallery in London, UK. Questioned by police, 





social, and economic conditions in Britain” (Fine & Shatin, 1985, p. 143). More recently, 
Maximo Caminero, a Dominican artist, picked up an ancient Chinese ceramic vase in an 
installation by the Chinese conceptual artist, Ai Weiwei, on display at the Perez Art 
Museum in Miami, Florida, and dropped it on the floor, causing it to shatter. According 
to Caminero, he was inspired by another work by the same artist called, Dropping a Han 
Dynasty Urn, which is a collection of sequential photographs that show the artist 
shattering an ancient vase to make a point about the arbitrary valuation of works of art, 
and the fragility of cultural objects. Caminero said that his own act was thus inspired by 
Ai Weiwei as a protest against what he contended was the exclusion of Miami artists’ 
work by the Pérez museum, and by similar institutions in the area 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/14/arts/design/man-gets-probation-in-attack-on-ai-
weiwei-vase.html?_r=0, electronically retrieved August 23, 2014).  
Other art vandals destroy works for religious reasons. A classic example of this 
rationalization is the damage of the Pieta (1498-99) by Lazlo Toth mentioned above. 
More recently, the world has witnessed ISIS assert its global reign of terror on the world 
by destroying of thousands of years of history. According to CBS News, ISIS’s 
archeological vandalism in the Iraqi city of Nimrud in April of 2015 was declared a war 
crime by UNESCO. The militants videotaped themselves smashing artifacts with 
sledgehammers and uprooting statues with bulldozers. The group is on a mission to 
destroy any imagery it deems as heresy in an attempt to erase the past and rewrite history 
(http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/isis-s-archaeological-vandalism-destroys-





Still others have destroyed art in the name of social activism. Homosexuality was 
protested by Hans Bruan when he attacked Rosy Times (unknown year) by Salomé with 
spray paint. “Assailing the painting, which depicted a homosexual, Bruan wanted to 
make a statement about how the show was not about art” (Dornberg, 198, p. 102). 
Additionally, Jabal Brown, a student at the Ontario College of Art and Design, vomited 
on Mondrian’s Composition in Red, White, and Blue (1930) as an ““artistic statement’ 
about “oppressively trite’ and “painfully banal” art” (Siebers, 2002, p. 238). Modern art 
was further protested by Pierre Pinoncelli in 2006 when he attacked Duchamp’s Fountain 
(1917), with a small hammer. Pinoncelli also attacked this same work by Duchamp in 
1993 by urinating on it and damaging it with a hammer. The reason that Pinoncelli gave 
for his outrageous behavior was that “he wanted to rescue the Duchamp work from its 
inflated status and restore it to its original use” (http://archive.courier-
journal.com/article/20071202/SCENE05/712020310/Why-vandalize-art-, electronically 
retrieved October 6, 2014).  
Many instances of art vandalism are the result of psychiatric illnesses and 
conditions, a prime example of which was Hans-Joachim Bohlmann, who poured sulfuric 
acid on Ruben’s Portrait of Archduke Albrecht (1559-1621) in 1982. Bohlmann claimed 
that “he had been troubled by the figure’s piercing eyes” (Siebers, 2002, p. 229). His wife 
had died in 1977 and Bohlmann had been suspected of vandalizing works of art since her 
death. Bohlmann has been nicknamed the “acid assassin” and in total he attacked 185 
works of art in six European cities. Also, in 1982, a young veterinary medicine student, 
Josef Nikolaus Kleer, who suffered from manic-depression violently struck Barnett 






Preventing Art Vandalism 
Security measures intended to prevent object vandalism are standard in most 
museums and galleries worldwide. In the mid-twentieth century, according to Mason 
(1975), former retired FBI senior art crime investigator, vandalism of museum collections 
typically occurred while public museums were open to the public, and little could be 
done to reasonably deter its activity (p. 66). He notes that the best defense against 
vandalism is the security guard because a security guard can react immediately to the 
vandal’s action, as opposed to an alarm which, may allow too much time to pass before 
the museum’s or gallery’s human element can stop the vandal’s actions. Mason does not 
discount the effectiveness of alarms, he posits that the guards are more efficient. Mason 
also recommends that local law enforcement be notified immediately.  
Steven Keller, a museum security expert and consultant, echoes Mason’s 
sentiments, “Vandalism is probably the most difficult thing to protect against”.  He 
recommends that the best strategy is to install a camera above the artwork that registers 
movement around the objects. When a visitor gets too close, the system will alert a guard 
stationed in the room. Keller acknowledges that the camera isn’t foolproof.  Robert 
Wittman, a former FBI agent with the art crime unit, adds that good sightlines for guards 
and a camera system are needed to help prevent vandalism. "I'd like to see a Plexiglas 
case around it, too, but I'm a security guy," he said, "I doubt the curators would want 
that" 
(http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000087239639044479990457804888034422605





In conclusion, art vandalism is an effective vehicle for portraying messages of 
protest, anger, and even psychological impairment. As militant groups and clever citizens 
become more effective in their methods of destruction, institutions who display art both 
inside and outside of their walls must be more prepared to prevent such annihilations 
from occurring.  
 
Chapter Conclusion 
After this granular examination of the dynamics of art theft and art vandalism 
several themes emerge. First, the deficit of respect and attention given to these crimes by 
the general public and law enforcement is disturbingly low. Secondly, criminal statutes 
and prosecution related to these forms of crimes slack rigorous enforcement and strong 
punitive measures. Third, compared to their general counterparts, art theft and art 
vandalism are not recognized by state criminal justice systems. In sum, all of these 
factors contribute to a culture ripe for art crime commission.  
The next chapter explores the role and properties of guardianship in art theft and 












Art Museum and Art Gallery Security-Introduction 
In 1990, Boston’s Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum (ISG) lost $300 million 
worth of Old Master paintings from its collections when two thieves dressed as police 
officers infiltrated the galleries with relative ease. In the aftermath of one of the twentieth 
century’s best-known art heists, the ISG made radical changes to their security program 
and practice. Prospective guards now undergo extensive training and background checks.  
Hidden cameras “of every size and capability” monitor the galleries 24 hours a day, and 
are equipped with lowlight image capture, night vision, and a wide range of motion 
controlled remotely. “I know of a number of larger institutions that don’t have anything 
close to what we do,” says Anthony Amore, who became the security director for the ISG 
five years ago and has obsessively built the massive case database that he revisits daily. 
The museum also acquired a theft insurance policy, having “brutally learned,” in 
Amore’s words, a “big lesson” (http://www.bostonmagazine.com/2010/03/gardner-heist/, 
electronically retrieved September 20, 2014). 
The Gardner theft raised the demand among arts institutions that house and/or 
exhibit valuable works of art for an agreed-upon industry standard for security programs. 





considerably less well-endowed museums than the ISG, the AAM now publishes a 
detailed “Suggested Practices for Museum Collections Space Security” document on their 
website for use by accredited museums ( https://www.aam-us.org/docs/professional-
resources/suggested-practices-for-museum-collections-space-
security.pdf?Status=Master&sfvrsn=2, electronically retrieved September 1, 2014).  
The largest museums typically have the budget to pursue state-of-the-art security 
systems and the best-trained personnel. The Smithsonian Institution, for example, boasts 
one of the most effective security teams in the in the world, and its guards maintain 
federally-mandated “law enforcement authority” to act against potential risk factors 
(Benny, 2013, p. 7). Similarly, The Metropolitan Museum of Art’s chief of security, John 
Barelli, relies upon his department’s strength in numbers, with his team of 600 
employees, sophisticated communications center, plainclothes detail, and armed officers 
at the museum’s entrances. Barelli proclaims “when people come into this museum, they 
see my security staff, and they know we mean business; they know if they do anything 
here, we are going to react, and they’re going to be taken care of”. (Danzinger, 2009, 
p.7).  
The larger proportion of the world’s museums, however, cannot replicate the 
multi-million-dollar security systems at work in gigantic institutions with millions of 
priceless objects like the Smithsonian or the Met. These institutions can find themselves 
embroiled in a seemingly unresolvable dilemma, such as in the 2012 case of the art thief, 
Radu Dogaru, who sued Rotterdam’s Kunsthal museum for negligence in making it too 
easy for him and his team to steal seven famous paintings worth $24 million. Contending 





undertook in part to make a public example of the Kunsthal’s foolishness and breech of 
public trust in not adequately securing works of art otherwise considered priceless objects 
of collective cultural patrimony. When Dogaru infiltrated the Kunsthal’s galleries, he 
found there were not even alarms or motion detectors on the paintings, and that the 
emergency exit in the back of the museum was unmonitored, not connected to any alarm 
system, and was unlocked. According to Caesar (2013), the valuable works were 
displayed close to an exit on the first floor of the museum and the wires that held the 
objects to the wall were weak. The museum incredibly employed no night-time security 
staff, and the CCTV did not cover the area of the museum where the thieves broke in. 
When an alarm did finally activate, it was not until long after the men had entered the 
institution and they escaped with their full haul of stolen paintings with relative ease. 
More like “shoplifting . . . than robbing a museum,” Dogaru and his colleagues found 
themselves in a treasure vault that, like the ISG and other smaller museums that have 
been the victims of art heists in the past 30 years, had less security than a common retail 
shop (https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/17/magazine/what-is-the-value-of-stolen-
art.html, electronically retrieved September 1, 2014). Regardless, the Kunsthal, like other 
institutions in its predicament, maintains the fiction that “adequate security measures had 
been taken” and no further investment is needed in its security infrastructure 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/17/world/europe/Picasso-and-Monets-Are-Stolen-
From-Dutch-Museum.html, electronically retrieved September 1, 2014).  
The Dogaru versus the Rotterdam Kunsthal was a rare sensational public case, but 
accusations of criminal negligence between institutions, especially in the context of loan 





disputes over adequate custodianship is a 1996 lawsuit brought by the St. Louis Art 
Museum against the Whitney Museum of American Art, in New York, in which St. Louis 
had lent the museum Roy Lichtenstein’s 1962 Curtains.  While in the Whitney’s custody 
this work was vandalized. St. Louis maintained that the Whitney’s ineffective security 
service caused the painting lent for a Whitney exhibition to be seriously damaged. More 
specifically, one of the Whitney’s temporary security guards, Reginald Walker, 
purportedly drew a heart inscribed with “Reggie + Crystal 1/26/91” and wrote “I love you 
Tushee, Love, Buns”. The painting was valued at the time approximately $1.5 to $2 
million. Similarly, when it was humiliatingly revealed that one of the State Hermitage 
Museum in Moscow’s senior-level staff members had systematically pilfered objects 
from the permanent collection, which her husband then sold to pawn shops over a six-
year period, a judge accused the state museum of incompetence 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/16/arts/16herm.html?_r=0, electronically retrieved on 
July 24, 2014). 
These cases pose several questions: 1) What levels of guardianship are reasonable 
for the public to expect from these public cultural repositories? 2) Do accountability 
expectations outstrip collections management competence in both commercial and non-
profit galleries? 3) how can the restrictive costs associated with the most effective 
security measures, which must be continually reassessed and improved, be offset, 
especially in institutions that clearly lack the resources to undertake the programs 
maintained in the world’s most important museums? Recent evidence indicates that 
security measures are still not where institutions are investing. Stevan Layne (2009) 





dollars on accessions, or glamorous expansion campaigns that emphasize well-known 
architects more than updated facilities. Charney states that public art museums’ 
investment in security programs is materially insignificant to the investment incurred for 
capital construction projects or collection expansion. According to Karl Heinz Kind, a 
member of the stolen works unit of the Interpol General Secreteriat, museums must 
change this mindset and embrace better security programs that utilize a holistic approach 
to preserving works of art with a well-trained personnel and the most advanced 
technology available (https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/No-Artistry-in-These-Crimes.aspx, 
electronically retrieved September 1, 2014).  
The following sections all examine security personnel, target hardenting, bag 
inspection, theft from storage, background checks, commercial art gallery issues, 
university museums/galleries, and the role of non-security personnel. Overall, the gap 
between best practices and current norms will be outlined.  
 
Museum and Gallery Security Forces 
Museum security is a necessary museum or gallery measure that can be succinctly 
defined as “a mechanism that provides for the protection of collection, equipment, 
information, personnel, and physical facilities and that prevents influences that are 
undesirable, unauthorized or detrimental to the goals or the well-being of the museum” 
Fennely, 1983, p. 3-4).  
The most visible aspect of a public museum’s or private gallery’s security 





primary interface with the visitor, the museum guard’s roles are myriad. According to 
Wallis (2013) museum guards’ duties might be described as: 
[to] find the lost, shepherd the confused, and save runaway 
toddlers from impending collisions with immovable sculptures. 
The job demands long hours, constant vigilance and a reservoir of 
patience to put up with illicit picture takers, soda smugglers and 
pontificating amateur art critics, among other annoyances. 
Consider these guards the army grunts of the art world 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/arts/artsspecial/museum-guards-on-life-
beyond-the-galleries.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, electronically retrieved July 
18, 2014). 
 
Evolution of security guards 
As collections transitioned from the haphazard walls of private homes to the 
careful order of the public gallery, security needs were developed to protect viewing 
spaces and the arrival of crowds focused solely on scrutinizing works of art on display. 
According to Lillios (2013), initially uniformed security officers enforced both formal 
and informal social norms with museum visitors. The guards controlled the flow of the 
visitors throughout the galleries, determined who could and who could not gain 
admittance, and ensured that proper behavior was maintained. In addition, at times, the 
guards acted as docents. (p. 52).  
 
 Today’s security officers 
Twenty-first century uniformed museum security officers share more evolved 
responsibilities as well that go far beyond interfacing with visitors to encompass 
advanced surveillance practices. For example, security must monitor the often-combined 
threats of electronic and cyber-attacks that could compromise the elaborate technological 





Beyond these contemporary threats, museum guards’ first-responder training is essential 
to confront more conventional robbery, vandalism, and the possibility of being struck by 
natural disaster. The average museum security officer can usually be expected to be able 
to lead emergency efforts in mass evacuations, medical emergencies, severe weather, 
flooding and water damage, power outages, explosions, fires, chemical spills, and acts of 
terrorism (Speed Art Museum training manual). Given the high monetary value and often 
cultural heritage stature of the objects guards are charged to protect, they should possess 
considerable curatorial knowledge as well. The guards at the New Mexico Museum of 
Fine Art in Santa Fe, for example, are briefed by the education department on the entire 
permanent collection and on special exhibitions. They receive the same training on the 
curatorial aspects of each exhibit that the docents undergo. They also read and sign off on 
the exhibit press release, so they are cognizant of every aspect of the exhibition (Smith, 
2006).  
 After the Van Gogh Museum was robbed in 2002, the museum conducted a 
security overhaul.  A portion of the improvements included expanding their guard staff, 
improved training, and discontinuing the use of contract security guards, as well as using 
volunteers as security personnel.  Drent (2009) and his staff developed five elements that 
they wanted to see in their guards: “cooperation with other staff, working well with 
visitors, reacting well to changes and new requests, commitment to their careers and the 
museum, and the ability to be presentable, articulate and polite” (p. 147).   
In addition to securing collections, visitors, employees, and the museum premises, 
guards are responsible for their own safety. Not only are guards tied up and knocked 





on duty by a white supremacist at the Holocaust Museum in June of 2009 
(http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/06/10/museum.shooting/index.html, electronically 
retrieved October 3, 2014).   
As a result of security technology becoming more advanced, thieves are 
increasing their modus operandi and incorporate more violence into their tactics. 
Consequently, security guards have to contend with an increased risk of life threatening 
situations. In response to possible danger while on the job, a few museums have armed 
security officers, such as the Smithsonian Institution and the National gallery of Art in 
Washington, DC whose guards at entrances and exits are armed (Falkenstein, 2005, p. 
137). 
Unfortunately, a full complement of electronic security services for a museum or 
gallery can be very expensive, and a full guard staff can quickly account for more than 
half of a museum or gallery’s operating budget. Given their high percentage of an 
institution’s daily operating budget, some institutions, such as the Kentucky Museum of 
Art and Craft in Louisville, Kentucky, forego a human presence within their protection 
plans and only utilize electronic devices and physical barriers.  
 
Hybrid Security Forces 
When donations and other philanthropic activity contracted as a result of the 
2008-2014 global recession, operating budgets in many American public museums 
suffered cut-backs and devaluation. As a result, such institutions found themselves forced 
to scale back their security programs. While many museums replaced full-time staff with 





were considerably lower than their full-time professional counterparts, others opted for a 
blend of the two, otherwise known as a hybrid security force. Museums still starved for 
revenues to support essential operations also increasingly hosted public and private 
events in their gallery spaces increasingly throughout the recession years and through to 
the present day. These events pose different threats of damage, vandalism, or theft of 
objects displayed in galleries, and contract security guards not bound by permanent 
employment contract to the institutions could pose added liability to the institutions in 
question (Longmore-Etheridge, 2012, p. 58). Ideal institutional practice in these revenue-
generating affairs place their International Foundation for Cultural Property Protection 
(IFCPP)-certified, full-time security staff on the gallery floor, and bring in outside 
technical support for surveillance and monitoring from the communications center. 
According to a spokesperson, the Art Institute of Chicago, for instance, will often hire 
contract guards for high-volume blockbuster exhibitions, for which each “undergo four 
days of in-house training and then accompany senior [permanent security] staff when the 
show opens. [The contractors] are not put in sensitive areas” (Falkenstein, 2005, p. 137). 
Full-time guards with The Institute receive basic training with a professional security 
contractor called Securitas, followed by object-focused training with the museum’s 
curatorial department. They receive both museum orientation and art orientation 
including training from the conservation and curatorial departments. Both forms of 
guards receive refresher training constantly that includes a daily roll call. All proprietary 
officers receive International Foundation for Cultural Property Protection (IFCPP) 
certification of which training in customer service is a key component. Steven Layne, the 





the anonymity that thieves and vandals attempt to maintain which in turn might deter any 
acts of this nature. Other areas of the training include crowd control, package inspection, 
metal detection, basic first aid, and how to deal with upset and aggressive visitors. Basic 
self-defense and de-escalation techniques are also included in the training.  (Longmore-
Etheridge, 2012, p. 62, 64).  
The AAM security committee compared and contrasted the benefits/ negatives 
of hiring both types of guards for museums in the United States. The committee supports 
the use of contract guards because there is generally no delay in quickly securing them. A 
separate company or agency performs guards’ hiring and training, while a third-party 
handles billing for the costs incurred with their contractual, short-term employment. In 
addition, the hiring institution does not have to pay a pension or purchase any work-
related equipment. As of now, there are no union issues, and the committee suggests that 
contract guards are more appropriate for smaller museums 
(http://www.securitycommittee.org/securitycommittee/Guards.html, electronically 
retrieved September 7, 2014).  
Regardless, retention remains a problem, since remuneration for security guard 
positions has not kept pace with inflation and wages are low versus similar positions in 
other industries. According to Conklin (1994), “being a museum guard is not a career 
position, but rather a minimum wage job with high turnover. Most museum guards in the 
United States are college students and retired people” (p. 125). According to the website  
Simply Hired, in 2016, the average museum security guards earn an average annual 






retrieved February 17, 2016). In 2006, it was reported that an average gallery security 
guards’ starting salary at the New Mexico Museum of Fine Art was just $15,620, which 
is inadequate for supporting more than one person, even in a geographic location with a 
considerably lower cost of living than in the larger metropolitan areas where the larger 
and much more valuable art collections tend to be located. Even so, wages for security 
guards are still abysmal versus starting salaries versus other entry-level museum 
positions. Hence, finding individuals willing to take this important, and occasionally 
dangerous, a position for so little compensation or career growth exacerbates the 
widespread practice of not maintaining adequate protection of collections and assets. 
Without having kept pace with other museum professions, it is of little surprise that so 
many fewer potential guards choose jobs that have adequate pay and benefits, make one 
eligible for pay raises, advance in a profession, and “be made to feel like an appreciated 
part of a trusted team” (Smith, 2006, 
http://search.proquest.com.echo.louisville.edu/docview/331552215/fulltext/ 
53E2995421E74CCEPQ/1?accountid=14665, electronically retrieved January 22, 2013).  
In conclusion, it is recommended that institutions adjust their budgets to invest in 
adequately compensated security guards who will remain loyal to the museum’s mission, 
works, and visitors.  
 
Museum Security Hardware and Software Technologies (target hardening) 
Financial challenges and substandard wages hinder the human side of the museum 
or gallery security team for many institutions, but ever improving surveillance and 





security force. In recent times, thieves are increasingly focused on compromising 
physical and digital security systems in museums and galleries. Predictably, thieves are 
typically more attracted to institutions with demonstrated inferior protection in both the 
human and technological capacity.  
In the past, heavy investment in object security has resulted in obstructive panels 
and other protections that interfere with the visitor’s ability to view the given object in 
the gallery. After Edvard Munch’s The Scream was stolen in 2004 from The Munch 
Museum in Oslo, Norway, the museum tightened security with the addition of more 
guards in the galleries and TSA-style checkpoints that visitors need to pass through when 
entering or leaving the museum, including x-ray machines and body scanners. In 
addition, the museum encased Munch’s iconic proto-expressionist portrait of the terror of 
modernity behind thick bullet proof plate glass monitored by such an array of scanners 
and motion sensors that reporters have dubbed the museum, “Fortress Munch” (Houpt, 
2006; Bazley, 2010; Brisman, 2011).  
Current security technologies are less obstructive and more efficient at lower cost 
and prices continue to fall. Public museums and commercial galleries of all sizes have 
invested in economically-priced security solutions specifically catered to the protection of 
art objects in gallery settings. Boser (2010) reports that five years ago, small institutions 
might expect to spend more than $1 million annually on security. A 2007 government 
report on the Smithsonian’s security program found that the institution pays almost $70 
million annually to protect its collection; even this amount may not be enough. The same 
report explained that the miscellaneous museums that fall under the Smithsonian’s 





managed to steal some fossils out of a gallery in the National Museum of Natural 
History” (http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487040262045752662 
93870407552, electronically retrieved July 18, 2014).  Wilemse and Etman (1995) 
learned in their study that large museums spend more on security than small museums.  
According to Bazley (2010), museum security technology divides into two 
discrete application groups: perimeter and interior. Perimeter security “detects intrusions 
through exterior entry points such as doors and windows.” This category of equipment 
includes electronic sensors such as motion detectors and alarms that are installed at 
exterior doors and they will activate if an intrusion occurs. Exterior lighting, surveillance 
equipment, and reinforced doors and windows are also included in this category.  
Interior security equipment “detects intrusions into protected area through visual 
observation and motion, the removal of objects from their display positions and even 
violation of the secure space between an object and museum visitors.” Some types of 
hardware that define this category are CCTV, smart tags, infra-red motion detectors, 
break-beam sensors, scanning devises, and automated fingerprinting systems. Bazley 
notes that there are “tags that emit signals that distinguish light touches versus a heavy 
touch and lift” (p. 181).  
With the ongoing surge of attacks and theft of cultural heritage objects, more 
museums and galleries need to acquire appropriate alarms, motion detection and 
intelligent video analytics. Tom Szczepanski, chief of protective services at the Toledo 
Museum of Art, has created access points in “sensitive” areas utilizing card readers, high-
security locks, and RF keys. (Ritchey, 2010, p. 80). Houpt (2006) suggests that devices 





detectors, and microwave sensors that can be hidden in walls that pick up unusual sound 
waves, are all extra devices that can help prevent art theft (p. 143).  
Twenty years ago, a Dutch study of museum security found that 83% of the 
museums sampled did not utilize barriers to separate the public from collections. 
Electronic measures were found to be more anomalous and comprised only 29% of the 
sample group (p. 57). 
The respondents in this study were also surveyed on their opinion of their 
institutions’ specific security measures. The Dutch researchers found that, on average, the 
museums sampled agreed that mechanical security measures are most essential, followed 
by electronic measures, with security management and control as tertiary priorities (p. 
57). The researchers could identify “no connection” between a given institution’s 
attentiveness to security, the measures actually taken, and the number of incidents of 
crime experienced and reported at that museum” (p. 59). Benson’s (2013) findings 
produced similar conclusions in her study on art theft in South Africa.  Specifically, 
according to Benson (2013) “The research shows that a lack of mechanical security 
(beams and sensors), as well as poor or ineffective physical security contributed to the 
thefts being perpetrated. The findings also show that theft incidents occur in spite of 
museums/galleries having very good/good security, as well as physical and additional 
security” (p. 231). Given these two studies were conducted almost 20 years apart and on 
two separate continents, it seems prudent to propose similar studies should be conducted 
in the United States: 1) to determine whether or not it is merely poor security practices 
that endanger collections or 2) that this form of criminality is difficult to combat 







Stevan Layne (2009) recommends that museums conduct both internal and 
external audits of their institutional security practices. Wilemse and Etman (1995) 
discovered that 47% of their respondents had never had such a risk analysis conducted at 
their museums, while 27% did not know if one had ever been conducted. Smaller 
museums on tighter budgets charged their volunteers with some security duties (p. 56). A 
contributing factor to the low statistic may be that within the sample of large and small 
museums only 14% used any form of contract security service and only 56%% of the 
large museums utilize at least one internal security person (p. 56). 
 
Bag inspection and ID badges 
Two security measures that became popular following the September 11, 2001 
attacks in New York and Washington, DC, in particular, that are employed by museums 
of all sizes are bag and package inspection, and limited entry and exit points. Volunteers 
and docents are required to wear photo IDs at all times at the Toledo Museum of Art, 
while at the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, all the staff and contractors must 
enter and exit through the same entrance, that features a guard presence 24-hours a day. 
Bag checks are conducted on every single person on their way in and out of the museum, 








Theft from Storage Spaces and in Transit 
Steven Layne (2009), museum security expert, supports the belief that artwork is 
not primarily stolen from exhibition cases but rather from storage spaces and while in 
transit. Collection and storage areas are a treasure trove for thieves; both visitors and 
insiders. Many times museums and galleries do not inventory their works in storage and a 
theft of a work stored for many months or years will go unnoticed. Not only should these 
areas be watched more closely, but the physical security and layout of the grounds should 
be analyzed in terms of security deficits in any access points to these storage spaces. 
Houpt (2006) notes that the AAM passed security guidelines that required that museums 
discontinue their tours of collections in storage (Spadanuta, 2011, p. 48, 52; Houpt, p. 
34). 
Wilemse and Etman (1995) learned from their study that less than 27% of their 
sample utilized checks of their collections in storage and these checks were substandard. 
In 59% of the museums there are no security measures in place to monitor theft from 
storage and only 20% of the museums check their collection in storage once every three 
months. Interestingly, nearly 15% of the collection loans made were to the staff for 
private use (p. 57). To avoid similar statistics, galleries and museums should frequently 
check their works in storage to ensure that both the inventory is itemized on a regular 
basis and employees will be hesitant to help themselves to more secure objects.  
Traveling exhibitions also present unique security issues. Each time a work leaves 
its home institution, gallery, or a collector’s home, a risk assessment must be conducted 
to determine the likelihood of theft or damage while en route to its borrower. Works in 





practices for this scenario are numerous. First, museums should generate risk profiles for 
each piece in a traveling exhibition based on a work’s intrinsic, cultural, and research 
value, the reputation and focus of an institution and its visitor demographic. Secondly, in 
some instances, works are transported in custom high security cases with tracking devices 
and sensors. Third, representatives from the loaning institution may also conduct a site 
visit to the borrowing institution where a test evaluation will be done. Before the work 
leaves the home institution, a condition report is made of the work so if any damage 
occurs after it leaves the museum, the original museum has documentation of the original 
condition of the work (Turk, 2005).  
Additionally, once a loaned work of art is en route from its original collection, the 
transportation vehicle should have GPS and an anti-hijacking system. Curators, registrars, 
and other museum officials often travel with high-value objects as couriers, accompany 
the piece to its gallery destination, see it through the insurance paperwork and condition 
report submission to the other institution’s registration department, and often oversee the 
installation of the work(s) within the exhibition gallery. Couriers also accompany lent 
works back to their home institution. Because lent works of art can be transported by car 
or rail, but also by commercial passenger flights, absolute discretion is a must.  
In a prime example of careless transport of a work of art, in November of 2006, 
the Toledo Art Museum in Ohio sent the 1778 painting, Children with a Cart, by 
Francisco Goya to the Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum in New York City. The piece 
was transported by truck in a carefully designed, unmarked crate. The drivers, it seems, 
had checked into a hotel en route for a few hours to take a nap due to driving exhaustion, 





and the unmarked crate containing the masterpiece was missing (See, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/18/arts/design/18goya.html, electronically retrieved 
July 18, 2014). If the museum had employed better security precautions this theft might 
have been prevented.  
 
Background Checks 
As mentioned earlier, the risk of insider theft is a considerable concern in public 
museums and commercial galleries alike. Security expert, Steven Keller, encourages 
institutions to conduct extensive criminal background checks and carefully screen all 
incoming museum staff, paid or volunteer. These background checks should include 
criminal history, credit history, education verification, employment verification, 
residential history, and even character references (Layne, 2009; Spadanuta, 2011). In 
addition to pre-employment screening, Layne (2009) emphasizes that exit interviews “for 
departing employees are also critical, to determine whether there might be any passive-
aggression or a scheming on the part of the departing employee that could lead to any 
future incidents” (p. 140). Layne advises that museums and galleries must screen any 
persons with access to galleries, vaults, or other locations where collections are stored, 
even if these individuals are closely monitored researchers looking at objects. But this 
strategy is easier said than done and getting the thorough background information on 
virtually any person poses an array of potential obstacles. Layne remarks, however, that 
background checks should be conducted on any persons before they are allowed on an 
institution’s property. Paul J. Steiner, the security manager for the Rock and Roll Hall of 





special entrances, passageways, and exits for different levels of access clearance in order 
to better track traffic to and from different parts of the museum. Keller also stresses the 
need for bag and package checks on all persons entering and exiting despite the fact that 
many museums and galleries do not have the resources to conduct such checks. 
(Spadantu, 2011, p. 51). Conklin (1994) still assures that despite increased security 
efforts, art theft will continue because the thieves will step up to fight the increased 
security measures by becoming more violent in their crime commissions and some 
thieves will simply attack softer targets with less security such as churches and 
residences. (Conklin, 1994; Houpt, 2006).  
W 
Security Issues Within Art Galleries 
According to Ho (1992), in order for a gallery to be issued theft insurance, it has 
to meet the insurer’s security requirements. Although not all galleries carry theft 
insurance, they still are aware of security concerns. Many art galleries are generally 
smaller than museums and thus devote fewer financial resources to security—usually 
because the majority of capital in these smaller for-profit businesses is tied up in their 
collection inventories. Many commercial galleries, such as the galleries located in the 
Chelsea area of New York City, occupy areas zoned for retail businesses, are located on 
the street level, and are usually vacant at night and on holidays with the works for sale 
prominently displayed by the windows with easy view from the outside.  
Ho (1992) explored the various security measures utilized by art galleries in New 
York and discovered common security practices included door locks, good inventory 





guards, movement detector, CCTV, mirrors, additional lights, a lobby guard and an 
admittance buzzer. The respondents had a problem with alarm systems creating false 
alarms (p. 152). One of the gallery respondents reported they used their buzzer frequently 
to let their customers in and another respondent reported that they did not use their buzzer 
frequently because they wanted to send out a message that anyone could come in freely 
(p. 118). 
Ho (1992) also noted that galleries located on upper floors had fewer incidences 
of art theft. However, Ho (1992) determined that for art thieves the ideal gallery is one 
located in the business district, heterogeneous in population demographics, with an 
informal atmosphere, on a busy street, on the ground floor, with a separate showroom, 
prominently placed price list/stickers, an exit door without a buzzer, blind spots in the 
gallery space, employees not watching, many visitors, the receptionist desk away from 
the front entrance, and no CCTV. Ho also determined that for burglars, the most 
advantageous gallery is one that is located in a semi-residential section or business area 
with few nighttime activities on a tree-lined street. Preferably, the building has windows 
and/or glass doors, no guards, and on street level with old business buildings with few 
stories (p. 163).  
Bazley (2010) advises that security concerns should be taken into account prior to 
opening a new business. He suggests that both the geographic location and the building 
characteristics are important considerations for new gallery owners. High traffic areas 
that are crime free are ideal. Bazley recommends that prospective buildings should have 
well-lit spaces and reinforced exterior doors. Burglars can gain access to galleries via 





inaccessible from the roof (p. 177). Conklin (1994) calls attention to line of sight and 
urges that office spaces be designed in such a way that the galleries can be observed at all 
times discreetly. Along these lines, he encourages commercial galleries to limit their 
number of visitors at once in order to maintain adequate surveillance over as many people 
as possible, while doing the same for all gallery rooms. Large, open floor plans are best, 
according to Conklin. Ideally, a selective network ought to be established among gallery 
owners to share information on suspicious visitors, commonly used techniques of theft, 
and resources to alert neighborhood dealers to possible real time threats (p. 258). Bazley 
(2010) also reports that during business hours, galleries are more susceptible to larceny 
and robbery and more vulnerable to burglary during closed hours (p. 177). Ho’s (1994) 
study reveals that larceny occurred most often on Tuesday and Wednesday afternoons. 
Burglaries occurred most frequently on Sunday nights from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. when most 
art galleries are closed. Aarons (2001) produced somewhat similar results in a study of art 
theft in Australia.  Commercial galleries were victimized more often during business 
hours and public galleries and residential homes were victimized more frequently at night 
(p. 23).  
 
Securing University Collections 
At Durham University in the UK, on the evening of April 4, 2014, Lee Wildman 
and Adrian Stanton cut a two by three foot hole into the Oriental Museum’s brick wall 
and stole a Qing Dynasty porcelain sculpture and an 18
th
-century carved jade bowl, 






retrieved September 7, 2014). Even though colleges and universities are secluded by the 
venerable walls of academia, they too are vulnerable to art theft and art vandalism.  
College and university art galleries and museums form an integral part of the 
humanities mission in higher education. According to the AAM, these specialized 
departments on college and university campuses support the institution’s mission of 
education, research and service, as well as enhance the academic experiences of students, 
faculty, staff, and the general public. The college and university galleries and/or 
museums frequently act as a cultural bridge between the university population and the 
non-academic community in which they are located.  
These higher-education-context galleries and museums typically fall under the 
wider operating budget for the entire institution, and have less control over expenditures 
that may be needed for the proper safeguards for at-risk, high-value art collections. With 
budget cutbacks, some of these campus institutions have become vulnerable to thieves 
and vandals 
(http://www.securitycommittee.org/securitycommittee/College_Galleries.html, 
electronically retrieved September 7, 2014 & 
https://aamd.org/sites/default/files/document/2011ProfessionalPracitiesinArtMuseums.pd
f, electronically retrieved December 29, 2014).  
According to the AAM’s Security Committee, there are several challenges 
university collections face as part of an academic institutions. As campus departments, 
galleries and/or museums can be compelled to hire work-study student staff as security 
personnel with little to no security training or experience. A worthy solution is for the 





Also, university galleries may occupy spaces not suitable for reliable and effective 
protection of their collections. Referred to as “mixed use of spaces,” valuable objects 
from the university’s collection may be displayed in hallways or lecture hall areas, where 
students and faculty have to pass through or attend their classes. Thus, they have much 
broader access to the work than in a typical museum or gallery setting. Many times the 
works in these public areas are not secured well to the walls and no security cameras are 
installed. For example, at one Midwestern University, a donor included as part of his 
acquisition agreement that his collection of valuable prints be displayed in a public area 
within the fine arts building. Unfortunately, the donor provided no additional funding to 
support additional security measures, and the institution was saddled with the 
responsibility of providing what protective measure they could afford in order to ensure 
that the works were not damaged or stolen. Security arrangements are often not specified 
or required in the gift agreements between the university and the donor. In addition, extra 
activities and lectures held in gallery spaces and classes may be conducted in the art’s 
storage sites, which allows students access during hours in which the gallery is normally 
closed. Thus, access to collections is much wider and deeper than most art institutions’ 
protocols allow.  
Since university galleries and museums use many student workers who may be 
left alone with the collections, it can be difficult to ensure workers’ ability to adhere to 
ethical practices. Young and inexperienced, undergraduate students may present 
challenges for the institutional background checks and can have dubious references 
(http://www.securitycommittee.org/securitycommittee/College_Galleries.html, 





University collections often lend objects out to other facilities and departments 
across campus, which further complicates the need and ability to inventory and monitor 
the collections. Lastly, with 24-hour access to all areas of a given institution and its 
campus, custodial staff generally clean the buildings after hours and are usually 
unsupervised. In these scenarios, inadvertent damage could result, and alarms and access 
codes may be unintentionally compromised. It has been suggested that if the facilities 
management clean the museum or galleries area during the day when the door alarms do 
not need to be activated, any desire to steal on the part of the facilities management 
personnel can be reduced. However, this is an increased cost that may not be approved by 
college and university administrators whose departments are already budget strapped 
(http://www.securitycommittee.org/securitycommittee/College_Galleries.html, 
electronically retrieved September 7, 2014; Charney, 2009; J. Begley, personal 
communication, October 2, 2014). 
Ohio State University (OSU) recognized the vulnerability of its museum 
collections and began an innovative program to create awareness and responsible 
handling of its institutions’ works campus wide. Created by the OSU Police Department, 
the program educated “administrative and academic members of various departments . . . 
about the importance of documenting and properly recording important and overlooked 
items.” (Kleberg, 2009, p. 166). There are three facets to this program. The first facet is 
the distribution of attention grabbing promotional items to various administrative persons 
instructing them in how to document the valuable objects within their respective areas. 
Secondly, OSU created a database with information and images of objects within the 





protection of the objects on display outside the standard museum galleries, on an annual 
basis.  
John Begley advises that while the OSU program is innovative, many colleges 
and universities are unaware of their collections’ total value, do not have objects 
appraised regularly, or clearly delegate responsibilities within the institution. Undertaking 
such change is seen as just added work, too expensive, or a lower priority. These 
circumstances all lead to university collections often being at risk (Kleberg, 2009, p. 166; 
J. Begley, personal communication, October 2, 2014).  
In conclusion, even though, university collections may only be a small portion of 
the university life, they still deserve, and are legally required to, protection and 
preservation to the best of the institutions’ ability to due to the high value of the art.  
 
Non-security Personnel and Security 
Tim Szczepanski, former Chief of Protective Services at the Toledo Museum of 
Art, reports that “one of his biggest ongoing challenges is to convince all staff that they 
are an integral part of the security of the institution” (Ritchey, 2010, p. 80). Layne (2009) 
strongly recommends that all museum personnel receive some sort of security related 
training and remain vigilant of threats to the collection. Some of these non-security staff 
are encouraged to contribute to the fundamental approaches to installations and 
exhibitions, for example, the arrangement of the works in the show can affect the degree 
of the risk of theft. Ian Rosenkranz, an exhibition designer, acknowledges that “if 
someone wants to steal something and they’re smart enough, they’ll find a way,” but 





layouts for special exhibitions, for instance, Rosenkranz avoids any hidden dead ends or 
corners where visitors can stay out of visible range of surveillance cameras and guards. 
He also considers whether or not the object should be displayed in glass and how far 
away the object can be from the viewers without minimizing its aesthetic appeal. 
Rosenkranz utilizes security screws and other forms of securing works to walls along 
with invisible electric beams. He carefully schedules continuous monitoring by security 
staff in terms of the availability of guards, their rotation times, the relief schedule, and 
24-hour surveillance of high-interest areas. Lastly, Rosenkranz recommends utilizing the 
most advanced security technology (Smith, 2006).  
Szcezpanski reports that majority of his museum’s staff members are helpful and 
security conscious. Theft and vandalism affect not only the artwork but the entire 
institution. The more people that can act as guardians for our cultural objects, the more 
successful detection and prevention of theft and vandalism will be (Ritchey, 2010).  
In conclusion, a review of the existing literature and documentation on art 
museums, art galleries, art theft, art vandalism, and security reveals a lack of clarity 
surrounding these issues.  First of all, professional organizations seem to lack collection 
security expectations for curators, gallerists, art dealers, and security staff. Secondly, 
museums and galleries have overlapping roles and they operate under a shroud of 
secrecy, which makes them unsusceptible to any form of regulation or ethical compass. 
Further, there is a lack of reliable statistics and financial impact surrounding art crime. 
Lastly, museums and galleries appear unwilling to involve law enforcement and to allow 





world.  All of these factors contribute to a lack of coordination within the art world that 
may possibly contribute to the current state of art world victimization.  
In the preceding chapters, museum and gallery thefts and vandalism and 
protective measures have been reviewed. Literature suggests multiple key problems. 1) 
The first issue is inadequate art theft and art vandalism investigation given the scale of 
the two forms of crimes examined.  2) Security may contradict art museum’s increasing 
transformation into a space of infotainment, family outings, dating destinations, and 
mainstream cultural centers rather than as traditional museums. 3) The conceptual 
delineation between art galleries and museums are now obscured and this creates security 
concerns that were not formerly considered issues when the two business structures were 
clearly separate entities.  Now with both technological and societal changes that 
encourage intersection across broad sectors of the cultural environment, these terms and 
the legal definitions related to art crimes may be no longer pertinent. In sum, due to the 
abovementioned factors, there is perplexity within the art industry that did not formerly 
exist regarding the precise role of art world participants, including the security sector as 
designated guardians of treasured works and the patrons of the visual arts.  
The next chapter is a review Cohen and Felson’s (1979) Routine Activities 
















Introduction to Routine Activities Theory 
The birth of Routine Activity Theory (RAT) is credited to Lawrence C. Cohen 
and Marcus Felson and was first presented in 1979. RAT falls under the broader 
theoretical umbrella of rational choice. The rational choice perspective asserts that 
offenders are rational actors who carefully consider whether to commit crimes by 
weighing the pros and cons of their criminal actions (Cornish & Clarke, 1987). From this 
perspective, the likelihood of a crime occurring can be manipulated by increasing or 
decreasing the costs of committing the crime (i.e., increasing the likelihood the offender 
is caught).  According to RAT, in order for a crime to take place, there must be a 
convergence in time and space of three components: a motivated offender; a suitable 
target; and lack of a capable guardian (Cohen & Felson, 1979, p. 590). A motivated 
offender is an individual who has both the desire to commit a crime and the ability to 
perpetrate a criminal offense. A suitable target refers to an object or a person that attracts 
an offender to criminal perpetration. Lastly, a capable guardian is a person(s) who can 
prevent a criminal act from occurring (Cohen & Felson, 1979, 1980).  When these three 





opportunity. This is when crime is most likely to occur. Therefore, if one of the 
components is absent, according to the theory, crime will not occur.  
An individual’s, or at a more macro-level—a neighborhood or society’s—routine 
activities affect the likelihood that an individual or a population is in situations where 
criminal opportunity exists, which is why this theory is referred to as routine activities 
theory.  Cohen and Felson (1979) define routine activities as “any recurrent and prevalent 
activities which provide for basic population and individual needs, whatever their 
biological or cultural origins” (p. 593). A person’s day-to-day routine activities, such as 
going to work, participating in leisure activities away from their residence, or spending 
time at their home may or may not create a situation ripe for criminal victimization. In 
other words, an individual’s routine activities influence the likelihood that they are in 
situations where a motivated offender, suitable target, and lack of capable guardianship 
converge in time or space. The next section discusses the three elements of RAT in much 
greater detail.  
  
Defining and Measuring the Key Elements of Routine Activities Theory 
As previously stated, according Cohen and Felson (1979), RAT consists of three 
integral components: a motivated offender, a suitable/attractive target, and lack of a 
capable guardian/guardianship which converge in space and time. However, since its 
birth, RAT has evolved, and each component has undergone definitional and 








Shortly after Cohen and Felson’s inception of RAT, Cohen, Kluegel, and Land 
(1981) tested each component of Cohen and Felson’s original conceptualization of RAT 
with regards to the influence of age, race, and income on criminal victimization of assault 
burglary, and larceny. Cohen et al. (1981) surmised that Cohen and Felson’s motivated 
offender component could be divided into two contextual arenas in which predatory 
violations could occur: exposure to motivated offenders and proximity to motivated 
offenders. Exposure to motivated offenders refers to “the physical visibility and 
accessibility of persons or objects to potential offenders at a given time or place and 
proximity to motivated offenders refers to the physical distance between areas where 
potential targets of crime reside and areas where relatively large populations of potential 
offenders are found” (Cohen, Kluegel, & Land, p. 507).  Exposure to offenders 
conceptually relies on victims exposing themselves or their property to risky situations 
and/or interacting with offenders is more important than proximity to offenders in which 
victims live in or frequent a high crime area where there is a higher population of persons 
with criminal inclinations (Meier & Miethe, 1993; Miethe & McDowall, 1993; Ronek & 
Maier, 1991). For example, a person exposes themselves to potential crime victimization 
when their home is unoccupied, they go to a bar or a night club, or engage in risky 
situations such as committing delinquent acts where they may be exposed to criminally 
inclined persons (Finkelhor & Asdigian, 1996; Meier & Miethe, 1993; Miethe & 
McDowall, 1993; Ronek & Maier, 1991) and a person increases their proximity to 
motivated offenders by living, working, or frequenting a high crime area (Finkelhor & 





Within the art world art thieves’ exposure to the illicit underworld may motivate 
them to steal art in order to elevate their criminal status. According to former art detective 
with Scotland Yard’s Art and Antiquities Unit Charles Hill, some art thieves may steal a 
valuable masterpiece or other treasured work of art for a “trophy”. The stolen art 
represents a display of exceptional criminal prowess (Bailey, 2004). Next, we move on to 
the second component of routine activities theory; a suitable or attractive target.  
 
A Suitable/Attractive Target 
The second component of RAT, a suitable/attractive target, has been defined by 
Felson and Cohen (1980) as an object or a person that contains one or all of these four 
features: value, inertia, physical visibility and accessibility (VIVA). Value refers to 
material or symbolic allure of the object. For example, in addition to flaunting their 
pilfered “trophy”, former New York City art cop, Robert Volpe also suggests that some 
thieves preferred to steal art to “enjoy the high prestige within the criminal underworld 
because of their skill, the ‘touch of culture’ involved in their crimes, and the high social 
standing of the clients for whom they steal” (Conklin, 1994, p. 129).  
The inertia of an object generally refers to the target’s dimensional size, weight, 
and any features that prevent it from being removed. For example, a large David Smith 
steel sculpture bolted into the ground is more difficult to steal than a small Dale Chihuly 
glass vessel sitting on a pedestal unsecured.  
An object’s visibility is the prominence or prestige of the object which determines 





art thieves have been unsuccessful selling famous painting stolen from prominent 
museums and this is largely due to the painting’s visibility.  
Accessibility refers to the location where a crime is to occur. Offenders consider 
whether a potential crime scene is easy to access and simple to escape from undetected. 
For example, according to Ho (1994), an art thief is more likely to steal from an art 
gallery that is located on the ground floor rather than one that located on the second or 
third floors of a building because it allows for an easier and quicker exit. Also, works that 
are close to the windows of a gallery are much more suitable targets than works that are 
displayed further back in the gallery. Cohen, Kluegel, and Land (1981) only included the 
target’s value and inertia as a feature of target attractiveness. However, they added that 
value of a target’s attractiveness also is based upon the desire of the offender to steal an 
object or attack a person solely for the thrill of the theft or violence; i.e. no other benefit 
is attached to criminal action. A prime example of this is the art theft that occurred on 
April 27, 2003, in Manchester, UK. Thieves stole three paintings from the Whitworth Art 
Gallery for the mere purpose of highlighting the gallery’s poor security. In fact, the 
thieves left a note behind claiming this was indeed their motive. The paintings were later 
found in a tube behind a public toilet near the gallery. 
(http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2003/apr/28/ukcrime.arts, electronically retrieved 
7/4/2015).  
Several measurements have been used to capture elements of target attractiveness. 
These include: the social class of the respondent, household income (Miethe, Hughes, & 
McDowall, 1991; Outlaw, Ruback & Britt, 2002; Zhang, Messner, Liu, 2007), ownership 





McDowall, 1991; Miethe & McDowall, 1993; Outlaw, Ruback & Britt, 2002; Rountree, 
Land & Miethe, 1994; Zhang, Messner, Liu, 2007)), cash on hand, wearing jewelry in 
public (Miethe, Hughes, & McDowall, 1991;Miethe & McDowall, 1993; Outlaw, Ruback 
& Britt, 2002; Rountree, Land & Miethe, 1994), and basic demographics of victims such 
as age (Fisher, Cullen, Turner, 2002), race, gender, marital status (Fisher, Cullen, Turner, 
2002), and household/family income ( Cohen & Cantor, 1981; Miethe, Hughes, & 
McDowall, 1991; Miethe & McDowall, 1993; Moriarty & Williams, 1996; Roundtree, 
Land & Miethe, 1994; Sampson  & Wooldredge, 1987). Specific to the target 
attractiveness for assault victimization are alcohol and drug usage because if a victim is 
more incapacitated they are less able to defend themselves against perpetration—making 
them a more suitable target (Lasley, 1989).  
Similar to the VIVA model, previously discussed, Finkelholr and Asdigian (1996) 
divided the concept of target suitability into distinct categories by proposing that potential 
targets possess three features: target vulnerability, target gratifiability, and target 
antagonism. Target vulnerability refers to a victim’s susceptibility to risk due to a 
victim’s small stature, lack of physical strength, or weakened emotional state. Target 
gratifiability references characteristics that make the victims a source of gratification to 
an offender such as the female gender which can fulfill a sexual need to control, 
manipulate, or violate. Finkelholr and Asdigian (1996) refer to juvenile sexual assault as 
an example to illustrate this concept. Target antagonism accounts for features of a victim 
that incite anger, jealousy or resentment in an offender, such as a victim’s race or sexual 
preference, poor behavior within the home, or being disabled. These target features could 





works are vulnerable to destruction simply due the delicacy of the materials used to 
construct them and/or the ease at which they are to attack due to a lack of protective 
barriers. In 2014, the Delaware Art Museum was victimized by a group of visitors who 
effortlessly placed stickers on eleven works including paintings, an outdoor statue, and 
frames (http://www.delawareonline.com/story/entertainment/arts/2014/05/01/museums-
struggle-protect-art-public-
defacement/8574121/?from=global&sessionKey=&autologin=, electronically retrieved 
December 12, 2015). Target gratifiability has been exhibited by art vandals such as 
German serial art vandal mentioned in chapter three, Hans Joachim Böhlmann, who 
declared the reason behind his destruction of over 50 works over several decades 
beginning in 1977 was in response to his personal sense of injustice.  He proclaimed, “I 
have hated all art since my wife’s death and draw great satisfaction from destroying it” 
(Gorvy, 1993, p. 60) Böhlmann’s wife had died a few days prior to the beginning of his 
string of attacks and the vandal himself had recently been diagnosed with a brain tumor. 
(Friedberg, 1985; Gamboni, 1997; Scott, 2009).  A prime example of target antagonism 
in which vandals destroyed a work of art due its featured imagery occurred in October of 
2014, in Paris, France, when vandals deflated artist Paul McCarthy’s 79-foot inflatable 
green sculptural installation, Tree, that was similar in shape to a Christmas tree. 
However, according to the artist, the work was also inspired formally by an anal plug 
(butt plug) and admitted that the work was meant to be a joke. The vandals failed to 
appreciate the humor and they cut the cables supporting the piece in Paris’ Place 
Vendôme because the work resembled a giant sex toy which outraged the vandals and 






giant-sex-toy-sculpture-in-Paris.html, electronically retrieved December 12, 2015) .  
Target suitability was further re-conceptualized in 1999 when Ronald V. Clarke 
published his government report, Hot Products: Understanding, Anticipating and 
Reducing Demand for Stolen Goods. He expanded upon Cohen and Felson’s (1980) 
concept of VIVA due to the belief that VIVA was a primary attempt to describe desirable 
aspects of targets of a wide variety of crimes. Clarke (1999) created his own 
characteristics of target suitability specifically for stolen objects: CRAVED. The 
components of Clarke’s characterization of targets refer to whether the stolen object is: 
concealable, removable, available, valuable, enjoyable, and disposable.  Concealable 
items such as a pair of earrings can easily be hidden on a thief’s person as opposed to a 
piece of luggage. Removability pertains to objects that are lightweight and not secured. 
They are easily removed from homes, stores, cars, etc. Availability is a necessity to be a 
hot object. An object must be in existence in order to be stolen. Clarke (1999) explains, 
for example, that there was no computer theft before there were computers. Availability 
also refers to the visibility of potential targets. Cars that are parked on the street are at 
greater risk of being stolen as opposed to cars parked in a garage. Valuable goods are 
more desirable targets than less valuable ones. Clarke (1999) holds that thieves are more 
likely to steal goods which command a higher resale value on the black market or in 
pawn shops. Value can also refer to personal value such as auto thieves that steal simply 
for joyriding and selected their targets based on the vehicle’s performance, rather than 
monetary value. Enjoyability is a feature of potential targets that attracts burglars. 





opposed to a cappuccino machine. Last, disposability refers to whether a stolen good is 
easy to sell. A thief usually needs a plan of how he/she is going to dispose of their loot or 
a fence to do the job for them. If the item is not easily disposable, it is less likely to be 
stolen. As mentioned earlier, stealing art is much easier than selling it, whether it be in 
the legitimate or illegitimate art market.  
 
Lack of a Capable Guardian/Guardianship 
Cohen, Kluegel, and Land’s (1981) version of guardianship is more all-
encompassing than Cohen and Felson’s lack of a capable guardian definition. 
Accordingly, guardianship is “the effectiveness of persons (e.g. housewives, neighbors, 
pedestrians, private security guards law enforcement officers) or objects (e.g. burglar 
alarms, locks, barred windows) in preventing violations from occurring, either by their 
presence alone or by some sort of direct or indirect action” (p. 508). This definition 
introduces the inclusion of professional security personnel and non-human protective 
measures that Cohen and Felson had not yet considered.  
Guardianship has commonly been divided into two classifications: social and 
physical. Social (interpersonal) guardianship is measured by household composition 
(both membership demographics and quantities such as living alone or with others) 
(Fisher, Cullen, Turner, 2002; Outlaw, Ruback & Britt; Miethe, Hughes, McDowall, 
1991, Miethe & McDowall, 1993; Rountree, Land, & Miethe, 1994), unemployment rates 
(Miethe, Hughes, McDowall, 1991), and the police (Fisher & Wilkes, 2003) are also 
included as potential guardians within the category of social guardianship. Physical 





implemented by residents such as locking the door when leaving a residence, extra locks, 
burglar alarms, guard dogs, leaving lights on, special outside lighting, owning a weapon, 
and joining a neighborhood watch program. (Miethe, Hughes, & McDowall, 1991; Meier 
& Miethe, 1993; Miethe & McDowall, 1993; Rountree, Land & Miethe, 1994).  
In Breetze and Cohn’s (2013) study of residential burglary in gated communities 
in Tshwane, South Africa, the researchers state that within the context of burglary, 
“social guardianship derives from surveillance activities of people while physical 
guardianship refers to devices that offer protection such as fences, locks, dogs, and 
alarms (p. 60).” The researchers also point out, “the physical structure of gated 
communities with features such as security guards and patrols (often armed), walls and/or 
electrified fences surrounding the community, controlled access, and CCTV monitoring 
at entry/exit points should result in significantly increased levels of both social and 
physical guardianship” (p. 60). 
Interestingly, asking a neighbor or someone in a college dorm to watch one’s 
property while either away from one’s residential space have been designated as both as 
measures of social guardianship (Fisher, Sloan & Lu, 1998; Fisher & Wilkes, 2003; 
Tseloni, Wittebrood, Farrell, & Pease, 2004) and physical guardianship (Miethe & 
McDowall, 1993; Outlaw, Ruback, & Britt 2002; Rountree, Land & Miethe, 1994). 
Within the studies in which the measure was categorized as physical guardianship, it was 
grouped in with other physical guardianship measures such as owning a burglar alarm 






Additionally, many studies do not differentiate between physical or social 
guardianship; measures are simply identified as “capable guardianship” or 
“guardianship” (Cass, 2007; Coupe & Blake. 2006; Fisher, Daigle, & Cohen, 2009; Rice 
& Smith, 2002; Zhang, Messner, & Lui, 2007).  
Further, scholars dispute some measures of social and physical guardianship in 
terms of the proper guardianship classification of guardianship or even if the measures 
count as guardianship at all, such as security guards (see discussion below).  
CCTV is a form of guardianship that is a topic of scholarly discourse. It should be 
noted that Hollis-Peel, Reynald, van Bavel, Elffers, and Walsh (2011) state that when 
CCTV is being actively monitored, it is a form of human guardianship rather than 
physical guardianship or target hardening. However, for the purposes of this study, 
CCTV will be classified as a form of physical guardianship regardless of whether or not 
it is being actively monitored or not since it is used in museums and galleries in both 
capacities. 
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) was first used in the private retail industry in 
the United Kingdom and in the banking industry in the United States in the 1960s for 
crime prevention as a form of formal surveillance (Welsh & Farrington, 2009a). 
Interestingly, in both public and private settings, CCTV technology also helps law 
enforcement solve crimes and aids in the prosecution of suspected offenders. In term of 
crime reduction, the logic behind this surveillance technology is that when offenders 
observe the cameras they will be deterred from committing crimes due to the possibility 
of being caught on camera.  Paradoxically, Welsh and Farrington (2009b) also note that 





turn, could create increased vulnerability to potential crime victims. For example, an art 
gallery that has CCTV cameras installed throughout their space may hang their paintings 
close to entrances and exits assuming this is safe to do because the cameras are a 
deterrent to art thieves or vandals. However, the placement of the artwork within an 
exhibition space can actually make it easier for a thief or vandal to steal/damage the 
work, such as the art theft from the Fine Art Firm (FAF) art gallery in Louisville, 
Kentucky during the evening in October of 2014. According to the surveillance camera, a 
lone male art thief conducted a “smash and grab” of a small bronze statue, worth 
$9,000.00. The sculpture was displayed in the gallery’s front window and has not been 
recovered. However, the thief was arrested and prosecuted 
(http://www.wlky.com/news/man-accused-of-stealing-valuable-art-from-downtown-
gallery/29127482, electronically received December 21, 2015).  
According to the Security in Museums, Archives, and Libraries manual (2003), 
CCTV in museums has numerous benefits: deterrence, aid to keeping watch over works, 
recording for post-incident investigation, entry control, aid to management, and site 
monitoring after hours.  Despite the listed benefits of CCTV, many art thefts captured on 
surveillance cameras go unsolved. For example, on July 16, 2015, two men stole Rodin’s 
bust, The Man with the Broken Nose (1863), from the Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek Museum 
in Copenhagen, Denmark during broad daylight. Apparently, none of the security guards, 
museum employees, or visitors noticed the men steal the $300,000, 10.5-inch work from 
the pedestal where it was displayed and supposedly secured. The event was captured on 
CCTV. Additionally, the two men were also observed on CCTV visiting the museum a 





men had loosened “the sculpture from its base and disabled the alarm” during their prior 
appearance at the museum (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34013451, 
electronically retrieved August 22, 2015).  
With regards to art vandalism, CCTV has provided some relief to cultural 
institutions. According to the Washington Post in 2007, two Smithsonian Art Museums 
had experienced a slew of vandalistic perpetration such as vandals writing on works and 
visitors kissing or spitting on the art on display. This criminal activity was affiliated with 
a lack of patrolling security guards. Once the surveillance cameras were installed, the 
incidences of vandalism ceased. The presence of the cameras was presumed to deter 
potential vandals (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/09/28/AR2007092801990.html, electronically retrieved October 
18, 2015).  As the study of guardianship became more expansive, the concept was 
divided into three components—the handler, place manager, and super controllers.  
 
The Handler 
In 1986, Marcus Felson introduced the concept of “the handler” to the field of 
criminology as a component of guardianship whose role is to discourage offenders (the 
handle) from committing crimes due to the emotional bond an offender forms with his 
handler such as a parent, teacher, or coach. Felson (1986) contends that once potential 
offenders deviate from their handlers, they are more inclined to perpetrate crimes.  
The handler concept inspired Eck (1994) to create his Crime Triangle. This 
triangle consists of three sides; each with two supporting players who comprise a revised 





and 3) guardian/target. Here guardianship has been broken down into three subtypes: 
handlers, place managers, and guardians. According to Eck (1994), a revised version of 
Routine Activities Theory is, “Crime occurs when there is a convergence in time of a 
desirable target without an effective guardian, a motivated offender without an effective 
handler at a facilitating place without an attentive manager” (p. 29).  
Within the context of art crime this theoretical based concept could apply to 
juvenile art vandals. As stated in chapter two, art vandalism is often perpetrated by 
minors. For example, in late evening of December 14, 2017, in Calgary, Canada several 
minors boys were captured on CCTV vandalizing three student works on display at 
Alberta College of Art and Design (ACAD). The vandalistic acts took the form of 
smashing and painting over the art (https://globalnews.ca/news/3922887/calgary-police-
investigate-after-student-art-vandalized-at-alberta-college-of-art-and-design/, 
electronically retrieved April 5, 2018). The vandals were alone without adult supervision 
or anyone to “handle” their deviant behavior. 
 
Place Managers 
The second subtype of actor within Eck’s crime triangle are place managers. 
Place managers are a form of social guardianship. They are actors who discourage crime 
and reduce the potential for criminal activity by their mere presence and daily activities at 
specific places. These managers are not guarding a potential target; rather, these actors 
are controlling activities at specified locations. Place managers are also referred to as 
controllers. Examples of place mangers are business owners, store managers, landlords, 





1995; Mazerolle, Kadleck, & Roehl, 1998). Felson (1995) created four levels of crime 
discouragement for place managers—personal, assigned, diffuse, and general. These 
levels of place management, while labeled differently, have been empirically examined.   
Mazerolle et al. (1998) focused specifically on the role of the four levels of place 
managers within the context of drug dealing in 100 street blocks in Oakland, California. 
These researchers labeled the four levels of place management responsibility as: primary, 
secondary, tertiary, and quaternary. Accordingly, primary responsibility for places is 
assigned to the owners of places or those people who have a high stake in the place. 
Within the art museum context, the person with the primary responsibility is the museum 
director who oversees every aspect of the museum’s functioning. Secondary 
responsibility is delegated to the people who are employed to regulate behavior and are 
often assigned a crime prevention role, such as a beat officer, either directly or indirectly 
at particular places. At a museum, this individual is generally a private or contract 
security guard hired by the museum with or without peace officer powers.  Also, within a 
museum context, all museum employees, other than the executive director, such as a 
curator, a registrar, or a human resources officer are also categorized at the secondary 
level of responsibility.  
Place managers have tertiary responsibility for discouraging crime when they are 
assigned generally to a task, but not employees of a business such as a service technician 
or delivery person. At a museum, the person who delivers packages to the museum 
usually has to sign in on the visitor log and this person could notice unfamiliar faces 
claiming to work for another delivery company trying to gain access to the museum close 





of their occasional presence at a place such as a customer. When museums hold 
blockbuster exhibitions such as a retrospective of Monet’s works, the museum’s foot 
traffic is increased exponentially. Photography is allowed at many museums and the 
constant photographing of works may discourage an art vandal from harming an artist’s 
masterpiece because there will be a strong chance that any destructive acts are likely to 
be captured on a camera or a smart phone. Additionally, it will be difficult for the vandal 
to get close to his or her intended target within a crowded gallery. 
Mazerolle et al. (1998) also notes that many place managers take initiative and 
extend their place management duties beyond their specific areas of supervision. For 
example, a store owner may organize community crime control activities that unite an 
entire street block. Within the art world, it is key for all the place managers within a 
museum or gallery to unite together to prevent criminal perpetration. Mike Kirchner, 
former director of security for Harvard Art Museums, remarks that the first line of 
defense in protecting artworks is “alert guards and museum employees”. He further 
states, “Everyone has to start a relationship with a smile, a nod, and a good morning with 
people coming into the museum. You can scan the crowd, you can try to look for people 
who don’t want to make contact. Everyone should always be on alert” 
(https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/museums-fine-art-of-protecting-
masterpieces/2011/08/15/gIQAfRfvHJ_story.html, electronically retrieved December 9, 
2015). Moreover, Meredith, Kadleck, and Roehl (1998) reveal that when place managers 
act together as a cohesive group, crime rates are reduced. Anthony Amore, the head of 
security at Boston’s Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum, advises in his interview with 





and volunteers, to take an active role in the security of the facility. Let them know how 
important they are to identifying problems and potential thefts or vandalism. Museum 
frontline staff can be invaluable in identifying or taking immediate action in the case of 
an incident of theft or vandalism” (p. 135). Furthermore, a collections manager at a large 
museum noted in Scott’s (2009) study, “I think good invigilation is 95% of the answer” 
to effectively reduce art vandalism. Invigilation is the supervision of others and not 
necessarily by security personnel.  
Museums and galleries should also exercise social cohesion within their 
respective communities by communicating with each other in order to disseminate 
information regarding suspicious visitors and activities.  
 
Security Guards and Police Officers As Place Managers 
It should be noted that Mazerole et al. (1998) included beat officers within their 
classification of place managers as with a guardianship role. However, there is somewhat 
of a debate within the literature as to whether law enforcement officers should be 
considered place managers or a form of physical target hardening. Some scholars have 
argued that police officers and/or security officers act as formal guardians (Bosse, Effers, 
& Gerritsen, 2010; Lawton, Taylor, Luongo, 2005) and others have argued that police 
provide guardianship to their communities either merely their physical presence and 
surveillance actions, or explicit or implicit acknowledgement of their ability to administer 
criminal sanctions (Crank et al, 2010). They also point out that frequent positive police 
visibility within a community should establish the police as trustworthy, which in turn, 





Conversely, Felson and Clarke (1998) encapsulate Cohen and Felson’s (1979) 
original conception of a guardian and maintain that a guardian is not a security person or 
a police officer; only a non-law enforcement affiliated person whose presence or 
proximity would discourage a perpetrator from carrying out their criminal action. Felson 
and Clarke (1998) cite examples such as a resident, a neighbor, or a co-worker. In 
addition, Felson (2006) adapted the definition to “a guardian keeps an eye on the 
potential target of a crime. This includes anybody passing by, or anybody assigned to 
look after people or property. This usually refers to ordinary citizens, not police or private 
guards” (p. 80). Further, Felson and Eckert (2016) add “that guardians should not be 
mistaken for police officers or security guards, who are very unlikely to be on the spot 
where a crime occurs” (p. 31). While there continues to be a debate surrounding the 
categorization of security personnel, for the purposes of this study, private and contract 
security officers, school resource officers, and campus police officers are considered 
formal guardians. 
Welsh and Farrington (2009a) report that security guards are a growing industry 
who outnumber sworn police officers. According to Welsh, Mudge, and Farrington 
(2010), security guards’ main function is to act as a deterrent to potential criminal 
offending. They also monitor and are expected to intervene if they witness any criminal 
or potentially criminal activity. However, security guards are rarely armed, and they lack 
the arrest powers of formal peace officers.  
Many museums utilize contract private security officers for their after-hours 
events and special exhibitions. Scott (2009), in her study of iconoclasm in the UK, points 





private security guards in order to more effectively prevent vandalism. However, Scott 
(2009) is strongly opposed to that measure due to the fact that contract guards, despite 
their expertise in security related incidences, are not familiar with an institution’s 
collection or proper methods of caring for these collections. In addition, according to 
Reynald (2010), “Felson’s (2006) theory that that contextual familiarity and knowledge is 
a fundamental precondition for capable guardianship, as it enhances the ability to discern 
individuals who are at a place for illegitimate purposes” (p. 383). Felson (2006) supports 
the notion that in-house guardians possess superior familiarity and awareness compared 
to a non-permanent, contract guardian.  
However, regardless of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the various physical 
and social guardianship implementations, controlling crime does not stop at the place 
management level of responsibility. Super-controllers monitor and give incentives to 
place managers, handlers, and guardians to limit criminality.  
 
Super controllers 
Super controllers are the entities (the media, the government, institutions, 
organizations, etc.) who exercise power and control over place managers, guardians, and 
handlers by providing incentives to them to prevent and control crime (Sampson, Eck, & 
Dunham, 2010). In their analysis of super controllers, Sampson, Eck, & Dunham (2010) 
explore why some crime prevention strategies fail and under what circumstances crime 
control is unsuccessful.  Sampson et al. (2010) contend that the controllers (place 
managers, handlers, and guardians) have the tools to optimize crime control activities but 





may be continually robbed. Several reasons for the repeated victimization could be 
because the museum does not allocate enough of their budget to update security 
equipment, run background checks on all employees and volunteers, have internal 
policies that require security personnel make sure all doors are locked at night, do not 
inventory storage areas once a week, and do not require bags are checked upon entry and 
exit of the museum.  
According to Sampson, Eck, & Dunham (2010), the incentives that super 
controllers exert have the potential to be positive or negative. For example, in the 
scenario mentioned above, the museum’s super-controllers, namely the board, may 
threaten to leave the board unless changes are implemented to remedy the museum’s 
grave security issues, which would leave the museum without a governing body and 
support. Also, the museum may lose their art insurance policy and valuable donors will 
lose confidence in the museum and cease any charitable donations. In addition, other 
museums will stop lending works to the museum which is continually victimized by 
thieves and the negative media coverage may also deter potential museum visitors. 
Conversely, if a museum demonstrates exemplary security procedures they will 
be positively reinforced by their super controllers. For example, the Dallas Museum of 
Art, was designated by the Transport Security Administration (TSA) as a certified cargo 
screening facility in 2013 in order to ensure the works receive proper handling and care 
during the shipment process. The clearance level has only been afforded to very few 
American museums. In order to qualify for this certification, the museum had to undergo 
a year and a half certification process and now the museum can continue to maintain their 






electronically retrieved August 9, 2015) .  
 Guardianship adopted a multi-contextual meaning when Wilcox, Madensen, and 
Tillyer (2007) expanded guardianship to include not only several forms of individual 
level guardianship methods but also several forms of neighborhood level methods of 
guardianship. This study improved upon former studies of guardianship at both the 
individual and neighborhood level by examining four forms of guardianship methods 
rather than only one or two. The forms of guardianship examined at both the individual 
and neighborhood levels are physical guardianship measures of target hardening (safety 
precautions) such as use of a burglar alarm, personal guardianship measures of home 
occupancy such as the number of days a resident is present at their home, social 
guardianship measures of informal social control such as having a neighbor watch over 
one’s home when away, and guardianship by natural surveillance through environmental 
design of the residential spaces. These are features of residential properties that enhance 
natural surveillance such as ground floor windows. Wilcox et al. (2007) found that the 
effectiveness of the individual level measurements is augmented when the neighborhood 
level guardianship measures increased. Accordingly, “individual efforts are most 
effective when carried out in neighborhoods where many people are making similar 
efforts. Because collective effort has the potential to “make or break” individual effort, 
crime prevention policy must be multi-level with a clear focus on enhancing 
environmental or collective guardianship” (Wilcox, Madensen, & Tillyer, 2007, p. 794).  
Lastly, as methods and measurements of crime prevention evolved, guardianship 





to active field research observation. Criminologists coined this new area of scholarship 
“guardianship in action.”  
 
Guardianship in Action 
Active surveillance became a bold new approach to studying crime prevention 
when Reynald (2009) added a new observational action-based research approach, 
“guardianship in action” to the body of guardianship studies. Reynald (2009; 2010; 2011) 
measured what she referred to as guardianship intensity. Reynald’s (2009; 2010; 2011) 
studies measure the guardianship intensity of household residents and neighborhoods by 
observing residential guardianship in real time via field research rather than creating 
proxy measures to test guardianship capability. According to Reynald (2009), “residential 
guardianship intensity is the product of a two-fold process that involves both the physical 
potential to carry out supervision of people and places, as well as, the acts of monitoring 
and intervention when necessary” (p. 1). Reynald (2009) proposed a four-stage model of 
guardianship intensity in which researchers could observe residents’ guardianship actions 
or inactions. Reynald’s (2009) novel four stage measure of guardianship is as follows. 
Stage one is invisibility, which is when the resident is not home or visible.  
However, due to the fact that at level 1 there is no potential guardian, 
guardianship in action technically only includes three levels of guardianship potential: 
availability, capability, and willingness to intervene.  
Interestingly, Reynald’s (2009, 2010) four stage Guardianship In Action model is 
applicable to the art world. Reynald’s (2010) study, in particular, applies to the 





do not become active or intervening guardians. As mentioned in chapter two, the art 
world and the culture in which it thrives is notorious for perpetuating the shroud of 
secrecy in which it operates by not reporting any forms of art crimes perpetuated by 
outsiders, protecting its own malfeasance, avoiding any transparency within the industry, 
and failing to comply with ethical regulations set forth by the various governing bodies 
within the art world. Art museums and art galleries have a fiduciary responsibility to 
maintain the integrity of its own institutions and the profession itself by fostering 
forthrightness and industry unity. Paradoxically, the museum and gallery community may 
not be entirely culpable for their reluctance to become active guardians. Fear of negative 
reactions from the public and art industry contemporaries accounts for many victims of 
theft and vandalism to remain quiet when victimized. Also, when a missing work is 
discovered there may some confusion as to why it is missing. Was it stolen or merely lost 
in storage. Lastly, when a vandal or thief is armed with a lethal weapon, museum 
personnel are hesitant to intervene for fear for their own safety and the safety of other 
staff or visitors who may be present during the criminal perpetration.  
GIA concludes the discussion and measurement of the three components of 
routine activities theory to date. The next section addresses the various tests of RAT 
within several contexts, as well as for a range of forms criminal perpetration.  
 
Empirical Effectiveness of Routine Activities Theory 
Routine Activities Theory has undergone a multitude of tests within various contexts, 





diverse predictive utility. However, this theory and/or specific components of the theory, 
has had limited success regarding some specific criminal victimization and environmental 
arenas. Since this dissertation is addressing and analyzing the guardianship construct of 
RAT, the review of the analytical effectiveness will only focus on guardianship. The next 
section begins with a brief summary of tests of Cohen and Felson’s guardianship 
component.  
 
Guardianship empirically tested 
 The discussion of this theoretical construct will commence with the analytical 
successes and failures of tests of physical and social guardianship and then proceed to a 
specific empirical examination of CCTV and security guards. Tests of measures of 
guardianship have produced mixed results; especially in the area of physical security 
measures. This may be due Hollis-Peel, Reynald, Bavel, Effers, & Welsh’s (2011) 
assertion of the lack of research in this area of scholarly exploration.  
 
Physical and social guardianship 
As mentioned above, many scholars have divided the third component of RAT 
into two categories: social and physical guardianship. Briefly, physical guardianship is 
“the implementation of situational or target hardening measure (e.g. burglar alarms, door 
locks, window locks, guard dogs)” (Fisher & Wilkes, 2003, p. 531). Social guardianship 
is informal and formal surveillance of people and objects by property owners, neighbors, 
friends, passer-byers, and police/security personnel. Without the utilization of either form 









Meithe and Meier (1990)’s study on residential burglary, personal theft, and 
assault measured physical guardianship by whether the respondent carries a weapon or 
has a burglar alarm. It was determined that lack of possession of these protective 
measures increases one’s risk of burglary and violent victimization, but this measure was 
found to be insignificant when predicting theft victimization. Meithe and Meier (1990) 
measured social guardianship by whether the respondent lives alone or has at least one 
person over the age of 16 living with them. The study determined that persons who lived 
alone were at greater risk for all three forms of victimization.  
D’Alessio, Eitle, and Stolzenberg (2011) analyzed how unemployment rates 
affect residential burglary rates during two time periods: weekday residential burglary (6 
a.m. – 6 p.m.) and during the weeknights/weekend. Their results confirmed that 
unemployment reduces residential burglary rates of incidences during weekday hours. 
The researchers did not find any statistically significant relationship between 
unemployment and residential burglary rates during the weeknights or weekends.  
Within Breetzke and Cohn’s (2013) research on the effects of gated barriers on 
day time and night time burglary rates in gated and partially gated communities Tshwane, 
South Africa, three measurements of guardianship were utilized. These variables were: 
population density; road density; and partially or fully gated. Population density was 





of persons in an area could increase the rates of burglary by those potential offenders who 
live close to the affluent gated communities or increase the potential for more capable 
guardians which would decrease burglary rates. Breetzke and Cohn (2013) hypothesized 
in the context of their study that a pool of motivated offenders living within close 
proximity to the affluent gated communities would increase burglary rates. Gated 
communities contain aspects of both social and physical guardianship.  
Contrary to their hypothesis that living in a gated community would decrease the 
rates of residential burglary, Breetzke and Cohn (2013)’s analysis revealed that living 
within a gated community actually increases one’s chances of daytime and night time 
burglary victimization. Both the variables of population density and partially/fully gated 
communities are positively associated with day time and night time victimization within 
an enclosed neighborhood in South Africa. Road density was not found to be a 
statistically significant guardianship measure. 
In conclusion, guardianship measures utilized within the context of residential 
burglary, appear to produce for the most part inconsistent Physical security measures 
generally reduce victimization or have no significant effect on victimization and 
population density both increases and decreases victimization. 
 
Empirical Tests of Residential Guardianship In Action  
Reynold’s (2009) first test of her new Guardianship In Action measurement 
scheme was conducted by field observation of 814 properties located on randomly 
selected street segments in three neighborhoods in The Hague, Netherlands, between 9 





intensity observations. A score of 1 was given to homes where the guardian was invisible 
up to a score of 4 if the guardian demonstrated intervention by interacting with the field 
researcher. Reynald (2009) notes that two limitations to this study are that some capable 
guardians (level 3) may not have intervened due to the fact that the field researcher was 
not perceived as a security threat and the issue that each property was observed at only 
once during daylight hours.  
Within the evaluation of this study, the researchers also empirically tested the 
validity of the measures of guardianship in action with the presence of environmental 
correlates (a territorial definition of each property, surveillance opportunities for each 
property, and the image/maintenance of each property), the social interaction and 
cohesiveness between neighbors, and the activity level within the neighborhoods). All of 
these factors theoretically impact the residents’ guardianship intensity capacity. Simply 
stated, are the property and neighborhood environment of each resident ideal to exercise 
the highest level of guardianship intensity? The results indicate that higher levels of 
surveillance opportunities correlate with higher levels of guardianship intensity and when 
territoriality levels are low in order to optimize the surveillance potential of each resident.  
A positive correlation is also representative of the relationship between the social 
interaction between neighbors and guardianship intensity. When the researchers 
examined the relationship between the effectiveness of guardianship intensity and activity 
level of the neighborhoods, the relationship was negatively correlated; but statistically 
insignificant. The primary results of the study indicate that “property crime decreases 
consistently guardianship intensity increases at each stage although the decrease between 





Peel and Welsh (2014) replicated Reynald’s (2009) test of the role of guardianship in 
explaining property crime by utilizing Reynald’s GIA measures in Boston neighborhoods 
and Hollis and Welsh (2014) found the GIA instrument to be both reliable and valid. 
Reynald (2010) expanded upon her 2009 guardianship in action study, by 
interviewing 255 residents in 13 neighborhoods within the Dutch province of South-
Holland in April of 2008 about their guardianship behaviors and willingness to intervene 
in order to explore the reasons why available, capable guardians can or cannot be 
transformed into intervening guardians; i.e. what factors contribute to distinguishing 
between why some guardians chose to remain in the capable guardianship stage and other 
guardians advance to the stage of active guardianship.  
In this study, Reynald (2010) proposed that becoming an active guardian is 
dependent on three broad factors: whether a guardian choses to monitor, if monitoring a 
guardian’s ability to detect criminal activities and questionable persons who might 
commit criminal activities, and whether or not the guardian who has detected a criminal 
activity choses to intervene either indirectly by calling the police or another authority or 
directly intervening either verbally or physically.  
Of the 255 residents interviewed, 217 revealed that they supervised their 
residential space. 15% of the sample reported that they did not have the ability to identify 
specific cues that would cause suspicions of criminal activities or suspicious persons. 9% 
of the sample reported that they chose to ignore something suspicious because they did 
not want to get involved. 80% of the sample reported that they would initiate some form 
of either indirect or direct intervention action if they noticed criminal activities. Of the 





16% indicated they would directly intervene. Lastly, 23% of the residents agreed that 
they would intervene either indirectly or directly. However, the form of intervention 
depended upon the seriousness of the activity.  
Reynald (2010) also examined the impact of a resident’s neighborhood 
characteristics such as level of crime, income levels of residents, and ethnic heterogeneity 
within the neighborhood, influence a resident’s decision to intervene. Results indicate 
that persons who live in neighborhoods with lower crime levels, residents with higher 
incomes, and neighborhoods with a higher percentage of ethnic homogeneity are more 
likely to supervise their properties and intervene either directly or indirectly when a 
criminal or potential criminal situation arises.  
Lastly, Reynald (2010) examined the primary categorical factors which impacted 
a resident’s willingness to intervene. These factors are: whether or not a resident feels a 
sense of obligation or responsibility to intervene, a resident’s perception of how their 
neighborhood will react to intervention, whether or not a resident feels that they are 
trained to intervene, whether or not a resident feels there is a risk to their personal safety, 
whether or not a resident has the proper tools for protection immediately available, and 
whether or not a resident feels physically competent to intervene.  
In sum, this study moves beyond mere observation of residential guardianship 
levels to the verbal inquiry of reasoning behind a residents’ choice to intervene or not. 
Adding a qualitative component to a quantitative concept allows researchers to acquire 







College and University Victimization 
In their study, examining the factors related to forms of on-campus violence and 
theft victimization, Fisher, Sloan, Cullen, and Lu (1998) utilized only components of 
social guardianship for the individual-level measures and a general guardianship heading 
for institutional level measures.  Three measures are used on the individual level: living 
alone without roommates on campus, participating in a non-mandatory crime prevention 
or crime awareness seminar, and how often someone is asked to watch personal property 
while items are left unattended. The last variable is only used in theft victimization 
analysis. Three measures of guardianship are used on the institutional level. Fisher et al. 
(1998) did not specify whether these variables are measures of social or physical 
guardianship. The first measure includes three components and it is only used for 
predicting violent victimization: a university’s requirements for attending a mandatory 
rape prevention program, a mandatory alcohol awareness program, and a mandatory drug 
awareness program. The researchers also examined the effect of a campus wide crime 
watch which is only used in the theft model. The last contextual guardianship measure is 
the total number of full time guards (either sworn officers or private security guards) per 
1,000 students. Findings indicate, that at the individual level, attending a non-mandatory 
crime prevention or crime prevention awareness seminar reduced a student’s risk of 
violent victimization and asking someone to watch unattended property reduced a 
student’s risk of theft victimization. No other individual level variables were significant 
and none of the institutional level variables were significant in predicting either violent or 





Mustaine and Tewksbury’s (1998a) guardianship measures consisted only of 
target hardening measures and were categorized under “home security measures” such as 
installing a security system in their study of minor and major theft victimization of 
college students. Students who had a dog in their residence decreased their chance of 
minor theft victimization and students who both installed extra locks on their door and 
had dog in the residence reduced their risk of major theft victimization. No other physical 
guardianship measures were statistically significant with predicting theft.  
Even though Tewksbury and Mustaine’s (2003) examination of college student’s 
exposure, proximity and target suitability to potential offenders as a predictors of a 
student’s use of self-protective measures did not utilize guardianship as an independent 
variable, the descriptive statistics surrounding the self-protective measures is worthy of 
discussion.  Mace (21.5%) and guns (17.0%) were the objects used at the highest 
percentages and forty-two percent of the sampled population uses some form of self-
protective measure. Tewksbury and Mustaine (2003) note that they “find strong support 
for the notion that routine activity theory can be used as a theory that explains all 
elements of the criminal incident not just the frequently assessed victimization risks of 
individuals” (p. 323). Tewksbury and Mustaine (2003) further posit that “this analysis 
suggests the exploration of guardianship element of routine activity theory is a valid and 
valuable endeavor. The importance of guardianship should not be taken as a given but 
considered more fully as a potential influence over criminal events” (p. 323).  
Regarding vandalism, the measurement of guardianship has been more limited. 
Tewksbury and Mustaine’s (2000) operationalization of capable guardianship was 





measures of target hardening such as owning a burglar alarm, extra exterior and interior 
lights, extra locks on doors, and owning a dog. None of these measures were significant 
in predicting the odds of increasing or decreasing one’s chances of vandalism 
victimization.  
Lagrange (1994) operationalized guardianship in general as residential areas with 
a high rental occupancy compared to home ownership, the number of young (age 20-24) 
male residents, the number of single males residents, unemployment rates, the number of 
residents who are new to the area (less than a year) as representative of transitory rental 
trends, and population density. The findings showed that the variables that increased the 
rates of vandalism were high unemployment rates, high rental occupancy and high 
proportion of young male residents. The variables that decreased the rates of vandalism 
were the number of new residents and a high population density.  
In conclusion, except for Lagrange’s (1994) study which not utilize college 
students as respondents, guardianship measures have been shown to be primarily non-
significant in preventing or promoting college student victimization. Other than 
Tewksbury and Mustaine’s (1998) study of major and minor theft of college students, no 
other study found any significance with any variables representing physical guardianship 
measures. Fisher et al.’s (1998) work on college student’s violent and theft victimization 
only resulted in one measure of social guardianship and one measure of general 
guardianship (which is actually a measure of social guardianship) producing any 
significant results. Therefore, even though a few studies were carefully examined, it 





or scholars and college administrators should conceptualize how they are enacting 
guardianship on college and university campuses.  
 
Grades K-12 Student Victimization 
As the violence in primary schools continued to escalate, many schools adopted 
several guardianship techniques such as: the placement of full time police officers (school 
resource officers), private security guards, CCTV, metal detectors, identification cards for 
students, staff and visitors, clear-back pack policies, lockless student lockers, staff 
training on lock down procedures, campus design changes, removal of student lockers, 
walkie-talkies for administrators, and frequent hall monitoring (Addington, 2009; 
Johnson, 1999).  
 Schreck, Miller and Gibson’s (2003) research on risk factors determining 
victimization of junior high and high school students utilized many measures of social 
and physical guardianship. However, the measures were only present in the school 
context and the student individual characteristics category. Ten variables measuring 
guardianship were utilized within the school context. The target hardening measurements 
included: guards, metal detectors, locked doors, visitor sign-in, and supervision of 
hallways, locker checks, and hall passes. Three additional guardianship measures within 
the school category were: restroom limits, drug education, and corporal punishment. 
Three social guardianship measures were tested within the individual characteristics 
category: the student’s first year at the school, does the student believe that the rules are 
unfair, and does the student express alienation toward the school. The other guardianship 





protect himself or herself. Locker checks, bringing weapons to school, belief that rules 
are unfair, and alienation toward school increased a student’s risk of overall 
victimization. Only three guardianship measures increased a student’s odds of violent 
victimization were a school’s use of corporal punishment, bringing a weapon to school, 
and belief that rules are unfair. Similar to the violent victimization analysis, only three 
guardianship variables were found to increase a student’s odds of theft victimization: 
locker checks, belief that rules are unfair, and alienation toward school. No guardianship 
measures were found to reduce any form of victimization. Lastly, of particular interest is 
that none of the security measures put in place at schools had any significant effect at 
either reducing or increasing the odds of victimization other than locker checks which 
increased the odds of student overall and theft victimization.  
Burrow and Apel‘s (2008) comparison of youth community and assault 
victimization utilized many guardianship measures many of which were mentioned in the 
above empirical tests of exposure due to Burrow and Apel‘s (2008) multiple 
measurement conceptualization of several variables within their study. The variable 
representing solely indicators of guardianship are students who have siblings attending 
the same school, physical security measures incorporated by the school such as 
surveillance cameras, non-physical security policies such as requiring students to wear ID 
badges, and rule clarity regarding policies and their enforcement? These proxy measures 
are contained within the school related predictors category. The analytical results add to 
the body of previous literature illuminating ineffectiveness of physical measures and non-
physical security procedures within the school systems. The only guardianship measure 





which reduced the odds of both forms of victimization. Burrow and Apel (2008) do note 
that at the bivariate level of analysis the presence of security guards, a measure of 
physical security, is positively associated with larceny risk and locker checks, a measure 
of non-physical security, is negatively associated with larceny risk within schools. 
Lastly, Tillyer, Fisher, and Wilcox’s (2011) examination of the effects of school 
crime prevention on students’ risk, perception of risk of, and fear of serious violent 
victimization employed many measures of guardianship. The following individual level 
exposure measures were utilized: a student’s attachment to school such as the strength of 
the relationship of a student with their teachers, a student’s attachment to their peers such 
as how strongly a respondent values the opinion of his or her closest friends, a student’s 
frequency of involvement in school sports, and a student’s frequency of involvement in 
school activities other than school sports. The school level measures of crime prevention 
representing guardianship are school efficacy such collaboration between teachers and 
administrators, the degree of police involvement, the usage of metal detectors, and 
whether or not backpack and book bags are banned from campus.  
The findings indicated that two of the individual level measures of guardianship, 
strong attachment to school and strong attachment to peers reduced the likelihood of a 
student being a victim of serious violence. In addition, a student’s involvement in school 
sports increased his or her chances of being a victim of serious violence.  
None of the guardianship measures within the set of school crime prevention 
variables had any predictive power with any of the dependent variables except metal 
detectors which reduced a student’s fear of serious violent victimization while enrolled in 





Overall, K-12 guardianship measures and policies do not appear to be an effective 
use of a school’s resources given that this form of crime prevention appears to be 
consistently successful.  
 
Empirical Tests of CCTV 
Generally, the effectiveness of CCTV in crime prevention from a scholarly 
standpoint has been mixed. Welsh and Farrington (2009b) conducted a systematic review 
and meta-analysis of 41 studies of the effects of CCTV surveillance on crime prevention 
in the following public places: city and town centers, public housing areas, subway 
systems (public transportation sites), and car parks (public parking lots), Welsh & 
Farrington’s (2009b) results concluded that the CCTV studies have revealed that 
surveillance cameras produce the best results in crime reduction in public parking lots 
(51%). A 7% reduction in crime was observed in both the city and town center and public 
housing areas. The CCTV placement in the subway systems produced a 23% decrease in 
crime. It should be noted, though, that the many of the studies (approximately 77%) 
analyzed, utilized CCTV that was actively monitored by a police officer or another form 
of security personnel with a link to the police. Also, many of the successful studies, 
contained additional environmental features at the test sites such extra lighting to enhance 
visibility of persons inhabiting the locations being monitored.  (Welsh & Farrington, 
2009b).  
Within the primary school systems, CCTV has been successful in monitoring 





(Burrow & Apel, 2008; Hope 2009) or reducing students’ fear of criminal victimization 
(Tanner-Smith, 2015), 
Hurley’s (2002) study on the effects of calls of service to the police regarding 
crime and disorder after the implementation of CCTV at three tests sites in Cincinnati, 
Ohio produced mixed results. Only two sites experienced a reduction in calls for service 
of crime and disorder after the CCTV equipment was installed and the reduction in calls 
was most significant in calls for disorder rather than crime.  
Lastly, Eck and Guerette (2012) evaluated 149 studies of various place based 
crime intervention methods within various settings and crime typologies. The findings 
revealed that CCTV was overall slightly more effective than not effective in crime 
reduction. Within residential areas, CCTV was effective in one study and not effective in 
another study in reducing burglary/theft. Within public places, CCTV showed a mixed 
effectiveness in reducing burglary/theft in one study and was shown to be effective in two 
other studies. CCTV was effective in reducing multiple forms of crime in eight studies, 
non-effective in three studies, and was found to have a mixed effectiveness in five studies 
within public places. Within the retail establishments, CCTV was effective in reducing 
burglary/theft in four studies, exhibited a mixed effectiveness in one study, and the 
effectiveness of CCTV of reducing burglary/theft within retail establishments was found 
to be inconclusive in one study. Eck and Guerette’s (2012) final exploration was the 
public transportation stations which includes trains, buses, planes, and taxis. CCTV was 
found to be effective in reducing burglary/theft in one study, effective in reducing 
disorder in one study, and effective in reducing violence in one study. In sum, Eck and 





not effective in five of the studies that examined CCTV, providing a mixed effectiveness 
in nine of the studies that utilized CCTV, and inconclusive results regarding CCTV 
effectiveness were revealed in one study.  
In conclusion, despite the inconclusive crime prevention potential of CCTV, this 
technology remains a popular form of surveillance. Another, perhaps more effective, 
form of surveillance is the place manager.  
 
Empirical Analysis of Place Managers 
Place managers have been proven to deter criminal activity or create criminal hot 
spots such as bar owners/managers or landlords who own apartment buildings or 
complexes. Landlords who exhibit poor management by allowing their properties to 
decline, cheat their tenants in rent, knowingly allow drug dealing and other crime to 
occur on their properties, or simply cannot control the antisocial behavior of their tenants 
are referred to as slumlords. In addition, if a slumlord acquires additional properties the 
criminal activities from the original properties may spread to the newly acquired ones 
creating new hot spots of crime. (Clarke & Bichler-Robertson, 1998). Tenants who are 
attracted to properties owned by slumlords are those who may be illegal immigrants or 
are persons with criminal records who cannot meet the screening requirement of more 
stable housing complexes.  
Clarke and Bichler-Robertson (1998) conducted two cases studies in Santa 
Barbara, California on the effects of intervention of one form of place managers, the 
police, and super controllers (the media and the courts) upon altering the actions of 
apartment building slumlords. The goal of the study is to evaluate the effects on the high 





units receives police intervention, threat of abatement, intense media attention and 
pressure from local businesses and if the other slumlord of another group of units 
receives no intervention. The slumlord with whom intervention was directed improved 
the quality of how his or her properties were managed and maintained his properties. In 
addition, the crime and arrest rates at the apartment complexes that he or she owned 
drastically decreased. The slumlord who received no intervention had no improvements 
in crime occurrences or arrest rates.  
The effects of police intervention with place managers of rental properties 
plagued with drug dealing and criminal behavior was further investigated by Eck and 
Wartell (1998) in San Diego, California. The properties were divided into two treatment 
groups and one control group. One treatment group (42 places) received only a letter 
from the San Diego Police Department’s specialized drug unit, Drug Abatement 
Response Team (DART), warning impending civil action of forced property closure and 
a $25,000.00 fine if the drug dealers were not evicted; along with offers of assistance 
from law enforcement with the eviction of the offenders. The other treatment group (37 
places) received both a letter and a follow up visit from a DART detective along with a 
member of the city of San Diego’s Code Compliance Department. A control group (42 
places) received no police intervention. More drug dealers were evicted by place 
managers involved with the treatment groups; the meeting group evicted more tenants 
than the letter group. Lastly, there was a significant reduction (60%) in incidences of 
crime in the treatment group over a 30-month period who had personal interaction with 





received a letter was inconclusive due to fluctuations of increase and decreases of crime 
over the 30 month period.  
 Mazerolle, Kadleck and Roehl (1998) also conducted a study surrounding the role 
of place managers within the context of controlling drug activity, signs of disorder, and 
indications civility; specifically, in 100 street blocks of Oakland, California. Fifty of the 
street blocks were assigned to the Oakland’s Police Department’s specialized program 
“Beat Health”, which is responsible for exerting concentrated efforts to control drug 
dealing and other criminal activities by working with the landlords, homeowners, and 
business owners of the blocks they were assigned. The Beat Health officers educated the 
place managers about simple crime prevention measures, their rights and responsibilities 
as tenants and landlords. The Beat Health officers also engaged in formal actions such as 
sending warning letter to assess the condition of the properties for levels of decline, 
conducting warning telephone communications, issuing beat orders, and helping property 
owners with tenant evictions. The remaining fifty blocks were not assigned to a 
specialized police unit. Two measures of guardianship were examined: place 
management activity and levels of social cohesion on each street blocks. The results 
revealed that if place managers acting as a cohesive group and working together to 
improve community activity on their street blocks is positively associated with the 
reduction of drug dealing and disorder and increased levels of civility, while place 
managers who acted on their own (individually) to reduce crime did not reduce drug 
dealing and disorder. Furthermore, the residents on the aforementioned street blocks 





officers did decrease crime and disorder within the street blocks they targeted 
independent of the cohesiveness or the collective activities of the place managers.   
 The place management at criminal hot spots such as bars was examined by 
Madensen and Eck (2008). Madsen and Eck (2008) hypothesized that crime is a result of 
poor management regardless of the neighborhood crime levels, that bar patrons are 
predisposed to commit crimes and bars are their locale of congregation, and that 
incidences of crime are a combination of the type of neighborhood the bar is located, 
level of criminogenic potential of the patrons, and the management style of the bar 
managers.  
 The study focused on the incidences of physical and threatened violence within a 
sample of 184 bars located within the city limits of Cincinnati, Ohio. Madensen and Eck 
(2008) determined that the ‘violent’ bars were located next to ‘non-violent’ bars, there it 
was not the geographical location of the bar which affected victimization, rather it was 
the place management style of the bar managers that affected the incidences of violence 
at their facilities, as well as enhance or assuage the negative influences from external 
sources not related to their specific bar. Accordingly, “bar managers create and maintain 
settings that can suppress, permit, or facilitate acts of violence’ (Madensen & Eck, 2008, 
p. 117).  
In conclusion, research demonstrates that place managers can be effective in 
reducing crime if they chose to be engaged in crime prevention. Another form of place 







Security Guards Empirically Analyzed 
The existing literature provides mixed results for security guards as effective 
deterrents to crime. On college campuses, security officers appear to not have had any 
impact on crime reduction or production (Cass, 2007; Fisher, Sloan, Cullen, & Lu; 1998). 
Also, within the primary school’s system, school resource researchers have indicated that 
school resource officers (SRO) which can be sworn police officers or non-peace officers 
in the role of security guards have no significant impact on crime reduction (Brown, 
2006; Burrow & Apel; 2008; Schreck, Miller, & Gibson, 2003; Tillyer, Fisher, & Wilcox; 
2010) or any influence in reducing students’ fear of criminal victimization (Tanner-
Smith, 2015). Furthermore, Swartz, Osborne, Dawson-Edwards, and Higgins (2015) 
found that both the mere presence of SROs and SROs performing guardianship duties 
actually increased the reporting of serious violent victimization within primary schools.  
Additionally, Brown’s (2005) survey of 250 high school students indicate that the 
majority of the students believe that the police officers (68.4%) and security officers 
(71%) do a good job. However, despite the fact that the majority of the students believed 
the officers did a good job, only 41.9% of the students supported the school increasing 
the number of security officers. Upon examination, of the effectiveness of the 
implementation of the security measures in the Brownsville school system, the data 
indicated that there was still a strong presence of drugs and weapons in the high schools. 
Conversely, Johnson’s (1999) study revealed that school resource officers were effective 
in reducing incidences of violence and non-violent delinquent behaviors. 
Within public spaces, Welsh, Mudge, and Farrington (2010) conducted five 





countries including two in the United States, one in Canada, one in the Netherlands, and 
one in the United Kingdom. Three of the security guard evaluations were performed in 
car parks, one in a city redevelopment area, and one was conducted in a subway station. 
Before and after effects were measured. The only evaluation that indicated a decrease in 
crime commission was the placement of security guards in car parks.  
In conclusion, security guards as place managers may not be as effective at crime 
reduction or prevention as other forms of place managers. However, more research 
should be conducted to obtain a more accurate empirical picture.  
 These empirical studies, when examined in their entirety, facilitate the potential 
applicability of the guardianship construct to art theft and vandalism within art 
institutions; especially the effectiveness of social guardianship measures. Furthermore, 
despite the conflicting results of physical guardianship measures, there may be findings 
which indicate reduction of victimization within the above-mentioned context. This 
concludes the discussion of empirical studies of guardianship. The next section is a brief 
commentary on the validity of RAT in general.  
   
Predictive Validity of Guardianship 
In conclusion, the guardianship component of Routine Activities can be 
empirically relevant in many criminological contexts and analytical models as illustrated 
in the above sections. However, RAT overall does present a few limitations. First, is the 
frequency overlap of measurements among each of the three components which creates 
contrary theoretical predications that weakens that strength of RAT’S validity. For 





school as a measure of guardianship, exposure, and target suitability in their study of 
school assault and larceny victimization. In Burrow and Apel’s research, bringing a 
weapon to school had no statistical significance on a student’s risk of either form of 
victimization. As guardianship, the weapon was conceived as a form of self-protection 
against any potential predatory confrontation, as exposure the variable was 
conceptualized as an indicator of a student who is likely to engage in activities that would 
expose them to potential victimization, and as a measure of target attractiveness, bringing 
a weapon to school was envisioned as an indication that a youth who possess weapons 
are more likely to be aggressive and antagonistic which will attract youths with similar 
characteristics.  
Furthermore, measurements used to operationalize the same construct within the 
same criminal context have resulted in conflicting findings. Employment status, used as a 
measure of guardianship, has both empirically been proven to increase and decrease 
one’s chances of residential burglary. In addition, the measurement of population density 
has both increased and decreased the odds of property theft, most likely due to the fact 
that the increased number of persons can either aid as capable guardians or increase 
exposure to pool of motivated offenders 
Lastly, since the focus of this dissertation is on social and physical guardianship, 
it is prudent to assess the empirical successes and failures of these two conceptual areas 
in order to formulate theoretical derived explanations for the results of the data analysis. 
Measures of physical guardianship overall do not appear to successfully decrease or 
increase predatory violations either for individuals as uses for self-protection or as 





Social guardianship, especially in the form of social cohesiveness and proactive place 
management, has presented more scholarly success in crime reduction within a variety of 
settings and criminal violations. Two crime typologies in which both forms of 
guardianship have never been empirically tested are art theft and art vandalism.  In fact, 
art theft and art vandalism in art museums and art galleries has never been empirically 
explored within any context of routine activities theory. The next section will address the 
empirical utility of the RAT within the aforementioned forms of criminal perpetration.  
 
Routine Activities Theory and Art Theft and Art Vandalism  
Despite the extensive body of literature, examining the applicability of RAT 
measures, it is surprising that these researchers could not find any scholarly endeavors 
empirically testing the utility of any measures of RAT to predict art theft or art 
vandalism. However, given the shroud of secrecy and elusiveness in which the art world 
functions, the paucity of any tests of RAT within the realm of art crime is none-the-less 
to be expected.  
Many art crime scholars have proposed Routine Activities theory as a viable 
criminological theory to explain various forms pf art crime (Aarons, 2001; Balcells, 
2016; Conklin, 1994; Durney, 2011; Dietzler, 2013; James, 2000; Kerr, 2015; 
MacKenzie, 2005).  
Conversely, Lane, Bromley, Hicks, and Mahoney (2008) argue that RAT is not a 
suitable theory to explain the transnational nature of the art and antiquities theft market 
because RAT is primarily a micro-level theory. The researchers maintain that RAT 





demand, and regulation. However, Durney and Proulx (2011) proclaim in their 
introduction to art crime in Crime, Law, and Social Changes’ 2011 issue devoted to 
solely art crime, including theft of art and antiquities, that “criminal conduct involving art 
and antiquities occurs when three factors converge in time and space: a motivated 
offender, a suitable target, and the absence of a capable guardian” (p. 127).  
None of the above-mentioned scholars mentioned nor any scholars have used 
RAT to explain art vandalism. 
Studies of the destruction of property have been used to quantitatively support 
RAT (Lagrange; 1994; Tewksbury & Mustaine, 2000). Therefore, RAT may prove to be 
an effective tool of analysis to predict art vandalism. Art vandals are motivated by 
attention-seeking ploys, revenge on the art world, anger with an art works’ morality or 
imagery, and social or political protest (Conklin, 1994; Passas & Proulx, 2011). For many 
vandals, art work is a suitable object in which to express the above-mentioned 
motivations and once again the museums and galleries which house the suitable 
vandalistic targets may not be as rigid in their guardianship techniques in order to prevent 
the destruction of their cultural treasures.  
Therefore, given the deficit in the scholarly literature regarding empirical tests of 
routine activities theory in the arena of art theft and art vandalism, as well as, the 
endorsements of highly respected art crime scholars who have logically proposed RAT as 
a viable theory to explain the above forms of art crime, this study seeks to empirically 
analyze RAT. More precisely, measurements of the guardianship component of RAT will 
be quantitatively tested to predict the chances of art theft and art vandalism victimization 





suitable targets, and a host of documented cases of a lack of capable guardianship within 















The purpose of this research is to apply the lack of capable guardianship 
component of Routine Activities Theory (RAT) to art crime and explore the quantitative 
relationship between physical guardianship and social guardianship activities engaged at 
American art museums and art galleries and its relationship to the prevalence of art theft 
and art vandalism. Although, both forms of guardianship practices have proven to be 
successful in reducing criminal victimization, many art industry professionals and non-art 
crime criminological scholars have posited greater success rates of social guardianship 
(the human element) measures compared to physical guardianship (the security devices 
and procedures element) measures in reducing predatory violations. Accordingly, the 
following hypotheses will be tested:  
Hypothesis 1: Both social and physical guardianship measures will reduce the odds 
of both art theft and art vandalism victimization.    
Hypothesis 2: Social guardianship measures will reduce the odds of art theft at 
higher rates than physical guardianship measures. 
Hypothesis 3: Social guardianship measures will reduce the odds of art vandalism at 





Data Collection Methods 
Survey 
The data for the current analysis was obtained using a survey developed for the 
purposes of the current study that identified, through self-report, incidences of museum 
and gallery art theft, art vandalism, and security practices and devices.  The survey 
contained primarily objective-based, closed-ended questions. However, provisions were 
made for some open-ended responses.   The survey was mailed to directors of art 
institutions within the United States, due to directors possessing the knowledge required 
to complete the survey or the authority to distribute the questionnaire to an employee 
within another management or oversight role with the ability to complete the 
questionnaire. The survey was part of a mailed packet that included a cover letter 
describing the purpose of the survey, promising anonymity of the respondent as well as 
the institution, and a self-addressed stamped return envelope.  The preamble consent 
document from the University of Louisville Institutional Review Board was also included 
in the survey packet.  
The cover letter was addressed to the Director of each art institution.  The cover 
letter was signed by Peter Morrin, (who at the time was the former Director of the Speed 
Art Museum and the Director of the University of Louisville’s Center for Arts and 
Cultural Partnerships), as well as Dr. Deborah Keeling, (who at the time was the Chair of 
the Department of Justice Administration, University of Louisville).  The letter was 
printed on letterhead with the names of both the Fine Arts and Justice Administration 





joint effort between the University of Louisville Department Of Fine Arts and the 
Department of Justice Administration.  
 
Sample 
The population for this study was identified from the Official Museum 
Directory’s online database in 2013.  This source consists of a listing of “14,600 art 
institutions including museums, houses/sites, planetariums, science-technology centers, 
art galleries/centers, aquariums and zoological parks” 
(http://www.officialmuseumdirectory.com). This resource is highly regarded as the most 
comprehensive listing of U.S. art museums and galleries by art industry professionals.  
Specific search parameters were utilized to narrow down the study population to 
institutions that exhibit art. These categorical descriptors included art museums and 
galleries; arts and crafts museums; china, glass, and silver museums; civic art and cultural 
centers; decorative arts museums; folk art museums; textile museums; and college and 
university museums. These categories were entered within the search engine of the 
database at the same time and a list of 4,160 art institutions resulted from this search.   
In order to make the study more manageable and the survey more affordable, 
every fifth institution that “exhibited art” was sampled from the larger population. This 
resulted in a sample of 832 institutions.  Following a review of each of the 832 entries, 
many of the institutions had to be rejected due to replication in names, institutions that 
were no longer in existence, inclusion of contacts that were used as survey pre-testers or 
survey construction consultants, incorrect collection descriptions, or categorical error of 





All contact information for each institution was entered into a spreadsheet.  Each 
individual institution was then contacted, by telephone, to verify the name of the 
institution’s director.  The survey packets were mailed in January of 2014. A follow up 
reminder card was mailed two months later to the same institutions. The final sample 
included 111 respondents, or 17.5% of the original sample. While this might seem to be a 
very low return rate, it seems quite reasonable given the nature of the survey.  According 
to Hagan (2006), non-response is a common issue with mail-in surveys and a 20% 
response rate is “fortunate” for a “one-time-only survey” distributed by a researcher 
without sponsorship (p. 162). Additionally, Friedrichs (2007) notes that a profound 
challenge associated with conducting research utilizing corporate entities as respondents 
is acquiring access and gaining the trust of the institution in order to garner information.  
Furthermore, the survey asked respondents to provide guardianship (security) 
information about their facility, a type of information they are hesitant to disclose. For 
instance, a Director of Security of a prominent American museum respectfully informed 
the researchers that it was not their policy to answer surveys or any questions regarding 
their security practices. Also, in 2014, Janis Tomlinson, Director of the University of 
Delaware museums was quoted in Delaware’s The News Journal stating she would not 
discuss their security procedures because “part of security is that people don’t know 
about it” (http://www.delawareonline.com/story/entertainment/arts/2014/05/01/museums-
struggle-protect-art-public-defacement/8574121/, electronically retrieved November 4, 








The questionnaire was composed of 149 questions.  The majority were closed-
ended questions.  A copy of the survey is contained in Appendix A. The survey was 
divided into three sections: the general characteristics of each institution, security topics, 
and vandalism and theft victimization. The survey was pre-tested by ten former and/or 
current museum directors. The survey, cover letter, and an on-line application were 
submitted to the University of Louisville’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) for approval 
in early July of 2013. This study qualified for an expedited review and was approved in 




Two dependent variables will be used for this study: “Yes art vandalism 
incidence(s)” and “Yes art theft incidence(s)”. Several challenges dogged the survey: the 
infrequent occurrence of vandalism and theft within the respondent sample, the perceived 
hesitancy of the museums and galleries to report these forms of crime, and the concern 
within the art world to determine the overall chances of being victimized (rather than the 
exact number of victimization incidences).  Therefore, the decision was made to utilize 
yes/no dichotomous dependent variables rather than continuous variables that capture the 
precise number of incidences within the sample set. The variable, “Yes art vandalism 
incidence(s)” refers to whether or not a museum or gallery experienced any incidences of 
art vandalism over the past five years, in which 0= no incidences of art vandalism and 1= 





actual number of vandalism incidences reported by each institution into a dummy 
variable. The second dependent variable “Yes art theft incidence(s)” refers to whether or 
not a museum or gallery experienced any incidences of art theft over the past ten years as 
reported by each respondent. This variable was coded 0= no incidences of art theft and 
1= yes at least one incidence of art theft. This variable was created by transforming the 
actual number of art theft incidences reported by each institution into a dummy variable. 
It should be noted that there was inconsistency with one of the respondent’s reporting of 
incidences of vandalism.  Because this respondent did not report any incidences of art 
vandalism in the forced answer choice but did report occurrences of intentional 
destruction of art within the comments section of the survey instrument, their response 
for the variable, ‘Yes art vandalism incidence(s)” was recoded as 1.  
The objects that were included as possible theft or vandalism targets as listed in 
the survey were outdoor sculpture, sculptures (larger than 10 inches in height), small 
sculptures (less than 10 inches in height, small paintings (8.5”x11” or smaller), paintings 
larger than 8.5”x11”, small photographs (8.5”x11” or smaller), photographs larger than 
8.5”x11”, decorative arts objects, large glass objects, small glass objects, china objects, 
silver objects, textiles, rare books or manuscripts, posters, or other (please specify). 
Respondents to the survey were asked how many of each specific item had been 
vandalized (over the past five years) or stolen (over the past ten years). It should be noted 
that even though the researchers collected this granular data, the primary analytical 







Independent Theoretical Variables 
The independent or predictor variables used in this study are proxy measures of 
social guardianship and physical guardianship. The variables measuring the two 
components of guardianship have been grouped into theoretically derived categories that 
represent various aspects of guardianship measures within art museums and art galleries. 
The first set of categories relate to social guardianship within cultural institutions. 
 
Social guardianship 
There are sixty-six variables used to measure social guardianship. These variables 
are divided into eight separate categories: 1) non-security variables relevant to place 
managers, 2) security variables relevant to place managers, 3) training variables relevant 
to place manager activities, 4) variables that examine place manager activities relating to 
due diligence, 5) variables that describe security guard related practices, 6) variables that 
are designated as measures of possible place manager improvements, 7) variables that 
represent various aspects of guardianship in action for vandalism, and lastly, 8) similar 
variables that represent aspects of guardianship in action for theft. 
 
Place Managers 
Place managers have the potential to reduce and discourage crime merely by their 
presence and activities at specific places. Place managers can be anyone from an owner 
of a store or establishment to a customer or visitor of the establishment. Many types of 
place managers are present within art museums and galleries. It was mentioned in chapter 





level place managers are employees of the museum or gallery, such as the security 
officers, or non-security personnel, such as a curator. Volunteers also are included in this 
level of place management even though they are not paid employees.  Art institutions 
could not survive without volunteers due to funding constraints within the art world, and 
often it is the volunteers who compose the majority of the staff. Tertiary level place 
managers are not employees of the museum or gallery but are service providers to the 
facility, such as the mail delivery persons. Quaternary level place managers are non-
employees and non-service providers to the museum or gallery who frequent the facility, 
such as visitors.  
Meredith, Kadleck, and Roehl (1998) argue that when place managers act 
together as a cohesive group, crime rates are reduced. Anthony Amore, the head of 
security at Boston’s Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum, advises in his interview with 
Noah Charney (2009), to “engage the entire museum community, including employees 
and volunteers, to take an active role in the security of the facility. Let them know how 
important they are to identifying problems and potential thefts or vandalism. Museum 
frontline staff can be invaluable in identifying or taking immediate action in the case of 
an incident of theft or vandalism” (p. 135).  
 
Place Managers-Non-Security 
The first theoretical categorical grouping of social guardianship variables is three 
types of non-security place managers present in art galleries and museums. These three 
forms of place managers represent the primary, secondary, and quintenary levels of place 





“non-security employees” is defined as the total number of full time and part-time 
employees (excluding full time equivalents) minus the number of full-time and part-time 
security guards. The variable “volunteers” is defined as the annual number of volunteer 
employees (excluding full time equivalents) and the variable “visitors” is defined as the 
number of visitors present at a respondent’s museum or gallery. These continuous 
variables are measured at the interval/ratio level of measurement.  
 
Place Managers- Security Guards 
The next categorical grouping of place manager theoretical measures, types of 
security guards, refer to the museum or gallery’s security personnel. This group of 
variables represent the secondary level of place managers. Admittedly, many scholars 
(Felson, 2006; Felson & Clarke, 2006; Felson & Eckert, 2016) have asserted that security 
guards are not guardians. However, for this study we are including them as a form of 
place managers. Security guards have been regarded as a museum and gallery’s best 
defense against theft or vandalism. Charles Hill (2003), former Scotland Yard Art and 
Antiquities detective remarks, “all of the security locks, bolts, CCTV systems ad 
gadgetry in the world could turn a museum into Fort Knox, but that would defeat the 
purpose of being a museum. For those responsible for security, the human dimension is 
all-important in dealing with potential theft” (p. 16). Additionally, the respondents in 
Cordess and Turcan’s (1993) study on art vandalism reported that, in order to 
substantially reduce the number of major acts of destruction to their artworks, adequate 
human supervision would be more effective than the somewhat effective usage of target 





guards as a measure of guardianship in her study of characteristics of art theft in the U.S. 
and recovery of stolen art which lends credence to the designation of security guards as a 
measure with the guardianship construct. 
Six variables refer to various types of security guards present at a museum and/or 
gallery.  The first two variables are “full time guards” and “part time guards”.  Museums 
and galleries struggle with security budgets, which contributes to the low salaries of 
security staff and high turnover for cultural institutions (Conklin, 1994; MacKenzie, 
2005). Full-time guards can be perceived as preferable to part-time guards due to the job 
security and benefits that a full-time guard is afforded. In addition, full-time guards can 
be considered more effective guardians than part-time guards due to their increased hours 
of exposure to an institution’s day-to-day functioning and collections. However, 
according to Peter Morrin, former director of the J.B. Speed Art Museum, “many believe 
that in contrast to the tedium suffered by full-time guards, part-time guards may be more 
vigilant with fresher eyes.” (P. Morrin, personal communication, November 12, 2015). 
The variable, “number of full-time or part-time roving security guards” refers to 
the   guards who regularly patrol a designated area within a museum or gallery to observe 
any change in circumstances that would indicate any form of victimization to an 
institution.  
The variable “number of full time or part time guards who are stationary at 
entrance” refers to the number of guards who are stationed at the entrance of the museum 
or gallery to monitor the flow of visitors and/or staff entering and leaving the facility. At 
some institutions, such as the Smithsonian’s Hirschhorn Museum, these guards conduct 





The variable “number of full time or part time security guards manning a security 
station” refers to the number of guards who are assigned to a specific security area, such 
as the number of guards that are assigned to monitor activity within separate exhibition 
spaces within a museum or art gallery. For example, five guards may be assigned to the 
exhibition areas that contain the recent exhibit of Picasso sculptures at the Museum of 
Modern Art (MOMA) and two guards may be assigned to observe the area with the 
CCTV monitors at the same museum.  
Lastly, the variable “number of full time and part time guards employed for at 
least 5 years” refers to the number of guards employed by the respondent’s institution for 
at least five years. A security guard with more than five years’ experience is more likely 
to be acclimated and loyal to their institution, as well as more experienced as an effective 
place manager. These continuous variables are operationalized as the exact number of the 
security guards and are measured at the interval/ratio level of measurement.  
It should be noted that, similar to the reporting of vandalism, several respondents 
left the closed ended answer choices pertaining to security guards blank However, in the 
comments section of the questionnaire one respondent reported that they were a state 
museum located within a government building and the security service they utilized was 
the state police. Therefore, in order to attempt to accurately account for this revelation, 
the number 1 was assigned to both the variables, “number of security guards” and 
“number of roving security guards”. Additionally, a few respondents wrote in the 
comments section that their student workers were the security guards without specifying 
the exact number of student workers acting in a security guard capacity. Given the fact 





number 2 to both the variables “number of part-time security guards” and “number of 
roving security guards”. 
 
Place manager activities 
 The theoretical category “place manager activities” contains measurements of 
place management duties within an art museum or gallery. Place managers engage in 
activities that either make them effective or ineffective place managers (Clarke & 
Bichler-Robeton, 1998; Madensen & Eck, 2008; Sampson, Eck & Dunham, 2010). 
Within the art world, place managers can either be proactive about the care of their 
collections or elect to adopt the minimum requirements, depending on budgets, resources, 
and institutional attitudes to performing due diligence. Eighteen variables composing two 
separate categories of place manager activities are utilized.  
The first-place manager activity category, training, is an important activity that 
place managers may or may not be required to participate in. A method of creating 
cohesiveness among the museum community is providing guardianship training for all 
staff, including volunteers. Place manager security training refers to security training for 
security and non-security staff, as well as for volunteers that will help reduce art theft and 
art vandalism. This category contains 14 measures that represent the various forms of 
training conducted at art institutions. The measures for security staff training include “SS 
training in suspicious objects”, “SS training in detection systems”, “SS training in safety 
of artworks”, “SS training in greeting & visitor reception”, and “SS training in CCTV 
management”. Each respondent was given the choice of yes=1 or no=0 to indicate 





training options. The same measures were utilized for the assessment of the extent of 
security related training for museum employees (“MS training in suspicious objects”, 
“MS training in detection systems”, “MS training in safety of artworks”, “MS training in 
greeting & visitor reception”, and “MS training in CCTV management”), and volunteers 
(“VS training in suspicious objects”, “VS training in detection systems”, “VS training in 
safety of artworks”, and “VS training in greeting & visitor reception”). It should be noted 
that generally, volunteers are not exposed to CCTV camera operations.  
The second place manager activity category, due diligence, refers to how 
proactive an art institution is regarding the works they acquire, as well as how frequently 
they catalog the works within their collections. Five variables compose this theoretical 
grouping. The variable “consult stolen art databases” refers to whether or not a museum 
or gallery searched one of the many stolen art databases, such as the FBI’s National 
Stolen Art File, the Art Loss Register’s stolen art database or Interpol’s stolen art 
database, to ensure that the works in their collections, travelling exhibitions, or works 
being considered for acquisition are not stolen. This variable is coded 0=never, 
1=sometimes, 2=most of the time, 3=always, and 8=non-applicable (N/A) and is 
measured at an ordinal level of measurement.  
 The variable “outside risk analysis performed” is defined as whether or not an 
outside security consultant has conducted a formal annual security risk analysis at the 
respondent’s respective museum or gallery. Risk analyses assess the overall effectiveness 
of an institution’s security department and security practices. Normally, it is conducted 
by an external party. This variable is coded 0=never, 1=yes, 2=don’t know, and 





The variable “time elapsed since last risk analysis” is defined as the timeframe in 
which a risk analysis assessment by an outside consultant was conducted. The following 
codes were employed 0=never had a risk analysis, 1=had risk analysis conducted 15-19 
years ago, 2=had a risk analysis conducted 11-14 years ago, 3=had a risk analysis 
conducted 6-10 years ago, 4=had a risk analysis conducted 2-5 years ago, and 5=had a 
risk analysis conducted within the last year. This variable is measured at an ordinal level 
of measurement.  
The next two variables in this category pertain to the inventory practices of a 
museum and gallery. Many times works that have been stolen are not known to be 
missing or are noticed as missing long after the theft occurred because the museum or 
gallery did not bother to check their collection of works on view or in storage. Refraining 
from this practice is also a factor that contributes to the unreliable statistics regarding the 
true extent of art theft. The variable “inventory works on view” is defined as the 
frequency with which an institution’s on-view collection is inventoried and is coded as 
0=less than once a year, 1=once a year, 2=every six months, 3=every three months, 
4=monthly, 5=weekly/more frequently, 6=daily, and 7=missing. It should be noted that 
even though 0= ‘less than once a year’ was not an answer choice on the survey form, this 
code was created because one respondent indicated in writing that they had their last 
inventory of works on view inspection conducted “less than once a year”. The variable 
“inventory works in storage” is defined as the frequency with which an institution’s 
collection in storage is inventoried and is operationalized as 0=non-applicable (N/A), 
1=every 10 years, 2=every 5-10 years, 3=every 2-4 years, 4=annually, 5=more than once 





should be noted that even though 0= “N/A” was not an answer choice on the survey form 
this code was created because many respondents indicated that they either did not have a 
permanent collection, did not hold any works in storage, only showed temporary 
exhibitions, or simply wrote N/A on the survey form.  
The last two variables measure whether or not the art facilities conduct pre-hiring 
background checks on potential employees and volunteers. As mentioned in chapter two, 
it has been estimated that 80% of thefts from museums are committed by insiders. 
Therefore, this simple proactive measure may alleviate insider theft and/or vandalism.  
The variable “pre-hiring background checks on potential employees” is operationalized 
as 0=never, 1=sometimes, 2=most of the time, 3=always, and 8=non-applicable (N/A). 
The variable “pre-hiring background checks on potential volunteers” is operationalized as 
0=never, 1=sometimes, 2=most of the time, 3=always, and 8=non-applicable (N/A). 
These variables are measured at an ordinal level of measurement.  
 
Security Guard Related Practices  
Security guards’ specific duties are an important component of the measurement 
of security guard place management. This theoretical category contains five variables that 
pertain to art museum and art gallery security guards’ daily functioning. The variable 
“average square footage of roving” pertains to the average square footage a guard patrols 
in his or her designated roving circuit. This variable is a continuous variable, is measured 
at the interval/ratio level of measurement and assumes values from zero to 250,000 
square feet. The variable “number of designated security posts” refers to how many 





or gallery. This continuous variable is operationalized as the exact number of designated 
security posts and is measured at the interval/ratio level of measurement.  
The variable “where surveillance rounds are made” is defined as 0=internally only 
and 1=internally and externally, and 2=missing. This categorical variable is measured at 
the nominal level of measurement. At some cultural institutions, security guards patrol 
both inside the museum and outside of the museum’s interior spaces that are open and 
closed to the public. The variable “how often surveillance rounds are made” is defined as 
the number of surveillance rounds performed at the respondent’s museum or gallery 
within half hour intervals. This variable is operationalized as the exact number of 
surveillance rounds made within half hour intervals. The last variable in this category is 
“length of time security is on duty” refers to the number of hours, each day (24-hour 
period) the museum or gallery utilize security staff.  This variable is coded as 0=missing, 
1=public hours only, 2=extended hours (for special events/normally extended hours), 
3=24 hours, and 4=special events only and measured at a nominal level of measurement. 
It should be noted that the code 4= “special events only” was not a forced answer choice 
on the questionnaire. However, one respondent wrote this answer on their survey form. 
Consequently, it was added to the coding of the survey instrument.  
 
Place Manager Perceived Improvements 
 A portion of evaluating place manger effectiveness is measuring a place 
manager’s perceived ability to proactively improve the spaces in which they are 
performing guardianship duties. Within the art world, art museums and galleries are 





tend to be mandated as a low priority. The next grouping of six measures addresses the 
respondents’ perceptions of how to improve the guardianship capabilities of their 
respective museums and galleries. The answer choices to each item were 1=yes and 
0=no. The specific variables included are:” a larger budget”, “more security personnel”, 
“improved staff training”, “enhanced level of security”, “modern security equipment”, or 
“other improvements”.  
 
Guardianship in Action 
The last two categories of the social guardianship component of Routine 
Activities Theory’s element of guardianship pertain to Reynald’s (2009) groundbreaking 
four stage Guardianship in Action theoretical model with regards to art vandalism and art 
theft, in which she formulated four levels of residential guardianship intensity. As 
mentioned in chapter three, Reynald’s (2009) four levels of guardianship intensity begins 
at stage one, in which the guardian is invisible (i.e., not home and unavailable to act as a 
guardian). A score of zero is assigned to this level of guardianship. Stage two is the 
capable guardian, which is when the resident is at home but he or she is not willing or 
capable to conduct any surveillance of their property or street. A score of one is assigned 
to this level of guardianship. Stage three is when the capable guardian is home and is 
actively conducting surveillance of their property and street. A score of 2 is assigned to 
this level of guardianship. Stage four is when the available capable guardian is actively 
conducting surveillance of their property and street and will intervene by approaching the 
unknown person and asking questions if they notice a predatory crime or unusual event 





Essentially, Reynald (2009) determined that the higher level of guardianship one 
exercises, the greater the crime reduction. Reynald’s (2009) study was conducted by mere 
observation of neighborhood residents. 
Reynald’s (2010) study explores specific reasons why capable guardians do not 
become active guardians or, stated another way, why an available guardian does not 
become an intervening guardian. This study moved beyond the residential observation 
stage to researchers engaging and interacting with residents through structured and semi-
structured interviews surrounding guardianship actions and inactions.  
The art world is notorious for perpetuating the shroud of secrecy in which it 
operates by not reporting any forms of art crimes perpetuated by outsiders, protecting its 
own malfeasance, avoiding any transparency within the industry, and failing to comply 
with ethical regulations set forth by the various governing bodies within the art world. In 
the April 25, 2016, online edition of ARTnews, seasoned art industry writer M.H. Miller 
wrote, “The art market is notoriously opaque—the cliché is that it is the largest 
unregulated industry in the world, besides guns and drugs. There are certain rules, but 
chief among them is an almost pathological level of discretion. There is little oversight, 
and players can get away with a lot of ethically dubious behavior” 
(http://www.artnews.com/2016/04/25/the-big-fake-behind-the-scenes-of-knoedler-
gallerys-downfall/, electronically retrieved May 8, 2016).  Nonetheless, despite the art 
industry’s clandestine culture, art museums and art galleries have a fiduciary 
responsibility to maintain the integrity of its own institutions and the profession itself by 
fostering forthrightness and industry unity. A combined total of twenty-six variables are 






Guardianship in Action-Vandalism  
Ten variables within this category explore how cultural institutions deal with 
vandalism victimization. The categorical measures are used to determine whether a 
museum and/or gallery, as a capable guardian, will become an active guardian by 
intervening and reporting victimization. The first three measures assess how an institution 
deals specifically with employee perpetrated vandalism: “employee fired if committed 
vandalism”, “employee reported to police if committed vandalism”, and “other action 
with employee if committed vandalism”. These three variables are coded 0=no, 1=yes, 
and 3=missing. The next seven variables measure how cultural institutions additionally 
address vandalism victimization: “contact national law enforcement if vandalism”, 
“inform the local police if vandalism”, “contact the local media if vandalism”, “report to 
insurance agency if vandalism”, “inform your board if vandalism”, “fill out an incident 
report if vandalism”, and “other action taken if vandalism”. Since these seven variables 
only pertain to victimized institutions, the sample size of respondents is reduced from 111 
to 25. These variables are coded as 0=no, 1=yes and are measured at a nominal level of 
measurement. 
 
Guardianship In Action-Theft 
The first ten variables are identical to the above Guardianship In Action measures 
for vandalism except that they pertain to theft. Accordingly, the insider art thief measures 
include: “employee fired if committed theft”, “employee reported to police if committed 





coded 0=no, 1=yes, and 3=missing. The next seven variables measure how cultural 
institutions additionally address theft victimization: “contact national law enforcement if 
theft”, “inform the local police if theft”, “contact the local media if theft”, “report to 
insurance agency if theft”, “inform your board if theft”, “fill out an incident report if 
theft”, and “other action taken if theft”. Since these seven variables only pertain to 
victimized institutions, the sample size of respondents is reduced from 111 to 17. These 
variables are coded as 0=no, 1=yes, and are measured at a nominal level of measurement.  
The next six variables explore the respondents ‘rationale’ for not reporting theft.  
The following reasons are the theoretical measures: “didn’t report theft due to fear of bad 
publicity”, “didn’t report theft due to fear of future thefts”, “didn’t report theft due to fear 
of public embarrassment”, “didn’t report theft due to fear of increased insurance rates”, 
“didn’t report theft due to fear of extortion”, and “other reason”. These variables are 
coded as 0=no and 1=yes and are measured at a nominal level of measurement. Once 
again, since these variables only pertain to victimized institutions, the sample size of 
respondents is reduced from 111 to 17. 
 
Physical Guardianship 
The theoretical derived variable groupings, that represent the physical 
guardianship component of the guardianship element of Routine Activities Theory within 
cultural institutions, are divided into two categories: target hardening devices and 
mechanisms, and preventative physical guardianship actions. Admittedly, there is also 
dissent among Routine Activities Theory scholars regarding which construct of Routine 





Felson, & Welsch (2013) declare that “targeting hardening activities do not increase the 
availability of capable guardians; they merely make it more difficult for the offender to 
complete the criminal act” (p. 74). Hence, target hardening measures should be 
conceptualized as measures of target suitability. Conversely, a compelling number of 
scholars categorized target hardening variables as measures of guardianship (Breetze & 
Cohn, 2013; Fisher & Wilkes, 2003; Meithe & Meier;1990; Mustaine & Tewksbury 
(1998a); Rountree, Land, & Miethe, 1994; Schreck, Miller, & Gibson, 2003; Wilcox, 
Madensen, & Tillyer, 2007). Furthermore, Burman (2017) utilized target hardening 
devices such as cameras and alarms as measures of guardianship in her study of art theft 
characteristics and recovery of stolen art. In line with Burman (2017), for this study, 
target hardening devices and mechanisms will be measures of physical guardianship. 
Fifteen variables comprise this theoretical construct.  
 
Target Hardening Devices and Mechanisms 
The first category, target hardening devices and mechanisms, is composed of 
twelve theoretical measures. Target hardening devices and mechanisms are present in 
almost every institution that collects and/or exhibits art works. Access to collections takes 
many forms. However, museums and galleries are caught in a paradoxical situation of 
protecting their cultural treasures from defacement or theft while simultaneously offering 
the public ideal engagement with the works.  
Each respondent was asked whether or not their facility utilizes each of the 
following security devices or physical barriers: “door alarms”, “window alarms”, “motion 





“glazing on some pictures”, “glazing on all pictures”, “vitrines”, “barriers in front of 
artworks, “ropes and stanchions”, and “other type of physical barriers”. The answer 
choices are coded as 0=no and 1=yes and are measured at a nominal level of 
measurement. 
 
Preventive Physical Guardianship Actions  
The last theoretical category grouping relating to physical guardianship is 
preventive physical guardianship actions. This category is comprised of three physical 
guardianship measures that address non-target hardening physical guardianship actions 
performed by security personnel to ensure that any employees, volunteers, visitors, and/or 
objects entering museums and galleries are not apt to perpetrate or aid in the perpetration 
of any vandalistic or theft incidences. The variable “bag/package inspection” refers to the 
extent of diligence that a museum or gallery requires within its security practices 
regarding purse, bag, and package inspection at the time of entry and/or exit of the 
institution. This practice can be perceived as a deterrent to a terrorist, art theft, or art 
vandal. This categorical variable is coded 0= missing, 1=no package inspections are 
required, 2= yes, only on the visitors entering the museum/gallery, 3=yes only on 
employees and volunteers entering the museum/gallery, 4=yes, only on employees and 
volunteers entering and leaving the museum/gallery, 5=yes, on all persons entering the 
museum/gallery, 6=yes, on all persons entering and exiting the museum/gallery, and 
7=yes, on all packages and bags except purses. This variable is measured at a nominal 





The second measure within this grouping, “oversized bag storage” refers to 
whether or not a museum or gallery requires that visitors leave their oversized bags or 
large items in a designated area before the visitor will be permitted to enter the exhibition 
space. This preventative measure allows museums and galleries to hinder visitors from 
carrying and concealing larger objects when entering the gallery space and exiting the 
building, as well as preventing the oversized bag from becoming a potential hazard to the 
works of art. Large bags, such as backpacks, can accidently rub against a delicate 
sculpture or unglazed painting, thus possibly damaging the work. Additionally, in a 
crowded museum gallery space oversized bags can be a hindrance to visitors’ range of 
vision and the bags may constantly bump against other visitors due to space limitations. 
Institutions without a policy requiring storage for oversized bags were coded as 0, those 
with a policy requiring storage for oversized bags were coded as 1, and if the answer was 
missing a code of 2 was entered. This is a categorical variable and is measured at a 
nominal level of measurement.  
The last variable in this categorical grouping, “ID badges required for staff and 
volunteers”, refers to an institution’s requirement for its staff and volunteers to be 
identified as members of a museum or gallery’s organization. This use of visual 
identifiers allows visitors to recognize who is associated with the museum and who is not 
when they need help or advice. These badges and ID’s can also act as a deterrent of theft 
and vandalism due to the apparent presence of an employee or volunteer. The responses 
to this survey item include the following and are coded, numerically, as indicated:  0=no 
one is required, 1=staff only, 2=volunteers only, 3=staff and volunteers and is measured 








Information on demographic and institutional characteristics was collected for each of the 
responding art institutions. These measures are designated as control variables, which are 
“extraneous variables that researchers can control to determine its effect on the dependent 
variable” (Abu-Bader, 2006, p. 3). Four measures are included within this group of 
variables. The variable “population of the institution’s city” is the population of the city 
in which the respondent’s institution is located and is coded as the exact population. The 
variable “number of volunteer hours” is defined as the total number of volunteer hours a 
museum or gallery receives in one calendar year and is coded as the exact number of 
hours. The variable “operating budget” is defined as an institution’s annual operating 
budget in dollar amounts and is operationalized as the exact monetary budget amount. 
The last control variable, “square feet of institution” is defined as the size of the museum 
or gallery in square footage and is operationalized as the exact square footage. These 
continuous variables are measured at the interval/ratio level of measurement. 
Additionally, these four variables are transformed for ease of interpretation, beginning at 
the bivariate level of analysis. Specifically, “population of institution’s city” was divided 
by 10,000, “volunteer hours” was divided by 100, “operating budget” was divided by 









There are forty-six variables included as non-theoretical and non-
demographic/control variables contained within seven categories. This set of variables 
relate to the number of specific objects stolen and/or vandalized, the precise number of 
art theft or vandalism incidences, the perpetrator of art thefts and vandalism, the recovery 
of stolen works, and the locations of the two forms of victimization.  
The first non-theoretical category, objects vandalized, contains sixteen variables 
which document the number of types of artworks that were vandalized. The variables in 
this category relate to these specific objects: “number of outdoor sculptures vandalized”, 
“number of sculptures (larger than 10 inches in height) vandalized”, “number of small 
sculptures (less than 10 inches in height) vandalized”, “number of small paintings 
(8.5”x11” or smaller) vandalized”, “ number of paintings larger than 8.5”x11” 
vandalized”, “number of small photographs (8.5”x11” or smaller) vandalized”, “number 
of photographs larger than 8.5”x11” vandalized”, “number of decorative arts objects 
vandalized”, “number of large glass objects vandalized”, “number of small glass objects 
vandalized”, “number of china objects vandalized”, “number of silver objects 
vandalized”, “number of textiles vandalized”, “number of rare books or manuscripts 
vandalized”, “number of posters vandalized”, and “number of other (please specify) 
vandalized”. These variables are coded as the exact number of each object vandalized and 
are measured at the interval/ratio level of measurement.  
The second non-theoretical category, objects stolen, contains sixteen variables 
which document the number of types of artworks that were stolen. The variables in this 





sculptures stolen”, “number of sculptures (larger than 10 inches in height) stolen”, 
“number of small sculptures (less than 10 inches in height) stolen”, “number of small 
paintings (8.5”x11” or smaller) stolen”, “ number of paintings larger than 8.5”x11” 
stolen”, “number of small photographs (8.5”x11” or smaller) stolen”, “number of 
photographs larger than 8.5”x11” stolen”, “number of decorative arts objects stolen”, 
“number of large glass objects stolen”, “number of small glass objects stolen”, “number 
of china objects stolen”, “number of silver objects stolen”, “number of textiles stolen”, 
“number of rare books or manuscripts stolen”, “number of posters stolen”, and “number 
of other (please specify) stolen”. These variables are coded as the exact number of each 
object stolen and are measured at the interval/ratio level of measurement.  
The next non-theoretical category of variables, all objects victimized, capture the 
composite number of works illegally removed from a museum or gallery or intentionally 
attacked; “total number of objects stolen”, “total number of objects vandalized”, and 
“total number of objects victimized” which is the total number of objects both stolen and 
vandalized. These variables are coded as the exact total number of objects stolen, 
vandalized, and victimized. These variables are measured at the interval ratio/level of 
measurement. Lastly, the non-theoretical category, incidences of victimization, pertains 
to exact counts of incidences of perpetration. Three variables are included in this group of 
measures: “total number of incidences of vandalism, “total number of incidences of theft” 
and “total number of vandalism and theft incidences” which is the total number of both 
art theft and art vandalism incidences added together. These variables are coded as the 
exact incidences of each form of victimization and are measured at the interval/ratio level 





The non-theoretical category, vandalism/theft perpetrator, contains four variables 
which address aspects of the perpetrator. The variables “how often was the vandalism 
perpetrator identified?”, and “how often was the theft perpetrator identified?” are defined 
as the frequency with which the art thief and/or art vandal was identified. These variables 
are operationalized as 0=never, 1=a few times, 2=most of the time, and 3=always, and are 
measured at an ordinal level of measurement. These variables only pertain to institutions 
that experienced victimization and the sample size was reduced from 111 to 25 for 
vandalism victimization and to 17 for theft victimization.  
The variables “acts of vandalism likely committed by” and “acts of theft likely 
committed by” are defined as the category of the art vandal and art thief and the variables 
are operationalized as 0=non-applicable (N/A), 1=employee, 2=visitor(s), 3=contract 
worker(s), 4=unknown, and 5=other, such as. These categorical variables are measured at 
a nominal level of measurement.  
The non-theoretical category, recovery of stolen work, address the recovery of 
stolen artwork and contains two measures. The variable, “how often was the stolen work 
recovered?” is defined as the frequency with which the respondent’s institution was able 
to recover their stolen artworks and this ordinal variable is operationalized as 0=never, 
1=a few times, 2=most of the time, and 3=always. The variable, “on average, how 
quickly did your institution mange to recover the stolen art object?” narrows the 
frequency of recovery of stolen works into specific timeframes. This ordinal variable is 
operationalized as 0=never, 1=more than 5 years, 2=3-5 years, 3=1-2 years, 4=less than 1 





only pertain to institutions that experienced art theft victimization and the sample size 
was reduced from 111 to 17.  
Two variables pertain to the location of the incidences of theft and vandalism. The 
variables “location of vandalism incidence(s) and “location of theft incidence(s)” are 
defined as the locations where the vandalism and/or theft victimization occurred. These 
variables are operationalized as 1=gallery space, 2=storage space, 3=while in transit, 
4=while on loan to another institution, 5=at a construction site, 6=on the museum 
premises, but outside the museum, 7= in the rare book room, and 8=other location, such 
as. These are categorical variables and are measured at a nominal level of measurement. 
These variables only pertain to institutions that experienced victimization and the sample 
size was reduced from 111 to 25 for vandalism victimization and to 17 for theft 
victimization.  
The next section will discuss the analytical steps which will be undertaken to 
determine whether social or physical guardianship measures increase or decrease the 









Table 6.1                                                                  THEORETICAL VARIABLE GROUPINGS 
Measures Metrics Range Level of 
Measurement 
Victimization Dependent Variables    
  Yes art vandalism incidence(s) (0=no incidences of art vandalism, 
1=yes, at least one incidence of art 
vandalism) 
0-1  Nominal 
 Yes art theft incidence(s) (0=no incidences of art theft, 1=yes, 
at least one incidence of art theft) 
0-1  Nominal 
    
    
Theoretical Independent Variables    
 Social Guardianship Measures    
  Place Managers-Non-Security    
  # of non-security employees (# of employees) 0- infinity Interval/Ratio 
  # of volunteers (# of volunteers) 0- infinity Interval/Ratio 
  # of visitors (# of visitors) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 








  Place Manager- Security Guards    
  # of full time security guards (# of guards) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
  # of part- time security guards (# of guards) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
  # of FT or PT roving security guards (# of roving) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
  # of FT or PT guards who are 
stationary at entrance 
(# of stationary guards) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
  # of FT or PT guards who man a 
security station 
(# of guards that man) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
  # of FT and PT guards employed for at 
least 5 years  
(# of guards) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
    
 Place Manager Activities    
  Training    
  SS training in suspicious objects (0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
  SS training  in detection systems (0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
  SS training in safety of artworks  (0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
  SS training in greeting & visitor  
  reception 
(0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 








  MS training in suspicious objects (0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
  MS training in intruder detection (0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
  MS training in safety of artworks (0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
  MS training in greeting & visitor  
  reception 
(0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
  MS training in CCTV management (0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
  MV training in suspicious objects (0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
  MV training in detection systems (0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
  MV training in safety of artworks (0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
  MV training in greeting & visitor  
  reception 
(0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
    
  Due Diligence    
  Consult stolen art databases (0=never to 3=always; 8=N/A) 0-3; 8  Ordinal  
  Outside risk analysis performed (0=never to 3=missing) 0-3 Ordinal 
  Time elapsed since last risk analysis (0=never had a risk analysis 
conducted to 5=had risk analysis 
conducted within last year) 
0-5 Ordinal 









  Inventory works in storage (0=N/A to 6=missing) 0-6 Ordinal 
  Pre-hiring Background checks on  
  potential employees 
(0=never to 3=always; 8=N/A) 0-3; 8 Ordinal 
  Pre-hiring Background checks on  
  potential volunteers 
(0=never to 3=always; 8=N/A) 0-3; 8 Ordinal 
    
  Security Guard Specific duties    
  Average sq. footage of roving (# of roving  sqft.) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
  # of designated security posts (# of posts) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
  Where surveillance rounds are made (0=internally to 2=missing) 0-3 Interval/Ratio 
  How often surveillance rounds are 
made 
(# of time intervals) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
  Length of time security is on duty (0=missing to 4=special events only) 0-4 Nominal 
    
  Place Manager Perceived 
Improvements 
   
  Would a larger budget improve level of 
  security? 








  Would more security persons improve 
  level of security? 
(0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
  Would improved staff training improve 
  level of security? 
(0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
  Would modern security equipment  
  improve level of security? 
(0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
  Other improvements? (0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
  Other improvement (Exact Improvement) Categorical Nominal 
    
  Guardianship In Action - Vandalism    
  Employee fired if committed 
vandalism 
(0=no to 2=missing)  0-2 Nominal 
  Employee reported to police if  
  committed vandalism 
(0=no to 2=missing)  0-2 Nominal 
  Other actions with employee if  
  committed vandalism 
(0=no to 2=missing)  0-2 Nominal 
  Other action taken (name of other action) Categorical Nominal 
  Contact national law enforcement if  
  vandalism 
(0=no, 1=yes)   0-1 Nominal 








  Contact  the local media if vandalism (0=no, 1=yes)   0-1 Nominal 
  Report to insurance agency if 
vandalism 
(0=no, 1=yes)   0-1 Nominal 
  Inform your board if vandalism (0=no, 1=yes)    0-1 Nominal 
  Fill out an incident report if vandalism (0=no, 1=yes)  0-1 Nominal 
  Other action if vandalism (0=no, 1=yes)  0-1 Nominal 
  Other action taken (name of other action) Categorical Nominal 
    
  Guardianship In Action - Theft    
  Employee fired if committed theft (0=no to 2=missing)  0-2 Nominal 
  Employee reported to police if  
  committed theft 
(0=no to 2=missing)  0-2 Nominal 
  Other actions with employee if  
  committed theft 
(0=no to 2=missing)  0-2 Nominal 
  Other action taken (name of other action) Categorical Nominal 
  Contact national law enforcement if 
theft 
(0=no, 1=yes)  0-1 Nominal 
  Inform the local police if theft (0=no, 1=yes)  0-1 Nominal 








  Report to insurance agency if theft (0=no, 1=yes)  0-1 Nominal 
  Inform your board if theft (0=no, 1=yes)  0-1 Nominal 
  Fill out an incident report if theft (0=no, 1=yes)  0-1 Nominal 
  Other action if theft (0=no, 1=yes)  0-1 Nominal 
  Other action if theft (name of other action) Categorical Nominal 
  Didn’t report theft due to fear of bad  
  publicity 
(0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
  Didn’t report theft due to fear of future 
  thefts 
(0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
  Didn’t report theft due to fear of public 
  embarrassment 
(0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
  Didn’t report theft due to fear of  
  increased insurance rates 
(0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
  Didn’t report theft due to fear of  
  extortion 
(0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
  Didn’t report theft due to fear of other 
  reason 
(0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
  Other reason (name of other reason) Categorical Nominal 
    








 Physical Guardianship Measures    
  Target Hardening Devices &  
  Mechanisms 
   
   Door alarms  (0= no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
   Window alarms (0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
   Motion detectors (0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
   CCTV  (0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
   Individual object alarms (0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
   Glazing on some pictures  (0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
   Glazing on all pictures (0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
   Vitrines (0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
   Barriers in front of artworks  (0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
   Ropes and stanchions (0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
   Other type of security systems (0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 
   Other type of security systems  (name of other security system) Categorical Nominal 
   Other type of physical 
deterrents  
(0=no, 1=yes) 0-1 Nominal 









    
  Preventive Physical Guardianship  
  Actions 
   
   Bag/package inspections (0=missing to 7=on all packages & 
bags except purses) 
0-7 Nominal 
   Oversized bag storage (0=no to 2=missing) 0-2 Nominal 
   ID badges required for staff and 
volunteers 
(1=no one to 3=staff & volunteers) 1-3 Nominal 
    
    
Demographic/Control Variables    
  Population of institution’s city (population #) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
  # of volunteer hours (# of hours) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
  Operating budget ($ amount) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 










Table 6.2                                                                    NON-THEORETICAL VARIABLE GROUPINGS 
Measures Metrics Range Level of 
Measurement 
    
Objects Vandalized    
 # of outdoor sculptures vandalized (# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 # of large sculptures (larger than 10” in 
 height) vandalized 
(# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 # of small sculptures (smaller than 10” in 
 height) vandalized 
(# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 # of small paintings (8.5” by 11” or 
 smaller) vandalized 
(# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 # of large paintings (8.5” by 11” or larger)  
 vandalized 
(# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 # of small photograms (8.5” by 11” or 
 smaller) vandalized 
(# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 # of large photographs (8.5” by 11” or 
 larger) vandalized 
(# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 








 # of large glass objects vandalized (# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 # of small glass objects vandalized (# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 # of china objects vandalized (# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 # of silver objects vandalized  (# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 # of textiles vandalized (# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 # of rare books or manuscripts vandalized (# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 # of posters vandalized (# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 # of other objects vandalized (# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 Name of other object vandalized (name of other object) Categorical Nominal 
    
Objects Stolen    
 # of outdoor sculptures stolen (# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 # of large sculptures (larger than 10” in 
 height) stolen 
(# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 # of small sculptures (smaller than 10” in 
 height) stolen 
(# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 # of small paintings (8.5” by 11” or 
 smaller) stolen 








 # of large paintings (8.5” by 11” or larger)  
 stolen 
(# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 # of small photograms (8.5” by 11” or 
 smaller) stolen 
(# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 # of large photographs (8.5” by 11” or 
 larger) stolen 
(# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 # of decorative objects stolen (# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 # of large glass objects stolen (# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 # of small glass objects stolen (# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 # of china objects stolen (# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 # of silver objects stolen (# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 # of textiles stolen (# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 # of rare books or manuscripts stolen (# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 # of posters stolen (# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 # of other objects stolen (# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 Name of other object stolen (name of other object) Categorical Nominal 
    








 Total # of objects vandalized (# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 Total # of objects stolen (# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 Total # of objects victimized (vandalized 
 & stolen) 
(# of objects) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
    
Incidences of Perpetration    
 Total # of vandalism incidences (# of incidences of vandalism) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 Total # of theft incidences (# of incidences of theft) 0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
 Total # of vandalism and theft incidences  
 combined 
(# of incidences of both vandalism & 
theft) 
0-infinity Interval/Ratio 
    
Vandalism/Theft Perpetrator    
 How often was the vandalism 
 perpetrator identified? 
(0=never to 3=always) 0-3 Ordinal 
  How often was the theft perpetrator    
  identified? 
(0=never to 3=always) 0-3 Ordinal 
  Acts of vandalism likely committed by (1=employee to 5=other, such as) 1-5 Nominal 
  Acts of vandalism likely committed by 
  other 










            Acts of theft likely committed by (1=employee to 5=other, such as) 1-5 Nominal 
  Acts of theft likely committed by  
  other 
(name of other category of 
perpetrator) 
Categorical Nominal 
    
Recovery of Stolen Work    
  How often was the stolen work of art 
  recovered? 
(0=never to 3=always) 0-3 Ordinal 
  On average, how quickly did your  
  institution manage to recover the  
  stolen art object? 
(0=never to 4=less than one year) 0-4 Ordinal 
    
Location of Vandalism/Theft    
  Location of most vandalism   
  incidence(s) 
(1=in the gallery space to 8=other 
location, such as) 
1-8 Nominal 
  Other location of vandalism   
  incidence(s) 
(name of other location) Categorical Nominal 
  Location of theft incidence(s) (1=in the gallery space to 8=other 
location, such as) 
1-8 Nominal 






In order to present a detailed picture of art theft and vandalism in American art 
museums/galleries, univariate and bivariate descriptive statistical analyses, bivariate 
binary logistic regression analyses, and multivariate binary logistic regression analyses 
will be conducted.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
The first step will utilize univariate descriptive statistical analysis of the 
demographic/control and theoretical independent measures, which presents a general 
description of the sampled institutions. This analysis will reveal the mean and standard 
deviation of the interval/level variables and the frequencies and proportions of the 
categorical and ordinal level variables. The statistical description of the non-theoretical 
variables will be contained in Appendix B using a graphical format of pie charts and bar 
graphs. The second step and third steps will also utilize a description of the sampled 
institutions. However, a bivariate descriptive statistical exploration will be conducted as 
subgroup comparisons analyses between the victimized versus non-victimized 
institutions. One series of analyses will compare the means and proportions of the 
museums/galleries that were victimized by art vandalism to the means and proportions of 
those not victimized by art vandalism. The other series of analyses will compare the 
means and proportions of the museums/galleries that were victimized by art theft to the 
means and proportions of those not victimized by art theft. Before these analyses 
commence, all variables with answer choices of unknown, N/A, or missing will be 






Bivariate Logistic Regression Analysis 
Bivariate binary logistic regression will reveal any significant relationships 
among the control and/or theoretical independent variables and each dependent variable. 
Binary logistic regression is utilized when dichotomous or binary categorical variable(s) 
represent the dependent variable(s) (Field, 2013). The two dependent variables utilized, 
“Yes art vandalism incidence(s)” and “Yes art theft incidence(s)” are both binary 
categorical variables, consequently binary logistic regression is the appropriate analytical 
method for this study. Additionally, logistic regression does not represent a linear 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Rather, this form of 
analysis predicts the odds or probability of an event occurring and the dependent variable 
does not need to be normally distributed (Field, 2013; Menard, 2002). The independent 
variables that are determined to have p-values between 0.00 and 0.10 in the bivariate 




Lastly, there are several forms of multivariate statistical regression analyses that 
examine the relationships between a dependent variable and multiple independent 
variables. The current study will be using multivariate binary logistic regression. At this 
level of analysis, more than one independent variable will be analyzed as a group with 
each dependent variable to determine how each measure within the group influences each 





The variables selected for potential inclusion in the binary logistic regression 
model will be subjected to two types of diagnostic tests to ensure that the measures 
ultimately utilized for a full regression model fulfill the diagnostic criteria.  
The first test is to check for multicollinearity between independent variables. It is 
assumed that there is a strong correlation between the dependent and independent 
variables. However, when two or more independent variables are highly correlated they 
lend little to the predictive potential of a multiple regression model. Various tests for 
multicollinearity can be used, such as the Tolerance and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
tests. The VIF test will be used in this study because this method of determining 
multicollinearity not only indicates whether there is an issue with collinearity but it 
allows the researcher to interpret which variables are problematic and the severity of the 
problem. The scores of the VIF range from 1 to infinity (Champion & Hartley, 2010). 
According to Walker and Maddan (2013) “A VIF of 4 or less indicates no problem with 
multicollinearity in the model. A VIF of 5 is acceptable, but anything greater should lead 
to other collinearity diagnostics to assess problems” (p. 419).  
Next, the presence of any outliers will be examined.  Outliers are cases that fall 
far above or below the mean of the majority of the data and they can affect the estimates 
of the regression coefficients. Failure to detect and address any issues with outliers that 
are determined to be influential cases could ultimately affect the validity of the regression 
model (Sarker, Midi, & Rana, 2011). Therefore, the outliers need to be identified and if 
necessary, permanently removed (Agresti & Finlay, 2009; Field, 2013). The inspection of 
outliers will be based on the examination of errors within the model, often referred to as 





dependent variable in the sample and the predicted value of a dependent variable in the 
regression model (Agresti & Finlay, 2009; Field, 2013).  
One test will be used to identify any outliers: the Standardized Pearson Residual 
test. This test will examine the standardized residuals and their effects on the regression 
model. A standardized residual is “a residual which has been converted into a z-score; i.e. 
they have been converted into standard deviation units.  They are now distributed around 
a mean of 0 and have a standard deviation of 1” (Field, 2013, p. 306). This transformation 
is accomplished by calculating the standard deviation of the residuals of all cases together 
and then one by one take each case’s residual and dividing by the standard deviation of 
all the residuals (D. Roelfs, personal communication, February 3, 2017). Furthermore, 
according to Field (2013), when residuals are standardized they can be compared within 
various statistical analytical models and their values can be interpreted from a universal 
standard. For example, if a confidence interval of 95% is declared within any statistical 
model, then 95% of the z-scores should fall within the threshold of -1.96 and +1.96 
within a normally distributed sample. A standardized residual value outside of these 
numerical ranges would be considered an outlier. Additionally, Roelfs (2017) further 
posits, if a confidence interval of 99% is declared then any case that has a standardized 
residual value of more than +2.65 or less than -2.565 presents evidence of possible outlier 
cases within the model.  
After this step is completed, the influence of the outliers is determined by three 
criteria. First, have any new significant variables appeared which were not significant 
prior to removal of the outlier cases or vice versa? Second, have any of the p-values of 





decreased substantially? Third, have any of the log odds coefficients (B) of the variables 
that were significant in both models (with and without outliers) increased or decreased 
substantially or changed direction? If any of these scenarios occurred, then a decision 
must be made as to how to handle the outlier cases that are significantly influencing the 
regression model (D. Roelfs, personal communication, February 3, 2017). The outliers 
can either be retained and the investigative results reported, the outliers can be 
permanently removed, or the outliers can be transformed with an appropriate 
mathematical function (Aguinis, Gottfredson, and Joo, 2013).  
The variables that remain after the examination and resolution of multicollinearity 
and outlier issues will be included in the initial full multivariate binary logistic regression 
model. Next, a parsimonious model will be derived from the full regression model, 
containing the variables that withstood the above-mentioned diagnostic tests. A 
parsimonious model is a regression model that does not include any predictor variables 
unless they have an explanatory benefit; each variable that does not make a significant or 
marginally significant contribution to the model will be removed (Field, 2013). Lastly, a 
separate model will be constructed for art vandalism and art theft.  






Physical Guardianship Independent Variables 
Figure 6.1– Proposed Conceptual Model 
Social Guardianship Independent Variables 
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The analytical portion of this study took place in four stages. First, a univariate 
statistical description of both the demographic and theoretical variables was presented. 
Next, bivariate descriptive statistics of a refined selection of theoretical measures was 
examined within the context of victimized versus not-victimized museums and galleries 
for each dependent variable. Following the first two steps of rudimentary analyses were 
the bivariate binary logistic analyses of the same select theoretical variables, and lastly 
the multivariate binary logistic regression analyses were conducted.  
 
Stage 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Due to the exploratory nature of this study, two phases of descriptive statistics 
were conducted. First, a univariate description of demographic and theoretical variables 
was examined for the entire sample of 111 respondents. The results of the analysis of the 
demographic and theoretical measures are reported in Table 7.1. It should be noted that 
to reduce the length of this chapter, the demographic and theoretical variables not 
included in the table are included in Appendix B (in a graphical format rather than a 





variables (such as the number of each form of object vandalized or stolen and the location 
of the victimization) are included in Appendix C and D.  
Among the 111 museums/galleries that were included in this analysis, 22.5% (25) 
experienced at least one incidence of art vandalism, 15.3% (17) experienced at least one 
incidence of art theft, and 31.5% (35) experienced at least one incidence of either art 
vandalism or art theft. Within the sample, the mean population of the museum/galleries’ 
respective cities was 334,832.39 (SD, 823,150.05). The average number of annual 
volunteer hours donated was 2,161.43 (SD, 3,623.94). The average operating budget of 
the sample was $1,287,473.60 (SD, $3,452.546.93). Lastly, the museum/gallery average 
square footage of the sample was 74,135.72 (SD, 462,018.93).  
As mentioned in chapter 6, the variables have been divided into theoretical 
measures that represent several forms of social and physical guardianship. The 
description of theoretical variables began with social guardianship measures that were 
divided into multiple theoretical categories. Place Managers-Non-Security were the initial 
theoretical grouping analyzed within a univariate descriptive statistical format. The first 
variable within this category is non-security employees and within this sample there was 
an average of 15.81(SD, 42.69) non-security employees. Volunteers are also a measure of 
a non-security categorical place manager in which there was an average of 58.97 (SD, 
88.50). Additionally, the sample contained an average of 52,780.48 (SD, 178,534.94) 
visitors. 
Several forms of security guards are found in American art museums and galleries 
and for the purposes of this study, they are categorized within a separate category of 





number of full-time security guards was 2.76 (SD, 16.72), the average number of part-
time security guards was 2.29 (SD, 5.39), the average number of full-time or part-time 
roving security guards was 1.46 (SD, 2.78), the average number of full-time or part-time 
security guards stationary at the entrance of an museum/gallery was 0.67 (SD, 1.72), the 
average number of part-time and full-time security guards who man a security station was 
0.48 (SD, 1.28), and the average number of full-time and part-time security guards 
employed for at least five years was 2.26 (SD, 5.78). 
Place managers’ effectiveness or ineffectiveness depends on their actions. The 
first category of place manager activity is training. Within this category are variables 
representing training for museum and gallery security staff, non-security staff (museum 
and gallery staff), and volunteer staff. Security staff training in identification of 
suspicious objects occurred in 21.6% of the sample and it did not occur 78.4% of the 
sample. Security staff training in intruder detection systems occurred in 24.3% of the 
sample and it did not occur in 75.7% of the sample. Security staff training in safety of 
artworks occurred in 31.5% of the sample and it did not occur in 68.5% of the sample. 
Security staff training in greeting and visitor reception occurred in 32.4% of the sample 
and it did not occur in 67.6% of the sample. Lastly, security staff training in CCTV 
management occurred in 24.3% of the sample and it did not occur in 75.7% of the 
sample.  
Measures of non-security staff training (museum and gallery staff) were the same 
for security staff. Within the sample, museum staff training in identification of suspicious 
objects occurred in 23.4% of the sample and it did not occur in 76.6% of the sample. 





sample and it did not occur in 60.4% of the sample. Museum/gallery staff training in 
safety of artworks occurred in 85.6% of the sample and it did not occur in 14.4% of the 
sample. Museum/gallery staff training in greeting and visitor reception occurred in 80.2% 
of the sample and it did not occur in 19.8% of the sample. Lastly, museum/gallery staff 
training in CCTV management occurred in 26.1% of the sample and it did not occur in 
73.9% of the sample.  
The theoretical measures representing volunteer staff training were the same for 
security staff and museum staff except CCTV training was not included in this group of 
place manager training. Within the sample, volunteer training in identification of 
suspicious objects occurred in 8.1% of the sample and it did not occur in 91.9% of the 
sample. Volunteer training in intruder detection systems occurred in 15.3% of the sample 
and it did not occur in 84.7% of the sample. Volunteer training in safety of artworks 
occurred in 65.8% of the sample and it did not occur in 34.2% of the sample. Lastly, 
volunteer training in greeting and visitor reception occurred in 65.8% of the sample and it 
did not occur in 34.2% of the sample.  
The second theoretical category of museum/gallery place manager activities is the 
presence or absence of the performance of due diligence. The consultation of stolen art 
databases ensures that a museum/gallery’s collection is not comprised of any 
“questionable” works. The consultation of stolen art databases primarily never occurred 
in 48.6% of the sample, sometimes occurred in 7.2% of the sample, occurred most of the 
time in 3.6% of the sample, always occurred in 13.5% of the sample, and this question 
was non-applicable to 27.0% of the sample. An outside risk analysis was never 





analysis had been performed, and 21.6% of the sample did not know if an outside risk 
analysis had ever been conducted. Additionally, 0.9% of the sample had a missing 
response. The respondents were also directed to document the year that the most recent 
outside risk analysis was conducted if applicable. Consequently, the variable “time 
elapsed since last analysis” was created and subsequently, the results indicated that 
54.1% of the sample never had a risk analysis conducted, 0.9% of the sample had a risk 
analysis conducted 15-19 years ago, 0.9% of the sample had a risk analysis conducted 11-
14 years ago, 2.7% of the sample had a risk analysis conducted 6-10 years ago, 11.7% of 
the sample had a risk analysis conducted 2-5 years ago, and 7.2% of the sample had a risk 
analysis conducted within the last year. 
Inventorying works on view and in storage are proactive measures to ensure that a 
museum/gallery’s collection is intact. Only 0.9% of the sample inventoried their works 
on view less than once a year, 22.5% of the sample inventoried their works on view once 
a year, 3.6% of the sample inventoried their works on view every 6 months, 6.3% of the 
sample inventoried their works on view every 3 months, 11.7% of the sample inventoried 
their works on view monthly, 15.3% of the sample inventoried their works on view 
weekly/more frequently, 30.6% of the sample inventoried their works on view daily, and 
9.0% of the sample had a missing response.  
Not all museums/galleries have a permanent collection of work; rather they only 
exhibit temporary shows. Consequently, because there is no need to inventory works in 
storage for museums without permanent collections, 9.0% of the sample gave a non-
applicable answer choice to this question. The lowest percentage of the sample 





inventoried their works in storage every 5-10 years, 20.7% of the sample inventoried 
their works in storage every 2-4 years, 27.9% of the sample inventoried their works in 
storage annually, 9.0% of the sample inventoried their works in storage more than once a 
year, and 10.8% of the sample had a missing response. Additionally, as mentioned in 
chapter four, many of the respondents did not have a permanent collection, keep any 
works in storage, hold only temporary exhibitions, or wrote in non-applicable (N/A) as 
their answer choice. These factors contributed to the moderately high number of missing 
responses.  
Additional measures of due diligence are conducting pre-employment background 
checks on potential employees and volunteers. Within this study, 18.9% of the sample 
never conducted a pre-employment background check on any potential employees, 9.0% 
of the sample only sometimes conducted a pre-employment background check on any 
potential employees, 8.1% of the sample conducted a pre-employment background check 
on any potential employees most of the time, 57.7% of the sample always conducted a 
pre-employment background check on any potential employees, and 6.3% of the sample 
answered non-applicable to this question.   
With regard to pre-employment background checks on any potential volunteers, 
the majority of the sample (54.1%) never conducted a pre-employment background check 
on any potential volunteers, 15.3% of the sample only sometimes conducted a pre-
employment background check on any potential volunteers, 7.2% of the sample 
conducted a pre-employment background check on any potential volunteers most of the 
time, 13.5% of the sample always conducted a pre-employment background check on any 





Security guard specific duties were categorized within their own theoretical 
grouping. The average square footage of roving for a security guard was 3,429.46 sq. ft. 
(SD, 10,359.41sq. ft.). The average number of designated security posts was 1.64 (SD, 
6.65). Surveillance rounds were made internally by 18.9% of the sample and both 
internally and externally by 18.9% of the sample. Furthermore, 62.2% of the sample had 
a missing response. Several factors could account for the high number of missing 
responses. First, many of the respondents did not employ security guards and 
consequently this question would be non-applicable to those respondents. Secondly, if the 
respondents did employ security guards, this measure of security guard duties was not 
considered relevant or did not apply to the security guard functions. 
Security guards also were monitored for frequency of their surveillance rounds. 
The average number of rounds within half hour intervals was 2.91 (SD, 6.79). The 
response for the length of time a security guard is on duty was missing for the majority of 
the sample (64.0%). However, 9.9% of the sample’s security guards were on duty for 
public hours only, 19.8% of the sample’s security guards were on duty for extended hours 
(for special events/normally extended hours), 5.4% of the sample’s security guards were 
on duty for 24 hours, and 0.9% of the sample’s security guards were on duty for special 
events only. Once again, possible reasons for the high number of missing responses could 
be that the respondents did not employ security guards and consequently this question 
would be non-applicable to those respondents. Or, if the respondents did employ security 
guards, this measure of security guard duties was not considered relevant or did not apply 





In addition to the physical activities that museum/gallery place managers engage 
in daily, they also conceptualize perceived improvements to their security practices and 
procedures. The majority of the sample (76.6%) answered “yes” that a larger security 
budget would improve their level of security and 23.4% of the sample answered “no”. 
The majority of the sample (58.6%) also answered “yes” that more security personnel 
would improve their level of security and 41.4% of the sample answered “no”. The 
majority of the sample (58.6%) also answered “yes” that improved staff training would 
improve their level of security and 41.4% of the sample answered “no”. The majority of 
the sample (54.1%) also answered “yes” that modern security equipment would improve 
their level of security and 45.9% of the sample answered “no”. Lastly, in terms of other 
improvements that would improve a museum/gallery’s level of security, 7.2% of the 
sample answered “yes” and 92.8% of the sample answered “no”. Examples of other 
suggestions given were: a better relationship with local and campus police, a clearer 
delineation between the art building and the museum building, a patch-through ability to 
police and fire departments, and support from the university administration for further 
security measures.  
The next two theoretical categories represent measures of Guardianship In Action 
(GIA) relating to vandalism victimization. Specifically, these categories measure how 
willing a museum or gallery is to report either internal employee malfeasance and/or 
instances of victimization. The first group of variables relate to employee vandals. If an 
employee committed vandalism, 32.4% of the sample reported that they would fire the 
employee, 4.5% of the sample would not fire the employee, and 53.1% of the sample had 





that they would report the employee to the police, 10.8% of the sample would not report 
the employee to the police, and 64.9% of the sample had a missing response. If an 
employee committed vandalism, 3.6% of the sample reported that they would utilize 
other actions against the employee, 28.8% of the sample would not would utilize other 
actions against the employee, and 67.6% of the sample had a missing response. Only one 
“other action” taken against an employee vandal was reported and that was requiring the 
employee to pay the institution restitution to have the damaged work repaired. Possible 
reasons for the high percentage of missing responses is that within the 111 respondents 
only 22.5% of the sample were victimized by art vandalism and the respondents may 
have misinterpreted this question to pertain only to victimized institutions. Additionally, 
the respondents may have chosen to withhold their policy regarding employee 
perpetration or the respondents did not have a policy regarding employee criminal 
misconduct. 
The next group of GIA variables relate to actions taken after an incidence of 
vandalism by the victimized museum/gallery. It should be noted that this group of answer 
choices applied only to museums/galleries that were victimized. Consequently, the total 
number of museums/galleries within this sample is 25 as opposed to 111. Only 4.0% of 
the sample reported that they contacted national law enforcement if there was an 
incidence of vandalism and 96.0% of the sample did not. Within the sample, 44.0% 
contacted the local police if there was an incidence of vandalism and 56.0% of the sample 
did not. Only 4.0% of the sample contacted the local media if there was an incidence of 
vandalism and 96.0% of the sample did not. Only 28.0% of the sample reported an 





40.0% of the sample informed their board of an incidence of vandalism and 60.0% of the 
sample did not. Only 20.0% of the sample filled out an incident report if they experienced 
vandalism victimization, and 80.0% of the sample did not. Only 24.0% of the sample 
utilized another form of action if an incidence of vandalism occurred and 76.0% of the 
sample did not. Examples of “other actions” taken by the sample include art 
conservation, contacting the artist/owner, repairing the artwork, and seeking funding to 
repair and remove the object.  
The second theoretical category represents measures of Guardianship In Action 
relating to theft victimization. The first group of variables relate to employee thieves. If 
an employee committed theft, 24.3% of the sample reported that they would fire the 
employee, 0.9% of the sample would not fire the employee, and 74.8% of the sample had 
a missing response. If an employee committed theft, 22.5% of the sample reported that 
they would report the employee to the police, 0.9% of the sample would not report the 
employee to the police, and 76.5% of the sample had a missing response. If an employee 
committed theft, 1.8% of the sample reported that they would utilize other actions against 
the employee, 19.8% of the sample would not utilize other actions against the employee, 
and 78.4% of the sample had a missing response. “Other actions” against taken against an 
employee thief that were reported were reporting the employee to the board and giving 
the employee the option to return the property undamaged to avoid prosecution. As stated 
above, possible reasons for the high percentage of missing responses is that within the 
111 respondents only 15.3% were victimized by art theft and the respondents may have 





respondents may have chosen to withhold their policy regarding employee perpetration or 
the respondents did not have a policy regarding employee criminal misconduct. 
The next group of variables relate to actions taken after an incidence of theft by 
the victimized museum/gallery. It should be noted that due to this group of answer 
choices applying only to museums/galleries that were victimized, the total number of 
museums/galleries within this sample is 17 as opposed to 111. Only 5.9% of the sample 
contacted national law enforcement if there was an incidence of theft and 94.1% of the 
sample did not. The majority of the sample (64.7%) contacted the local police if there 
was an incidence of theft and 35.3% of the sample did not. Only 17.6% of the sample 
contacted the local media if there was an incidence of theft and 82.4% of the sample did 
not. Only 35.3% of the sample reported an incidence of theft to their insurance agency 
and 64.7% of the sample did not. The majority of the sample (70.6%) informed their 
board of an incidence of theft and 29.4% of the sample did not. The majority of the 
sample (70.6%) filled out an incident report if they experienced theft victimization and 
29.4% of the sample did not. The majority of the sample (94.1%) utilized another form of 
action if an incidence of theft occurred and 5.9% of the sample did not. The only “other 
action” reported by the sample was discussing the incident with the artist.  
In addition to measures representing the reporting of art theft, this study examined 
why a victim of art theft would not report the incident.  Once again, due to this group of 
variables applying only to museums/galleries that were victimized, the total number of 
museums/galleries within this sample is 17 as opposed to 111. The variables utilized as 
reasons for not reporting theft are: fear of bad publicity, fear of future thefts, fear of 





other reason. Not one respondent answered yes for the reasons listed above other than for 
“fear of other reason”. Only 25.3% of the sample acknowledged that they would report a 
theft for an “other reason” and 76.5% of the sample did not. The other reasons given for 
not reporting were: the police or insurance company isn’t interested, the total value of the 
work did not warrant it, and the value of the item was low.  
The next set of theoretical variables represent measures of physical guardianship. 
The first category is composed of security measures such as security devices and physical 
barriers that are commonly classified as target hardening mechanisms. Within this study, 
several variables were designated as such. The majority of the sample (84.7%) used door 
alarms and 15.3% of the sample did not. Window alarms were utilized by 43.2% of the 
sample and were not utilized by 56.8% of the sample. A large percentage (71.2%) of the 
sample utilized motion detectors and 28.8% of the sample did not. CCTV was utilized by 
49.5% of the sample and was not utilized by 50.5% of the sample. Individual object 
alarms were utilized by 16.2% of the sample and were not utilized by 83.8% of the 
sample. Glazing on some pictures was utilized by 52.3% of the sample and was not 
utilized by 47.7% of the sample. Glazing on all pictures was utilized by 5.4% of the 
sample and was not utilized by 94.6% of the sample. Vitrines were utilized by 71.2% of 
the sample and were not utilized by 28.8% of the sample. Low lying barriers in front of 
artworks were utilized by 36.9% of the sample and were not utilized by 62.2% of the 
sample. Ropes and stanchions were utilized by 42.3% of the sample and were not utilized 
by 57.7% of the sample. Other types of security systems were utilized by 8.1% of the 
sample and were not utilized by 91.9% of the sample. Examples of other types of security 





contact, silent alarms, and a double alarm system. Other types of physical barriers were 
utilized by 9.9% of the sample and were not utilized by 90.1% of the sample. Examples 
of other types of physical barriers that the sample reported were a line on the floor, 
platforms, and signage with the message “Do not touch. This gallery is monitored by 
video surveillance”.  
Museums and galleries cannot rely on target hardening measures alone to protect 
their collections. The final theoretical category of variables relates to other forms of 
preventative physical guardianship measures that are incorporated in museum’s and 
gallery’s guardianship protocols. A widely-used procedure is bag and package 
inspections of visitors, volunteers, and employees. This question had a missing response 
for 2.7% of the sample. The majority of the sample (86.5%) conducted no bag or package 
inspection, 3.6% of the sample conducted a bag or package inspection only on visitors 
entering the museum/gallery, 0.9% of the sample conducted a bag or package inspection 
only on employees and volunteers entering the museum/gallery, 1.8% of the sample 
conducted a bag or package inspection only on employees and volunteers entering and 
exiting the museum/gallery, 0.0% of the sample conducted a bag or package inspection 
on all persons entering the museum/gallery, 1.8% of the sample conducted a bag or 
package inspection on all persons entering and exiting the museum/gallery, and 2.7% of 
the sample conducted an inspection only on all packages and bags except purses.  
An additional policy that aides in the reduction of theft or vandalism of art works 
is to require visitors to check their oversized bags in a specific storage area. Over half 
(58.6%) of the sample required oversized bag storage, 40.5% of the sample did not, and 





measure of guardianship by staff and volunteers is to wear ID badges that will alert 
visitors to the presence of staff surveillance. The majority of the sample (56.8%) required 
neither their staff nor their volunteers to wear an ID badge, 9.0% of the sample required 
only their staff to wear an ID badge, 5.4% of the sample required only their volunteers to 
wear an ID badge, and 28.8% of the sample required both their staff and their volunteers 







Table 7.1. Descriptive Statistics of Theoretical Variables For Full Sample of 111 Respondents. 
 Variable  Central Tendency 
Measure 
Variability Measure Number of 
Missing Cases 
Victimization Dependent Variables    
Yes Art Vandalism Incidence(s)  22.5%  
(25 museums/galleries) 
 
Yes Art Theft Incidence(s)  15.3%  
(17 museums/galleries) 
 
    
Demographic/Control Variables    
    
Population of institution’s city 334,832.39 residents 
(mean) 
 
823,150.05 residents (Std. 
Dev.) 
4 (3.6%) 
Volunteer hours  2,161.43 hours 
(mean) 
 
3,623.94 hours (Std. Dev.) 15 (13.5%) 
Operating budget $1,287,473.60 
(mean) 
  
$3,452,546.93 (Std. Dev.) 13 (11.7%) 





462,018.93 sq.ft. (Std. 
Dev.) 
12 (10.8%) 
    
Theoretical Measures-Social Guardianship 
Place Managers-Non-Security    
# of non-security employees 15.81 (mean) 
 
42.69 (Std. Dev.) 2 (1.8%) 
# of volunteers 58.97 (mean) 
 
88.50 (Std. Dev.) 2 (1.8%) 






    
Place Manager-Security Guards    
# of full time security guards 2.76 (mean) 
 
16.72 (Std. Dev.) 0 (0.0%) 
# of part- time security guards 2.29 (mean) 
 
5.39 (Std. Dev.) 2 (1.8%) 
# of FT or PT roving security guards 1.46 (mean) 
 
2.78 (Std. Dev.) 0 (0.0%) 




1.72 (Std. Dev.) 2 (1.8%) 




1.28 (Std. Dev.) 2 (1.8%) 




5.78 (Std. Dev.) 4 (3.6%) 
    
Place Manager Activities-Training    
SS training in identification of 
suspicious objects 
  0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  21.6%   
(24 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  78.4%   
(87 museums/galleries) 
 
SS training in intruder detection 
systems 
  0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  24.3%   
(27 museums/galleries) 
 






SS training in safety of artworks    0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  31.5%   
(35 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  68.5%   
(76 museums/galleries) 
 
SS training in greeting & visitor 
reception 
  0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  32.4%   
(36 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  67.6%   
(75 museums/galleries) 
 
SS training in CCTV management   0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  24.3%   
(27 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  75.7%   
(84 museums/galleries) 
 
MS training in identification of 
suspicious objects 
  0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  23.4%   
(26 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  76.6%   
(85 museums/galleries) 
 
MS training in intruder detection 
systems 
  0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  39.6%   
(44 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  60.4%   
(67 museums/galleries) 
 
MS training in safety of artworks   0 (0.0%) 





(95 museums/galleries)  
 No  14.4%   
(16 museum/gallery) 
 
MS training in greeting & visitor 
reception 
  0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  80.2%   
(89 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  19.8%   
(22 museums/galleries) 
 
MS training in CCTV management   0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  26.1%   
(29 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  73.9%   
(82 museums/galleries) 
 
VS training in identification of 
suspicious objects 
  0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  8.1%   
(9 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  91.9%  
(102 museums/galleries) 
 
VS training in intruder detection 
systems 
  0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  15.3%  
(17 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  84.7%   
(94 museums/galleries) 
 
VS training in safety of artworks   0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  65.8%   
(73 museums/galleries) 
 






VS training in greeting & visitor 
reception 
  0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  65.8%   
(73 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  34.2%   
(38 museums/galleries) 
 
    
Place Manager Activities-Due 
Diligence 
   
Consult stolen art databases   30 (27.0%) 
 Never  48.6%  
(54 museums/galleries) 
 
 Sometimes  7.2%   
(8 museums/galleries) 
 
 Most of the time  3.6%   
(4 museums/galleries) 
 
 Always  13.5%   
(15 museums/galleries) 
 
 N/A  27.0%   
(30 museums/galleries) 
 
Outside risk analysis performed   25 (22.5%) 
 Never  54.1%%  
(60 museums/galleries) 
 
 Yes  23.4%   
(26 museums/galleries) 
 







 Missing  0.9%   
(1 museum/gallery) 
 
Time elapsed since last risk analysis   25 (22.5%) 
 Never had a risk analysis  54.1%   
(60 museums/galleries) 
 
 Had risk analysis conducted 15-19 
 years ago 
 0.9%  
(1 museum/gallery) 
 
 Had risk analysis conducted 11-14 
 years ago 
 0.9%  
(1 museum/gallery) 
 
 Had risk analysis conducted 6-10 
 years ago 
 2.7%   
(3 museums/galleries) 
 
 Had risk analysis conducted 2-5 
 years ago 
 
 11.7%   
(13 museums/galleries) 
 
 Had risk analysis conducted last 
 within last year 
 7.2%   
(8 museums/galleries) 
 
Inventory works on view
 
  10 (9.0%) 
 Less than once a year  0.9%   
(1 museum/gallery) 
 
 Once a year  22.5%   
(25 museums/galleries) 
 
 Every 6 months  3.6%   
(4 museums/galleries) 
 
 Every 3 months  6.3%   
(7 museums/galleries) 
 
 Monthly  11.7%   
(13 museums/galleries) 
 
 Weekly/More frequent  15.3%   
(17 museums/galleries) 
 
 Daily  30.6%   
(34 museums/galleries) 
 
  Missing  9.0%   
(10 museums/galleries) 
 
Inventory works in storage   22 (19.8%) 







 Every 10 years  8.1%   
(9 museums/galleries) 
 
 Every 5-10 years  14.4%   
16 museums/galleries) 
 
 Every 2-4  20.7%   
(23 museums/galleries) 
 
 Annually  27.9%   
(31 museums/galleries) 
 
 More than once a year  9.0 %   
(10 museums/galleries) 
 
  Missing  10.8%   
(12 museums/galleries) 
 
Pre-hiring Background checks on  
potential employees 
 
  7 (6.3%) 
 Never  18.9%   
(21 museums/galleries) 
 
 Sometimes  9.0%   
(10 museums/galleries) 
 
 Most of the time  8.1%   
(9 museums/galleries) 
 
 Always  57.7%   
(64 museums/galleries) 
 
 N/A  6.3%   
(7 museums/galleries) 
 
Pre-hiring Background checks on  
potential volunteers 






 Never  54.1%   
(60 museums/galleries) 
 
 Sometimes  15.3%   
(17 museums/galleries) 
 
 Most of the time  7.2%   
(8 museums/galleries) 
 
 Always  13.5%   
(15 museums/galleries) 
 
 N/A  9.9%   
(11 museums/galleries) 
 
    
Security Guard Specific Duties    
Square footage of roving 3,429.46 sq.ft.(mean) 
 
10,359.41 sq.ft.(Std. Dev.) 17 (15.3%) 
# of designated security posts 1.64 (mean) 
 
6.65 (Std. Dev.) 1 (0.9%) 
Where surveillance rounds are made   69 (62.2%) 
 Internally  18.9%   
(21 museums/galleries) 
 
 Internally & Externally   
18.9%   
(21 museums/galleries) 
 
  Missing  62.2%   
(69 museums/galleries) 
 
How often surveillance rounds are  
Made 
2.91/half  hour 
intervals  (mean) 
 







Length of time security on duty   71 (64.0%) 
  Missing  64.0%   
(71 museums/galleries) 
 
 Public hours only  9.9%   
(11 museums/galleries) 
 
 Extended hours (for special  
 events/normally extended hours 
 
 19.8%   
(22 museums/galleries) 
 
 24 hours  5.4%   
(6 museums/galleries) 
 
 Special events only  0.9%   
(1 museum/gallery) 
 
      
Place Manager Perceived 
Improvements 
   
Would a larger budget improve level 
of security? 
  0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  76.6%   
(85 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  23.4%   
(26 museums/galleries) 
 
Would more security personnel 
improve level of security? 
  0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  58.6%   
(65 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  41.4%   
(46 museums/galleries) 
 
Would improved staff training 
improve level of security? 
  0 (0.0%) 






 No  41.4%   
(46 museums/galleries) 
 
Would modern security equipment 
improve level of security? 
  0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  54.1%   
(60 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  45.9%   
(51 museums/galleries) 
 
Other improvements?   0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  7.2%   
(8 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  92.8%   
(103 museums/galleries) 
 
    
Guardianship In Action-Vandalism    
Employee fired if committed 
vandalism 
  70 (63.1%) 
 Yes  32.4%  
 (36 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  4.5%   
(5 museums/galleries) 
 
 Missing  63.1%   
(70 museums/galleries) 
 
Employee reported to police if 
committed vandalism 
  72 (64.9%) 
 Yes  24.3%   
(27 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  10.8 %   
(12 museums/galleries) 
 
 Missing  64.9%   
(72 museums/galleries) 
 
Other actions with employee if 
committed vandalism 
  75 (67.6%) 
 Yes  3.6%   
(4 museums/galleries) 
 







 Missing  67.6%   
(75 museums/galleries) 
 
Contact national law enforcement if 
vandalism 
 *Note the reporting 





 Yes  4.0%   
(1 museum/gallery) 
0 (0.0%) 
 No  96%   
(24 museums/galleries) 
 
Inform the local police if vandalism   0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  44.0%  
(11 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  56.0%   
(14 museums/galleries) 
 
Contact  the local media if vandalism   0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  4.0%   
(1 museum/gallery) 
 
 No  96.0%   
(24 museums/galleries) 
 
Report to insurance agency if 
vandalism 
  0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  28.0%   
(7 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  72.0%   
(18 museums/galleries) 
 
Inform your board if vandalism   0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  40.0%   
(10 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  60.0%   
(15 museums/galleries) 
 
Fill out an incident report if vandalism   0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  20.0%   
(5 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  80.0%   
(20 museums/galleries) 
 
Other action if vandalism   0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  24.0%   
(6 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  76.0%   
(19 museums/galleries) 
 
    





Employee fired if committed theft   83 (74.8%) 
 Yes  24.3%   
(27 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  0.9%   
(1 museum/gallery) 
 
 Missing  74.8%   
(83 museums/galleries) 
 
Employee reported to police if 
committed theft 
  85 (76.6%) 
 Yes  22.5%   
(25 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  0.9%   
(1 museum/gallery) 
 
 Missing  76.6%   
(85 museums/galleries) 
 
Other actions with employee if 
committed theft 
  87 (78.4%) 
 Yes  1.8%   
(2 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  19.8%   
(22 museums/galleries) 
 
 Missing  78.4%   
(87 museums/galleries) 
 
    
Contact national law enforcement if 
theft 
 *Note the reporting 





 Yes  5.9%   
(1 museum/gallery) 
 
 No  94.1%   
(16 museums/galleries) 
 
 N/A  0.0%   
(0 museums/galleries) 
 
Inform the local police if theft   0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  64.7%   
(11 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  35.3%   
(6 museums/galleries) 
 
Contact the local media if theft   0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  17.6%   
(3 museums/galleries) 
 







Report to insurance agency if theft   0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  35.3%   
(6 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  64.7%   
(11 museums/galleries) 
 
Inform your board if theft   0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  70.6%   
(12  museums/galleries ) 
 
 No  29.4%   
(5 museums/galleries) 
 
Fill out an incident report if theft   0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  70.6%   
(12 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  29.4%   
(5 museums/galleries) 
 
Other action if theft   0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  5.9%   
(1 museum/gallery) 
 
 No  94.1%   
(16 museums/galleries) 
 
Didn’t report theft due to fear of bad 
publicity 
  0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  0.0%   
(0 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  100.0%   
(17 museums/galleries) 
 
Didn’t report theft due to fear of 
future thefts 
  0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  0.0%   
(0 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  100.0%   
(17 museums/galleries) 
 
Didn’t report theft due to fear of 
public embarrassment 
  0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  0.0%   
(0 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  100.0%   
(17 museums/galleries) 
 
Didn’t report theft due to fear of 
increased insurance rates 
  0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  0.0%   
(0 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  100.0%   
(17 museums/galleries) 
 
Didn’t report theft due to fear of 
extortion 





 Yes  0.0%   
(0 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  100.0%   
(17 museums/galleries) 
 
Didn’t report theft due to fear of other 
reason 
  0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  23.5%   
(4 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  76.5%   
(13 museums/galleries) 
 
    
Theoretical Measures-Physical Guardianship 
Target Hardening Devices & 
Mechanisms 
   
Door alarms   0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  84.7%   
(94 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  15.3%   
(17 museums/galleries) 
 
Window alarms    0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  43.2%   
(48 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  56.8%   
(63 museums/galleries) 
 
Motion detectors    0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  71.2%   
(79 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  28.8%   
(32 museums/galleries) 
 
CCTV    0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  49.5%   
(55 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  50.5%   
(56 museums/galleries) 
 
Individual object alarms     
 Yes  16.2%   
(18 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  83.8%   
(93 museums/galleries) 
 
Glazing on some pictures   0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  52.3%   
(58 museums/galleries) 
 






Glazing on all pictures   0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  5.4%   
(6 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  94.6%   
(105 museums/galleries) 
 
Vitrines    0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  71.2%   
(79 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  28.8%   
(32 museums/galleries) 
 
Low-lying barriers in front of 
artworks  
  1 (0.9%) 
 Yes  36.9%   
(41 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  62.2%   
(69 museums/galleries) 
 
Ropes and stanchions    0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  42.3%   
(47 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  57.7%   
(64 museums/galleries) 
 
Other type of security systems   0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  8.1%   
(9 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  91.9%   
(102 museums/galleries) 
 
Other type of physical barriers   0 (0.0%) 
 Yes  9.9%   
(11 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  90.1%   
(100 museums/galleries) 
 
    
Preventive Physical Guardianship 
Actions 
   
Bag/package inspections   3 (2.7%) 
  Missing  2.7%   
(3 museums/galleries) 
 
 No inspections required  86.5%   
(96 museums/galleries) 
 
 Only on visitors entering the 
 museum/gallery 
 3.6%   
(4 museums/galleries) 
 






After examination of the above results, an abundance of missing data was 
revealed that required immediate attention before any further exploration of the data 
could be conducted. Missing data is a common issue with survey research. According to 
Horton and Kleinman (2007), “missing data are a frequent complication of any real-
world study. The causes of missingness are often numerous, some due to design, and 
some due to chance. Some variables may not be collected from all subjects, some 
subjects may decline to provide values, and some information may be purposely excised, 
 entering the museum/gallery 
 
(1 museum/gallery) 
 Only on employees & volunteers  
 entering and exiting the  
 museum/gallery 
 
 1.8%   
(2 museums/galleries) 
 
 On all persons entering the  
 museum/gallery 
 0.0%   
(0 museums/galleries) 
 
 On all persons entering and 
 exiting the museum/gallery 
 1.8%   
(2 museums/galleries)  
 
 On all packages & bags except  
 purses 




Oversized bag storage 
 
   
1 (0.9%) 
 Yes  58.6%   
(65 museums/galleries) 
 
 No  40.5%   
(45 museums/galleries) 
 
 Missing  0.9%   
(1 museum/gallery) 
 
ID badges required for staff and  
volunteers 
  0 (0.0%) 
 No one is required  56.8%   
(63 museums/galleries) 
 
 Staff only  9.0%   
(10 museums/galleries) 
 
 Volunteers only  5.4%   
(6 museums/galleries) 
 







for example to protect confidentiality” (p. 545). As mentioned earlier in chapter 1, due to 
the reticent culture of the art world, attaining any form of disclosure regarding 
victimization has proven to be extremely difficult. Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
researchers received incomplete survey responses.  Of the 85 theoretical and 
demographic variables, 32 measures contained at least one missing case (37.6%). 
Nineteen variables (22.4%) contained more than four missing cases. A decision was 
made to remove all variables that contained missing cases that reached the threshold of 
20.0% (22) or more of the sample size. Eleven variables were removed at this point, as 
well as the variable “inventory works in storage”, since this measure did not apply to the 
entire sample set. Additionally, the 20 GIA variables that were only applicable to the 
museums and galleries that experienced victimization were also removed since the 
smaller sample sizes greatly reduced the overall power of the full sample.  Furthermore, 
to ensure that the remaining variables were coded in the most parsimonious manner for 
analysis, all variables with answer choices of unknown, don’t know, N/A, or missing 
were transformed into the “missing” column of SPSS. Lastly, any remaining ordinal or 
categorical variables that could logically be transformed into dichotomous variables were 
recoded into a binary variable. Two variables, bag/package inspection and ID badges 
required for staff and volunteers were subjected to recoding into dichotomous variables. 
Bag/package inspection was transformed into 0=no bags inspected and 1=bags inspected. 
ID badges required for staff and volunteers was transformed into 0=no ID badges 
required and 1= ID badges required for staff and volunteers. Additionally, the variable, 





there was no consistent frequency of requiring that oversized bags be stored in a separate 
location. The final grouping of 53 variables was used from this point on. 
 
Stage 2: Descriptive Statistics of Victimized Versus Non-victimized Museums and 
Galleries (Subgroup Comparisons) 
 The second stage of analysis is the bivariate descriptive statistical examination of 
the victimized museums and galleries compared to the non-victimized museums and 
galleries within each dependent variable. These variables were divided into two separate 
forms of variables for recording purposes. Consequently, the continuous variables were 
maintained in their own table for each dependent variable and a separate table for each 
dependent variable was created for categorical variables. An attempt was made to 
maintain the theoretical categories within one table. However, a few of the measures 
were recorded separately due to the differing typology of variable. The findings of this 
phase of analysis are based on examining the differences between proportions and means.  
 
Phase 1. Vandalism Versus No Vandalism 
Twenty-five museums/galleries (22.5%) experienced at least one incidence of art 
vandalism and eighty-six museums/galleries (77.5%) did not experience any incidences 
of art vandalism. The results of the analysis of the continuous theoretical variables are 
reported in Table 7.2.  
Beginning with the demographic/control variables, the following results were 





category where the non-victimized sample had a higher mean than the victimized sample. 
Specifically, the mean of non-victimized museums/galleries’ respective city’s population 
(365,771.70) was higher than the victimized museums/galleries’ respective city’s 
population (221,836.65). The examination of the remaining variables within this category 
produced the following results. The victimized museums and galleries all had a higher 
average number of volunteer hours (M=3,592.17), operating budgets ($2,383,568.09), 
and square footage of their respective institutions (234,564.33 sq. ft.) compared to the 
average number of volunteer hours (M=1,831.26), operating budgets ($970,183.09), and 
square footage of their respective institutions (22,786.09 sq. ft.) of the non-victimized 
museums and galleries.  
The remaining variables in this phase of analysis are measures of social and 
physical guardianship that have been grouped into theoretical categories. Theoretical 
constructs representing social guardianship will be examined first. Interestingly, the 
examination of the first social guardianship category (general place managers-non-
security) produced results that indicated that the victimized museums/galleries had higher 
means than the non-victimized museums/galleries. The means for victimized 
museums/galleries were 21.39 non-security employees, 78.63 volunteers, and 98,806.21 
visitors. The means for non-victimized museums/galleries were 14.31 non-security 
employees, 53.42 volunteers, and 39,471.83 visitors.  
Within the theoretical category of place managers-security guards, the victimized 
museums/galleries employed a higher average of full-time security guards (M=3.52), 
part-time security guards (M=2.74), full-time or part-time roving security guards 





time security guards who man a security station (M=0.64), and full-time and part-time 
guards employed for at least 5 years (M=4.78). This is compared to the number of full-
time security guards (M=2.53), part-time security guards (M=2.17), full-time or part-time 
roving security guards (M=1.15), full-time or part-time guards stationary at entrance 
(M=0.64), full-time or part-time security guards who man a security station (M=0.44), 
and full-time and part-time guards employed for at least 5 years (M=1.57) employed by 
non-victimized museums. In sum, all forms of place managers are present at higher 
averages at the victimized museums/galleries than at the non-victimized museums 
galleries. 
Security related practices are a form of place manager activity and the average 
amount of square footage of roving covered by security guards (M=3,672,18 sq. ft.) at the 
non-victimized museums/galleries was higher than the average amount of square footage 
of roving covered by security guards (2,585.71) at the victimized museums/galleries. The 
remaining variables in this category, the number of designated security posts (M=2.88) 
and the frequency that the surveillance rounds are made (M=5.05 per half hour) at the 
victimized museums/galleries had higher averages compared to the number of designated 
security posts (M=1.29) and the frequency that the surveillance rounds are made (M=2.37 








Table 7.2.  Descriptive Statistics of Museums/Galleries that were Victimized by Art Vandalism Compared 
with Museums/Galleries that were not Victimized by Art Vandalism, Continuous Variables 
  Vandalized (25 museums/galleries)  Not vandalized (86 museums/galleries) 
  N M SD N M SD 
Demographic/Control Variables 
      










Number of volunteer hours 
18 

















       
Social Guardianship Measures 
      
Place Managers-Non-Security 
      
# of non-security employees 23 21.39 35.98 86 14.31 44.38 
# of volunteers 24 78.63 94.73 85 53.42 86.44 
# of visitors 24 98,806.21 249,904.91 83 39,471.83 141,286.04 
       
Place Managers- Security Guards 
      
# of full time security guards 25 3.52 9.47 86 2.53 18.34 
# of part- time security guards 23 2.74 4.19 86 2.17 5.69 
# of FT or PT roving security  
guards  
25 2.52 3.51 86 1.15 2.46 
# of FT or PT guards stationary  
at entrance 
23 0.78 1.31 86 0.64 1.81 
# of FT or PT guards who man a  
security station 








# of FT and PT guards 
 employed for at least 5 years 
23 4.78 9.30 84 1.57 4.17 
  
      
Security Guard Related Practices 
      
Square footage of roving 21 2,585.71 sq.ft.  5,566.80 sq.ft. 73  3,672.18 sqft 
113,990.47 
sq.ft. 
Number of designated security  
Posts 
24 2.88 7.02 86 1.29 6.55 
How often surveillance rounds  
    are made 
       22 
5.05 /half hour 
intervals   
8.45/half hour 
intervals   
86 
2.37 /half hour 
intervals 
6.23 /half 
hour intervals   
Note: N= the number of 
museums/galleries  












The categorical variables within the dataset will be examined next. The results are 
reported in Table 7.3. The first theoretical group of place manager activities (place 
manager training) is composed of forms of training for security staff, museum/gallery 
staff, and volunteer staff. The security staff training in identification of suspicious objects 
(32.0%), training in intruder detection systems (40.0%), training in safety of artworks 
(56.0%), training in greeting and visitor reception (52.0%), and training in CCTV 
management (40.0%) was conducted by a higher percentage of the victimized sample 
compared to the security staff training in identification of suspicious objects (18.6%), 
training in intruder detection systems (19.8%), training in safety of artworks (24.4%), 
training in greeting and visitor reception (26.7%), and training in CCTV management 
(19.8%) conducted by the non-victimized sample. In sum, these theoretical measures are 
present at higher percentages by the victimized museums/galleries than at the non-
victimized museums/galleries.  
The results of the museum/gallery non-security staff training was not as consistent 
as the results of the examination of differences between proportions of the security staff 
training in the victimized and non-victimized museums/galleries. Museum/gallery non-
security staff training in identification of suspicious objects (24.0%) and museum/gallery 
staff training in safety of artworks (92.0%) was conducted by a higher percentage of the 
victimized sample compared to the museum/gallery staff training in identification of 
suspicious objects (23.3%) and museum/gallery staff training in safety of artworks 
(83.7%) conducted by the non-victimized sample. However, museum/gallery staff 
training in intruder detection systems (41.9%), training in greeting and visitor reception 





percentage of the non-victimized sample compared to the museum/gallery staff training 
in intruder detection systems (32.0%), training in greeting and visitor reception (72.0%), 
and training in CCTV management (16.0%) conducted by the victimized sample.  
The volunteer staff training in identification of suspicious objects (16.0%) was 
only conducted at a higher percentage of the victimized sample compared to the 
volunteer staff training in identification of suspicious objects (5.8%) conducted by the 
non-victimized sample. However, volunteer staff training in intruder detection systems 
(18.6%), training in safety of artworks (69.8%), and training in greeting and visitor 
reception (73.0%) was conducted at a higher percentage of the non-victimized sample 
compared to the volunteer staff training in in intruder detection systems (4.0%), training 
in safety of artworks (52.0%), and training in greeting and visitor reception (40.0%) 
conducted by the non-victimized sample.  
The second theoretical category of museum/gallery place manager activities is 
place manager due diligence. The first act of due diligence measured, inventorying works 
on view, was conducted less than once a year (4.5%), once a year (40.9%), and every 6 
months (9.1%) by a higher percentage of the victimized sample compared to the 
inventorying works on view less than once a year (0.0%), once a year (20.3%), and every 
6 months (2.5%), conducted by the non-victimized sample. However, inventorying works 
on view was conducted every three months (7.6%), monthly (16.5%), weekly/more 
frequently (17.7%), and daily (35.4%) by a higher percentage of the non-victimized 
sample compared the conduction of inventorying works on view every three months 
(4.5%), monthly (0.0%), weekly/more frequently (13.6%), and daily (27.3%) by the 





inventoried their works on view with less frequency than the non-victimized sample of 
museums/galleries.  
The second and third acts of due diligence measures were pre-hiring background 
checks on potential employees and pre-hiring background checks on potential volunteers. 
The pre-hiring background checks on potential employees were never conducted (21.7%) 
and always conducted (65.2%) by a higher percentage of the victimized sample compared 
to the conduction of pre-hiring background checks on potential employees never (19.8%) 
and always (60.5%) by the non-victimized sample. However, the pre-hiring background 
checks on potential employees were conducted sometimes (9.9%) and conducted most of 
the time (9.9%) by a higher percentage of the non-victimized sample compared to the 
conduction of pre-hiring background checks on potential employees sometimes (8.7%) 
and most of the time (4.3%) by the victimized sample. 
The pre-hiring background checks on potential volunteers was always conducted 
(26.3%) by a higher percentage of the victimized sample compared to (12.3%) always 
conducted by the non-victimized sample. However, the pre-hiring background checks on 
potential volunteers was conducted never (60.5%), sometimes conducted (18.5%), and 
conducted most of the time (8.6%) at a higher percentage by the non-victimized sample 
compared to conducted never (57.9%), sometimes conducted (10.5%) and conducted 
most of the time (5.3%) by the victimized sample. 
Responsible place managers look for ways to improve their museum or gallery’s 
security departments. This last category of social guardianship examines five perceived 
improvements that place managers might conceptualize as measures that improve the 





more security personnel, improved staff training, modern security equipment, and other 
improvements were the variables examined. A higher percentage of the victimized 
sample only believed that “other improvements” (12.0%) would improve the level of 
security of the artwork at their museum/gallery compared to the non-victimized sample 
who believed that “other improvements” (5.8%) would improve the level of security of 
the artwork at their museum/gallery. Conversely, a higher percentage of the non-
victimized sample believed that a larger budget (76.7%), more security personnel 
(60.5%), improved staff training (60.5%), and modern security equipment (57.0%) would 
improve the level of security of the artwork at their museum/gallery compared to the 
victimized sample who believed that a larger budget (76.0%), more security personnel 
(52.0%) improved staff training (52.0%), and modern security equipment (44.0%) would 
improve the level of security of the artwork at their museum/gallery. 
Physical guardianship is the other form of guardianship examined in this study. 
Several theoretical categories relate to physical guardianship. Art museums and galleries 
use many forms of target hardening to prevent vandalism and theft. Within this study, six 
forms of security devices (door alarms, window alarms, motion detectors, CCTV, 
individual objects alarms, and other types of security systems) and six forms of physical 
barriers (glazing on some pictures, glazing on all pictures, vitrines, low lying barriers in 
front of artworks, ropes and stanchions, and other types of physical barriers) were utilized 
as measurements of this specific category of physical guardianship. Window alarms 
(56.0%), motion detectors (72.0%), CCTV (56.0%), glazing on some pictures (68.0%), 
vitrines (76.0%), low lying barriers in front of artworks (37.5%), and ropes and 





compared to the utilization of window alarms (39.5%), motion detectors (70.9%), CCTV 
(47.7%), glazing on some pictures (47.7%), vitrines (69.8%), low lying barriers in front 
of artworks (37.2%), and ropes and stanchions (38.4%) by the non-victimized sample. 
Conversely, door alarms (84.9%), individual object alarms (16.3%), glazing on all 
pictures (5.8%), other types of security systems (8.1%), and other types of physical 
barriers (10.5%) were utilized by a higher percentage of the non-victimized sample 
compared to the utilization of door alarms (84.0%), individual object alarms (16.0%), 
glazing on all pictures (4.0%), other types of security systems (8.0%), and other types of 
physical barriers (8.0%) by victimized sample. 
The last three theoretical measures of physical guardianship are categorized as 
preventative physical guardianship measures (bag/package inspections, oversized bag 
storage, and ID badges required for staff and volunteers). The findings from the 
examination of these variables reveal that the conduction of bag and package inspections 
(16.0%) and the existence of some sort of policy requiring oversized bag storage (60.0%) 
was present at a higher percentage of the victimized sample compared to the conduction 
of bag and package inspections (9.3%) and the existence of some sort of policy requiring 
oversized bag storage (58.1%) present at the non-victimized sample. However, ID badges 
were required for staff and volunteers (44.2%) by a higher percentage of the non-
victimized sample compared to ID badges required for staff and volunteers (40.0%) by 
the victimized sample. In sum, a higher percentage of the victimized sample utilized 
measures to detect and/or inhibit objects used in the commission of an act of vandalism 











Table 7.3.  Descriptive Statistics of Museums/Galleries that were Victimized by Art 
Vandalism Compared with Museums/Galleries that were not Victimized by Art 
Vandalism, Categorical Variables 
  
Vandalized                                   
(25 museums/galleries)  
Not vandalized        
(86 museums/galleries) 
  N % N % 
Social Guardianship Measures 
    
Place Manager Activities-Training 
    
SS training in identification of  
suspicious objects     
Yes 8 32.0% 16 18.6% 
No 17 68.0% 70 81.4% 
SS training in intruder detection  
systems     
Yes 10 40.0% 17 19.8% 
No 15 60.0% 69 80.2% 
SS training in safety of artworks  
    
Yes 14 56.0% 21 24.4% 
No 11 44.0% 65 75.6% 
SS training in greeting & visitor  
reception     
Yes 13 52.0% 23 26.7% 
No 12 48.0% 63 73.3% 
SS training in CCTV  








Yes 10 40.0% 17 19.8% 
No 15 60.0% 69 80.2% 
MS training in suspicious objects 
    
Yes 6 24.0% 20 23.3% 
No 19 76.0% 66 76.7% 
MS training in intruder detection  
systems     
Yes 8 32.0% 36 41.9% 
No 17 68.0% 50 58.1% 
MS training in safety of artworks 
    
Yes 23 92.0% 72 83.7% 
No 2 8.0% 14 16.3% 
MS training in greeting & visitor  
reception     
Yes 18 72.0% 71 82.6% 
No 7 28.0% 15 17.4% 
MS training in CCTV  
management     
Yes 4 16.0% 25 29.1% 
No 21 84.0% 61 70.9% 
VS training in suspicious objects 
    
Yes 4 16.00% 5 5.8% 
No 21 84.0% 81 94.2% 
VS training in intruder detection  
systems     
Yes 1 4.0% 16 18.6% 
No 24 96.0% 70 81.4% 
VS training in safety of artworks 
    
Yes 13 52.0% 60 69.8% 








VS training in greeting & visitor  
reception     
Yes 10 40.0% 63 73.3% 
No 15 60.0% 23 26.7% 
     
Place Manager Activities-Due Diligence   
   
Inventory works on view 
    
Less than once a year 1 4.5% 0 0.0% 
Once a year  9 40.9% 16 20.3% 
Every 6 months 2 9.1% 2 2.5% 
Every 3 months 1 4.5% 6 7.6% 
Monthly 0 0.0% 13 16.5% 
Weekly/More frequently 3 13.6% 14 17.7% 
Daily 6 27.3% 28 35.4% 
Pre-hiring Background checks on  
potential employees 
  
   
Never 5 21.7% 16 19.8% 
Sometimes 2 8.7% 8 9.9% 
Most of the time 1 4.3% 8 9.9% 
Always 15 65.2% 49 60.5% 
Pre-hiring Background checks on  
potential volunteers 
  
   
Never 11 57.9% 49 60.5% 
Sometimes 2 10.5% 15 18.5% 
Most of the time 1 5.3% 7 8.6% 
Always 5 26.3% 10 12.3% 
     Place Manager Perceived Improvements 








Would a larger budget improve  
level of security?     
Yes 19 76.0% 66 76.7% 
No 6 24.0% 20 23.3% 
Would more security personnel  
improve level of security?     
Yes 13 52.0% 52 60.5% 
No 12 48.0% 34 39.5% 
Would improve staff training  
improve level of security?     
Yes 13 52.0% 52 60.5% 
No 12 48.0% 34 39.5% 
Would modern security  
equipment improve level of  
security? 
    
Yes 11 44.0% 49 57.0% 
No 14 56.0% 37 43.0% 
Other improvements? 
    
Yes 3 12.0% 5 5.8% 
No 22 88.0% 81 94.2% 
     
Physical Guardianship 
    
Target Hardening Devices & 
Mechanisms     
Door alarms  
    
Yes 21 84.0% 73 84.9% 
No 4 16.0% 13 15.1% 
Window alarms  
    Yes 14 56.0% 34 39.5% 








Motion detectors  
    Yes 18 72.0% 61 70.9% 
No 7 28.00% 25 29.1% 
CCTV  
    Yes 14 56.0% 41 47.70% 
No 11 44.0% 45 52.3% 
Individual object alarms  
    Yes 4 16.0% 14 16.3% 
No 21 84.0% 72 83.7% 
Glazing on some pictures 
    Yes 17 68.0% 41 47.7% 
No 8 32.00% 45 52.3% 
Glazing on all pictures 
    Yes 1 4.0% 5 5.80% 
No 24 96.0% 81 94.2% 
Vitrines  
    Yes 19 76.0% 60 69.8% 
No 6 24.0% 26 30.2% 
Barriers in front of artworks  
    Yes 9 37.5% 32 37.2% 
No 15 62.5% 54 62.8% 
Ropes and stanchions  
    Yes 14 56.0% 33 38.4% 
No 11 44.0% 53 61.6% 
Other type of security systems   
   
Yes 2 8.0% 7 8.1% 
No 23 92.0% 79 91.9% 
Other type of physical barriers   
   








No 23 92.0% 77 89.5% 
     
Preventative Physical Guardianship 
Actions     
Bag/package inspections 
    
Conducted 4 16.0% 8 9.3% 
Not conducted 21 84.0% 78 90.7% 
Oversized bag storage 
    
Other than yes 15 60.0% 50 58.1% 
No 10 40.0% 36 41.9% 
ID badges required for staff and   
volunteers 
 
    
   ID Badges required        10 40.0% 38 44.2% 





Phase 2. Theft Versus No Theft 
Seventeen (15.3%) museums/galleries experienced at least one incidence of art 
theft and ninety-four (84.7%) museums/galleries did not experience any incidences of art 
theft. The results of the analysis of the continuous theoretical variables are reported in 
Table 7.4.  
Beginning with the demographic/control variables, the following results were 
obtained. The non-victimized museums and galleries all had a higher average of the 
population of the museum/gallery’s respective city (333,398.03), number of volunteer 
hours (M=2,236.32), operating budgets ($1,411,426.66), and square footage of their 
respective institutions (85,471.54 sq.ft.) compared to the average number of the 
population of the museum/gallery’s respective city (308,829.80), volunteer hours 
(M=1,757.00), operating budgets ($601,600.00), and square footage of their respective 
institutions (15,332.69 sq.ft.) of the victimized museums and galleries. In sum, all the 
non-victimized museums/galleries contained higher averages of the entire category of 
demographic measures than the victimized museums/galleries.  
The analysis of the variables representing social and physical guardianship 
produced the same trend in the difference of means as the demographic measures. 
Specifically, the examination of the first social guardianship category (place managers-
non-security) produced results that indicated that all the general place managers (non-
security employees (M=16.96), volunteers (M=59.03), visitors (M=57,925.23)) for the 
non-victimized museums/galleries had higher means than the general place managers 
(non-security employees (M=9.53), volunteers (M=58.65), and visitors (M=23,519.69)) 





Furthermore, within the theoretical category of place managers-security guards, 
the non-victimized museums/galleries employed a higher average number of full-time 
security guard (M=3.20), part-time security guards (M=2.59), full-time or part-time 
roving security guards (M=1.65), full-time or part-time guards stationary at entrance 
(M=0.76), full-time or part-time security guards who man a security station (M=0.52), 
and full-time and part-time guards employed for at least 5 years (M=2.57) compared to 
the victimized museums/gallery’s averages for full-time security guards (M=0.29), part-
time security guards (M=0.71), full-time or part-time roving security guards (M=0.41), 
full-time or part-time guards stationary at entrance (M=0.18), full-time or part-time 
security guards who man a security station (M=0.29), and full-time and part-time guards 
employed for at least 5 years (M=0.65). In sum, all forms of place managers are present 
at higher averages at the non-victimized museums/galleries than at the victimized 
museums/galleries.  
Lastly, security related practices produced the following results. The non-
victimized museums/galleries had a higher average amount of square footage of roving 
covered by security guards, (M= 3,974.92 sq.ft.), number of designated security posts 
(M=1.88), and frequency in that surveillance rounds are made (M=3.10 per half hour) 
compared to the average amount of square footage of roving covered by security guards 
(M=770.13 sq.ft.), the number of designated security posts (M=0.29) and frequency in 
that surveillance rounds are made (M=1.88 per half hour) at the victimized 
museums/galleries. 
Interestingly, all but two (population of an institution’s city and square footage of 





descriptive statistical examination were found to be opposite to the results produced in 












Table 7.4.  Descriptive Statistics of Museums/Galleries that were Victimized by Art Theft Compared with 
Museums/Galleries that were not Victimized by Art Theft, Continuous Variables 
  Stolen from (17 museums/galleries)  Not stolen from (94 museums/galleries) 
  N M SD N M SD 
Demographic/Control Variables             







residents   
 868,696.26 
residents  
 Number of volunteer hours  15  1,757.00 hours   2,307.40 hours  81  2,236.32 hours   3,824.56 hours  
Operating budget 15 $601,600.00 $1,112,853.78 83 $1,411,426.66 $3,713,157.22 
    Square feet of museum/gallery  16 
           
    15,332.6 
                       
 36,724.03 sq.ft.  83   85,471.54 sq.ft.   504,044.70 sq.ft. 
 
Social Guardianship Measures 
 
          
Place Managers-Non-Security 
 
          
# of non-security employees 17 9.53 15.43 92 16.96 45.96 
# of volunteers 17 58.65 116.02 92 59.03 83.24 
    # of visitors  16 23,519.69 48,450.92 91 57,925.23 192,278.75 
 
Place Managers-Security Guards 
 
          
# of full-time security guards 17 0.29 0.85 94 3.20 18.15 








# of FT or PT roving security  
guards 
17 0.41 1.06 94 1.65 2.95 
# of FT or PT guards stationary  
at entrance 
17 0.18 0.53 92 0.76 1.84 
# of FT or PT guards who man a  
security station 
17 0.29 0.771 92 0.52 1.35 
# of FT and PT guards employed  
5 years ago 
17 0.65 2.67 90 2.57 6.15 
  
Security Guard Related Practices             
Square footage of roving 16 770.31 sq.ft. 2,209.25 sq.ft. 78  3,974.92 sq.ft. 11,264.79 sq.ft. 
Number of designated security  
posts 
17 0.29 0.99  93 1.88 7.20 
How often surveillance rounds  
are made 
17 
1.88 /half hour 
intervals   
6.27 /half hour 
intervals   
91 
3.10 /half hour 
intervals 
6.89 /half hour 
intervals   






The categorical variables within the dataset will be examined next. The results are 
reported in Table 7.5. The place manager training results for security staff indicated that 
the security staff training in identification of suspicious objects (23.4%), training in 
intruder detection systems (26.6%), training in safety of artworks (34.0%), training in 
greeting and visitor reception (34.0%), and training in CCTV management (26.6%) was 
conducted by a higher percentage of the non-victimized sample compared to the security 
staff training in identification of suspicious objects (11.8%), training in intruder detection 
systems (11.8%), training in safety of artworks (17.6%), training in greeting and visitor 
reception (23.5%), and training in CCTV management (11.8%) conducted by victimized 
sample. In sum, these theoretical measures are present at higher percentages by the non-
victimized museums/galleries than at the victimized museums/galleries. Additionally, 
these findings are also counter to the findings in the art vandalism examination of these 
variables. 
The results of the museum/gallery non-security staff training, for the most part, 
was polar to the results of the examination of differences between proportions of the 
security staff training in the victimized and non-victimized museums/galleries. 
Museum/gallery non-security staff training in identification of suspicious objects 
(23.5%), training in safety of artworks (88.2%), training in greeting and visitor reception 
(82.4%), and training in CCTV management (29.4%) was conducted by a higher 
percentage of the victimized sample compared to the museum/gallery non-security staff 
training in identification of suspicious objects (23.4%), training in safety of artworks 
(85.1%), training in greeting and visitor reception (79.8%), and training in CCTV 





security staff training, museum/gallery non-security staff training in intruder detection 
systems (40.0%), was conducted at a higher percentage of the non-victimized sample 
compared to the museum/gallery non-security staff training in intruder detection systems 
(35.3%) conducted by the victimized sample.  
The volunteer staff training in identification of suspicious objects (11.8%) and 
volunteer staff training in safety of artworks (76.5%) was conducted at a higher 
percentage of the victimized sample than volunteer staff training in identification of 
suspicious objects (7.4%) and volunteer staff training in safety of artworks (63.8%) by 
the non-victimized sample. However, the volunteer staff training in intruder detection 
systems (16.0%) and volunteer staff training in greeting and visitor reception (66.0%) 
was conducted at a higher percentage of the non-victimized sample compared to the 
volunteer staff training in in intruder detection systems (11.8%) and volunteer staff 
training in greeting and visitor reception (64.7%) conducted by the victimized sample.  
The first measure of place manager activities within the due diligence theoretical 
category (inventorying works on view) was conducted less than once a year (6.30%), 
once a year (31.3%), every 6 months (6.3%), and weekly/more frequently (18.8%) by a 
higher percentage of the victimized sample compared to the inventorying works on view 
less than once a year (0.00%), once a year (23.5%), every 6 months (3.5%), and 
weekly/more frequently (16.5%) conducted by the non-victimized sample.  
However, inventorying works on view was conducted every 3 months (7.1%), 
monthly (12.9%), and daily (36.5%) by a higher percentage of the non-victimized sample 
compared to the conduction of inventorying works on view every 3 months (6.3%), 





The examination of the second and third acts of due diligence measures produced 
the following results. The pre-hiring background checks on potential employees was 
never conducted (25.0%) and conducted most of the time (12.5%) by a higher percentage 
of the victimized sample compared to the conduction of pre-hiring background checks on 
potential employees never (19.3%) and most of the time (8.0%) by the non-victimized 
sample. However, the pre-hiring background checks on potential employees was 
conducted sometimes (10.2%) and always conducted (62.5%) by a higher percentage of 
the non-victimized sample compared to the conduction of pre-hiring background checks 
on potential employees sometimes (6.3%) and always (56.3%) by the victimized sample. 
The pre-hiring background checks on potential volunteers was conducted never 
(69.2%) and always conducted (15.4%) by a higher percentage of the victimized sample 
compared to never conducted (58.6%) and always conducted (14.9%) conducted by the 
non-victimized sample. However, the pre-hiring background checks on potential 
volunteers was conducted sometimes (18.4%) and most of the time (8.0%) at a higher 
percentage by the non-victimized sample compared to the conducted sometimes (7.7%) 
and conducted most of the time (7.7%) by the victimized sample. 
The last category of social guardianship produced the following findings that 
provide an insight into how place managers might conceptualize specific improvements 
to the level of security of the artwork at their respective museum or gallery. First, a 
higher percentage of the non-victimized sample only believed that modern security 
equipment (54.3%) would improve the level of security of the artwork at their 
museum/gallery compared to the victimized sample who only believed that modern 





museum/gallery. Conversely, a higher percentage of the victimized sample believed that 
a larger budget (82.4%), more security personnel (64.7%), improved staff training 
(58.8%), and other improvements (17.6%) would improve the level of security of the 
artwork at their museum/gallery compared to the non-victimized sample who believed 
that a larger budget (75.5%), more security personnel (57.4%) improved staff training 
(58.5%), and other improvements (5.3%) would improve the level of security of the 
artwork at their museum/gallery. Interestingly, a higher percentage of the victimized 
sample did not believe that modern security equipment was necessary to improve the 
level of the security of the artwork at their separate museums or galleries when this 
security measure is noted by many museums and galleries as a desired upgrade within 
their security departments. 
Physical guardianship measures categorized as target hardening variables were 
examined next. Door alarms (86.2%), window alarms (44.7%), motion detectors (73.4%), 
CCTV (52.1%), individual object alarms (18.1%), vitrines (72.3%), low lying barriers in 
front of artworks (40.9%), and ropes and stanchions (42.6%) were utilized by a higher 
percentage of the non-victimized sample compared to the utilization of door alarms 
(76.5%), window alarms (35.3%), motion detectors (58.8%), CCTV (35.3%), individual 
object alarms (5.9%), vitrines (64.7%), low lying barriers in front of artworks (17.6%), 
and ropes and stanchions (41.2%) by the victimized sample. Conversely, glazing on some 
pictures (58.8%), glazing on all pictures (5.9%), other types of security systems (11.8%), 
and other types of physical barriers (11.8%) were utilized by a higher percentage of the 





glazing on all pictures (5.3%), other types of security systems (7.4%), and other types of 
physical barriers (9.6%) by the non-victimized sample. 
The findings from the examination of the last group of physical guardianship 
variables reveal that bag and package inspections (11.8%) were conducted by the 
victimized sample at a higher percentage compared to the conduction of bag and package 
inspection (10.6%) by the non-victimized sample.  However, the existence of some sort 
of policy requiring oversized bag storage (61.7%) and the requirement of ID badges for 
staff and volunteers (44.7%) was present at a higher percentage of the non-victimized 
sample compared to the existence of some sort of policy requiring oversized bag storage 
(41.2%) and the requirement of ID badges for staff and volunteers (35.3%) present at the 












Table 7.5.  Descriptive Statistics of Museums/Galleries that were Victimized by Art Theft Compared 
with Museums/Galleries that were not Victimized by Art Theft, Categorical Variables 
  
Stolen from                                  
 (17 museums/galleries)  
Not stolen from                            
 (94 museums/galleries) 
  N % N % 
Social Guardianship Measures 
    
Place Manager Activities-Training 
    
 
SS training in identification of  
suspicious objects 
    
Yes 2 11.8% 22 23.4% 
No 15 88.2% 72 76.6% 
SS training in intruder detection  
systems     
Yes 2 11.8% 25 26.6% 
No 15 88.2% 69 73.4% 
SS training in safety of artworks  
    
Yes 3 17.6% 32 34.0% 
No 14 82.4% 62 66.0% 
SS training in greeting & visitor 
reception      
Yes 4 23.5% 32 34.0% 








SS training in CCTV  
management     
Yes 2 11.8% 25 26.6% 
No 15 88.2% 69 73.4% 
MS training in suspicious objects 
    
Yes 4 23.5% 22 23.4% 
No 13 76.5% 72 76.6% 
MS training in intruder detection  
systems     
Yes 6 35.3% 38 40.4% 
No 11 64.7% 56 59.6% 
MS training in safety of artworks 
    
Yes 15 88.2% 80 85.1% 
No 2 11.8% 14 14.9% 
MS training in greeting & visitor  
reception     
Yes 14 82.4% 75 79.8% 
No 3 17.60% 19 20.2% 
MS training in CCTV management 
    
Yes 5 29.4% 24 25.50% 
No 12 70.6% 70 74.5% 
VS training in suspicious objects 
    
Yes 2 11.8% 7 7.4% 
No 15 88.2% 87 92.6% 
VS training in intruder detection  
systems     
Yes 2 11.8% 15 16.0% 
No 15 88.2% 79 84.0% 
VS training in safety of artworks 
    








No 4 23.5% 34 36.2% 
VS training in greeting & visitor  
reception     
Yes 11 64.7% 62 66.0% 
No 6 35.3% 32 34.0% 
     
Place Manager Activities-Due Diligence   
   
Inventory works on view 
    
Less than once a year 1 6.3% 0 0.0% 
Once a year  5 31.3% 20 23.5% 
Every 6 months 1 6.3% 3 3.5% 
Every 3 months 1 6.3% 6 7.1% 
Monthly 2 12.5% 11 12.9% 
Weekly/More frequently 3 18.8% 14 16.5% 
Daily 3 18.8% 31 36.5% 
Pre-hiring Background checks on  
potential employees 
  
   
Never 4 25.0% 17 19.3% 
Sometimes 1 6.3% 9 10.2% 
Most of the time 2 12.5% 7 8.0% 
Always 9 56.3% 56 62.5% 
Pre-hiring Background checks on  
potential volunteers 
  
   
Never 9 69.2% 51 58.6% 
Sometimes 1 7.7% 16 18.4% 
Most of the time 1 7.7% 7 8.0% 
Always 2 15.4% 13 14.9% 
     Place Manager Perceived Improvements 








Would a larger budget improve level  
of security?     
Yes 14 82.4% 71 75.5% 
No 3 17.6% 23 24.5% 
Would more security personnel  
improve level of security?     
Yes 11 64.7% 54 57.4% 
No 6 35.3% 40 42.6% 
Would improved staff training  
improve level of security?     
Yes 10 58.8% 55 58.5% 
No 7 41.2% 39 41.5% 
Would modern security equipment  
improve level of security?     
Yes 9 52.9% 51 54.3% 
No 8 47.1% 43 45.7% 
Other improvements? 
    
Yes 3 17.6% 5 5.3% 
No 14 82.4% 89 94.7% 
     
Physical Guardianship 
    
Target Hardening Devices & Mechanisms 
    
Door alarms  
    
Yes 13 76.5% 81 86.2% 
No 4 23.5% 13 13.8% 
Window alarms  
    
Yes 6 35.3% 42 44.7% 
No 11 64.7% 52 55.3% 
Motion detectors  








Yes 10 58.8% 69 73.4% 
No 7 41.2% 25 26.6% 
CCTV  
    
Yes 6 35.3% 49 52.1% 
No 11 64.7% 45 47.9% 
Individual object alarms  
    
Yes 1 5.9% 17 18.1% 
No 16 94.1% 77 81.9% 
Glazing on some pictures 
    
Yes 10 58.8% 48 51.1% 
No 7 41.2% 46 48.9% 
Glazing on all pictures 
    
Yes 1 5.9% 5 5.3% 
No 16 94.1% 89 94.7% 
Vitrines  
    
Yes 11 64.7% 68 72.3% 
No 6 35.3% 26 27.7% 
Barriers in front of artworks  
    
Yes 3 17.6% 38 40.9% 
No 14 82.4% 55 59.1% 
Ropes and stanchions  
    
Yes 7 41.2% 40 42.6% 
No 10 58.8% 54 57.4% 
Other type of security systems   
   
Yes 2 11.8% 7 7.4% 
No 15 88.2% 87 92.6% 
Other type of physical barriers   
   
Yes 2 11.8% 9 9.6% 
No 15 88.2% 85 90.4% 








Preventative Physical Guardianship 
Actions     
Bag/package inspections 
    
Conducted 2 11.8% 10 10.6% 
Not conducted 15 88.2% 84 89.4% 
Oversized bag storage 
    
Other than yes 7 41.2% 58 61.7% 
No 10 58.8% 36 38.3% 
ID badges required for staff and  
volunteers     
ID Badges required 6 35.3% 42 44.7% 





Bivariate Binary Logistic Regression 
Due to the abundance of variables in this study, the most efficient analytical 
approach chosen to utilize all the measures from the preceding analyses as well as to 
indicate the strongest relationship and the direction of the relationship between each 
continuous or categorical independent variable and dichotomous dependent variable, was 
bivariate binary logistic regression.  
First, it should be noted that even though social scientists traditionally set alpha at 
0.05, given the small sample size, a decision was made to relax alpha to 0.10 to produce a 
viable number of variables for inclusion in the multivariate analysis. Admittedly, 
declaring alpha at 0.10 increases the likelihood of a type I error. Although, this approach 
may be regarded as somewhat risky due to the above-mentioned reason (Chapman & 
Hartley, 2010; Walker & Madden, 2013), the researchers chose to analytically venture in 
this direction for a variety of reasons. First, this study was handicapped at its onset by the 
inherent culture of non-disclosure within the art world. Secondly, this is primarily an 
exploratory study and is the first study in the United States to examine concurrently 
incidences of art theft, art vandalism, and security practices at art galleries and museums. 
As such, extending the parameter of the alpha value in order to create a baseline of 
knowledge for other researchers to expand upon who are fortunate to acquire a larger 
sample size and more statistical power that might indeed show that theoretically measures 
are associated with art theft and art vandalism seemed reasonable. In fact, Cohen (1992) 
acknowledges that it is acceptable in exploratory studies to relax alpha to 0.10 due to the 
“less rigorous standard for rejection that is desired” (p. 156). Last, even though a scant 





vandalism, or museum security (Burnham, 1978; Cordess & Turcan, 1993; Ho, 1992; 
Scott, 2009; Wilemse & Etman, 1995) with a more substantial response rate than the 
current study, this dissertation offers a rare glimpse into the reticent art industry. So much 
so that after disclosing to several industry professionals the existence of this study, the 
standard expectation was that no art museum or gallery would respond to the survey 
form.  
Additionally, as noted in chapter six, the four demographic variables were 
transformed for ease of interpretation at this phase of analysis. Specifically, “population 
of institution’s city” was divided by 10,000, “volunteer hours” was divided by 100, 
“operating budget” was divided by 10,000, and square feet of museum/gallery” was 
divided by 1,000.  
 
Art Vandalism 
The results from the bivariate logistic regression analysis of the “yes art 
vandalism incidence(s)” dependent variable with the myriad of independent variables is 
reported in Table 7.6. 
The variables that were not significant predictors of art vandalism included the 
population of an institution’s city, annual operating budget, square feet of 
museum/gallery, number of non-security employees, number of volunteers, number of 
visitors, number of full-time security guards, number of part-time security guards, 
number of full-time or part-time security guards stationary at a museum/gallery’s 
entrance, number of full-time or part-time security guards who man a security station, 





training in identification of suspicious objects, museum/gallery staff training in intruder 
detection systems, museum/gallery staff training in safety of artworks, museum/gallery 
staff training in greeting and visitor reception, museum/gallery staff training in CCTV 
management, volunteer staff training in identification of suspicious objects, volunteer 
staff training in intruder detection systems, volunteer staff training in safety of artworks, 
pre-hiring background checks on potential employees. pre-hiring background checks on 
potential volunteers, square footage of roving, number of designated security posts, how 
often surveillance rounds are made, would a larger budget improve level of security, 
would more security personnel improve level of security, would improve staff training 
improve level of security, would modern security equipment improve level of security, 
other improvements to improve level of security, door alarms, window alarms, motion 
detectors, CCTV, individual objects alarms, other types of security systems, glazing on 
all pictures, vitrines, low lying barriers in front of artworks, ropes and stanchions, other 
types of physical barriers, bag/package inspections, oversized bag storage, and ID badges 
required for staff and volunteers.  
The variables that were significant predictors of art vandalism included full-time 
and part-time roving security guards, full-time and part-time guards employed by a 
museum or gallery for at least five years, security staff training in intruder detection 
systems, security staff training in safety of artworks, security staff training in visitor 
reception and greeting, security staff training in CCTV maintenance, volunteer staff 
training in visitor reception and greeting, and inventory of works on view. The variables 
that were marginally significant predictors of art vandalism included glazing on some 





Specifically, each one unit increase in the number of full-time or part-time roving 
security guards was associated with a 16.0% increase in the odds of art vandalism 
victimization. Each additional security guard employed by a museum or gallery for at 
least 5 years was associated with an 8.1% increase in the odds of art vandalism 
victimization. Compared to museums and galleries that do not train their security staff in 
intruder and detection systems, the odds of art vandalism victimization was 170.0% 
higher for museums and galleries that train their security staff in intruder detection 
systems. Compared to museums and galleries that do not train their security staff in 
safety of artworks, the odds of art vandalism victimization was 294.0% higher for 
museums and galleries that train their security staff in safety of artworks. Compared to 
museums and galleries that do not train their security staff in greeting and visitor 
reception protocols, the odds of art vandalism victimization was 197.0% higher for 
museums and galleries that train their security staff in greeting and visitor reception 
protocols. Compared to museums and galleries that do not train their security staff in 
CCTV management, the odds of art vandalism victimization was 171.0% higher for 
museums and galleries that train their security staff in CCTV management. Compared to 
museums and galleries that do not train their volunteers in greeting and visitor reception 
protocols, the odds of art vandalism victimization was 75.7% lower for museums and 
galleries that train their volunteers in visitor greeting and reception protocols. Each one 
unit increase in the frequency of inventorying works on view by a museum or gallery was 
associated with a 23.2% decrease in the odds of art vandalism victimization. Compared to 
museums and galleries that do not utilize glazing on some of their pictures, the odds of 





glazing on some of their pictures. Lastly, each 100 hour increase in the number of 







Table 7.6.  Bivariate Binary Logistic Regression Comparison of Museums/Galleries that were 
Victimized by Art Vandalism Compared with Museums/Galleries that were not Victimized by Art 
Vandalism 
Measures  B Exp(B) p-value 
Demographic/Control Variables 
   
Population of institution’s city -0.003 0.997 0.474 
Number of volunteer hours 0.011 1.001 0.082 
Operating budget 0.001 1.001 0.132 
Square feet of museum/gallery 0.005 1.005 0.164 
    
Social Guardianship Measures 
   
Place Managers-Non-Security 
   
# of non-security  
employees 
0.003 1.003 0.498 
# of volunteers 0.003 1.003 0.228 
# of visitors 0.000 1.000 0.200 
    
Place Managers-Security Guards 
   
# of full time security guards 0.003 1.000 0.797 
# of part- time security guards 0.018 1.018 0.656 
# of FT or PT roving security  
guards 
0.152 1.160  0.038* 
# of FT or PT guards stationary at  
entrance 
0.045 1.046 0.722 
# of FT or PT guards who man a  
security station 
0.104 1.110 0.521 
# of FT and PT guards employed 5  
years ago 
0.078 1.081 0.038* 
    
Place Manager Activities-Training 
   
SS training in identification of  
suspicious objects 
 





SS training in intruder detection  
systems 
0.995 2.700 0.042* 
SS training in safety of artworks 1.370 3.940 0.004* 
SS training in greeting &  
visitor reception 
1.090 2.970 0.020* 
SS training in CCTV  
management 
0.995 2.710 0.042* 
    MS training in suspicious  
   objects 
0.041 1.040 0.938 
MS training in intruder detection  
systems 
-4.250 0.654 0.377 
MS training in safety of artworks 0.805 2.240 0.310 
MS training in greeting &  
visitor reception 
-0.610 0.543 0.248 
MS training in CCTV management -0.766 0.465 0.198 
VS training in suspicious  
objects 
1.130 3.090 0.115 
VS training in intruder detection  
systems 
-0.170 0.182 0.108 
VS training in safety of artworks -0.756 0.469 0.103 
VS training in greeting &  
visitor reception 
-1.410 0.243  0.003* 
    
Place Manager Activities-Due Diligence 
   
Inventory works on view -0.264 0.768 0.027* 
Pre-hiring Background  
checks on potential employees 
0.013 1.010 0.947 
Pre-hiring Background  
checks on potential volunteers 
0.206 1.229 0.340 
    
Security Guard Related Practices 
   
Square footage of roving 0.000 1.000 0.673 
Number of designated  
security posts 
0.028 1.029 0.341 
How often surveillance  
rounds are made 
0.049 1.050 0.111 
 
   
Place Manager Perceived Improvements 
   
Would a larger budget  
improve level of security? 
-0.041 0.960 0.938 
Would more security  
personnel improve level of  
security? 





Would improved staff  
training improve level of  
security? 
-0.345 0.708 0.451 
Would modern security  
equipment improve level  
of security? 
-0.522 0.593 0.254 
Other improvements? 
 
0.793 2.210 0.303 
    
Physical Guardianship 
   
Target Hardening Devices & Mechanisms 
   
Door alarms           -0.067 0.935 0.914 
Window alarms 0.666 1.950 0.147 
Motion detectors  0.052 1.050 0.917 
CCTV  0.334 1.397 0.465 
Individual object alarms  -0.021 0.980 0.973 
Glazing on some pictures 0.847 2.330 0.078 
Glazing on all pictures -0.393 0.675 0.726 
Vitrines   0.316 1.372 0.546 
Low lying barriers in front of  
artworks 
 0.012 1.012 0.979 
Ropes and stanchions   0.715 2.040 0.120 
Other type of security systems  -0.019 0.981 0.982 
    Other type of physical barriers           -0.296          0.744        0.717 
    
Preventative Physical Guardianship Actions 
   
Bag/package inspections 0.619 1.860 0.348 
Oversized bag storage 0.077 1.080 0.868 
ID badges required for  
Staff and volunteers 
-0.172 0.842 0.710 
*significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 











The results from the bivariate analysis of the “yes art theft incidence(s)” 
dependent variable with the myriad of independent variables are reported in Table 7. 
The variables that were not significant predictors of art theft included the 
population of an institution’s city, number of volunteers hours, annual operating budget, 
square feet of museum/gallery, number of non-security employees, number of volunteers, 
number of visitors, number of full-time security guards, number of part-time security 
guards, number of full-time and part-time roving security guards, number of full-time or 
part-time security guards stationary at a museum/gallery’s entrance, number of full-time 
or part-time security guards who man a security station, number of full-time and part time 
guards employed by a museum or gallery for at least five years, security staff training in 
identification of suspicious objects, security staff training in intruder detection systems, 
security staff training in safety of artworks, security staff training in greeting and visitor 
reception, security staff training in CCTV management, museum/gallery staff training in 
identification of suspicious objects, museum/gallery staff training in intruder detection 
systems, museum/gallery staff training in safety of artworks, museum/gallery staff 
training in greeting and visitor reception, museum/gallery staff training in CCTV 
management, volunteer staff training in identification of suspicious objects, volunteer 
staff training in intruder detection systems, volunteer staff training in safety of artworks, 
volunteer staff training in visitor reception and greeting, inventory of works on view, pre-
hiring background checks on potential employees. pre-hiring background checks on 
potential volunteers, square footage of roving, number of designated security posts, how 





would more security personnel improve level of security, would improved staff training 
improve level of security, would modern security equipment improve level of security, 
door alarms, window alarms, motion detectors, CCTV, individual objects alarms, other 
types of security systems, glazing on some pictures, glazing on all pictures, vitrines, 
ropes and stanchions, other types of physical barriers, bag/package inspections, oversized 
bag storage, and ID badges required for staff and volunteers.  
There were no variables that were significant predictors of art theft. However, the 
variables that were marginally significant predictors of art theft included “other 
improvements” that would improve the level of security of works of art and low-lying 
barriers in front of artworks. 
 Specifically, compared to museums and galleries that do not report that “other 
improvements” would improve the level of security of their artworks, the odds of art 
theft victimization was 281.0% higher for museums and galleries that do report that 
“other improvements” would improve the level of security of their artworks. Conversely, 
compared to museums and galleries that do not utilize low lying barriers in front of their 
art works, the odds of art theft victimization was 69.0% lower for museums and galleries 
that utilize low lying barriers in front of their artworks.  
 
Table 7.7. Bivariate Binary Logistic Regression Comparison of Museums/Galleries 
that were Victimized by Art Theft Compared with Museums/Galleries that were not 
Victimized by Art Theft 
 Measures B Exp(B) p-value 
Demographic/Control Variables 
   
Population of institution’s city          -0.001 0.999 0.887 
Number of volunteer hours          -0.004 0.996 0.639 





Square feet of museum/gallery          -0.008 0.992 0.392 
    
Social Guardianship Measures 
   
Place Managers-Non-Security 
   
# of non-security employees          -0.010 0.990 0.523 
# of volunteers 0.000 1.000 0.987 
# of visitors 0.000 1.000 0.550 
    
Place Mangers-Security Guards 
   
# of full time security guards           -0.212 0.809 0.382 
# of part- time security guards           -0.141 0.868 0.215 
# of FT or PT roving security  
guards 
         -0.332 0.717 0.130 
# of FT or PT guards stationary  
at entrance 
          -0.538 0.584 0.227 
# of FT or PT guards who man a  
security station 
          -0.211 0.810 0.514 
# of FT and PT guards employed  
5 years ago 
 -0.137 0.872 0.244 
    
Place Manager Activities-Training 
   
SS training in identification of  
suspicious objects 
 -0.829 0.436 0.295 
SS training in intruder detection  
systems 
-1.000 0.368 0.205 
SS training in safety of artworks   -0.879 0.415 0.191 
SS training in greeting & visitor  
reception 
 -0.517 0.596 0.398 
SS training in CCTV  
management 
-1.000 0.368 0.205 
MS training in suspicious objects 0.007 1.010 0.991 
MS training in intruder detection  
systems 
          -0.218 0.804 0.691 
MS training in safety of artworks 0.272 1.310 0.736 
MS training in greeting & visitor  
reception 
0.167 1.180 0.807 
MS training in CCTV  
management 
0.195 1.220 0.738 
VS training in suspicious objects 0.505 1.660 0.552 
VS training in intruder detection  
systems 
-0.354 0.702 0.660 





VS training in greeting & visitor  
reception 
-0.055 0.946 0.920 
    
Place Manager Activities-Due Diligence 
   
Inventory works on view          -0.202 0.817 0.126 
Pre-hiring Background checks on  
potential employees 
         -0.088 0.916 0.683 
Pre-hiring Background checks on  
potential volunteers 
          -0.085 0.918 0.760 
    
Security Guard Related Practices 
   
Square footage of roving 0.000 1.000 0.358 
Number of designated security  
posts 
         -0.362 0.696 0.228 
How often surveillance rounds  
are made 
         -0.033 0.968 0.500 
 
   
Place Manager Perceived Improvements 
   
Would a larger budget improve  
level of security? 
0.413 1.510 0.543 
Would more security personnel  
improve level of security? 
0.306 1.360 0.577 
Would improved staff training  
improve level of security? 
0.013 1.010 0.981 
Would modern security  
equipment improve level of  
security? 
-0.053 0.949 0.920 
Other improvements? 1.340 3.810 0.088 
    
Physical Guardianship 
   
Target Hardening Devices & 
Mechanisms    
Door alarms           -0.651 0.522 0.313 
Window alarms           -0.393 0.675 0.474 
Motion detectors           -0.659 0.518 0.227 
CCTV           -0.691 0.501 0.207 
Individual object alarms           -1.262 0.283 0.236 
Glazing on some pictures 0.314 1.370 0.557 





Vitrines            -0.355 0.701 0.524 
Low lying barriers in front of artworks  -1.171 0.310   0.081 
Ropes and stanchions  0.057 0.945 0.916 
Other type of security systems 0.505 1.657 0.552 
Other type of physical barriers 0.231 1.259 0.781 
    
Preventative Physical Guardianship 
Actions    
Bag/package inspections 0.113 1.120 0.891 
Oversized bag storage          -0.834 0.434 0.120 
ID badges required for staff and  
volunteers 
          -0.393 0.675 0.474 
marginally significant at the 0.100 level (2-tailed) 
 
Multivariate Logistic Regression 
Multivariate binary logistic regression was the last form of analysis conducted. At 
this phase of analysis, it was noted that missing values existed for four of the twelve 
variables (number of volunteer hours, number of part-time and full-time guards employed 
for at least five years, inventorying works on view, and low-lying barriers in front of 
artworks) that were determined to be significant or marginally significant after the 
bivariate logistic regression analysis was completed. The number of missing cases ranged 
from 1 to 15.  The remedy to the problem of missing values without sacrificing the 
number of cases originally selected for analysis was to utilize single mean/mode 
imputation. Mean/mode imputation or substitution is to replace each missing value within 
a given variable with the mean or mode of the reported values within the dataset (Allison, 
2002; Little & Rubin, 2002; Pigott, 2000). Admittedly, according to Allison (2002), “this 
method is well known to produce biased estimates of variances and covariances” (p. 11). 
However, when the bivariate logistic regression analysis was conducted with and 





that the mean imputation did not influence the results in a harmful way. The variables 
that were significant without mean imputation were also significant with the mean 
imputation. This finding also applied to the entire set of 18 variables that contained 
missing cases during the bivariate analysis phase. Within the multivariate phase of 
analysis, two separate binary logistic regression models were produced; one for art 
vandalism and another for art theft.  
 
Art Vandalism Model 
In order to investigate whether the ten variables that were either significant or 
marginally significant from the bivariate logistic regression analysis were viable for 
utilization within a full multivariate logistic regression model, VIF tests were first 
conducted to detect any multicollinearity issues. After this step was completed, only one 
variable (security staff training in safety of artwork) had a VIF coefficient higher than 5.  
This variable was consequently discarded from any further analysis due to potential 
issues with correlations with other predictor variables. A Standardized Pearson Residual 
test for outliers was conducted next. The initial results indicated that three cases were 
identified as outliers due to their Standardized Pearson Residual values exceeding 2.565. 
Two variables revealed significant p-values, inventory of works on view (p=.029) and 
volunteer training in greeting and visitor reception (p=.033).  The log odds coefficients 
(B) of each variable was -0.325 and -1.170 respectively when a baseline analysis for 
outliers was conducted.  
In order to determine how much these outlier cases exerted any influence on the 





additional significant variable, glazing on some pictures (p=.031), with a log odds 
coefficient of 1.554.  The p-values of the two variables that were significant prior to 
removal of the outliers retained their significance. However, the p-value of inventory 
works of view was reduced by 0.023 to 0.006 and the p-value of volunteer training in 
greeting and visitor reception was reduced by 0.021 to 0.012. The reduction of the p-
value of both of these variables were subjectively considered a substantial change in 
significance value. The logs odds coefficients of the two variables that were significant 
before and after the outliers were removed also both decreased. The log odds coefficient 
of inventory of works on view was reduced by 0.166 to -0.491and this was considered a 
substantial change. Additionally, the log odds coefficient of volunteer training in greeting 
and visitor reception was also subjectively considered a substantial change since it 
decreased by 0.387 to -1.557. In conclusion, the outlier cases were determined to have a 
substantial influence on the regression model. However, due to the small sample size, the 
decision was made not to remove or transform any of the three outlier cases. This 
decision was further supported when the standardized deviance residuals were examined, 
and no outliers were detected.  
A full logistic regression model was then produced with the nine significant 
and/or marginally significant variables. It should be noted that the number of volunteer 
hours, that had been designated as a control variable, served as a proxy for size of the 
museums. The results are reported in Table 7.8.  
The full model contained nine independent variables: full time and part-time 
roving security guards, full-time and part-time guards employed by a museum or gallery 





training in visitor reception and greeting, security staff training in CCTV maintenance, 
volunteer staff training in visitor reception and greeting, inventory of works on view, 
glazing on some paintings, and number of volunteer hours. 
The model as a whole explained 27.5% (Nagelkerke R squared) of the variance in 
art vandalism victimization. As shown in Table 8, only two of the independent variables 
made a unique statistically significant contribution to the model (volunteer staff training 
in visitor greeting and reception and inventory of works on view). Specifically, compared 
to museums and galleries that do not train their volunteers in greeting and visitor 
reception protocol, the odds of vandalism victimization was 69.0% lower for museums 
and galleries that train their volunteers in greeting and visitor reception protocols. Lastly, 
each one unit increase in the frequency of inventorying works on view by a museum or 
gallery was associated with a 27.8% decrease in the odds of art vandalism victimization. 
 
 
Table 7.8. Logistic Regression Analysis for Art Vandalism-Full Model (N=111) 
Measures B SE Sig. Exp(b)   VIF 
1.  Number of PT or FT Roving Security Guards -.022 .133 .871 .979 2.80
7 
2.  Security Guards Employed For At Least 5 Years .041 .063 .519 1.042 2.64
1 
3.  SS Training In Intruder Detection Systems -.104 .967 .914 .901 3.71
6 
4.  SS Training In Greeting & Visitor Reception .488 .955 .610 1.629 3.68
1 
5.  SS Training in CCTV Management .165 1.059 .876 1.180 4.11
7 
6.   VS Training in Greeting & Visitor Reception -1.170 .550 .033* .310 1.17
5 
7.   Inventory Works On View -.325 .149 .029* .722 1.17
9 
8.   Glazing On Some Pictures .952 .597 .111 2.590 1.19
3 
9.   Number of Volunteer Hours .008 .008 .335 1.008 1.44
9 





Nagelkerke R² .275     
*p>.05      
 
In order to develop a parsimonious model that presents the best fit of the data, the 
variables with the highest p-values were systematically removed one at a time until a 
parsimonious model was achieved. The results are reported in Table 7.9.  
The parsimonious model contained three significant theoretical independent 
variables: volunteer staff training in greeting and visitor reception, inventory of works on 
view, glazing on some pictures, and one significant control variable, number of volunteer 
hours.  The model as a whole explained 25.4% (Nagelkerke R squared) of the variance in 
vandalism victimization. As shown in Table 9, the two variables that predicted the 
reduction in the odds of art vandalism victimization were once again volunteer staff 
training in greeting and visitor reception and inventory works on view. Specifically, 
compared to museums and galleries that do not train their volunteers in visitor greeting 
and reception protocol, the odds of art vandalism victimization was 72.8% lower for 
museums and galleries that train their volunteers in visitor greeting and reception 
protocols. Additionally, each one unit increase in the frequency of inventorying works on 
view by a museum or gallery was associated with a 25.5% decrease in the odds of art 
vandalism victimization. 
The remaining theoretical independent variable, the utilization of glazing on some 
pictures predicted an increase in the odds of art vandalism victimization. Specifically, 
compared to museums and galleries that do not utilize glazing on some of their pictures, 





that utilize glazing on some of their pictures. Lastly, the significant control variable, 
number of volunteer hours, enhanced the precision of the regression model. 
 
Table 7.9. Logistic Regression Analysis for Art Vandalism-Parsimonious Model 
(N=111) 
Measures B SE Sig. Exp(b)   VIF 
1.  VS Training in Greeting & Visitor Reception -1.302 .528 .014* .272 1.101 
2.  Inventory Works On View -.294 .142 .038* .745 1.143 
3.  Glazing On Some Pictures 1.112 .566 .046* 3.041 1.079 
4.  Number of Volunteer Hours .013 .006 .042* 1.013 1.029 
Model chi-square 20.273**     
Nagelkerke R² .254     
*p>.05, **p>.000      
 
Art Theft Model 
The results of the analysis of the art theft model are reported in Table 7.10. 
Similar to the preparation of the full art vandalism model, a VIF test was conducted in 
order to determine whether there were any issues with multicollinearity with the two 
variables (low lying barriers in front of artworks and “other improvements” that would 
improve the level of security of works of art) that were determined to be marginally 
significant after the bivariate binary logistic regression analysis was conducted. No VIF 
coefficient exceeded 5. In fact, no coefficient was larger than 1.006.  
The Standardized Pearson Residual test for outliers was conducted next. The 
results indicated that five cases had outliers with Standardized Pearson Residual values 
that exceeded 2.565. Once again, both variables that were found to be marginally 





significant p-values: low lying barriers in front of artworks (p=.062) and “other 
improvements” that would improve the level of security of works of art (p=.056).  The 
log odds coefficients (B) of each variable was -1.304 and 1.60 respectively when a 
baseline analysis of outliers for the theft model was conducted.   
In order to determine how much these outlier cases exerted influence on the 
regression model, the outliers were removed. After the removal of the outliers only one 
variable, “other improvements” that would improve the level of security of works of art, 
retained any form of significance. Furthermore, this variable’s p-value was reduced by 
0.011 to 0.045, which is subjectively considered a small difference. However, this 
variable became significant rather than merely marginally significant. The variable’s log 
odds ratio was increased by 0.81 to 1.681; which is subjectively considered a small 
increase in value. The p-value of low-lying barriers in front of artworks was increased by 
.039 to .101. This difference is a substantial increase and consequently the variable lost 
its marginally significant classification. The log odds coefficient of this variable 
decreased by 0.138 to -1.168 which is a substantial decrease in value.  In conclusion, the 
outlier cases were determined to have a substantial influence on the regression model. 
However, due to the small sample size, the decision was made not to remove or transform 
any of the five outlier cases. This decision was further supported when the standardized 
deviance residuals were examined and no outliers were detected.  
Pursuant to the production of only two variables with marginal significance 
during the bivariate logistic regression analysis stage, the full model at the multivariate 
level only contained marginally significant independent variables: low-lying barriers in 





works of art.  The model, as a whole, explained 10.4% (Nagelkerke R squared) of the 
variance in reducing art theft. 
As shown in table 10, the variable low-lying barriers in front of art works 
predicted a reduction in the odds art theft while “other improvements” that would 
improve the level of security of works of art predicted an increase in the odds of art theft. 
Specifically, compared to museums and galleries that do not utilize low-lying barriers in 
front of their art works, the odds of art theft victimization was 72.9% lower for museums 
and galleries that utilize low-lying barriers in front of their artworks. Conversely, 
compared to museums and galleries that do not report that “other improvements” would 
improve the level of security of their artworks, the odds of art theft victimization was 
395.1% higher for museums and galleries that do report that “other improvements” would 
improve the level of security of their artworks. No further analysis on this model was 
necessary since the full model was also representative of the parsimonious model.  
 
Table 7.10. Logistic Regression Analysis for Art Theft Model (N=111) 
Measures B SE Sig. Exp(b)   VIF 
1.  Other Improvements In Level Of Security 1.600 .838 .056 4.951 1.006 
2.  Low Lying Barriers In Front Of Artworks -1.034 .698 .062 .271 1.006 
Model chi-square 6.833*     
Nagelkerke R² .104     
p>.10, *p>.05      
 
In conclusion, the analysis of the data yielded findings that did not support any of 
the three hypotheses that were formulated in chapter four. Specifically, the hypothesis 





and art vandalism victimization, the hypothesis that the social guardianship measures will 
reduce the odds of art theft at higher rates than physical guardianship measures, or the 
hypothesis that the social guardianship measures will reduce the odds of art vandalism at 
higher rates than physical guardianship measures were not proven to be valid within the 
current scholarly exploration.  Additionally, the wide disparity of results of this analysis 
at the bivariate descriptive stage, much like the art world, lead to further questions due to 
lack of consistency and transparency and the general lack of significant variables within 
the bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses makes it difficult to arrive at definitive 
and cohesive conclusions. 
However, the lack of significant findings, despite the rigorous analysis, is just as 
insightful within the context of the murky, elusive art world as the dearth of definitive 
outcomes in the scholarly literature. Furthermore, despite the numerous limitations within 
this study, these results provide a baseline for future researchers from museology, 
criminology, sociology, art history, archeology, and the legal arena to build upon. The 
next chapter will discuss the conclusions in detail and how the results could influence 
cohesion, transparency of information, and regulation within the art world in order to 
reduce crime; as well as what forms of guardianship would be effective measures in 
which to achieve this goal. The limitations of this study and potential next steps for 












DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND NEXT STEPS 
 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to explore the prevalence of art vandalism and art 
theft, as well as the guardianship measures utilized within American art museums and art 
galleries. Various social and physical guardianship measures of Cohen and Felson’s 
(1979) Routine Activities Theory’s guardianship component that represented the culture 
and functioning of art institutions were analyzed on a univariate, bivariate, and 
multivariate quantitative statistical level. In general, none of the three hypotheses 
asserting that both social guardianship and physical guardianship measures would reduce 
the odds of art vandalism and art theft victimization were supported by the data analysis. 
However, in rare empirical instances, both types of the above mentioned theoretical 
constructs of guardianship produced findings of reduction of each form of victimization, 
but not simultaneously.  
 
Univariate Descriptive Statistics 
The discussion of the entire body of analysis will commence with the 
interpretation of the results of the univariate examination of demographic variables. 





are located within modest geographical areas, within structures composed of a finite 
amount of square footage, function with challenging annual operating budgets, employ a 
limited number of staff (measured by part-time and full-time security staff combined with 
non-security staff), maintain a moderate number of volunteers, but benefit from an 
average of less than ideal annual volunteer hours. Specifically, approximately 80% of the 
sample is located within a town or city with 300,000 or fewer residents, receive no more 
than 3,000 donated volunteer hours and have 83 or fewer volunteers, run their institutions 
with an operating budget of $1,000,000.00 or less and have no more than 17 employees, 
and occupy a facility that is 36,000-square feet or less.  
 
Non-theoretical Measures 
Additionally, within the univariate descriptive statistical analysis, the 
characteristics of the sample that warrant further discussion are first the findings 
depicting the non-theoretical measures of the exact number of theft/vandalism incidences, 
the types of objects stolen/vandalized, the perpetrator, the location of perpetration, and 
the recovery of any stolen objects. Furthermore, the variables relating to the reporting and 
non-reporting of victimization (excluding employee theft and vandalism) will be 
elaborated upon.  
First, even though the dependent variables in this study were whether or not a 
museum or gallery had experienced at least one incidence of art vandalism or art theft 
victimization, the precise number of incidences were also documented. The total number 
of incidences of art vandalism within the sample was 56 compared to 39 incidences of art 





number of objects vandalized and/or stolen was exactly 58 each, which yields a total of 
116 objects which were subjected to one of the two forms of art crimes under 
investigation in the current study. In terms of vandalism, the types of objects most 
frequently intentionally harmed were large sculptures (25.9%), outdoor sculptures 
(22.4%), and decorative art objects (17.2%).  Similar to Scott’s (2009) vandalism study, 
the categories of objects most frequently harmed were also paintings and sculptures 
which comprised 66% of the works vandalized. In terms of objects that were stolen in the 
current study, the top three categories of objects were large sculptures (19.0%), 
decorative art objects (17.2%), and other objects (15.5%). Surprisingly, compared to 
other studies (Aarons, 2001; Barelli, 1986; Benson, 2013; Burmon, 2017; Burnham, 
1978; Ho, 1994) and data collected from professional agencies such as the Art Loss 
Register (ALR) and the FBI’s National Stolen Art File (NSAF), paintings were not one of 
the top three forms of objects stolen in this study. Sculptures were the only top category 
of art object stolen in the current work, which aligned consistently with prior data 
collected. As noted in chapter two, the FBI’s NSAF only collects data for objects with a 
minimum value of $2,000.00, have historical value, or are uniquely identifiable. 
Therefore, the data compiled in the NSAF may have more select criteria compared to 
reported theft of art by the respondents in the current study and comparable studies.  
The recovery rate for the sample that was victimized by art theft was 23.7%, 
which is higher than the standard 2% to 10% recovery rates cited by art theft 
professionals such as Bonnie Magness-Gardner and prior scholarly works (Burmon, 
2017; Conklin, 1994; Durney, 2010; Naylor, 2010). A factor that may have influenced 





within this study as opposed to the thousands of victims of art theft documented by the 
above-mentioned professionals and scholars. Additionally, if more of the respondents 
who experienced art theft victimization, but did not disclose any victimization to the 
researchers, had their stolen works recovered they may have reported art theft 
victimization in the current study.  
In the current study, the four respondents who were fortunate to reclaim their 
stolen works did so within 2 years or less of the theft incident. Respondent #69 shares, 
“we’ve experienced two thefts during the previous ten years: one theft was a small glass 
object in our permanent collection; which was subsequently replaced by the artist (of the 
work stolen, added for clarification).  The second theft was a painting which was part of 
an art auction. This painting was returned to the museum 2 years later in a mysterious 
manner: it was wrapped in a few grocery store plastic bags and left outside the front door 
of the museum. The package was found at opening time.” 
The location of both forms of victimization occurred primarily in the 
gallery/exhibition space and this trend is consistent when compared to other studies 
which captured data on the location of art theft victimization within museums and 
galleries (Aarons, 2001; Barelli, 1986; Benson, 2013; Ho, 1992; Wilemse & Etman, 
1995). However, no other scholarly works examined the categorical identifier of the 
perpetrator of art theft or art vandalism. Conversely, many journalistic and art industry 
professional sources maintain that most theft is committed by insiders. There are no 
comparable statistics for art vandalism.  
The current study did not align with the multitude of claims that art theft is 





identified as the culprit. One possible explanation for this disparity is that the respondent 
sample is primarily located in small communities with a limited number of staff and 
volunteers. In smaller communities, “everybody knows everybody” and as a result of 
possible close social bonds within the respondent sample, an insider would not attempt to 
steal or intentionally harm a work of art at their place of employment. Conversely, a 
victimized institution might not wish to report an employee perpetration without risking 
the information quickly being leaked to the general community. Thus, the institution 
would be taking a chance of suffering negative public consequences.   
Another feasible explanation for the lack of reported employee theft or vandalism 
could be illustrated by a scenario that occurred at the 2007 annual American Alliance of 
Museums’ (AAM) annual conference in which one of the speakers, a top Special Agent 
of the FBI’s Art Crime Team, asked the audience, “By a show of hands, how many 
attendees in the audience had experienced internal theft?” Reportedly, a large portion of 
the audience raised their hands. In response to the agent’s follow up question, “How 
many of the incidents were reported or investigated”, the majority of the same hands 
were retracted (http://www.imua.org/Files/reports/Insider%20Theft.html, electronically 
retrieved December 6, 2017). This illustrates that despite repeated assertions that insider 
theft is highly problematic in our cultural institutions, the victims are reluctant to report 
it. Consequently, the respondents to the current survey may have experienced many 
incidences of employee malfeasance, but chose not to disclose victimization. The primary 
category of perpetrator of both art vandalism and art theft in the current study was 





times” as opposed to “most of the time” or “always” in both instances of art vandalism 
and art theft victimization.  
 
Theoretical Measures 
Next, during the univariate examination of the theoretical measures of social and 
physical guardianship utilized within this study several patterns emerged that do not 
indicate an overwhelming commitment to the protection and care of artworks entrusted to 
the respondents. For example, the respondent sample only had an average of 2.76 full-
time security guards and an average of 2.29 part-time security guards. Additionally, the 
findings related to due diligence measures revealed that 75.6% of the respondents either 
did not consult stolen databases or had answered “N/A”. Lastly, within the physical 
guardianship category, only approximately half (49.5%) utilized CCTV and 86.5% of the 
sample does not conduct baggage checks on either visitors or staff. However, many 
factors may have contributed to the under-incorporated theoretical measures. First, as 
mentioned earlier, the respondent sample is restrained financially, and as a result, might 
not have chosen to implement many of the measures in lieu of delegating a higher 
percentage of their budget to the acquisition of works and presenting temporary exhibits. 
Secondly, the art world is notorious for its secrecy and as a result the sample might not 
have fully disclosed their breadth of guardianship measures.  
Third, as mentioned in chapter two, the fine art insurance industry is a stakeholder 
within the art world in which those institutions that have works insured are subject to 
compliance of some modicum of guardianship measures. However, given that a large 





portion of the respondents do not have insurance. In fact, Straus (2009) notes that “theft 
is much more prevalent in noninsured institutions and collections and that many 
institutions and private collections in the United States and abroad remain uninsured for a 
variety of reasons” (p. 98). Consequently, these respondents are not held accountable by 
any entity with powers of indemnification, to adopt any guardianship measures or simply 
cannot afford them. Admittedly, Kerr (2016) maintains that those institutions that own 
fine art that are not insured still benefit from the art insurance industry’s influence 
regarding guardianship. For example, Kerr (2016) contends that due to the insurance 
industry constantly improving their methods of assessments and improving security 
technology, art collectors, dealers, etc. benefit from due diligence/security methods and 
security/new technological product availability by acquiring theses risk reduction 
measures without the assistance of an insurance representative.  
However, given the dearth of both social and guardianship measures reported by 
the respondents, it is unlikely that any transference of general knowledge of preventative 
guardianship measures disseminated throughout the art world by the art insurance 
industry was adopted. Furthermore, according to Charney (2009b), a myriad of museums 
around the world adhere to the art industry practice of maintaining substandard security 
measures due to a lack of victimization, thereby utilizing only reactive guardianship 
measures as opposed to proactive guardianship measures. According to a museum 
director of a prestigious Italian museum, “We have very few security measures in place, 
because nothing has ever been stolen from our museum. Why would we spend money to 
fix what’s never been broken?” (Charney, 2009b, p. 59).  Moreover, Steven Layne, CPP, 





fact. That is closing the barn after the horses are gone-throwing up a few cameras, 
changing the locks, and adding a few alarms are all Band-Aids on a gaping wound” (p. 
139).  Lastly, Mustaine and Tewksbury (1999) maintained in their study on college 
female stalking victims that the presence of the protective measures were responses of 
victimization rather than precursory guardianship actions.  
Additionally, Dick Drent (2009), former Security Director of the Van Gogh 
Museum in Amsterdam, remarked that in 2005 he reversed this culturally ingrained 
guardianship practice within the Van Gogh Museum by implementing many new security 
procedures and installing state-of-the-art technologies. However, in many cases, it takes 
significant funding to fully prepare a facility to enact proactive tactics, which the majority 
of the respondent sample does not have. Furthermore, according to Suggested Practices 
for Museum Security As Adopted by The Museum, Library, and Cultural Properties 
council SIS International AND The Museum Association Security Committee of the 
American Association of Museums (2008), there is a “tendency of museums to avoid 
sound security procedures because of their lack of popularity with staff or their impact on 
the operational status quo, as a serious problem to be avoided 
(http://www.architectssecuritygroup.com/Consulting/WelcomeContractor_files/Suggeste
dPracticesforMuseumSecurity.pdf, electronically retrieved January 15, 2018).  
Interestingly, according to the American Alliance of Museums’ Standards 
regarding Collections Stewardship, “There are different ways to manage, house, secure, 
document and conserve collections, depending on their media and use, and the museum’s 
own discipline, size, physical facilities, geographic location and financial and human 





taken together, demonstrate the effectiveness of its collections stewardship policies, 
procedures and practices, and assess them in light of varying factors” (http://www.aam-
us.org/resources/ethics-standards-and-best-practices/collections-stewardship, 
electronically retrieved January 15, 2018). This standard exemplifies the diversity of 
factors present in each institution which might account for the lack of consistent reported 
measures by this study’s respondents.  
 
Social Guardianship 
The results of the Place manager activities-training and Place manager activities-
Due Diligence analyses present disappointing frequencies of place manager vigilance, 
some of which were briefly mentioned above. As a result of the limited measures of 
security training for the security, non-security, and volunteer staff, observed lackadaisical 
due diligence, regarding consulting stolen art databases, participating in outside risk 
analysis/audits, and volunteer background checks, the perpetuation of art crime will not 
decrease. In fact, it could possibly create a dynamic in which art crime will flourish.  
 
Place Manager Activities-Training 
Specifically, with regards to place manager training, all three measures of place 
mangers utilized in this category (security guards, non-security (museum staff), and 
volunteer staff) received training in safety of artworks and greeting and visitor reception 
in the highest proportions compared to the other forms of training within each theoretical 
training category. Museum and gallery non-security staff were trained with the highest 





then volunteer staff. Ideally, all the training measures (training in the identification of 
suspicious objects, training in intruder detection systems, and training in CCTV 
management) should have been offered to an institution’s security, non-security, and 
volunteer staff in equal proportions to maintain the most effective standards of place 
manager understanding of guardianship practices and policies. These results may be 
explained by the limited amount of annual budget earmarked for training of staff and/or 
the overwhelming view among the respondents that interacting with visitors and the 
ability to manage the safety of artworks takes priority over the other training measures 
listed.  
 
Place Manager Activities-Due Diligence 
With regards to place manager activities-due diligence, only 24.3% of the sample 
consulted a stolen art database to ensure that their works were not stolen or illegally 
acquired. Kerr (2013) notes that the most useful tool for creating a barrier for the sale of 
stolen art is the stolen art databases. Additionally, according to Marinello & Hassler 
(2016), “What is most important than any single resource for due diligence in the art 
market is the awareness of how useful databases can be in the due diligence 
responsibilities of auction houses, galleries, and dealers alike” (p. 318). However, there 
are currently limitations with regards the databases that exist. Kerr’s (2013) respondents 
advocated for a unified database, for more existing databases to be publicly funded, for 
the databases to be easily accessible rather than having to pay a fee for usage, and the 





Also, only 24.3% of the sample had an outside annual risk analysis conducted. 
Stevan Layne, CPP, CIPM, an expert in museum security, remarks in an interview in 
Charney’s (2009) book Art & Crime that institutions should “audit and self-evaluate 
often” (p. 141) and the IMUA (2007), Drent (2009), and Layne (2009) all advocate for an 
outside auditor. These low proactive percentages may be a matter of funding, time 
constraints, specific institutional views that audits are not relevant to their functioning, 
lack of insured works in which the insurance policy would require an annual audit, or 
these results may be due to a portion of the respondent institutions preserving the 
opaqueness of their operations that the art industry is notorious for.  
Interestingly, the highest percentage of frequency of the conduction of 
inventorying works on view was the daily inventorying of works on view (30.6%), which 
is the ideal practice among the answer choices. However, the second highest frequency 
was inventorying works on an annual basis (22.5%). This disparity could account for the 
value of a respondent’s collection, number of employees, or whether the respondent’s 
institution’s works were insured. Since not all respondents had a permanent collection, 
the inventory of works in storage measure was not a true representation of the entire 
respondent sample. Therefore, the responses cannot be subjected to the same level of 
scrutiny as the inventory of works on view measure. However, the institutions that did 
exercise the practice of inventorying works in storage did so only annually, which 
represented the highest proportion of the sample (27.9%).  
The conducting of pre-hiring background checks on employees and volunteers is 
a measure of a place manager exercising preemptive measures when considering 





an interview in Charney’s book Art & Crime that frequently an insider thief steals more 
than one object from their employer and commits their crime more than once. 
Admittedly, conducting background checks can be costly and time consuming. However, 
given the high rate of insider malfeasance in the art industry, conducting background 
checks is a standard or should be a standard preventative measure (Benney, 2013; ICOM, 
1993; IMUA, 2007; Layne, 2014; Straus, 2009, 2016).  Layne (2009) recommends 
“thorough preemployment screening of staff, volunteers, interns, contractors, and 
vendors” (p. 138). A substantial percentage of the sample (74.8%) conducted pre-
employment background checks on future employees with some sort of frequency while a 
smaller percentage of the sample (36.9%) conducted pre-employment background checks 
on future volunteers. The difference in the percentages may be accounted for by the fact 
that volunteers are not considered “actual employees” of an art museum or gallery since 
they receive no monetary compensation. Also, volunteers tend to be students, individuals 
already known to institutional staff, and/or may not be granted the same level of access to 
collections as paid employees. Therefore, there may not be an institutional perceived 
need for volunteers to undergo any pre-employment screening.  
 
Security Guard Activities 
Security guard activities vary among institution to institution depending on the 
size of the guard staff, size of the facility, and the operating budget. However, these 
factors are all inter-related. Consequently, the average square footage of roving and the 
average number of designated security posts was considered low due the fact that within 





as well as the average size of the institutions contained in the sample had a limited 
amount of square footage. Lastly, the variable measuring where surveillance rounds are 
conducted, and the length of time security guards are on duty were variables with such an 
extremely high number of missing cases that an accurate assessment of the veracity of the 
results would be futile.  
 
Place Manager Perceived Improvements 
The next category within the social guardianship construct is place manager 
perceived improvements. Overwhelmingly, the highest percentage of the sample (76.6%) 
perceived the need for a larger budget as a measure of increasing the safety of the 
artworks at their respective institutions. This result is not surprising since the other 
answer choices in this category rely on financial resources in order to be implemented.  
 
Guardianship in Action 
Lastly, within the construct of social guardianship are the theoretical 
categorizations of Guardianship In Action. In terms of the measures relating to the 
reporting of victimization, the data revealed that the respondent sample was a minimally 
capable guardian due to the lack of reported implementation of guardianship measures. 
Moreover, according to the data analysis, a pattern of a lack of willingness to advance to 
the intervening/active guardian stage of Reynald’s Guardianship In Action Model by 
consistently not reporting employee perpetrated victimization emerged. In fact, the 
findings indicate that the respondent sample prefers to handle employee art crime 





to take action against an employee art vandal or art thief was to fire the employee rather 
than report the crime or another form of action. Interestingly, institutions were slightly 
more apt to fire an employee vandal (32.4%) than an employee thief (24.3%). A plausible 
reason for the contrast may be that there exists a perception that the underlying cause of 
vandalism is some sort of psychological disorder rather than felonious motives. Hence, an 
employee who vandalizes may be viewed as more unpredictable then one who simply 
steals work(s) for seemingly logical reasons. However, these percentages are low in 
comparison to the high rates of missing responses within these categories. Furthermore, 
only less than 25.0% of the sample within each category measuring employee 
perpetration would involve law enforcement. Interestingly, a slightly higher percentage of 
respondents (24.3%) would contact law enforcement for insider acts of vandalism 
compared to insider theft (22.5%). These results are opposite to the respondents’ 
responses to the proportion of percentages that would fire their insider art vandals and art 
thieves. An explanation may be that the respondents would prefer to engage law 
enforcement when an incident of vandalism occurs. This is evidenced by the higher 
percentage of respondents who answered this question possibly having an art insurance 
policy and therefore being obligated to file a police report as part of the conditions of 
their insurance policy. This may also be because respondents had more faith in law 
enforcement to handle an art property destruction case with more aptitude than an art 
property theft cases. The inclusion of law enforcement in preventing art theft and art 
vandalism and post-crime reporting could possibly reduce the incidence of these forms of 
art crime. The art criminals could possibly be deterred if there was an institutional 





have to take art crime more seriously and investigate these cases with more rigor than has 
been suggested (Benson, 2013; Conklin, 1994; Dobovšek & Slak, 2011; Gerlis & Pes, 
2013; Houpt, 2006; Kennedy, 2010; Kerr, 2013). In sum, though, these overall findings 
regarding the reporting of insider art crime misconduct attest to the notion that art 
institutions, including university museums and galleries, are reluctant to involve law 
enforcement in their criminal matters (Benson, 2013; Chappell & Hufnagel, 2014; Clarke 
& Szydlo, 2017; Conklin, 1994; Dolnick, 2005; Houpt, 2006; Kerr, 2013; Kleberg, 
2009).  
In terms of actions taken after an act of art vandalism or art theft that occurred at a 
respondents’ respective museum or gallery perpetrated by a non-employee, the results 
were mixed between the two forms of victimization. The respondents who were 
victimized by art theft were most likely to inform their boards and fill out an internal 
incident report in equal frequencies (70.6%) and inform the local police of victimization 
(64.7%) than the respondents victimized by art vandalism who informed the local police 
of victimization (44.0%) and reported the vandalism to their board (40.0%). First, it is 
interesting that the respondents are more likely to report non-employee art crime 
perpetrators than insider art crime perpetrators. Furthermore, within the sample of 
respondents victimized by art vandalism 28.0% or less reported an incident of vandalism 
to their insurance agency, filled out an incident report, reported the incident to the media, 
reported the incident to national law enforcement, and took “other action”.  Within the 
sample of respondents victimized by art theft, 35.3% or less reported an incident of 
vandalism to their insurance agency, reported the incident to the media, filled out an 





action”.  Secondly, the findings are in contrast to the results of reporting employee 
malfeasance; the respondents were more likely to report non-employee art thieves than 
non-employee art vandals to local law enforcement. An explanation for the disparity may 
be that due to the overall budget and size of the respondent sample, they may not have art 
insurance for their works, some of the respondents do not have a permanent collection 
and therefore may not have art insurance for the temporary or rotating exhibitions they 
host, or if an act of vandalism occurred, the damage perpetrated did not require any 
conservation restoration or the damage was so severe that conservation could not salvage 
the work. For example, according to an interview conducted with an anonymous former 
gallery director of a medium size university, a student’s work of glass art that contained 
live red ants was vandalized by another student releasing the ants. The cost to replace the 
ants was only $25.00. The gallery made the decision not to take any action against the 
vandal. When asked if the artwork had been damaged beyond repair or stolen, would the 
police have been called or any other action taken, the gallery director’s answer was “yes, 
the incident would have been reported to the police” (anonymous personal 
communication, December 14, 2017).  
However, these percentages are low given that a large portion of art institutions 
receive some form of public funding and are therefore explicitly required to provide 
transparency when victimized (Charney, 2009; Wilemse & Etman, 1995). Conversely, 
the respondents who were victimized by art theft may have been less opaque in reporting 
victimization than the portion of the sample victimized by art vandalism. The differences 
between the two types of crimes and the additional aspects of art vandalism and art theft 





disparate findings. Additionally, art theft may be handled more thoroughly than art 
vandalism by art institutions, which would account for the higher reporting percentages 
of art theft victimization.  
Moreover, according to Steven Keller (2011), as well as Herb Lottier, former 
Director of Protective Services at the Philadelphia Art Museum, and Mike Seaman, head 
of installations at the Storm King Art Center in New York via an interview with 
Alexandra MacNamara (2013), acknowledge that that children are often the perpetrators 
of art vandalism. Furthermore, the extent of the damage to the works by juveniles is 
minimal. Consequently, crimes perpetrated by minors may not be reported with as much 
frequency as vandalism perpetrated by adults. In sum, these results confirm that art 
institutions operate within a culture of non-disclosure that is an appealing feature of art 
crime to motivated offenders; especially because of the fact that law enforcement is not 
notified on a consistent basis.  
Last, these particular findings are in contrast to Colin Quin’s, the Vice President 
and Director of Claims Manager at AXA Art Insurance Corporations, directive that in the 
event of vandalism an art institution should first notify their insurance broker in order to 
file a claim. This action will begin the process necessary to repair the damaged work(s).  
Despite the findings that art theft victims within the sample reported victimization 
with appreciable frequencies, not one respondent would reveal why they would not report 
an instance of art theft except for four respondents who answered yes to the measure of 
“other reasons”. This finding is interesting given that the literature is replete with reasons 
as to why art institutions and private collectors do not report art theft victimization. 





been victimized or the sample chose not to reveal their reasons for non-reporting. In sum, 
overall the findings reveal that respondents who were victims of art theft were more 
inclined to progress from the level of a capable guardian to the level of an active guardian 
with respect to reporting victimization than the respondents who were victims of art 
vandalism. Explanations for the difference may be that the damage due to vandalistic acts 
did not warrant reporting, the respondents did not want to publicize victimization to 
promote opaqueness or fear of reasons which were not revealed, or their institutions did 
not consider vandalism as serious as art theft in terms of an act of criminality. The survey 
did not ask the respondents what form of vandalism was perpetrated or the period of 
work in which the work was classified. Consequently, there is no data available to draw 
any conclusions regarding the seriousness of intentional damage inflicted upon the 
artworks within the victimized sample’s collections.  
 
Physical Guardianship 
Within the categories of physical guardianship, a lack of target hardening 
resources and industry related physical guardianship proactive measures became evident. 
 
Target Hardening 
  Of the ten target hardening measures contained within the survey’s forced answer 
choices list, only three target hardening mechanisms/devices were utilized by more than 
70% of the sample. The highest percentage of the sample (84.7%) utilized door alarms 
and 71.2% of the sample utilized both motion detectors and vitrines. Steven Keller noted 





motion detection” (p. 42). According to MacNamara (2013), Keller also posits that this 
proactive use of target hardening devices “leaves little potential for thieves and vandals to 
go undetected should they lag behind once a large group has left a museum gallery” p. 
42). He also “admits closed-circuit TV cameras can cause a strain on a museum’s 
security budget, he firmly believes that cameras should be installed, at the very least, at 
museums entry points” (p. 42). Respondent #60 notes that “Security cameras are located 
at the first-floor reception/security desk”. However, respondent #49 reports “Cameras are 
mounted in each room, but they are not functional.” The remaining seven measures were 
utilized by 52.3% of the sample or less. The lack of usage of target hardening devices 
may be a function of funding, a perceived lack of need of physical deterrents and devices, 
the sample’s perception that the devices are not effective in preventing victimization, lack 
of an insurance policy that might require certain target hardening devices, the 
respondent’s notion that staff vigilance is a better deterrent to victimization, or a large 
portion of the sample was reluctant to disclose their security arsenal.  
 
Preventative Physical Guardianship 
Perhaps even more discouraging than the lack of target hardening devices utilized 
by the respondent sample was the lack of preventative physical guardianship activities 
conducted by the sample; especially the minimal usage of bag and package inspection. 
Bag and package inspection is a common practice in airports, sports stadiums, and even 
small concert venues. Despite the fact that museums such as the Museum of Fine Arts, 
Boston, the Smithsonian’s Hirschhorn Museum, and the Museum of Modern Art, have 





that these inspections are not performed on a consistent basis at institutions that have 
implemented bag inspection policies. For example, respondent #90 reported that their 
“guards are authorized to check any bag they believe is suspicious and not every bag is 
searched every hour” and respondent #103 only conducts baggage checks on bags larger 
than purses. This respondent also added that “there is a posted size for bags that will be 
examined”. An alarmingly large percentage of the sample did not require any package or 
bag inspections of visitors or staff (86.5%) and 56.8% of the sample did not require 
anyone to wear an ID badge. The only measure in this category, oversized bag storage, 
presented a somewhat positive finding in that 58.6% of the sample required their visitors 
to store oversized bags prior to entering the exhibition space. Respondent #28 reported 
that they require that backpacks stay in their reception area and respondent #108 reported 
that their visitors “must secure belongings in lockers”. 
 In sum, the univariate descriptive statistics reveals that this study’s sample may 
be handicapped by limited resources, a lack of adequate security policies, or chose not to 
reveal the true scope of their security policies and procedures or incidences of 
victimization. Next, the results of the bivariate descriptive analysis of the demographic 
and theoretical measures will be discussed.  
 
Bivariate Descriptive Statistics (Subgroup Comparisons) 
The two forms of victimization will be presented together within the discussion of 
the results of the bivariate descriptive statistical analysis that compared first the means 
and proportions of the institutions victimized by art vandalism and those which were not 





institutions that were victimized by art theft with those that were not victimized by art 
theft. Within the bivariate descriptive analysis, an initial picture comparing and 
contrasting our sample as guardians within the contexts of art theft and art vandalism 
victimization is presented. Although the results present comparisons of each demographic 
and theoretical measure, it should be noted that results cannot be considered statistically 
significant since no quantitative tests were conducted.  This analysis was performed for 
exploratory purposes only to examine any potential theoretical trends that may or may 
not indicate the success of quantitative tests of the guardianship component of Routine 
Activities Theory for the current researchers and future scholars. Additionally, this 
analytical format allows the art industry professionals to examine the sample within 
simple comparative configurations that allows for more insightful results than a purely 
non-comparative descriptive statistical report provides.  
 
Social Guardianship 
Demographic, Place Managers, Security Guards 
As mentioned in chapter five, the results of the comparisons of the four 
demographic and the twelve place manager measures within the victimization versus no 
victimization contexts of both art vandalism and art theft were diametrically opposed, 
except for the variable “population of institution’s city”. Specifically, the portion of the 
sample that was a victim of art vandalism all had higher average means of the 
demographic and place manager measures except for the variable “population of 
institution’s city” compared to the portion of the sample that was not a victim of art 





guard measures) all had higher averages for the non-victimized sample of art theft 
compared to the victimized sample. This disparity could be interpreted in several ways. 
First according to one of the respondents in Scott’s (2009) study on vandalism, “Instances 
of vandalism are more common in larger/national institutions than in smaller/local 
institutions” (p. unknown). Similarly, Peter Morrin, former Director of the J.B. Speed Art 
Museum and President of the American Art Museum Directors (AAMD), vandalism 
occurs at greater frequencies at larger institutions and theft occurs at greater frequencies 
at smaller institutions. Morrin expounded upon this statement by noting that larger 
institutions have greater square footage, a greater numbers of works including those 
exhibited in a sculpture garden. Consequently, there is a greater chance of vandalism due 
to the above-mentioned factors. Additionally, the larger museums may have security 
guards, however, there is no guarantee that they are stationed within each gallery or are 
manning a CCTV monitor twenty-four hours a day. Furthermore, larger institutions are 
more visible in the community, represent the establishment of power. The larger 
museums also attract not only the “art lovers” as visitors, but the novice viewers. Morrin 
insightfully shares that the art world has created their own problem due to their 
prominence in the community.  
According to Anthony Amore, during his interview with Noah Charney (2009), 
“Because museum visitors are so often vested with a love for the art that they have paid 
to look at, they are very likely to speak up if they think a person means to do harm to the 
collection. They therefore, become an unwitting security measure and a vital layer of 
security lending hundreds of sets of eyes and ears to what is going on in the museum” (p. 





resources to organize exhibits that appeal to more than the “art lovers”. A person not 
familiar with museum etiquette could feel that is perfectly fine to vandalize a work or 
these larger shows contain works with more intrinsic and extrinsic value. Thus, the 
exhibit is desirable as a venue for a vandal to express his discontent for political reasons, 
religious consternation, anger with the “elitist” establishment, or sexual imagery protest. 
 It is also feasible that novice viewers may not be cognizant of the 
inappropriateness of adding to the art work by writing on the work with a pencil or pen. 
More children also are brought to the larger institutions and since they have been 
determined to contribute to the pool of art vandals there is greater chance that a child can 
intentionally harm a work.  
Secondly, the institutions that were victimized by art vandalism may have been 
more forthcoming in their disclosure during the survey process. Having artworks 
damaged as opposed to stolen may be a crime that the sample was more comfortable 
reporting on an anonymous questionnaire. Third, the institutions victimized by vandalism 
reportedly operated with a larger budget and within larger spaces than the non-victimized 
institutions, which either contributed to the larger institutions possessing more works that 
were desirable targets of victimization or the larger space may have been more difficult to 
monitor by place mangers despite the finding that the victimized institutions had more 
place managers. A fourth interpretation of the results regarding art vandalism 
victimization is consistent with research on guardianship relating to place mangers. The 
institutions that were not victimized by art vandalism compared to those that were 
victimized by art vandalism may work in art institutions in which place mangers work 





Consequently, the number of place managers may not impact victimization, rather the 
effectiveness in which they work together. This may be especially evident in smaller 
institutions in which staff work more closely with each other.  
Conversely, although a smaller staff may be a more unified group of guardians, 
they generally take on many roles that facilitates the need to multi-task, which would 
create an overstretched staff and impair the effectiveness of guardianship capability of the 
entire smaller institution (Scott, 2009). In fact, one of the respondents in Scott’s (2009) 
vandalism study, states, “Lack of resources can lead to staffing shortages, meaning that 
staff become over-stretched and artworks are not adequately invigilated” (p. unknown). 
For example, in 2011, three galleries in Chelsea, New York were victims of theft within a 
ten-day period. The shortage of staff was one reason cited for the wave of criminal 
activity. A Chelsea gallery owner told Art In America magazine, “It is a problem because 
we get engrossed in something or have to turn out backs to go to another area of the 
gallery, and everything in vulnerable, from artwork to tools to office equipment” 
(http://www.artinamericamagazine.com/news-features/news/marc-jancou-steven-parino-
theft/print/, electronically retrieved March 20, 2017).  
Alternatively, given that the reported number of vandalism incidences was greater 
than the number of reported number of theft incidences, and the institutions victimized by 
vandalism have more security guards and place managers in general, it may be that 
Wilmese and Etman’s (1995) proposal that “museums with a lot of attention to security 
care may, for instance, register incidences more carefully, as a result of which it will 
notice and report more incidences’ (p. 59). Hence, the sample victimized by vandalism 





realm, as well as more transparent with their reporting of victimization compared the to 
the sample not victimized.  
Lastly, the art vandalism victimized sample had greater financial resources to 
possibly designate a larger portion of their budgets to more non-security and security 
staff after an incidence of art theft. Thus, the results may be indicative of reactive actions 
post victimization by the institutions victimized by art vandalism as opposed to the 
respondents having instituted pre-crime preventative measures and these measures not 
effectively preventing victimization when compared to the institutions that were 
victimized by art theft.  
 
Place Manager Activities and Vigilance 
Place manager vigilance is an area which is examined on several levels in terms 
of victimization, employee retention, and the overall culture of an institution.  
 
Place Manager Activities-Training 
The first group of measures of place manager under investigation were the 
variables pertaining to place manager activities-training.  Unfortunately, the comparison 
of the victimized versus non-victimized sample within the realms of art vandalism and art 
theft do not provide a clear delineation of the results for all the training categories. The 
training measures for security staff follow the same pattern as the place manager 
measures, as mentioned in chapter five. The portion of the sample that was victimized by 
art vandalism had a higher proportion of all the training measures for security staff than 





of art theft had a higher proportion of all training measures offered for security staff 
compared to the victimized sample and the victimized sample of art vandalism had a 
higher proportion of all training measures offered for security staff compared to the non-
victimized sample.   
Several explanations may account for this disparity. First, vandalism and theft are 
very different crimes simply due to their separate motives, the various methods in which 
each form of crime is perpetrated, and a difference in many of the objects used to commit 
the two crimes. Therefore, the security guards, all staff, and volunteers may need training 
more precisely related to each form of crime, and if so, perhaps this is not occurring 
within the respondent population.  However, specifically with regard to the security guard 
training, it may be that the security guards within the respondent sample that were 
victimized by art vandalism either needed the abovementioned specialized training for 
theft and vandalism, they were not trained as well in general compared to the sample 
victimized by art theft, the training was in response to an incidence of art vandalism that 
would account for the higher percentages, or the respondents who were victims of art 
vandalism were more open in their disclosure regarding training opportunities for 
security staff than the respondent sample victimized by art theft due to their increased 
vigilance of hiring more security guards and place managers thus far. Additionally, 
according to the Suggested Practices for Museum Security As Adopted by The Museum, 
Library, and Cultural Properties council SIS International AND The Museum 
Association Security Committee of the American Association of Museums (2008) 
guidelines, security guard training and security training for staff who perform security 





not be implemented in the respondent sample and consequently the lack of continued 
training may have contributed to the higher percentage of museums/galleries that offered 
security staff training were not doing so on a frequent basis or may only offer training 
when an employee is hired or on an annual basis. 
The results of the analysis of the non-security (museum and gallery) staff and 
volunteer staff training for the victimized and non-victimized institutions of art vandalism 
and art theft differ from the pattern of the bivariate descriptive results discussed thus far. 
The museum and gallery non-security staff training results revealed that all but one 
training measure (training in intruder detection systems) was offered in a higher 
proportion by the sample victimized by art theft compared to the sample that was not 
victimized by art theft. Conversely, all but three training measures (training in intruder 
detection systems, training in greeting and visitor reception, and training in CCTV 
management) were offered in higher proportions by the sample victimized by art 
vandalism compared to the sample not victimized by art vandalism. These findings may 
indicate that the museum and gallery non-security staff at the institutions victimized by 
art theft are not being trained as well in theft prevention as vandalism prevention or the 
museum and gallery non-security staff is relying on the security staff to deter any 
potential theft incidences.  
Additionally, according to the univariate statistics results, the average number of 
museum and gallery non-security staff present at the institutions victimized by art 
vandalism (21.39) is more than twice the average number of museum and gallery non-
security staff present at the institutions victimized by art theft (9.53). Consequently, there 





victimized by vandalism either prior to or after an incidence of art vandalism. 
Additionally, potentially a higher average of non-security staff at the institutions 
victimized by vandalism are moving around the entire gallery or museum and interacting 
with visitors than the non-security staff at institutions victimized by art theft. Lastly, as 
mentioned earlier, increased training opportunities for non-security staff may have been 
implemented after an incidence of art theft or the respondents who were victims of art 
theft were more forthcoming with information than the respondents who were victims of 
art vandalism regarding their training opportunities for non-security staff.  
The results of the analysis of the volunteer staff training for the victimized and 
non-victimized institutions of art vandalism and art theft indicate that (similar to the 
analysis of the museum staff training measures) all but one training measure was offered 
in a higher proportion by the sample victimized by art theft compared to the sample not 
victimized by art theft. However, within these findings, the specific measure found at a 
higher proportion within the victimized sample was training in suspicious objects. 
Conversely, three of the four training measures (training in intruder detection systems, 
training in greeting and visitor reception, and training in safety of artworks) were offered 
in higher proportions by the sample not-victimized by art vandalism compared to the 
sample victimized by art vandalism. Similar explanations for the findings within the 
museum staff training category can be applied to explain the findings within the 
volunteer staff training category except that the difference between the average number 
of volunteers was less than the average difference in the average number of non-security 
staff. A final note before proceeding to the place manager due diligence measures is that, 





training category that were offered by the highest proportions of either the victimized or 
non-victimized sample within each form of art crime was the training in safety of 
artworks and the training in greeting and visitor reception.  
 
Place Manager Activities-Due Diligence 
The place manger activities-due diligence category offered more complex insights 
into ways the institutions victimized and not victimized by vandalism and the institutions 
victimized and not victimized by theft differ in their varying levels of place manager 
vigilance compared to the place manager-training category. First, surprisingly, the sample 
that did not experience vandalism victimization inventoried their works on view with 
more consistent and increased frequency than the sample not victimized by art theft. 
Within both groups of respondents that were not victimized, the highest percentage of 
each sample inventoried their works on view on a daily basis. This finding is consistent 
with the univariate descriptive statistics in which the highest percentage of the entire 
sample inventoried their works on view on a daily basis.  However, the greatest 
percentage of both groups that were victimized by either vandalism or theft inventoried 
their works on view once a year. Furthermore, the sample that was not victimized by art 
vandalism inventoried their works on view beginning every 3 months up to a daily basis 
in greater frequency than the sample not victimized by art theft, whereas the sample not 
victimized by art theft was slightly more sporadic compared to the sample not victimized 
by art theft in which the greater percentage of the sample that inventoried their works on 
view monthly were victimized by art theft. In sum, it appears that for the most part, 





victimization of art vandalism and art theft. However, since no quantitative analysis was 
conducted, these findings cannot be taken as statistically significant or as a definitive 
relationship between the theoretical measure and the results.  
The analysis of the second measure of due diligence, pre-hiring background 
checks on potential employees produced the following results. In both the art vandalism 
and art theft victimized respondent samples, overwhelmingly the highest percentage of 
the sample “always” conducted background checks on potential employees. However, the 
percentages were very close within the group of victimized and non-victimized 
respondents for both forms of victimization. However, the respondents victimized by art 
vandalism “always” conducted pre-employment background checks on future employees 
with a higher frequency compared to the respondents not victimized by art vandalism. 
Furthermore, the two percentages were close in value; 65.2% and 62.5% respectively. 
This finding is counter to the findings of the art theft sample in which a higher percentage 
of the non-victimized sample always conducted background checks on future employees 
compared to the sample victimized by art theft.  
A portion of this finding is commensurate with the art industry standard operating 
procedures due to the repeated assertions that the majority of theft from art institutions is 
committed by or aided by an insider. However, the vandalism result could possibly be 
interpreted as the victimized sample increased their pre-employment background checks 
after instances of insider vandalism which were not reported to the researchers, many 
more insider vandalism occurs in general which is not reported in either the scholarly 
literature or news reports, or the art theft respondents did not fully disclose their 





art vandalism and art theft victimization groups never conducted background checks on 
future employees, which was the second highest percentage of both samples; albeit much 
lower percentages than the above-mentioned frequency.  
The only remaining forced answer choice frequency in which the comparison of 
art vandalism and art theft victimization and non-victimization were aligned was the 
conduction of background checks on future employees “sometimes”. Both the non-
victimized art vandalism and non-victimized art theft sample was found in higher 
proportions of this frequency of pre-employment background check conduction. In sum, 
the results of this form of due diligence present mixed results. Obviously, doing nothing 
affects art crime victimization, which is what the art industry experts repeatedly contend. 
However, the different results within the frequency of pre-employment background 
checks conduction leads to more questions rather than plausible conclusions, especially 
within the context of art vandalism.  
The last measure of due diligence is pre-hiring background checks on potential 
volunteers. As mentioned earlier, many institutions may not invest any time or resources 
to this measure. The results of the comparison of institutions victimized and not 
victimized by art vandalism and art theft align with the findings of the univariate statistics 
in which the highest frequency was “never”. However, within this measure, the lack of 
pre-hiring background checks was present within a higher percentage of the sample that 
was not victimized by art vandalism compared the sample that was victimized by art 
vandalism. It should be noted that the difference between the percentages of the two 





background checks was present within a higher percentage of the sample that was 
victimized by art theft compared to the sample that was not victimized by art theft.  
Several plausible explanations could account for these findings. Once again, the 
lack of background checks on anyone with special access to an institutions collection or 
borrowed works is risky. However, the larger percentage of the sample that was not 
victimized by art vandalism within this measure is surprising. It may be simply a matter 
of insider vandalism does not occur very often, the institutions do not report it, or the 
respondent sample victimized by art theft began conducting pre-employment background 
checks on potential volunteers after an incidence of art vandalism and/or theft perpetrated 
by a volunteer. Other results within this measure were also different than the previous 
measure of pre-employment background checks on potential employees. A higher 
percentage of the sample victimized by art theft always conducted pre-employment 
background checks on future volunteers compared to the sample which was not 
victimized by art theft. This percentage of the sample was ranked 2
rd
 after the frequency 
of never. Similarly, a higher percentage of the sample victimized by art vandalism always 
conducted background checks on potential volunteers compared the sample which was 
not victimized by art vandalism and this frequency was also ranked 2
nd
 after the 
frequency of never.  
These results are diametric to the findings of the examination of the frequency of 
the pre-employment background checks of potential employees. Once again, the results 
within this measure do not align with art industry recommendations or expected findings. 
Possible reasons for the disparity may be the under-reporting of the sample, the 





lack of resources or institutional policy not to conduct pre-employment background 
checks for potential volunteers. However, many galleries and museums have many more 
volunteers than paid staff with access to their works. Case in point, in this study the 
average number of security and non-security staff is 25.73 and the average number of 
volunteers is 58.97. Consequently, by sheer numerical odds, it is more likely that a 
volunteer would perpetrate an act of vandalism or theft which lends credence to the 
finding that a higher percentage of the victimized sample which never conducts pre-
employment background checks on potential volunteers compared to the non-victimized 
sample. However, as mentioned earlier, volunteers may have already been vetted due to 
many volunteers being students and/or persons already personally known to institutional 
staff which would lead to an institution foregoing any background investigations on these 
persons. However, according to the data garnered in this study the lack of this form of 
due diligence may be detrimental to an art gallery or museum.  
 
Place Manger Perceived Improvements 
The last category is composed of measures that contribute to an assessment of an 
institution’s degree of place manager vigilance is place manager perceived 
improvements. These measures assess how well a place manager is able to conceptualize 
what would improve the safety of their institutions’ artworks. When the victimized versus 
non-victimized art vandalism and art theft samples were compared, a variety of findings 
were revealed. First, unexpectedly, all the measures were not found in greater proportions 
by both victimized samples. Specifically, if an institution had been victimized, it would 





this was not the case. Within the sample of victims of art theft, all but one measure, 
modern security equipment, was found in a higher percentage compared to the sample 
that was not victimized by art theft. It may be that the sample did not perceive modern 
security equipment as effective at preventing art theft as the other measures due to the 
other measures addressing the human component of guardianship that many researchers 
have advocated is more effective at crime reduction. Conversely, within the sample of 
victims of art vandalism, only one measure, “other improvement”, was found in a higher 
percentage compared to the sample that was not victimized by art vandalism. It should be 
noted though, that the difference in the percentages when comparing the sample 
victimized by vandalism versus the sample not victimized was only 0.70 for the measure 
of larger budget as an improvement to the safety of artworks. Although the results 
relating to the art vandalism sample are unexpected, it may be that the art vandalism 
sample that was not victimized did not actually perceive the need for improvements in 
greater proportions since this percentage of respondents did not experience any 
victimization; rather these measures had already been implemented as a preventative 
measure and victimization did not occur. However, it is difficult to conceive that any 
place manager at an art institution that had been victimized would not answer yes to the 
forced answer choices with greater percentages than place managers at non-victimized 
institutions.  
Due to these confounding results, the researchers were curious as to how the 
respondents within the separate samples assessed the overall level of security, the 
vulnerability of their artworks to vandalism, and the vulnerability of their artworks to 





utilized as either a demographic or theoretical measure. Each question was coded on a 5-
point Likert scale with the overall security measure ranging from 0=very low level of 
security to 4=very high level of security and the two questions measuring the 
vulnerability of artworks to theft and vandalism ranged from 0=very vulnerable to 
4=extremely safe. The majority of the sample victimized by art vandalism (44.0%) 
ranked their level of security at a “medium level of security” and the majority of the 
sample victimized by art theft (35.5%) ranked their level of security as “low level of 
security”. It is plausible that, the art vandalism victims may have overestimated the 
effectiveness of their guardianship capabilities. Furthermore, the majority of the sample 
victimized by vandalism (40.0%) ranked their vulnerability to vandalism as “safe” and 
the majority of the sample victimized by theft (41.2%) ranked their vulnerability to theft 
also as “safe”. Additionally, since 7 of the 35 institutions victimized by either theft or 
vandalism were victimized by both theft and vandalism, a quick comparison was 
conducted to examine the ranking of the sample of vandalism victims perceived 
vulnerability to theft and vice versa. The majority of the sample victimized by vandalism 
(48.0%) ranked their vulnerability to theft as “safe” and the majority of the sample 
victimized by theft (35.3%) ranked their vulnerability to vandalism as “safe” and “very 
safe” in equal percentages. It is interesting that the victims of crime still maintained that 
their vulnerability to each specific form of crime was at the mid-range level of the Likert 
scale (safe).  
In sum, the respondent sample exhibited a minimal level of place manager 
vigilance for all three categories of measures. The areas of strength for both the art 





employment checks on potential employees. The art vandalism sample’s place manager 
vigilance surpassed the art theft’s sample of place manager vigilance in the measures of 
museum staff security training, volunteer staff security training, and pre-hiring 
background checks on potential volunteers. The art theft sample surpassed the art 
vandalism sample in place manager vigilance in security staff training.  
The measure of perceived place manager improvements can be interpreted in two 
ways. First, the art theft sample that was victimized may be better at understanding their 
needs to prevent another incidence than the art vandalism victimization sample. Or 
secondly, the art vandalism sample that was not victimized may have already 
implemented the forced answer choices as preventative measures in higher proportions 
(compared to the victimized sample) as deterrents to future victimization even though 
they have not experienced victimization. Lastly, even though this data is useful, the 
researchers are still uncertain whether the findings of this assessment are in response to 
victimization, a true picture of the respondents’ art theft and/or art vandalism 
victimization, or under-reported results due to the issue of secrecy in the art world, 
particularly relating to security policies and practices.  
 
Physical Guardianship 
The next two sections will address the findings of the measures relating to the 
target hardening devices and preventative physical guardianship actions within the 








First, the findings of the target hardening measures revealed that the highest 
proportion of target hardening measure utilized by the victimized and non-victimized art 
vandalism and art theft samples was door alarms. This result is commensurate with the 
univariate descriptive statistics in which door alarms was the target hardening measure 
utilized by the largest percentage of the entire respondent sample. This was the only one 
of two target hardening measures that both the art vandalism and art theft samples were 
compared in which a larger percentage of the non-victimized sample of both forms of art 
crime utilized door alarms and individual object alarms compared to the victimized 
samples of the two types of crimes. In short, the analysis of the samples of victimized and 
non-victimized respondents within each of the two crime typologies revealed that within 
the forced answer choices (excluding the measures “other type of security systems” and 
“other type of physical barriers”) there was a blatant disparity between the victimized and 
non-victimized samples of the art vandalism and art theft groups’ usage of the remaining 
ten forms of target hardening. Specifically, within the art vandalism victimization group 
of respondents, only three of the twelve measures (door alarms, glazing on all pictures, 
and individual object alarms) were utilized by a larger percentage of the non-victimized 
sample compared to the victimized sample and within the art theft group of respondents 
eight of the twelve measures (door alarms, window alarms, motion detectors, CCTV, 
individual object alarms, vitrines, low lying barriers in front of artworks, and ropes and 
stanchions) were utilized by a larger percentage of non-victimized sample compared to 





Possible explanations for these results may be first that the vandalism results 
represent placement of the remaining seven measures in reaction to an incidence of 
vandalism rather than utilization of the devices and mechanisms as preventative 
measures. Within the demographic subgroup comparisons, it was found that the non-
victimized theft sample had a larger budget and square footage than the victimized 
sample. These two factors may account for the non-victimized respondents spending 
more money on “hardening” their targets as preventative measures or possibly the theft 
sample in general was not as transparent in reporting their physical guardianship 
measures’ effectiveness as the vandalism group. 
An additional possibility is that the non-victimized sample have an insurance 
policy which requires policy holder to utilize specific electronic devises and physical 
barriers. Lastly, it may be as simple as concluding that target hardening measures are a 
more effective method of preventing and/or reducing theft victimization than vandalism 
victimization given that these two crimes are conceptually different. In sum, the results of 
the target hardening bivariate statistical analysis mimic the mixed prior research findings 
related to target hardening utilized as a proxy measure of this theoretical construct. For 
example, in a robust number of studies, target hardening measures were not determined 
to be significant (Burrow & Apel, 2008; Hope, 2009; Schreck, Miller, & Gibson, 2003; 
Mustaine &Tewksbury, 2002; Tewksbury & Mustaine, 2001; Tewksbury & Mustaine, 
2000; Zhang, Messner, & Liu, 2007). Furthermore, some scholars reported that measures 
of physical guardianship increase victimization, such as living in a gated community 





campuses and residential burglary has shown that target hardening (Meithe & Meier, 
1990; Miethe & McDowall, 1993; Mustaine & Tewksbury, 1998a) reduces victimization. 
Hence, there may or not be some statistical utility of target hardening devices as 
proxy measures of successful or unsuccessful physical guardianship within the contexts 
of art vandalism and art theft for future research on a quantitative level.  
 
Preventative Physical Guardianship 
The examination of the last category, preventative physical guardianship actions, 
revealed that the entire respondent sample’s overall lack of usage of these measures 
(evident at the univariate descriptive statistical level of analysis) may have impacted art 
vandalism victimization to a greater degree than art theft victimization. Specifically, 
compared to the other two measures within this category, only a higher percentage of the 
sample that was victimized by art theft conducted bag/package inspections than the non-
victimized sample. Furthermore, a higher percentage of the sample that required 
oversized bag storage and ID badges for staff and volunteers was not victimized by art 
theft compared to the victimized sample. Conversely, only a higher percentage of the 
sample that was not victimized by art vandalism required ID badges for staff and 
volunteers compared to the victimized sample. Furthermore, a higher percentage of the 
sample that conducted bag/package inspections and required oversized bag storage was 
victimized by art vandalism compared to the non-victimized sample. In sum, these 
physical guardianship measures designated in this study overall were not found to be 
present in higher percentages within the vandalism victimized samples than the art theft 





These findings may indicate that either the entire sample was transparent in its 
disclosure and the results can be interpreted as either physical guardianship measures 
implemented after vandalism and theft victimization or the respondents utilized the 
physical guardianship measures prior to victimization and the measures are more 
appropriate for preventing art theft than art vandalism. Conversely, the results also may 
indicate that the vandalism sample may have been more transparent in their responses to 
the questionnaire than the theft sample which could also account for the vivid differences 
in the percentages between the victimized versus non-victimized institutions within the 
contexts of art theft and art vandalism. Lastly, according to a respondent in Scott’s (2009) 
study on vandalism, “Lack of resources is irrelevant, if an attacker is determined, greater 
resources will not prevent them from striking. Hence, it doesn’t matter what measures are 
implemented, victimization will occur regardless.  
In conclusion, although, none of these bivariate descriptive statistical results 
indicate any statistical significance since no quantitative analysis was conducted, these 
findings are useful in comparing and contrasting the various demographic and theoretical 
measures within two forms of victimization among the respondent sample. The bivariate 
binary logistic regression was the next level analysis undertaken and some of the 
potential relationships found in the bivariate descriptive statistics were determined to be 









Bivariate Binary Logistic Regression 
Art Vandalism  
The discussion of the ten variables that were determined to be significant or 
moderately significant from the bivariate binary logistic regression of the art vandalism 
dependent variable will commence with the finding that the number of volunteer hours is 
marginally significant at the bivariate level of logistic regression analysis. This variable 
was designated as a demographic/control variable used as a proxy measure of size and as 
such its marginal significance lends some credence to the notion that larger institutions 
may increase the odds of vandalism victimization. The finding may also aid in the utility 
of the results of the bivariate descriptive statistics in which this variable was found in 
higher averages within the sample of institutions victimized by vandalism.  
The majority of the remaining significant variables were measures of social 
guardianship. The only two place manager measures found to be significant were the 
number of part-time or full-time roving security guards and the number of full-time and 
part-time guards employed for at least five years. The finding that each one unit increase 
in the employment of the number of full-time or part-time roving security guards was 
associated with an increase in the odds of art vandalism victimization could be attributed 
to the fact that within the bivariate descriptive statistical analysis, the sample with a 
larger average amount of square footage and a larger average annual operating budget 
was victimized by art vandalism compared to the non-victimized sample with a smaller 
average amount of square footage. While larger institutions may be able to afford more 





roving circuits and consequently may not be able to notice or prevent an art vandal from 
perpetrating their crime.  
Moreover, art vandalism is an act of criminality which frequently occurs very 
quickly and requires a security guard or another place manager to be vigilant in their 
observation of visitors.  Conversely, the respondents victimized by vandalism may have 
hired more roving security guards after an incidence of victimization, which would not 
indicate that this variable is a measure that increases the odds of vandalism victimization. 
Rather, this variable is found at institutions after an incidence of art vandalism.  
The finding that each one unit increase in the employment of the number of full-
time or part-time security guards employed for at least five years was associated with an 
increase in the odds of art vandalism victimization could be attributed to the fact that, 
while long term employees may be better guardians due to a knowledge of an 
institutions’ policies, procedures, and collections, they also may become lackadaisical 
and not be quite as vigilant as an employee who is new.  Similarly, Dobovšek, B., 
Charney & Škrbec (2010) found in their study on museum security guards that, “trends 
suggest a prevalent passivity” which indicates “ineffectuality on the part of the guards in 
general” (p. 91). 
The scenario in which security guards’ roles are most similar to those who work 
in a museum or gallery is the school resource officer (SRO) programs in K-12 schools 
nationwide. Previous research shows that the presence of security guards and sworn 
police officers as SROs either increased victimization within the K-12 school setting 
(Burrow & Apel, 2008; Na & Gottfredson, 2013; Swartz, Osborne, Dawson-Edwards, & 





either increasing or decreasing victimization (Brown, 2006; Schreck, Miller, & Gibson, 
2003). Therefore, security guards may not be the ideal form of place manager to decrease 
victimization and the results of the analysis of the remaining types of security guards did 
not yield any significant findings. Consequently, previous scholars’ (Felson, 2006: Felson 
& Clarke, 1998; Felson & Eckert, 2016) contention that police officers and security 
guards are not a theoretical measure of guardians may in fact be accurate and applicable 
to the context of art vandalism. Lastly, similar to the analysis of the number of volunteer 
hours, this finding is consistent with the results of the bivariate descriptive statistics in 
which this variable was found in higher averages within the sample of institutions 
victimized by art vandalism.  
Within the place manager activities training variables, four of the five measures of 
security guard training were found to be statistically significant: SS training in intruder 
detection systems, SS training in safety of artworks, SS training in greeting & visitor 
reception, and SS training in CCTV management. These measures all were found to 
increase the odds of vandalism victimization at museums and galleries that offered these 
forms of training to their security guards compared to those that did not. According to the 
findings of the descriptive subgroup comparisons, all four variables were found in higher 
percentages within the sample of institutions victimized by art vandalism.  
First, the finding that the variable “SS training in intruder detection systems” 
increased the odds of art vandalism could be explained simply by the mere reality that 
larger institutions have more square footage and, despite being trained properly to react to 
the detections systems, once the detection device went off it was too late to stop the 





after the occurrence of a vandalism incident. Third, it may be that the training is not 
administered properly to teach the guards how to effectively deter vandalism 
victimization. The second significant security guard training variable “SS training in 
safety of artworks” could be explained in a similar manner as the security guard training 
in intruder detection systems. The finding that the security guard training in greeting and 
visitor reception significantly increases victimization could possibly be attributed latent 
consequences from training security staff to engage more with visitors by moving around 
and subtly letting patrons know that they are being acknowledged. For example, if a 
security guard is too busy navigating the gallery space, answering questions, shaking 
hands, or taking pictures for people, it would be easy for a vandal to make their move 
while the “guardian” is otherwise occupied. For example, perhaps Venus Over Manhattan 
Gallery’s Salvador Dali painting would not have been stolen by Phivos Istavrioglou when 
he slipping the work into his shopping bag if a security guard had not stepped away to 
take a picture (http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/salvador-dali-painting-stolen-east-
side-gallery-returned-theif-arraigned-article-1.1268330, electronically retrieved August 1, 
2016). Other explanations may include that security guards are not truly interested in 
interacting with guests and therefore any training may be ineffective. A third explanation 
may once again that this measure was implemented after an incident of vandalism 
victimization.  
The findings of the last security guard training variable “SS training in CCTV 
management” could be explained that the guards may have been trained in CCTV 
management, but the institution in which they work does not have their guards monitor 





be considered a deterrent. However, that is not always the case and may have been a 
contributing factor to the finding that this measure increased rather than decreased the 
odds of victimization. Similar to the above explanations, it may be that this measure was 
employed only after victimization or that the training was subpar. 
Surprisingly, the variable “VS training in greeting and visitor reception” was 
found to significantly reduce the odds of vandalism victimization. This finding was 
unanticipated because not only was the measure of volunteers not significant, but the 
measure “number of volunteer hours” was found to increase victimization. However, a 
possible explanation for the finding that volunteer training in greeting decreases 
victimization compared to the security guard training in the same category would be that 
the volunteers are volunteers and therefore more innately likely to assist visitors and 
therefore the training in this category may have been more effective. Additionally, 
volunteers perceive themselves as peers of the visitors and vice versa. Thus, they will 
engage more frequently and with better efficacy with visitors than a security guard may. 
Lastly, similar to the other measures, this variable may have been implemented after 
victimization. 
The only variable within the Place Manager Activities-Due Diligence category 
which was found to be significant was inventory of works on view. This variable was 
found to decrease the odds of vandalism victimization. This finding is also consistent 
with Steven Keller’s (2011) recommendation to check each item every day at closing to 
see if something has been damaged. This variable is a categorical variable and with the 





much higher percentage of the non-victimized sample compared to the victimized 
sample.  
The only variable within physical guardianship which had any form of 
significance was “glazing on some pictures” which was found to be marginally 
significant and to increase the odds of vandalism victimization. Interestingly, one would 
expect that putting a work behind glass would be a deterrent to a vandal. However, there 
are several explanations for this paradoxical finding. First, it was mentioned earlier that 
the larger institutions attract a more diverse audience who are not conversant with 
museum etiquette and the visitors may feel the need to touch the glass in which a work of 
art is protected by. Secondly, works that are protected by glass can have more intrinsic 
and extrinsic value than works that are not protected by glass, and therefore may be more 
desirable to vandals as a target due to the works’ prominence. Also, the glass may draw a 
viewer into the work because of the reflection and this may cause a vandalistic response 
from the viewer. Lastly, some vandals merely want to make a statement but not harm the 
work such as when Emnuel Leutz’s 1851 Washington Crossing the Delaware was 
vandalized in January of 2003. The vandal used Elmer’s glue as his weapon “because it's 
water-soluble and he didn't want to ruin the painting”  
http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/painting-9-11-defacing-article-1.676218, 
electronically retrieved December 19, 2018).  
 
Art Theft 
With the sample, no art theft variables were found to be statistically significant at 





improvements” and one physical guardianship variable “low lying barriers” were both 
found to be marginally significant at a 90% confidence interval rather than statistically 
significant at a 95% confidence interval. The lack of statistical significance within this 
form of victimization may be attributed to the small percentage of the sample that was an 
art theft victim.  
Low lying barriers in front of artworks can be any form of object from a low-
lying metal wire to a thick, long, black piece of tape alerting visitors not to go past that 
point. Low lying metal wires attached by two metal stanchions are commonly found in 
art museums and galleries. Additionally, according to Peter Morrin, former Director of 
the J.B. Speed Art Museum, motion detectors are commonly used in conjunction with 
these low-lying barriers to alert staff when a patron has crossed over the barrier (P. 
Morrin, personal communication, August 15, 2016). Also, many times a gallery or 
museum will simply use a piece of black tape with the words “do not cross this line” near 
the tape. These simple additions to the barriers could contribute to the finding that this 
measure decreased the odds of vandalism. Another explanation is that the barrier was 
placed after an incident of victimization.  
The variable “other security improvements” increased vandalism victimization. 
This measure was linked to an open-ended response section in which the respondents 
who answered yes to this question had an opportunity to write out their desired other 
security improvements. Interestingly, the following responses were given: “better 
relationship with local and campus police”, “cleaner delineation between museum 
building and art building”, dedicated, rather than borrowed space”, “facilities 





police and fire department”, “more staff”, and “support from the university 
administration for further security measures”. This variable was possibly found to 
increase victimization because it was a “wishful thinking” variable from a sample which 
had been victimized by art theft.  
In addition to examining the statistically significant and marginally significant 
variables within the two forms of victimization, the researchers explored any trends 
within the entire group comparing the signs of the coefficients of the variables within 
each form of victimization. Beginning with the demographic/control variables, all 
measures of place managers-non-security, and place managers-security guards, the 
direction of the signs of the coefficients were, for the most part, diametrically opposed 
within the vandalism and theft analysis. Specifically, with the exception of the 
“population of the institution’s city” all the coefficients for the above-mentioned 
measures within the art vandalism analysis were positive and all coefficients for the 
above-mentioned measures, with the exception of “number of visitors” within the art 
theft analysis were negative. Interestingly, in both the art vandalism and art theft analysis, 
the “number of visitors” had a positive coefficient. Despite the lack of significance of this 
variable it might indicate that visitors may not be a place manager, but a motivated 
offender. The paradoxical role of visitors was mentioned above and, given the results 
within the bivariate logistic regression, the case could be made for including visitors 
within the motivated component of RAT as opposed to the guardianship component 
within the art world context. The diametrically opposing signs of each form of 
victimization may add credence to the claims that vandalism occurs more often in large 





that the bivariate subgroup comparisons revealed that the institutions victimized by 
vandalism had larger financial resources, more staff, and a greater amount of space than 
the institutions not victimized by vandalism. Additionally, in the bivariate subgroup 
comparisons the institutions victimized by theft had fewer of the aforementioned features 
than the institutions not victimized by art theft.  
Within the place manager-training category, the signs of the coefficients are also 
all positive with the analysis of the security guard measures of art vandalism and all 
negative for art theft. The signs of the coefficients are mixed for both the art vandalism 
and art theft training measures of non-security staff and visitors. However, in both 
analyses, the following measures had the same sign for both forms of victimization. Both 
non-security staff and visitor training in suspicious objects had coefficients with a 
positive sign, both non-security staff and visitor training in intruder detection systems had 
coefficients with a negative sign, and non-security staff training in safety of artwork had 
a coefficient with a positive sign. These patterns may indicate that either security training 
was implemented after vandalism victimization or the guards are not being trained as 
well in vandalism as in theft. There is no clear indication as to whether non-security staff 
and volunteer training in general has any consistent impact on both forms of 
victimization.  
The place manager due diligence measures had opposite coefficient signs for theft 
and vandalism for all measures except for ‘inventory works on view” in which the 
coefficient was negative for both forms of victimization. Hence, this may indicate that 
inventorying works on view is a strong measure to incorporate into one’s security 





such as those of the American Alliance of Museums (AAM) and the International 
Council of Museums (ICOM). The analysis of the signs of coefficients within the 
theoretical category of security guard related practices revealed that all the measures for 
vandalism victimization had coefficients with a positive sign. Additionally, the entire 
group of measures for theft victimization had coefficients with a negative sign except for 
the measure, “square footage of roving,” which aligned with the vandalism victimization 
measure of a positive coefficient sign. This result may indicate that roving guards are not 
effective in reducing either form of victimization. It may be that guards should stay 
within a more confined area when on duty in order to keep a closer eye on the activity 
within a fine art institution.  
Within the category of place manager perceived improvements all the measures 
within the vandalism victimization analysis had coefficients with a negative sign except 
“other improvements,” and all the measures within the vandalism victimization analysis 
had coefficients with a positive sign except “would modern security equipment improve 
level of security”. It may be that the vandalism victims had already implemented the 
forced answer choices prior to victimization and theft victims had implemented the 
measures with the positive coefficients after victimization.  
In terms of the proxy measures for target hardening measures for both forms of 
victimization, there are some interesting insights to be garnered from examining the signs 
of the coefficients. It appears that the measures of security devices such as the various 
forms of alarms and CCTV might be measures that reduce art theft victimization given 
that these measures all had coefficients with a negative sign. It was revealed that the 





barriers which are placed in front of art works (low lying barriers and ropes and 
stanchions) had mixed results. Specifically, low lying barriers had a coefficient with a 
negative sign and the measure of ropes and stanchions had a coefficient with a positive 
sign. The results of the art vandalism victimization regarding target hardening measures 
presented, for the most part, a converse picture. All the security devices, except for door 
alarms and individual object alarms, had a coefficient with a positive sign. Furthermore, 
measures of physical barriers all had coefficients with a positive sign except for glazing 
on all pictures. Intuitively, it would be most difficult to steal a picture encased in glass or 
plexiglass. However, the fact that variable “glazing on some pictures” had a coefficient 
with a positive sign and the variable “glazing on all pictures” had a negative sign is 
puzzling. Perhaps the institutions that protected all their pictures with a glass or 
plexiglass barrier may have a more valuable collection and thus more sophisticated 
security systems. However, glazed works usually have more intrinsic and extrinsic value 
and present a desirable target for a vandal who wishes to make a statement through the 
destruction of art. An explanation for the overall findings might be explained by a 
statement made by one of the respondents in Scott’s (2009) vandalism study. The 
respondent reported that, “intrusive security measures do not necessarily prevent 
determined attackers and can even encourage ‘casual’ vandals” (p. unknown).  
The measures representing preventative physical guardianship actions were 
surprisingly similar for both forms of victimization. Specifically, the variable 
“bag/package inspections” had a coefficient with a positive sign for both forms of 
victimization and the variable “ID badges required for staff and volunteers” had a 





with a positive sign for vandalism victimization and the opposite for theft victimization. 
Consequently, it appears that the preventative variables might be measures that are more 
appropriate for reducing art theft victimization or the sample that had been victimized by 
art vandalism implemented them post-victimization.  
In summary of the social guardianship measures, they were either were not 
effective in general, the respondents did not honestly report these measures, the social 
guardianship measures are more effective in reducing theft victimization than vandalism 
victimization, or the respondents implemented the measures post-victimization. The 
physical guardianship measures appeared to have a potential to be somewhat effective 
depending on the measure and the form of victimization. However, given the small 
sample of victimized institutions and lack of true statistically significant measures, it is 
unclear exactly which measures might be truly effective. It does appear overall within the 
bivariate logistic regression analysis that physical guardianship is also more effective in 
institutions which were victimized by art theft. However, it is unclear as to whether the 
respondents implemented the measure pre- or post-victimization. Once again, given the 
small sample of victimized institutions and lack of true statistically significant measures 
it is unclear which measures might be truly effective.  
In conclusion, upon comparison of the significant and marginally significant 
variables within the contexts of art vandalism and art theft at the bivariate level, only one 
of the eight significant social guardianship measures decreased the odds of vandalism 
victimization and only one of the two physical guardianship measures decreased the odds 
of art theft victimization. Given the less than ideal sample size, the researchers can only 





given that each variable was found to be either in a greater or lesser proportion or means 
within the subgroup comparisons of the sampled institutions might indicated that there is 
added reliability to the results. However, the question still remains as to whether the 
measures found to be significant are a result of the respondents preemptively utilizing the 
security measures or if the findings are a result of the implementation of the measures 
after an incidence or incidence(s) of victimization.   
 
Multivariate Binary Logistic Regression 
Art Vandalism 
As mentioned in chapter five, in a parsimonious model that controlled for 
“number of volunteer hours,” only “training in greeting and visitor reception”, “inventory 
works on view”, and “glazing on some pictures” were statistically significant predictors 
of art vandalism. Interestingly, both “glazing on some pictures” and “number of volunteer 
hours” were only marginally significant within the bivariate analysis. The implications of 
these findings suggest, once again, that larger institutions are more likely to be victimized 
by art vandals (given that the control variable is a proxy for size and was statistically 
significant).   
Regarding the two forms of guardianship examined in this study, the two social 
guardianship measures decreased the odds of vandalism victimization while the only 
physical guardianship measure increased the odds of vandalism victimization. However, 
the two hypotheses (H1 & H2) which address social guardianship, physical guardianship 
and vandalism victimization state that both measures will decrease vandalism and theft 









The two variables which yielded any form of significance at the bivariate level of 
analysis, “low lying barriers in front of artworks” and “other improvements” for 
improving security remained marginally significant at the multivariate level.  
Regarding the two forms of guardianship examined in this study, the physical 
guardianship measure decreased the odds of theft victimization while the social 
guardianship measure increased the odds of vandalism victimization. However, the two 
hypotheses (H1 & H3) which address social guardianship, physical guardianship, and 
theft victimization state that both measures will decrease vandalism and theft 
victimization and that social guardianship will decrease theft victimization at higher rates 
than physical guardianship will. Only a portion of H1 was supported. 
 
Summary Of Quantitative findings 
First, contrary to prior scholarly research in which findings were supportive of 
place management as a crime reducing measure (Clark & Bichler-Robertson ,1998; Eck, 
1994; Eck, Clarke & Guerrette , 2007; Mazerolle, Kadleck and Roehl ,1998; Skogan, 
1990), place managers were, for the most part, not significant in the current study. In fact, 
the two significant place manager measures, “non-security employees” and “security staff 
training in greeting and visitor reception,” both increased vandalism victimization in the 





respondents ranked maintaining staff vigilance (82.3%) and the placement of attendants 
in each exhibition room (81.5%) as both very effective and effective measures to prevent 
further victimization. Albeit, as mentioned in chapter three, scholars have posited that 
security guards and police officers are not guardians or place managers (Felson & Clarke, 
1998; Felson & Eckert, 2016). This measurement discrepancy may have diluted the 
results of this study in terms of categorical significance. No other social guardianship 
measures were significant at this level of analysis.  
As mentioned earlier, research focused on physical guardianship has produced 
mixed results regarding the efficacy of this theoretical construct. The routine activities 
theory literature does not overwhelmingly find physical guardianship measures to be 
significant; especially target hardening measures.  
The remaining measures were not significant. Since this study is largely 
exploratory and the first to quantitatively test any construct of RAT within the context of 
the art world, it is not inconceivable for the results to deviate from the trends of prior 
guardianship scholarly work.   
The analysis of the theoretical categorical measures yielded non-definitive 
findings that present paradoxical conclusions.  The social guardianship measures (the 
place manager groupings of non-security, security guards, volunteers, and visitors) were 
either under-reported or under-represented within the sample of institutions when 
compared to the findings in prior research on Routine Activities Theory that conclude 
that place managers are a valid measure in crime reduction (Clarke & Bichler-
Robertson,1998; Eck, 1994; Eck & Wartell,1998; Felson, 1995; Madensen and Eck, 





museum culture in which some persons are allowed to deviate from art institution 
security policy and protocols. For example according to the Suggested Practices for 
Museum Security As Adopted by The Museum, Library, and Cultural Properties council 
SIS International AND The Museum Association Security Committee of the American 
Association of Museums (2008) ,“The Council has identified the tendency of museums to 
make exceptions to the security rules for trustees, volunteers, VIP's, donors, key staff, 
board members, members of affiliated groups, and others as a primary reason for the 
breakdown of security operational procedures and discipline” 
(
http://www.architectssecuritygroup.com/Consulting/WelcomeContractor_files/Suggested
PracticesforMuseumSecurity.pdf, electronically retrieved January 15, 2018). 
Additionally, scholarly contributions echoing the tenets of neoliberalism and 
security governance assert that when society and corporate entities self-police themselves 
effectively, successful risk management can be achieved (Ericson, Barry, & Doyle, 2000; 
Johnston & Shearing, 2003; Kerr, 2013).  Within art institutions the above-mentioned 
findings and assertions are especially potent given the multitude of security challenges 
locations that exhibit art face daily. Place managers are an integral facet of art security 
because self-policing has evolved to the viewpoint that “security is everybody’s 
business” (Johnston & Shearing, 2003, p. 16), even for volunteers and visitors who are 
not permanently ensconced as an institution’s shareholder. Case in point: two of Kerr’s 
(2013) respondents, the Head of Security #3 and Gallery Employee #5, reported that 
volunteers act “as both a layer of security and a guide to enhance the visitor experience” 
(p. 107). Also, Head of Security #2, stated, “the risk of theft is lessened by the huge 





However, in the course of Kerr’s investigation Head of Security #3 also noted that 
“at his mid-sized, independent museum, they do not employ full-time room stewards 
because of the expense. Instead, there are 140 volunteers, and this can make it a struggle 
to convey security messages to them” (p. 107). Head of Security #3’s two paradoxical 
statements could explain both the lack of statistical significance for volunteers within the 
place manager category, as well as the finding statistical significance of the volunteer 
training in visitor reception and greeting, which reduced the odds of vandalism 
victimization in both the bivariate and multi-variate analysis. Approximately seventy-five 
percent of the respondent sample only had a total of 60 volunteers; with a mean number 
of volunteers of 58.97. These numbers indicate a moderate amount of volunteers given 
that the average number of volunteers of the sample population is 48.51. Consequently, 
volunteers could either be of assistance or no assistance to impact of guardianship of an 
institution. However, if enough institutions within the respondent sample trained their 
small volunteer staff competently, that might account for the statistical significance of 
that measure.  
Additionally, similar to volunteers, visitors can be a hinderance rather than a help 
to an institution’s guardianship capabilities. According to Jackson (2016b), “the more 
visitors in a building, the higher the chance of criminal behavior occurring” (p. 99). 
Consequently, art gallery and museum guests may not necessarily be a place manager 
within Cohen and Felson’s (1979) guardianship component of their routine activities 
theory, but rather a motivated offender. As stated in chapter two, Conklin (1994) asserts 
that, “art and antiquities theft results from the convergence of three factors: artworks that 





works, and the presence of people who are motivated to steal” (p. 119). Accordingly, 
visitors, who generally compose the largest category of persons with access to artwork, 
could be present at art institutions with more nefarious reasons than merely engaging 
with art in a prosocial manner. 
Furthermore, Clarke and Szydlo (2017) note that notorious art thief Stephane 
Breiweiser’s modus operandi was for his girlfriend to distract a visitor and/or a security 
guard while Breiweiser stole a work of art that was unattended (p. 94). Within the sample 
population there were approximately 20,000 more annual visitors compared to the 
respondent population, which might add to the disparity of previous reported statements 
regarding the efficacy of visitors as effective place managers. Hence, the finding that 
visitors were not significant at either level of analysis is not surprising given that this 
form of place manager can either prevent or inadvertently facilitate art theft or vandalism 
victimization.  
 
Limitations of The Study 
While this dissertation demonstrates innovative scholarly efforts as the first 
exploration of art theft, art vandalism and museum security (guardianship) in American 
art museums and art galleries, many limitations prevail. This section presents these 
limitations and discusses how these limitations can be addressed in future research. 
First and foremost is the meager number of respondents. Hagan (2006) reports 
that for mail-in surveys nonresponse is a common issue and that a 20% response rate is 
“fortunate” for a “one-time-only survey” distributed without sponsorship (p. 162). 





conducting research utilizing corporate entities as respondents is acquiring access and 
gaining the trust of the institution in order to garner information. Consequently, low 
response rates are normative for research associated with white collar perpetration or 
victimization. A solution to the small sample size is to approach ICOM and/or the AAM 
for funding and a letter of sponsorship for the study and use their members as the survey 
sample. This would ensure a larger original sample and the financial support and 
sponsorship would aid in adding trust and credibility to the research. Another option 
would have been to utilize the original sample population after the OMD database had 
been narrowed down by the categorical descriptors rather than resample from this first 
group of institutions.  
The issue of non-disclosure appears to be an added barrier when delving into 
research surrounding security practices. For example, a Director of Security from a 
prominent American Museum respectfully informed the researchers that it was not their 
policy to answer surveys or any questions regarding their security practices. Other 
scholars have had similar reasoning presented to them by potential respondents. Scott 
(2009) was informed by some of her sample that it inappropriate to participate in her 
study “for reasons of security and confidentiality” (p. 230).  Cordess and Turcan’s (1993) 
request to participate in their survey was rejected by five respondents due to institutional 
policies prohibiting the disclosure of information, a fear of negative publicity, or the fear 
that publicity would inspire copycat acts of vandalism. Also, due to these crimes being 
ones that involve works held in the public trust, disclosing victimization is an especially 
sensitive topic. Scott (2009) was told by one respondent that “it was institutional policy 





Additionally, during an interview with an anonymous representative of a large fine art 
insurance company, it was gently commented that it was unexpected that any art 
institution responded to the survey instrument (personal communication, November 15, 
2017). Lastly and interestingly, the International Committee of Museums (ICOM) holds 
in their 2004 Code of Ethics for Museums, that “Information about the security of the 
museum or of private collections and locations visited during official duties must be held 
in strict confidence by museum personnel” 
(http://icom.museum/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/Codes/ICOM-code-En-web.pdf, 
electronically retrieved January 14, 2018). This international directed standard of practice 
offers insights into the industry wide issue of opaqueness with regard to security 
measures implemented within art institutions.  
Another issue associated with research relying on both survey instruments and 
white-collar respondents “is obtaining a sample that is representative of the population 
about which you want to generalize” (Friederichs, 20007, p. 37). Accordingly, not only is 
the current study’s sample size substandard, but after analyzing seven variables it was 
determined that the respondent sample is not representative of the larger sample pool 
from the Official Museum Directory (OMD). Several variables were compared between 
the two samples to substantiate this finding. It should be noted that not all variables were 
identified by the listings of institutions within the OMD sample. To ascertain whether or 
not the respondent sample was representative of the population sample, the zip codes 
from the OMD population were first transformed into population counts that were 
documented on the U.S. Census Bureau’s website Excel spreadsheet from 2013. The 





possible reason for this discrepancy is that the respondents made an educated guess as to 
their respective city’s population compared to the U.S. Census Bureau’s actual 
population counts.  
Figure 8.1 OMD sample population (cartography by Yi Ling Chan, 2017). 
 
The variable that was most similar in average number between the two samples 
was the number of employees. The respondent sample had an average of 1.35 more 





number between the two samples was the number of volunteers. The OMD sample had 
an average of 48.51 more volunteers than the respondent sample and the OMD sample 
had an average of 4,162.97 more annual donated volunteer hours than the respondent 
sample. The OMD sample had an average of 18,061.52 more annual visitors than the 
respondent sample. The average size of the respondent’s museums/galleries were an 
average of 61,972.72 square feet larger than the OMD’s sample’s size. This discrepancy 
may be due to the fact that the OMD sample labeled their institutional size in terms of 
exhibition space and the survey form which was sent to the respondent sample did not 
limit the requested size of museum/gallery space in terms of exhibition space. Lastly, the 
OMD sample’s average annual operating budget was $1,237,181.32 larger than the 
respondent sample’s average operating budget.  
An additional limitation is that not all of the 111 respondents answered all of the 
questions. This is partially due to the fact that not all of the questions pertained to each 
respondent, such as the presence of security guards.  However, throughout the survey 
instrument there were small typographical errors that could have affected the 
interpretation of the survey questions and/or led a respondent to believe that the survey 
instrument was not worth answering due to a perceived lack of questionnaire 
professionalism. In addition to the above mentioned typographical errors, the ordinal 
variables were not evenly spaced, and this created issues at the multivariate analysis 
level. A simple solution is to create answer choices which contain evenly spaced answer 
choices for ordinal level measures.  
A prevailing concern was the overwhelming length of the questionnaire by 





from participating in this study. The researchers chose to maintain the length given the 
difficulty of obtaining any information from art institutions and the decision was made to 
take this rare opportunity to garner as much information as possible. If this study were to 
be replicated, a shorter survey would be considered, and additional proofers should be 
utilized.  
A further limitation is that the survey instrument was perceived by some 
respondents as more appropriate for an art museum audience rather than for respondents 
from a commercial or non-profit art gallery. According to respondent #41, “This 
questionnaire is really designed for museums that are self-contained, physically and 
financially. University art galleries and museums are tied up carefully with academic 
bureaucracy and enmeshed with university safety and environmental systems and 
financial security.” Respondent #51 concurred by stating, “These questions do not relate 
to a privately-owned art gallery-more for large museums”.  A solution for future 
researchers would be to create two separate survey instruments: one designed specifically 
for museums and another designed for commercial, university, and non-profit galleries. 
The category of institution was also not captured within this questionnaire even though 
the sampling was conducted by categorical descriptors (art museums and galleries, arts 
and crafts museums, china, glass, and silver museums, civic art and cultural centers, 
decorative arts museums, folk art museums, textile museums, and colleges and university 
museums) within the OMD’s database. Furthermore, commercial and non-profit art 
galleries should have been divided since these are two distinct forms of art enterprises.  
Similar to the above-mentioned limitation is the language utilized within the 





contained within the questionnaire because some of the open-ended answer choices were 
answered with similar language to the forced answer choices. In addition, some of the 
words were not interpreted correctly by the respondents. A solution to this issue is to 
create a glossary of terms to be included at the end of the survey instrument. 
Additionally, there was an issue with survey questions that were relegated only to victims 
of one of the two forms of crimes, which limited the number of respondents available for 
analysis for those answer choices such as the reporting of crimes. If these questions had 
been phrased in a hypothetical manner, then a larger number of respondents would have 
been able to respond to those questions.  
Furthermore, the researchers neglected to ask the respondents whether or not they 
maintained a private collection of artworks and/or regularly held permanent exhibitions 
or if the respondents exclusively showed traveling exhibitions, rotating exhibits, and/or 
temporary exhibitions. Respondents #7 reported, “We do not have a permanent 
collection; rotating exhibits only”, and respondent #28 also does not have a permanent 
collection. Respondent #29 added, “We are a non-profit gallery and do not have a 
permanent collection or large inventory. Most of the art on display is not stored in the 
gallery before or after an exhibition” and respondent #32 is also a “non-profit exhibition 
gallery”. This respondent similarly notes, “We do not have a permanent collection or 
storage space to house one” and their “exhibits change monthly featuring local, regional, 
national artists”. Respondent #106 also has “rotating exhibits only”. Respondent #24 
suggested that these researchers include in the survey instrument “How many 





not articulated, the question regarding inspecting works in storage had to be eliminated 
from the analysis due to too many missing cases resulting in the final tally of results.  
Despite the problematic length of the survey form, a host of additional survey 
items that were not included that might have aided in either yielding a viable theoretical 
model or provided useful information for museologists and gallerists are whether or not 
CCTV was monitored, and what portion of an institution’s budget was relegated to 
security. First, prior studies find that the use of CCTV appears to demonstrate more 
effectiveness in reducing crime when it is actively monitored by security personnel or 
police (Gill & Sprigs, 2005; Welsh & Farrington, 2009b; Winge & Knutsson, 2003). 
Secondly, even though this questionnaire contained an item regarding the operating 
budget, it did not inquire as to what portion of the operating budget was delegated to 
security operations. As mentioned in chapter 4, large museums spend more on security 
than small museums (Wilemse & Etman, 1995) and according to the Suggested Practices 
for Museum Security As Adopted by The Museum, Library, and Cultural Properties 
council SIS International AND The Museum Association Security Committee of the 
American Association of Museums (2008), small museums are victimized more 
frequently than large museums (http://www.aam-us.org/docs/professional-
resources/suggested-practices-for-museum-security.pdf). An investigation of this stated 
correlation would have been interesting to pursue. Furthermore, similar to limitations 
mentioned above, two prior art vandalism studies, Cordes and Turcan (1993) and Scott 
(2009) both examined the type of weapon used in the commission of vandalistic acts. 





been useful to possess comparative data to the two previous studies to contribute to the 
sparse body of knowledge on art vandalism.  
Further questions should have been included in the survey instrument about art 
insurance, given that the art insurance industry appears to one of the be the primary 
regulatory body which holds owners of art accountable in terms of due diligence 
measures of inventory checks and audits, acceptable security measures, employment 
screening, prescribed protocols utilized during the transport of works, transparency 
within acquisitions and/or sales, and reporting requirements in the event of victimization. 
A question should have been included as whether or not the respondent’s collection was 
insured and if so what percentage, as well as the value of an institution’s collection and 
the value of the work that was stolen/vandalized. Kerr (2016) during an interview with a 
Loss Adjuster in 2009 it was revealed that “objects with a lower value of £10,000 - 
£50,000 could be most at risk from theft” (p. 336). This researcher was unable to acquire 
any updated similar data from the insurance industry.  
Additionally, there were several questions contained in Benson’s (2013) study on 
art theft in South Africa that should have been included in the current questionnaire, such 
as: how was the disappearance of the objects discovered (by an employee, by a visitor, by 
a security guard, when stock taking, etc.), is the provenance/background/authenticity of 
objects checked before they are purchased/acquired and if so how, what period was the 
stolen object from, date and time of incident, the number and gender of perpetrator(s) (if 
known), was the object stolen during visitor hours or after hours, the reasons the art 
object was stolen (size, recognizable work, etc.), and what factors contributed to the theft 





etc.). This researcher would also not only add a question asking what contributed to the 
vandalism of an object. The respondents were also not asked the subject of the work of 
art, which Scott (2009) included in her vandalism study. Specifically, this measure was 
coded as: no answer, abstract, figurative subject, landscape, portrait, still like, and other.  
Also, a portion of the questionnaire or a separate questionnaire should have been 
devoted to which measures were implemented after an incidence of vandalism and/or 
theft. The researchers had no method to compare and ultimately determine whether or not 
the respondents who disclosed victimization had implemented their security measure pre-
or post-victimization. Therefore, no tests that require a control group (such as t-tests) 
could not be conducted.  
Furthermore, the process of the mailing of the survey instrument and 
supplemental materials did not follow prescribed research methodological guidelines 
specifically recommended for mail questionnaires. According to Dillman, Smyth, and 
Christian (2014), a pre-notice of the study should be mailed prior to the questionnaire, 
alerting potential participants of the study and that a questionnaire is forthcoming. Within 
in a few days to a week after the pre-notice is mailed, the questionnaire should be mailed 
via first class mail and then a thank you reminder either in the form of a letter or postcard 
should be mailed to the sample a week after the questionnaire is mailed. Dillman, Smyth, 
and Christian (2014) also recommend sending a replacement questionnaire two to four 
weeks after the thank you reminder to the potential study participant. This is suggested in 
case any of the sample may have lost their questionnaires or if the document is simply 
forgotten. Last, a final reminder letter should be sent two to four weeks after the 





In addition to the mailing of the survey instrument and the reminder card, the 
OMD and/or the AAM could have been approached to possibly publish an announcement 
of this forthcoming study either through their email contacts, internet blogs, Facebook 
page, or industry print publications to encourage participation and create awareness of 
this study.  
Lastly, due to the small sample, the researchers were unable to create an 
empirically viable predictive model to test guardianship theory. Any empirically 
indicative conclusions found by this study can only be interpreted as a possibility that a 
true test of the guardianship component of RAT could be quantitatively viable if a larger 
sample were obtained by future researchers.  
Despite these limitations and the over-riding conclusion that this work did not 
fully answer the research questions hypothesized, which is normative with exploratory 
studies, this dissertation obtained the goal of an exploratory study which according to 
Babbie (2004) is to “hint at the answers and can suggest which research methods could 
provide definitive answers” (p. 89). Furthermore, these forms of investigation are 
“essential whenever a researcher is breaking new ground, and they almost always yield 
new insights into a topic for research” (Babbie, 2004, p. 89). 
Accordingly, this exploration into art theft, art vandalism, and guardianship 
makes some important contributions to the scholarship of art crime. First, this study is the 
first attempt to collect data within the United States that has not been previously 
obtained. In fact, two respondents expressed their appreciation for this study. Respondent 
#86 wished us good luck and stated that they think “this is well needed”. Respondent #92 





the variety of primary data and descriptive statistical analysis (both univariate and within 
the subgroup comparisons) can be used by the art world, museology and criminology 
scholars as a baseline for future research avenues and policy implementation. Third, this 
research proposes a viable empirical test of Routine Activities Theory; a theory which is 
frequently associated with art crime but has never been tested. 
 
Overall Conclusions and Next Steps 
Overall Conclusions 
In summary, the limited number of significant variables at both the bivariate and 
multivariate levels of analysis can be attributed to several potential factors. First, the lack 
of overall statistical significance is a symptom of an underpowered study, which is either 
a testament to the reluctance of the art world to disclose their incidences of victimization 
given that every week industry-related publications (such as Hyperallergic) and non-
industry related publications (such as the New York Times) regularly report art 
vandalism and/or art theft perpetration, or evidence that the theoretical measures were 
added after victimization rather than utilized initially as preventative measures. Secondly, 
as mentioned in chapter five, Lane, Bromley, Hicks, and Mahoney (2008) argued that 
RAT is not a suitable theory to explain the transnational nature of the art and antiquities 
theft market because RAT is primarily a micro-level theory. Furthermore, Burmon’s 
(2017) study of fine art theft in the U.S. yielded findings within her bivariate analysis of 
guardianship variables that offered “very little conclusive information” (p. 115). Granted 
this study had a minimal sample size of 114 and a paltry percentage of the sample utilized 





Additionally, as mentioned in chapter five, Hollis et. al (2013) posit that two 
measures formerly classified within the guardianship construct have been removed. First, 
these researchers claim that security guards and police officers are not guardians because 
they are not normally present when a crime occurs and secondly target hardening devices 
are measures that decrease the target suitability of an object rather than protect it. Lastly, 
given that art vandalism and art theft are demonstrably different from their standard 
counterparts it may be further substantiation that these specialized types of perpetration 
are not well suited for quantitative tests of the guardianship component of routine 
activities theory despite Balcells’ (2016) assertion that “Routine Activities Theory has 
probably been the most used theoretical framework to devise prevention policies against 
art theft” (p. 41). In fact, Tewksbury and Mustaine (2000) found in their study on 
vandalism victimization of college students that guardianship was the only component of 
RAT which had no impact on victimization. 
However, regardless of the numerous plausible reasons for the failure of this 
study to render any definitive theoretical applicability to the art theft and art vandalism, 
this work does lay the groundwork for the continuation for more precise and refined 
quantitative research. Additionally, despite the lack of analytical success, the insights 
garnered via the univariate and bivariate descriptive (subgroup comparisons) statistical 
level are useful to policy development and practices to decrease art theft and art 
vandalism victimization within U.S. art museums and galleries. Lastly, the review of the 
literature has stimulated several non-traditional approaches to combat victimization 
within our own visual art communities if the art world and all its players are willing to 





Italian Carabienieri strongly vocalized, “I firmly believe that the battle against art crime 
will be either won or lost together” (Pastore, 2009, p. 120).  
 
Next Steps 
In 2013, Felson reaffirmed the utility of his and Cohen’s Routine Activities 
Theory since its inception in 1979, by asserting that, “the everyday macro-level 
organization of the community and society lead to micro convergences of conditions 
more or less favourable to crime” (p. 191). This statement is especially applicable to the 
art world due to the collective norm by industry members and stakeholders to remain 
shrouded in secrecy and opaqueness, despite the fact that art crime remains one of the 
highest grossing international criminal enterprises.  
 
Recommendations for improvements in Art Crime Guardianship 
Suggestions for improving the efficacy of guardianship within the art world are 
presented in several phases.  A host of art crime scholars and art world practitioners from 
several countries have declared that the main barriers to successful engagement in 
combating art crime fall into several distinct areas. These categories are: the lack of 
regulation of the art and antiquities industry (Benson, 2013; Bogdanos, 2016; Charney, 
2014; Kerr, 2013; Nelson, 2009)), either none or very limited art crime specific statutes 
with which to prosecute art criminals (Benson, 2013; Conklin 1994; Dobovsek and Slak, 
2011; Kerr, 2013; Miller, 2009; Pastore, 2009), unqualified and/or disinterested law 
enforcement officials who are tasked to investigate art crimes (Benson, 2013; Chappell & 





Kerr, 2013; Kleberg, 2009), and a pressing need to educate the general public about 
art/cultural property and art crime (Clarke & Szydlo, 2017; Gamboni, 2007; Gillespie, 
2016; Kerr, 2013; Jackson, 2016a; Scott, 2009). As noted by Oliveri (2014), “the 
guardianship of cultural property should not be considered the sole responsibility of the 
cultural institution. It requires both interagency and interdisciplinary support and 
cooperation (p. 95)”.  
 
Instituting institutional regulation 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, it took archeologists’ advocacy, well-publicized 
scandals, and government-initiated advisory panels composed of government and art 
world professionals that issued policy recommendations to implement basic regulatory 
measures, to pressure both the US and the UK to comply with international agreements 
regarding the acquisitions of looted antiquities (Efrat, 2016).  In November of 2017, the 
US pulled out of the UN, which does not bode well for art crime reduction in one of the 
largest art markets in the world. Theoretically, the US is longer subject to any 
international sanctions if they do not comply with any portions of the 1970 UNESCO 
Conference or the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention regarding illegally acquired art and 
antiquities acquisitions and sales. This action by the US government could create an 
increased lack of transparency due to removal of any international modes of 
accountability. It is recommended that scholars and art world professionals appeal to the 
US government in a similar manner that forced the US to become a signatory of the 1970 





Today, the art industry is still functioning within its own elusive bubble.  Art 
work continues to be sold with a gentleman’s handshake, the ultra-rich and organized 
criminal enterprises can easily place finances they wish to bury in artwork worth 
millions, a documented bill of sale is not a necessity, and art dealers and auction houses 
are under no obligation to disclose their clients (Benson, 2013; Charney, 2014; Chappell 
& Hufnagel, 2014; Kerr; 2013). Case in point: there is still speculation as to the true 
identity of the buyer who purchased Leonardo da Vinci’s “Salvator Mundi” (circa 1500) 
for $450.3 million at Christie’s November 15, 2017, Post-war and Contemporary Art sale 
in New York City, despite valid claims that a Saudi Prince is the proud owner of the most 
expensive painting ever sold at auction 
(https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/opinion/who-bought-that-450-million-leonardo-
after-all.html?emc=edit_tnt_20171212&nlid=66900047&tntemail0=y, electronically 
retrieved December 13, 2017). Additionally, dealers do not require licensure and 
museums continue to aggressively litigate the return of Nazi looted art and illegally 
acquired antiquities. The super controllers monitoring the art world’s activities must take 
a more proactive role in holding the dealers, museums, and collectors accountable for 
their acquisitions, exhibitions, and sales of cultural heritage items. For example, the 
American Alliance of Museums (AAM) advocates for best practices for its member 
institutions in several areas of collections stewardship such as proper documentation of 
works, ethical practices, periodic inventory of works, ensure staff has appropriate 
education, training, and experience for their positions, be cognizant of where works in the 
collection and borrowed work came from, and provide physical security for collections in 





and-best-practices/collections-stewardship, electronically retrieved January 26, 2018). If 
this organization would hold its members accountable with more rigorous sanctions, 
compliance to AAM’s suggested practices might be observed with more diligence and 
earnest.  
 
Creating art crime specific statutes 
Until laws are devoted specifically to art crime there will continue to be an issue 
with the ability to obtain accurate statistics on the true extent of art crime. This form of 
criminalization will continue to be a “dark figure of crime” and the punitive measures 
that correspond to normal property crime will not increase in severity if new criminal 
statutes are not created.  Additionally, without accurate empirical statistical data, funding 
for increased resources for the research and prevention of art crime will continue to be 
difficult to obtain. The first recommended step to overcome this barrier is to appeal to 
state legislatures to create art crime specific legislation given these two forms of crime 
are different from their standard counterpart. At the current time, these crimes fall within 
the state statutes that encompass forms of theft and criminal mischief, where punitive 
measures can be inconsistent, disproportionate, and confusing. Agreeably, according to 
Farley (2005), creating a uniform definition of art is probably not in the industry’s best 
interest due to the potential to legislate aesthetic judgement and legally define art. 
However, Miller (2009) advocates for state statutes specifically for art vandalism and, as 
mentioned in chapter three, statutes specific to art theft are also needed in order for 
punitive guidelines to be commensurate with the monetary losses of the destruction 





have the potential to deny the public future engagement with these objects this factor 
must also be considered when formulating state art crime statutes. Additionally, 
specifically to vandalism cases, not only is the value of the work a consideration for 
prosecutorial measures, but the costs associated with repairing the work also must be 
considered. Miller (2009) also notes that there are instances when an artwork has 
undergone restoration and the conservationists have not been able to restore the work to 
its original condition. Consequently, the loss of the market value of the work should be 
taken into consideration when sentencing art vandals.  In sum, by creating specific 
criminal laws for art vandalism and art theft, the crimes will be clearly defined legally, 
specific and consistent penalties will exist, and potentially the art vandals and thieves will 
no longer rely on flimsy prosecutorial methods as a motivating factor for perpetration.  
The creation of specific art crime statutes will also require dedicated lobbying 
efforts from museums, galleries, art educators, law enforcement, artists, art insurers, and 
collectors. Once these laws have been passed, law enforcement, prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, and judges will need to be educated as to what these statutes entail. Specialized 
training surrounding art objects and why these crimes are different from their standard 
forms of art vandalism and art theft will be the critical link to effective prosecution of 
these crimes. These legislative and grass roots efforts should in some regard also alter a 
culture of non-reporting of these crimes to a culture in which the victims will feel more 
comfortable reporting crimes and museums/galleries will engage in a relationship of 
mutual respect with our criminal justice system. Additionally, a way to create 
cohesiveness between the museum/gallery community and the above-mentioned entities 





Scott (2009) also recommends “that police officials may be commissioned as advisors or 
asked to sit on security panels” (p. 206). Lastly, inviting law enforcement, judges, 
prosecutors, and other representatives of the criminal justice system to exhibition 
openings and other art functions is an informal method of exposing these groups to art 
and create social bonding among these various organizations.  
 
Disinterested Law Enforcement Officials 
As mentioned earlier, museums and galleries are hesitant to report crimes due to 
law enforcement not caring about art crimes. In fact, respondent #10 discloses, “Value of 
our pieces are $5 - $20. The police or insurance company isn’t interested”. A respondent 
in Scott’s (2009) work on vandalism reported that her institution had CCTV footage of an 
art vandal but that the perpetrator “was never reprimanded because the police failed to 
take the episode seriously” (p. 236).  This respondent advocated “for a campaign to raise 
awareness of art vandalism among police forces” (p. 236).   If law enforcement as 
engaged with art vandalism and art theft incidences as they are with these crimes’ 
standard counterparts, a greater number of victimized museums and galleries might be 
more willing to report victimization. Several scholars and art industry professionals have 
advocated for the training of local law enforcement in the dynamics of the art world, the 
specialized investigative skills required for art crime cases (Benson, 2013; Kerr, 2013; 
Pastore, 2009), and enlightening these police departments to the fact that many art crime 
cases are linked to crimes which law enforcement are traditionally more likely to invest 
more resources into, such as money laundering (Balcells, 2016; Nelson, 2009)), terrorist 





Pastore, 2009; Rutelli, 2016), organized criminal enterprises (Bailey, 1997; Dobovsek, 
2009; Jackson, 2016; Kleberg, 2009; McCalister, 2005; Tijuis, 2009), and drug 
trafficking (Bailey, 1997; Durney & Proulx, 2011; McCalister, 2005; Nairne, 2011; 
Tijhuis, 2009). In addition to the above-mentioned solutions, another option is to train 
one law enforcement detective per local police force in the specialized investigative skills 
needed for art crime cases in the event that an incident of victimization occurs. Also, 
since the civilian art beat squad in conjunction with Metropolitan Police has been 
successful in London, it might be worthwhile to initiate a similar unit as a pilot project in 
New York or Los Angeles. Museum and gallery personnel might be more comfortable 
discussing victimization to an industry insider and the civilian art team will possess the 
necessary contextual knowledge to avoid minimizing the seriousness of these forms of 
perpetration.   
Online databases exist for stolen works of art, but not for the known thieves. 
Admittedly, the perpetrator is infrequently known unless it is an employee. However, the 
efficacy of a private registry of art thieves and vandals could be created and tested for use 
by the art industry to screen for potential predatory visitors to their institutions. 
Additionally, Burmon (2017) found in her study on characteristics of fine art theft and 
recovery of stolen artworks in the U.S. that “public awareness of the theft either directly 
or indirectly led to the return of the art” (p. 3). Therefore, as a public engagement 
awareness measure and a mechanism to increase transparency, an art theft alert app could 
be created. The philosophy behind it is analogous to the amber alerts for missing 
children. Logistically, when an artwork is stolen the app will activate its alert with the 





and any information available about the perpetrators. This concept could only work if 
museums, galleries, and private collectors were willing to report more instances of 
victimization. Given the immediate popularity of Googles’s Arts & Cultureal app’s 
portrait feature in which a user is able to take of photograph of themselves and the app 
will look for a portrait matching a person’s features in a museum 
(https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/01/15/578151195/google-app-goes-viral-
making-an-art-out-of-matching-faces-to-paintings, electronically retrieved January 15, 
2018), it appears that users are engaged in the interactive nature of this app. Therefore, it 
is plausible that if stolen art became popular there would be more awareness of the 
missing objects, which in turn might increase recovery rates, as well as engage the 
general public in the preservation of cultural property. Thus, art institutions might have 
more confidence in reporting crimes.  
 
Educating the public 
Law enforcement agencies are not the only entity in which education surrounding 
art and art crime is vital to promoting the significance of protecting our cultural heritage. 
The general public is lacking an appreciation and general knowledge about its cultural 
property (Bodganos, 2016; Clarke & Szydlo, 2017; Gambino, 2007; Kerr, 2013).  
Guardianship studies have found that one of the strongest measures in reducing 
crime is the public’s involvement by creating cohesion within their communities in which 
neighbors look out for each other’s property (Fisher, Sloan, Cullen & Lu, 1998), the 
existence of Neighborhood Crime Watch organizations (Bennett, Holloway & Farrington, 





active guardians (Reynald, 2009, 2010). Edmund Capon, former director of the Art 
Gallery of New South Wales, echoed a similar sentiment within the art world context by 
stating “the public’s goodwill is our greatest insurance and it’s one of our greatest assets” 
The public has a role in safeguarding cultural property, through supporting the cultural 
institutions in their community (Chapell and Hufnagel 2016, p. 96)”. He further declared, 
“The public’s ‘goodwill’ is just as vital to life of a cultural institution as a good security 
system (Chapell and Hufnagel, 2016, p. 97)”. Consequently, engaging both the art and 
residential communities in the fight against art crime via educational measures is strongly 
recommended. 
If art communities adopted an arts association arts crime watch group, criminal 
activity, security practices, and unified strategies for crime prevention could be shared 
within their own community, with local law enforcement, and among the public, 
incidences of art vandalism and art theft might be reduced. As a result, art criminals 
would realize that there is a concerted effort to curb victimization and the lackadaisical 
approach once taken by all art world stakeholders no longer exists. Thus, art criminals 
may be deterred from perpetration due to a culture of motivation to curb art crime rather 
than one imbued with apathy.  
Several public educational measures have been put forth by both scholars and art 
world professionals. First, several art crime scholars posit that art institutions do not 
necessarily need to only house their artwork in structures with the latest high-tech 
security equipment and an army of guards in order to decrease victimization (Brisman; 
2011, Dornberg 1987; Gamboni; 2007, Scott 2009). Museums and galleries have a host 





Public Service Announcements (PSAs) regarding art vandalism and art theft is a format 
in which to educate the public about these crimes and about art in general. Anthony 
Amore, current Director of Security and Chief Investigator at the Isabella Stewart 
Gardner Museum, utilized the internet and social media to engage the public’s interest in 
art and art crime by creating a website dedicated to recovering stolen artworks. The 
website, “Stolen Cavalier,” profiles several art thefts for the public to view. For example, 
one case currently highlighted is the theft of Frans van Mieris’ A Cavalier (Self Portrait) 
(17
th
 century) which was stolen from the Art Gallery of New South Wales in Sydney 
Australia on June 10, 2007. The local authorities gave up searching for the cherished 
work, but Amore “knows from experience that the only time you should give up the 
search is when the missing artworks have been found 
(https://stolencavalier.wordpress.com/, electronically retrieved November 12, 2017).” 
Kerr (2013) also suggested a public campaign, “Buyer Beware”, which would educate the 
public about the importance of diligently researching any prospective artworks for sale 
due to the potential of buying a stolen work and the losses incurred by the buyer. 
Art can be perceived as exclusively for the privileged, upper class and thus these 
crimes do not warrant much sympathy. In fact, according to Clarke and Szydlo (2017), 
not only does law enforcement view art crime as low on the hierarchy of criminal 
offenses, so does the public. Specifically, “Generally, people erroneously believe that art 
crimes and cultural crimes do not actually damage anyone in a direct way (p. 1-2).  
However, if the public were to understand a spectrum of visual expressions; a 
greater respect for the preservation of artworks hopefully would ensue. Art education 





psyche. In a 1987 interview by John Dornberg, Dario Gamboni held that strengthening 
security is one way to prevent art vandalism. However, he advocated that a more 
effective means was to provide “information, education, and enlightenment about art 
starting in the primary schools” (p. 108). Regretfully, due to proposed cuts to the 
National Endowment of the Arts and many American school systems suffering budget 
cuts, the arts programs are the first to be eliminated. If funding could be replaced for art 
education under the guise of crime prevention, then perhaps our youth would grow up 
with a visual vocabulary and respect for the visual arts. Additionally, according to 
Hyperallergic blog on March 28, 2017, “there has recently been a widespread push to 
make art museums more engaging to adolescents. Several museums have programs with 
this purpose, such as the Failure Lab at the Museum of Contemporary Art Denver, Open 
Art Space at the Museum of Modern Art in New York, the Youth Insights program at the 
Whitney Museum, and the Teen Creative Agency at the Museum of Contemporary Art 
Chicago. A particularly unique initiative is the Art Detectives program, which is a 
partnership between the Perez Art Museum Miami, the Miami Dade Police Department, 
Breakthrough Miami, and Links Inc. Greater Miami Chapter. This program pairs middle 
school students from underserved communities with police through the engagement of 
creating art together. The goal of this program is to create a safe space in which the teens 
from communities in which the police respond frequently to criminal activity and the 
police officers can interact in a different context. One that “humanizes each group for the 
other, transforming teens from troublesome bodies into true, curious individuals and the 
police from threatening and potentially lethal figures to grownups with hearts. Both 











source=HyperallergicNewsletter&utm_term=Read%20More, electronically retrieved 
April 2, 2017). There are additional potential benefits to this program. First, both groups 
can gain an understanding and respect for the visual arts. Secondly, if any of the teens 
who participated in the program chose a career in the art industry they will be receptive to 
working with the local police with regards to reporting incidences of art vandalism and 
art theft and the police officers will be more sensitive to the destruction or theft of visual 
art and the art industry in general.  
Art education does not have to cease once one ages out of the K-12 or the higher 
education school system. Community art engagement activities, free art education 
seminars in art museums and at public education facilities, and seminars with topics on 
art vandalism and art theft may also enhance the public’s positive attitude and knowledge 
of art. Plus, if these recipients of the above mentioned free activities begin visiting art 
institutions either for the first time and/or more frequently, then the potential for 
additional place managers at the quaternary level increases. Furthermore, Clarke and 
Szydlo (2017) posit that engaged visitors can speak on behalf of the community to their 
shared public art institutions regarding the need for further protections of the works on 





for security policy changes to safeguard their objects of cultural heritage. Thus, people 
can become a catalyst of change in addition to their role as guardians within the walls of 
the museums and galleries.  
Lastly, other measures to be considered that were not widely proposed by a 
multitude of scholars and practitioners include re-conceptualizing security measures from 
the perspective of the art criminals’ various motives. As mentioned in chapter one, Scott 
(2009) appealed to museums and galleries to consider the motive of the perpetrator when 
designing their security policies and practices. Secondly, a closer examination of the 
super-controllers and stakeholders that influence guardianship policies and procedures 
within the art industry may yield insights as to how these entities may be creating not 
only ineffective place managers, but unobtrusively facilitating an industry in which art 
theft and art vandalism can flourish despite guardianship measures implemented by art 
institutions.  Pryor (2016) rightfully questions in her book, Crime and the Art Market, “Is 
the market a criminal’s playground, open to illicit activity and providing an environment 
where good and bad apples are one and the same?” (p. 12). Lastly, in accordance with 
Wylly’s (2014) qualitative study on the value of art and art theft, how is the astronomical 
financial value of art affecting art crime within a quantitative rather than qualitative 
empirical format?  
 
In Closing 
In conclusion, while this study did not produce the hypothesized results, this 
research did yield insights that could not have been garnered if the exploration of art 





been attempted. Given that this work was primarily exploratory and interdisciplinary in 
nature, this research should be continued empirically, both with a qualitative and 
quantitative research design.  
Furthermore, Routine Activities Theory may or may not be the appropriate theory 
to explain art crime quantitatively, however. Few of the measures derived from RAT 
yielded any significance. However, the fact that both previous RAT quantitative research 
and art world professionals both conclude that victimization is reduced when entire 
communities work together lends credence to further testing of RAT within the context of 
the art world.  
In closing, Anthony Amore reminds us, “When a masterpiece goes missing, 
civilization loses a piece of its connection with the period in which it was created. When 
we abandon the search for such items, we are making a statement about our attitudes 
towards such matters — a statement that does not speak well of us as a people” 
(https://stolencavalier.wordpress.com/, electronically retrieved November 11, 2017). 
Hence, regardless of what this research or any future research yields, unless art world 
members chose to abandon their objection of compliance and cohesion and chose to 
engage in proactive, transparent measures, the devastating trajectory of art crime 
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Appendix A- Federal Art Crime Statutes 
Title 18, United States Code, Section 659 - Theft From Interstate Shipment. 
This statute makes it a federal offense to steal or obtain by fraud anything from a 
conveyance, depot or terminal, any shipment being transported in interstate or foreign 
commerce. The statute also prohibits the "fencing" of such stolen property. It is common 
practice to transport stolen art across state or country boundaries 
(http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/vc_majorthefts/jag/statutes, electronically 
retrieved September 12, 2014).  
 
Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951 - Interference with Commerce by Threats of 
Violence (Hobbs Act). 
This statute makes it a federal offense to obstruct interstate commerce by robbery 
or extortion or to use or threaten to use violence against any person or property in 
interstate commerce (http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/vc_majorthefts/jag/statutes, 
electronically retrieved September 12, 2014). 
 
Title 18, United States Code, Section 2314 and 2315 - Interstate Transportation of Stolen 
Property. 
This statute prohibits the transportation in interstate or foreign commerce of any 
goods with a value of $5,000 or more, when the person transporting these goods knows 






retrieved September 12, 2014). 
 
Title 18, United States Code, Section 668 - Theft of Major Artwork. 
This statute makes it illegal to obtain by theft or fraud any object of cultural 
heritage from a museum and that is more than 100 years-old, or worth more than 
$100,000. The statute also prohibits the "fencing" or possession of such objects, with 
knowledge they are stolen. The penalties include fines and as much as 10 years in prison. 
This law was originally proposed by Senator Edward Kennedy after the Isabella Stewart 
Gardner Museum theft in Boston in 1990 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/USCODE-
2011-title18/USCODE-2011-title18-partI-chap31-sec668, electronically retrieved 
September 1, 2014). 
 
Title 18, United States Code, Section 641 and 2114 - Theft of Government Property. 
This statute makes it illegal to steal or embezzle any government property or to 
commit robbery of government property. Prosecutorial guidelines are established by the 
United States Attorney in each federal judicial district (http://www.fbi.gov/about-





























Position of Respondent 












































































'Other' artworks which are: jewelry and works on paper. 
* The following objects were not vandalized: small photographs (8.5" by 11" or smaller), larger 
photographs (8.5" by 11" or larger), small glass objects, china objects, rare books or 



































‘Other' artworks which are: jewelry, illustrations, and a limited-edition print 
* The following objects were not stolen: small photographs (8.5" by 11" or smaller), large glass 




























































Type of Victimaztion 
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Type of Incidences of Perpetration 



















A few times 
20% 




How Often Was The Vandalism Perpetrator Identified? 
Never 
71% 









*No respondents answered the forced answer choice "most of the time". 
Figure D.3 
 









Other, such as 
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*No respondents answered the forced answer choices "3-5 years" or "more than 5 years". 
Never 
76% 
A few times 
24% 





Less than 1 year 
12% 
On Average, How Quickly Did Your Institution 










*No respondents answered the forced answer choices "in the storage space", "while in transit", 
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*No respondents answered the forced answer choices "while in transit", "while on loan to 
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